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Introduction
It is a settled principle that states incur international responsibility when they breach 
international obligations, and all the more so when these breaches are particularly 
serious, that is, when they amount to international crimes. On the other hand, today 
it is undisputed that international law provides for the criminal responsibility of 
those individuals who commit international crimes. What is much more uncertain 
is the relationship between these two regimes of international responsibility, that 
is, the connections between state and individual responsibility when the same or 
analogous conduct, performed respectively by individuals and by states, gives rise 
to both individual and state crimes.
A recent case decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Genocide 
case,1 provides a good example of the kind of problems that may arise from the 
uncertainty concerning the relationship between state and individual responsibility 
for international crimes. 
In this case, the ICJ was asked to ascertain whether genocide was in fact carried 
out in Bosnia against the Muslim population in the mid-1990s, and whether Serbia 
was internationally responsible for that international crime. Th e same conduct falls 
under the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunal established in 1993 
and charged with the prosecution of individuals who have committed international 
crimes in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Before the ICJ decided the merits of the 
Genocide case, the ICTY had already had the occasion to try individuals charged 
with genocide in connection with the facts subsequently brought before the ICJ.2 
When the same facts are at the origin of both individual and state responsibility, 
and two diﬀ erent courts have to pronounce on these facts, although they are framed 
in two diﬀ erent legal regimes, the question of the relationship between individual 
and state responsibility is almost inevitable. Indeed, the ICJ was confronted with 
1 ICJ, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 11 
July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595 et seq.; ICJ, Application for the Revision of the Judgment of 11 
July 1996 in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
3 February 2003, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 7 et seq.; ICJ, Case Concerning the Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, 26 February 2007, <www.icj-cij.org>.
2 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001, and AC, Judgment, 19 April 2004; 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005.
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several problems of this kind. At the stage of preliminary issues, it was uncertain 
whether the ICJ could make a ﬁ nding of genocide by a state in the absence of a 
prior assessment of individual criminal responsibility. Another issue concerned 
the standard of proof: could the ICJ rely on the relevant ﬁ ndings of fact made 
by the ICTY at trial? Questions regarding the relationship between state and 
individual responsibility for genocide also arose in connection with the core issue 
brought before the Court, that is, the establishment of Serbia’s responsibility for 
genocide. For example, it was unclear whether the material breach entailing state 
responsibility for genocide had to be established in the same way as the actus reus 
entailing individual responsibility under international criminal law. Likewise, the 
parties to the dispute debated the question of whether the requirement of state 
fault necessary to establish state responsibility for genocide in fact corresponds to 
the mens rea necessary to ﬁ nd an accused liable for the same crime under interna-
tional criminal law.
Th is is just one example of the kind of issues raised by the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes. Today, the number of 
similar cases is increasing, together with the rapid development at the international 
level of international criminal law enforcement mechanisms, and the growing reli-
ance on international (political and judicial) bodies to address situations in which 
states are responsible for international crimes. Th us, for example, the 1998 NATO 
bombing campaign against the former Yugoslavia has given rise to claims of both 
state responsibility before the ICJ,3 and of individual criminal liability before the 
3 Serbia and Montenegro instituted proceedings before the ICJ against ten NATO Member States. 
However, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction. See ICJ, Case concerning Legality of Use of Force 
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 15 December 2004, ICJ 
Reports 2004, p. 279 et seq.; ICJ, Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro 
v. Canada), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 15 December 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 429 et 
seq.; ICJ, Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. France), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, 15 December 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 575 et seq.; ICJ, Case concerning 
Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Germany), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
15 December 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 720 et seq.; ICJ, Case concerning Legality of Use of Force 
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 15 December 2004, ICJ 
Reports 2004, p. 865 et seq.; ICJ, Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. 
Netherlands), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 15 December 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 1101 et 
seq.; ICJ, Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, 15 December 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 1160 et seq.; ICJ, Case concern-
ing Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment, 15 December 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 1307 et seq.; ICJ, Case concerning Legality of 
Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 2 June 
1999, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 761 et seq.; ICJ, Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. 
United States of America), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 2 June 1999, 
ICJ Reports 1999, p. 916 et seq.
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ICTY.4 Among other cases, one may recall the situation in Darfur, which has led 
the Security Council (SC) to adopt measures with respect to both Sudan5 and the 
individuals liable for the international crimes committed there, triggering for the 
ﬁ rst time the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) under Article 
13 (b).6 Moreover, there are cases in which the lawfulness of conduct amounting to 
international crimes was assessed under either state responsibility, for instance before 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR),7 or international criminal 
law, for instance before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),8 
but in each case the assessment could have been made under the other regime of 
international responsibility. Th ere are even cases in which this dual responsibility 
has been explicitly acknowledged by international courts and tribunals. Apart from 
the Genocide case,9 one may recall the Furundžija case in which the ICTY made a 
distinction between state and individual responsibility for torture.10
Questions arising from the relationship between state and individual responsibil-
ity for international crimes have also started attracting the attention of international 
law scholars. On the one hand, it was occasionally pointed out that the scope of 
 4 Th e ICTY “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (13 June 2000), which recom-
mended that no investigation be commenced before the ICTY, is available at <www.un.org/icty/
pressreal/ nato061300.htm>.
 5 See SC Resolutions 1547(2004), 1556(2004), 1564(2004), 1574(2004), 1585(2005), 1588(2005), 
1590(2005), 1591(2005), 1593(2005), 1627(2005), 1651(2005), 1663(2006), 1665(2006), 
1672(2006), 1679(2006), 1706(2006), 1709(2006), 1713(2006), and 1714(2006), <www
.un.org/Docs/sc>. Th is case is further discussed in Chapter 7.
 6 SC Resolution 1593(2005) of 31 March 2005, <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
 7 See, for example, the IACHR, Velásquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment, 29 July 1988, Annual Report of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 4, 1988, and more recently, the IACHR, 
Myrna Mack Chang Case, Judgment, 25 November 2003, Annual Report of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 101, 2003. 
 8 In a landmark decision, the ICTR took judicial notice of the Rwandan genocide as a “fact of 
common knowledge”, thus relieving the Prosecutor of the obligation to demonstrate in each 
case the existence of the genocidal campaign (ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., AC, Decision 
on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 16 June 2006). Th is case is 
further discussed in Chapter 3.
 9 Although the main focus of the Genocide Convention is on individual criminal liability, the ICJ 
has pointed out that it “does not exclude any form of State responsibility”. ICJ, Case Concerning 
the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 11 July 1996, supra note 1, para. 32.
10 “Under current international humanitarian law, in addition to individual criminal liability, State 
responsibility may ensue as a result of State oﬃ  cials engaging in torture or failing to prevent torture 
or to punish torturers. If carried out as an extensive practice of State oﬃ  cials, torture amounts to 
a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for 
safeguarding the human being, thus constituting a particularly grave wrongful act generating State 
responsibility.” ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para. 142.
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the overlap between state and individual responsibility for international crimes is 
not entirely clear,11 in particular as regards the distinction between the elements of 
crimes entailing individual criminal liability and the elements of serious wrongful 
acts entailing state responsibility.12 On the other hand, speciﬁ c questions concerning 
the relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes 
have been addressed, such as the possibility for the punishment of state organs 
who have committed international crimes to exhaust state responsibility,13 or the 
existence of elements diﬀ erentiating between state and individual responsibility14 
and the growing autonomy of the latter,15 or ﬁ nally the impact that individual 
criminal liability can have on both the establishment and the basic principles of 
state responsibility.16 
In the end, the question raised in international cases and by international law 
scholars is whether state and individual responsibility for international crimes 
are simply two diﬀ erent sides of the same regime of international responsibility, 
whether they are two completely diﬀ erent and separate regimes of international 
responsibility, or ﬁ nally whether certain links can indeed be established between 
these two regimes under international law.17
11 M. Spinedi, ‘International Crimes of State. Th e Legislative History’, in J.H.H. Weiler et al. (eds.), 
International Crimes of State. A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility 
(Berlin, De Gruyter, 1989), p. 138, points out that the ILC seems to consider these notions to be 
linked but does not clarify the elements of such a relationship.
12 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Th e Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Th eoretical Frame-
work’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational Publish-
ers, 1999), pp. 29–30, doubts that state responsibility for international crimes can be established 
without ﬁ rst determining the individual criminal liability of decision-makers and principal 
oﬀ enders for the same facts. Similarly, Rosenne raises the question of the possibility of establish-
ing state responsibility by relying on the previous establishment of State organs’ criminal liability: 
S. Rosenne, ‘State Responsibility and International Crimes: Further Reﬂ ections on Article 19 of 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 30 NYU J. Int’l L. Pol. (1997–1998), pp. 161–162.
13 M.D. Evans, ‘International Wrongs and National Jurisdiction’, in M.D. Evans (ed.), Remedies 
in International Law: Th e Institutional Dilemma (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), pp. 173–190; 
S. Rosenne, supra note 12, pp. 163–164.
14 A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 271.
15 P.-M. Dupuy, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and International Respon-
sibility of the State’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
A Commentary, vol. II (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1091–1099; P. Gaeta, ‘On What 
Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?’, 18 EJIL (2007), pp. 631–648.
16 A. Bos, ‘Crimes of State: In Need of Legal Rules?’, in G. Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty, and 
International Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 221–237; A. Nollkaemper, 
‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in International Law’, 
52 ICLQ (2003), pp. 615–640; A. Cassese, ‘On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining 
State Responsibility for Genocide’, 5 JICJ (2007), pp. 875–887.
17 For a survey of the problems connected to the relationship between state and individual responsi-
bility, see B.I. Bonafè, ‘Responsabilità dello Stato per fatti illeciti particolarmente gravi e responsa-
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Th e following analysis will address this crucial issue. Th e story of the relation-
ship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes is of 
great interest. Although the existence of a system of dual responsibility is widely 
acknowledged, there are hardly any theoretical inquiries shedding light on their 
mutual relationship. An investigation of the relationship between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes requires a patient and systematic analysis of 
international practice in order to isolate and evaluate the points of contact between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes. Th e purpose of this work 
is to put together the results of the analysis and provide as coherent a theoretical 
framework as possible in which to locate and solve the numerous problems raised 
by this relationship. 
Diﬃ  cult as this task may be, three main reasons justify such an inquiry. First, 
this relationship raises a number of speciﬁ c legal questions of practical interest 
for the daily application of and compliance with international norms. Th ese con-
cern, for instance, the possibility to prosecute state organs notwithstanding the 
immunity to which they might be entitled, or the possibility to recognize diﬀ er-
ent degrees of culpability for state organs according to the position they hold in 
the state apparatus. More generally, it is uncertain whether the same or diﬀ erent 
elements of international crimes are to be proved to establish state and individual 
responsibility arising out the same facts. From a diﬀ erent perspective, one may also 
wonder whether state responsibility has a role in the establishment of individual 
liability for international crimes, and, conversely, whether individual criminal 
bilità penale dell’individuo: due approcci a confronto’, in M. Spinedi et al. (eds.), La codiﬁ cazione 
della responsabilità degli Stati alla prova dei fatti (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 2006), pp. 501–517. See also 
C. Dominicé, ‘La question de la double responsabilité de l’Etat et de son agent’, in E. Yakpo and 
T. Boumedra (eds.), Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 1999), pp. 143–157; M. Kamto, ‘Responsabilité de l’Etat et responsabilité de l’individu 
pour crime de génocide. Quels mécanismes de mise en œuvre?’, in K. Boustany and D. Dormoy 
(eds.), Génocide(s) (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1999), pp. 487–511; H. Gros Espiell, ‘International Res-
ponsibility of the State and Individual Criminal Responsibility in the International Protection of 
Human Rights’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar 
Schachter (Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), pp. 151–160; L. Condorelli, ‘Responsabilité Eta-
tique et Responsabilité Individuelle pour Violations Graves du Droit International Humanitaire’, 
in L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man. Essays on International Law in Honour of 
Antonio Cassese (Th e Hague, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2003), pp. 211–219; P.-M. Dupuy, ‘States Sponsor of 
Terrorism: Issues of International Responsibility’, in A. Bianchi (ed.), Enforcing International Law 
Norms Against Terrorism (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 3–16; V.D. Degan, ‘Responsibility 
of States and Individuals for International Crimes’, in S. Yee and W. Tieya (eds.), International 
Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essay in Memory of Li Haopei (London, New York, Routledge, 
2001), pp. 202–223; A.A. Cançado Trinidade, ‘Complementarity between State Responsibility and 
Individual Responsibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: Th e Crime of State Revisited’, in 
M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, 
Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), pp. 253–270.
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liability has a role in the establishment of state responsibility for international 
crimes. International jurisdictions are increasingly confronted by such problems. 
At present, international case law has provided for ad hoc solutions to some of 
these issues. Yet the increasing complexity that characterizes new cases tends to 
show the inappropriateness of such a case-by-case approach. A general theoretical 
framework is therefore indispensable for addressing the various problems raised 
by the relationship between state and individual responsibility for international 
crimes in a systematic and consistent manner. 
 Second, the relationship between state and individual responsibility for interna-
tional crimes strikingly has not yet been the object of systematic theoretical inquiry. 
While much attention has been drawn to state responsibility and to international 
criminal law, the relatively new phenomenon of the relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes has rarely been addressed. 
Th us, the aim of the present analysis is to systematize the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility and to provide a clear theoretical framework 
capable of shedding light on the overall picture of these two regimes of international 
responsibility for international crimes, as well as the nexus between them. Th is 
work represents only a tentative eﬀ ort aimed at ﬁ lling this gap. It has been written 
in the hope that further reﬂ ection, diﬀ erent ideas and an increased awareness will 
emerge to enrich the debate on this subject.
Last but not least, identifying the precise relationship between state and indi-
vidual responsibility for international crimes is highly stimulating from a theoreti-
cal point of view. It requires an analysis of some basic principles of international 
law and of diﬀ erent conceptions of the international legal order. Understanding 
the relationship in question thus provides a privileged viewpoint from which to 
examine conﬂ icting conceptions of the international legal order and to evaluate 
the radical changes international law has undergone in the last 60 years. A rigor-
ous legal analysis of this relationship can be useful for understanding the broader 
phenomenon of universal recognition of the most important obligations owed to 
the international community as a whole and its possible legal consequences.
General Plan
From a methodological point of view, the present inquiry into the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes will be carried 
out on the basis of a three-step analysis. 
Part I will deal with the way in which this relationship can be ideally conceived 
of from a pure theoretical viewpoint. First, some preliminary notions are set forth in 
order to illustrate the legal framework in which the inquiry will be developed. Th ese 
notions include the basic features of the two regimes of international responsibility, 
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their overlap as far as international crimes are concerned, and the way in which their 
relationship has been treated by the International Law Commission (ILC) in the 
codiﬁ cation of both state responsibility and international criminal law. Second, the 
works of international law scholars will be taken into account. Neither a systematic 
analysis of the relationship between state and individual responsibility entailed by 
the commission of international crimes nor a general theory of this relationship is 
to be found in the international law literature. However, international law scholars 
have expressed a number of views on speciﬁ c issues raised by this relationship. Th ese 
can be used as a starting point from which to identify the conceptual schemes 
that can be relied upon to explain the relationship between state and individual 
responsibility. According to an ‘individual-oriented’ scheme, international criminal 
law is separate and independent from aggravated state responsibility. Exceptionally, 
international law imposes legal obligations directly upon individuals (providing for 
the criminal liability of those who do not comply with such obligations), but this 
has nothing to do with the traditional regime of state responsibility. According to 
a ‘state-oriented’ scheme rooted in the traditional conception of the international 
legal order, states are the only subjects of international law and international 
responsibility can only concern state conduct. Th erefore, individual liability for 
international crimes can only be conceived of as a particular form of reaction 
against the responsible state. Th ese two ideal approaches are diﬃ  cult to reconcile, 
and they lead to diverging solutions when applied to practical problems that arise 
from the relationship between state and individual responsibility.
Part II will then turn to a systematic analysis of international practice, and some 
particularly problematic aspects of the relationship between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes. Inevitably, this part presents a selection of 
the most signiﬁ cant problems entailed by the relationship between these regimes. 
In particular, these regard the overlapping elements of state and individual respon-
sibility for international crimes, and the parallel establishment of state and indi-
vidual responsibility for the same crime. Th ese problems are addressed separately, 
but following the same methodology, that is, ﬁ rst using the conceptual schemes 
identiﬁ ed in Part I as terms of comparison in order to illustrate the solutions which 
could abstractly be given to these practical problems, and then examining in detail 
the relevant cases in international practice in order to see how these issues have 
actually been addressed and solved. 
Finally, Part III will address the basic question set out at the beginning of this 
introduction, that is, the existence of a relationship between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes. First, the results emerging from the analy-
sis of international practice will be discussed and examined from a more general 
viewpoint, that of the identiﬁ cation of a general legal framework explaining this 
relationship. Second, the general conceptual schemes developed in Part I will be 
taken into account and evaluated in light of the results of the analysis of international 
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practice. Since the various connections between state and individual responsibil-
ity for international crimes revealed by the study of international practice show a 
certain complementarity between these regimes, an attempt will be made to explain 
their relationship according to a comprehensive framework capable of securing a 
more eﬀ ective co-ordination between them.
Part I
General Approaches to the Relationship Between 
State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes 

Chapter 1
Th e General Framework of the Relationship 
Between State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes
1. Clarifying Some Basic Concepts
Th e present work has the limited purpose of examining the relationship between 
aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability for international 
crimes. Th e use of the expression ‘international crimes’, referring to both state and 
individual responsibility, may need some preliminary clariﬁ cation.
First, international crimes is a very short and clear expression that will be employed 
here – for the sake of simplicity – to refer to those very serious breaches of customary 
international law rules entailing both state responsibility and individual criminal 
liability. In no way is this intended to suggest that, when referring to breaches 
entailing state responsibility, international law provides for a criminal regime of 
state responsibility.1 
Second, only international crimes prohibited under customary international 
law will be taken into account. Focusing on the so-called ‘core crimes’ has the 
advantage of limiting the analysis to a relatively small number of well-established 
1 The ILC has used this expression for years in connection with state responsibility, and in 
particular in the attempt to codify special consequences to attach to very serious breaches of 
international obligations. From the very beginning, the ILC has made it plain that referring to 
international crimes did not imply the establishment of a criminal regime of state responsibility 
under international law (see the ILC commentary on Article 19, ILC, ‘Report of the ILC on the 
Work of its 28th Session’, YILC (1976), vol. II(2), pp. 104, and 119). Nonetheless, the use of 
this expression raised some concern, because it could suggest the development of such a regime 
(see the general commentary on Articles 40 and 41, ILC, ‘Report of the ILC on the Work of its 
53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 111, paras. 5–6). Th us, the ILC decided to abandon this 
terminology in favour of a more neutral one (see J. Crawford, ‘First Report on State Responsibil-
ity’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.1, para. 60, and UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.2, paras. 68–71; 
J. Crawford, ‘Th ird Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507, para. 9, and A/
CN.4/507/Add.4, para. 407; J. Crawford, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/517, paras. 48–9). Th is aspect is examined in detail infra in Chapter 8.
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international rules which respond to the needs of the international community 
as a whole, and which establish binding obligations on all the members of the 
international community.2
Th ird, the present analysis concentrates on the particular consequences that the 
international legal order attaches to the commission of international crimes either 
by states or by individuals. Accordingly, it will essentially focus on the relationship 
between aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability under 
international law.3 As will be discussed below, these regimes originate from the 
breach of primary norms aimed at safeguarding the same collective interests of 
the international community and can be compared quite easily. Th e main charac-
teristics of these regimes are brieﬂ y described here, in order to set out the general 
framework in which the following analysis will be developed. 
A. Individual Criminal Responsibility
With respect to individual criminal liability, it is beyond question that today serious 
breaches of certain obligations owed to the international community as a whole 
entail individual criminal liability.4 In other words, customary international law 
2 Th e categories of international crimes entailing state and individual responsibility under customary 
international law are examined infra in this Chapter.
3 Th is means that the present analysis essentially deals with international crimes committed by, on 
the one hand, individuals (acting both in their private capacity and on behalf of a state, that is, 
as state organs), and, on the other hand, by states (that is, independent and stable political enti-
ties exercising eﬀ ective authority over a human community living in a given territory, to use the 
deﬁ nition adopted by A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 
46–48). Th us, the relationship with other regimes of international responsibility (for example, that 
concerning international organizations) will not be taken into account.
4 See, in particular, M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Th e Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A 
Th eoretical Framework’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Trans-
national Publishers, 1999), p. 21; F. Malekian, ‘International Criminal Responsibility’, in M.C. 
Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 1999), p. 157; 
K. Ambos, ‘Article 25’, in Triﬀ terer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1999), pp. 475–492; K. Ambos, ‘Individual Criminal 
Responsibility in International Criminal Law: A Jurisprudential Analysis – From Nuremberg to 
Th e Hague’, in G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural 
Aspects of International Criminal Law, vol. I (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 6; 
P. Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’, in R.S. Lee (ed.), Th e International Criminal 
Court. Th e Making of the Rome Statute. Issues, Negotiations, Results (Th e Hague, Kluwer, 1999), 
pp. 189–216; S. Lamb, ‘Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege in International Criminal Law’, in 
A. Cassese et al (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. I 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 733–766; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 136. Th e principle of individual criminal liability is 
recognized in both international documents of a universal character (see the London Charter of 
8 August 1945 establishing the International Military Tribunal; GA Resolution 95/I of 11 December 
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provides for a regime of criminal responsibility with respect to individuals who 
commit certain international oﬀ ences considered by the international community 
to be serious violations of its most important rules.5 Accordingly, individuals are 
brought to trial before national and international criminal courts and, if their 
responsibility is proved, they will face criminal punishment. Th us, international 
individual responsibility is a traditional regime of criminal liability providing for 
the punishment of individuals who have perpetrated international crimes. 
As for the oﬀ ences entailing individual criminal liability, there is general agree-
ment over the recognition of the existence of at least three categories of customary 
international crimes, namely, the so-called Nuremberg crimes: crimes of aggression, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.6 As will be discussed below, it is possible 
1946 aﬃ  rming “the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal”; SC Resolution 827(1993) establishing the International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia; SC Resolution 935(1994) establishing the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
adopted by the ILC in 1996; Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in 1998 at the 
Rome Conference) and in speciﬁ c conventions (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide of 1948; Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols 
of 1977; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apart-
heid of 1974; Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment of 1984). Moreover, states have expressed indisputable support for the principle 
of individual criminal liability under international law. See, in particular, the states’ comments 
on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/488, and UN Doc. A/CN.4/
515.
5 It has been pointed out that “[dans le] domaine de la responsabilité internationale de l’individu, 
nous nous apercevons que les termes de la nouvelle relation juridique qui s’établit sont l’individu (en 
tant qu’auteur du fait illicite) et l’ensemble des Etats qui constituent la communauté internationale (en 
tant que sujet subissant le préjudice). Cette notion introduit, comme donnée nouvelle dans le cadre du 
droit international, le lien juridique entre l’individu et la communauté internationale” (V. Abellán 
Honrubia, ‘La responsabilité internationale de l’individu’, 280 RCADI (1999), p. 205). See, in 
general, S. Glaser, Introduction à l’étude du droit international pénal (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1954), 
p. 11; A. Cassese, supra note 4, pp. 3–6; D. Th iam, ‘First Report on the Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, YILC (1983), vol. II(1), p. 148; D. Th iam, ‘Second 
Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, YILC (1984), 
vol. II(1), p. 94; D. Th iam, ‘Th irteenth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, YILC (1995), vol. II(1), p. 33; S. Szurek, ‘Historique. La formation du droit 
international pénal’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), 
p. 8.
6 S. Plawski, Etude des principes fondamentaux du droit international pénal (Paris, LGDJ, 1972); L.S. 
Sunga, Th e Emerging System of International Criminal Law (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law Internatio-
nal, 1997); M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 
1999); V. Abellán Honrubia, supra note 5, p. 135; J. Barboza, ‘International Criminal Law’, 278 
RCADI (1999), pp. 9–199; H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000); 
G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Interna-
tional Criminal Law (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000); K. Kittichaisaree, International 
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to ask whether two additional categories of international crimes, namely, genocide 
and torture, can now be listed among those oﬀ ences entailing individual criminal 
liability under customary international law.7
As for the elements of international crimes entailing individual liability under 
international law, the following analysis will essentially consider three of them. Th e 
ﬁ rst is the ‘subjective’ element, which concerns the subjects who can commit the 
international oﬀ ences. Individuals are certainly among the subjects that can com-
mit international crimes. But for purposes of the present work, what is important 
to stress is that international criminal law applies only to individuals and not to 
juridical persons, at least at its present stage of development.8 
Th e second is the ‘material’ (or ‘objective’) element, which consists of the descrip-
tion of the prohibited conduct. If we take torture, for example, as a crime against 
humanity in the ICC Statute, its material element listed by the PrepCom indicates 
that: (1) the perpetrator inﬂ icted severe physical or mental pain or suﬀ ering upon 
one or more persons; (2) such person or persons were in the custody or under the 
control of the perpetrator; (3) such pain or suﬀ ering did not arise only from, and 
was not inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions; and (4) the conduct was 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civil-
Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001); A. Cassese, supra note 4. See Articles 16 
(aggression), 18 (crimes against humanity), and 20 (war crimes) of the Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), 
vol. II(2), pp. 44, 49, 56; Article 5 of the ICC Statute listing crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and the crime of aggression, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>.
7 Th e developments concerning these crimes are illustrated infra in this Chapter.
8 For example, the Rome Statute explicitly gives the ICC jurisdiction only over natural persons. 
Article 25 reads: “1. Th e Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Stat-
ute. 2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually 
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute. . . . 4. No provision in this 
Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall aﬀ ect the responsibility of States under 
international law” (A/CONF.183/9, < untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>). For general comments 
on this provision, see K. Ambos, ‘Article 25’, supra note 4, p. 475; A. Eser, ‘Individual Criminal 
Responsibility’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A 
Commentary, vol. I (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 767–822. See also Article 1 of 
the ICTY Statute (SC Res. 827(1993)), and Article 1 of the ICTR Statute (SC Res. 955 (1994)). 
It can at least be said that in the establishment of the existing international criminal courts and 
tribunals a clear choice has been made not to include legal persons in their jurisdiction (see infra 
Chapter 2, note 85). While the existence of such a limited scope of criminal law may be fairly 
clear in many national legal orders, at the international level it plays an important role: it draws 
a clear borderline between individual and state responsibility. What lies between – the question 
of liability for legal persons or associations – will be conceived not in terms of corporate or group 
liability as such, but rather as individual or state responsibility. Th is gives rise to interesting prob-
lems of co-ordination between the two regimes of international responsibility in question (see infra 
Chapter 6).
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ian population.9 Th is immediately highlights a particular feature of international 
crimes. War crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, etc. are broad categories 
covering speciﬁ c sub-categories of prohibited conduct. Accordingly, the material 
element of international crimes can be considered as formed by, on the one hand, 
speciﬁ c elements of the oﬀ ence (murder, torture, etc.) and, on the other, general 
pre-requisites (nexus with an armed conﬂ ict, systematic attack against the civilian 
population, etc.) allowing the speciﬁ c oﬀ ence to be listed in one of the broader 
categories of international crimes. Th us, the perpetration of murder in the context 
of and linked to an armed conﬂ ict will constitute a war crime, while murder com-
mitted as a part of a systematic attack on the civilian population will constitute a 
crime against humanity. From the comparative viewpoint of the present analysis, 
these general pre-requisites are very important, as they can be regarded as the 
normative devices transforming domestic oﬀ ences, such as murder or rape, into 
international crimes, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Moreover, 
these general pre-requisites deﬁ ne the general context in which international crimes 
are carried out, and they are therefore crucial to establishing a link between state 
responsibility and individual criminal liability.10
Th e third is the ‘psychological’ element (mens rea): the intention to produce 
the consequences of the prohibited act,11 which is a distinctive element of crimes 
in all criminal systems. Accordingly, international criminal law not only requires 
that some subjective and material elements be met, but also requires proof of the 
existence of the psychological participation of the alleged perpetrator in carrying 
out the oﬀ ence in order to sustain a conviction for international crimes. Taking 
the same example as above, with respect to torture as a crime against humanity, 
the PrepCom for the ICC adds to the material element a further point (5): “the 
perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population”. It is 
important to take the existence of such a distinguishing feature into account when 
establishing the relationship between individual and state responsibility, since the 
need for a psychological element has long been a highly controversial issue with 
respect to the latter.12
Th e establishment of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes 
and the punishment of the oﬀ enders are the tasks of competent criminal tribunals. 
Since international crimes are among the most serious breaches of obligations of 
concern to the entire international community, one would expect the competent 
criminal tribunals to have been established directly by the entire international 
 9 UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, p. 12, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/ index.html>.
10 See infra Chapter 3.
11 A. Cassese, supra note 4, p. 57.
12 See infra Chapter 4.
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community and to have jurisdiction over international crimes committed in every 
part of the world. Th e enforcement mechanism of international criminal law has not 
reached such a stage of development. What we have today is a more complicated 
system, a patchwork of international ad hoc tribunals dealing with crimes commit-
ted in speciﬁ c areas of the globe,13 an ICC established by treaty and binding upon 
the states parties only,14 mixed tribunals operating at the domestic level but with 
the participation of international resources,15 and national criminal tribunals.16 
Put simply, there is a mixture of international and domestic criminal courts. Th e 
international legal order thus secures the prosecution of international crimes by 
way of both institutionalization and ‘decentralization’.17 Despite this complexity, 
13 Th e ICTY was established by SC Resolution 827 (1993), and the ICTR was established by SC 
Resolution 955 (1994), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
14 Th e ICC was established by the Rome Treaty, adopted on 17 July 1998 and entering into force 
on 1 July 2002 (UN Doc. A/CONF/183/9, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>). As of June 
2008, 106 states have become parties to the ICC Statute (see <www.icc-cpi.int>).
15 Th ese include the so-called mixed or internationalized tribunals in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East 
Timor, and Cambodia. See in general C.P. Romano et al. (eds.), Internationalized Criminal Courts: 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004); and 
D. Shraga, ‘Th e Second Generation UN-Based Tribunals: A Diversity of Mixed Jurisdictions’, in 
E. Skaar et al. (eds.), Roads to Reconciliation (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2005), pp. 55–79.
16 States have been punishing international criminals through national tribunals since the end of 
World War I. For a study of the relevant practice, see R.S. Clark and M. Sann (eds.), Th e Pros-
ecution of International Crimes (New Brunswick, London, Transaction Publishers, 1996); M.C. 
Bassiouni (ed.), supra note 6; G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), supra note 6; 
H. Fischer et al. (eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law: 
Current Developments (Berlin, Spitz, 2001); A. Cassese and M. Delmas-Marty (eds.), Juridictions 
nationales et crimes internationaux (Paris, PUF, 2002); A. Cassese, supra note 4, pp. 277–326.
17 In particular, the punishment of individual crimes started with the use of the aut dedere aut judi-
care clause in international conventions and then developed into a customary rule allowing the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction over international crimes. See L.C. Green, ‘International Crimes 
and the Legal Process’, 20 ICLQ (1980), pp. 567–584; F. Weiss, ‘Time Limits for the Prosecution 
of Crimes against International Law’, 53 BYIL (1982), pp. 163–196; B. Graefrath, ‘Universal 
Criminal Jurisdiction and an International Criminal Court’, 1 EJIL (1990), pp. 67–88; B. Stern, 
‘La compétence universelle en France: les cas des crimes commis en ex-Yougoslavie et au Rwanda’, 
40 GYIL (1997), pp. 280–299; M. Henzelin, Le principe de l’universalité en droit pénal international. 
Droit et obligation pour les Etats de poursuivre et juger selon le principe de l’universalité (Bâle, Genève, 
Munich, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2000); L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction. International and 
Municipal Legal Perspectives (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). Th e debate has essentially 
concerned the precise deﬁ nition of the ‘universality principle’ applied by domestic criminal courts, 
and in particular whether reliance on this principle is dependent on the existence of some links 
between the oﬀ ence and the domestic legal order. As recently pointed out, the requirement of a 
link with the forum state is simply a matter for domestic law, and must not be confused with the 
option of every state under international law to prosecute those responsible for international crimes 
(R. O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction. Clarifying Basic Concepts’, 2 JICJ (2004), pp. 754–759). See 
also H. Donnedieu de Vabres, Les principes modernes du droit pénal international (Paris, Recueil 
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two general features can be pointed out. On the one hand, it is on behalf of the 
entire international community that the punishment of international crimes is 
secured.18 On the other hand, individual criminal liability is generally established 
by bodies diﬀ erent from those dealing with state responsibility.
B. Aggravated State Responsibility
Turning to state conduct, states too incur international responsibility when they 
commit international crimes. More precisely, customary international law provides 
for a particular regime of aggravated state responsibility when the wrongful state act 
amounts to a serious breach of obligations owed to the international community as a 
whole.19 Th us, individual liability for international crimes overlaps, most of the time, 
Sirey, 1928), pp. 142–143; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (Th e Hague, TMC 
Asser Press, 2005), p. 59; K.C. Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’, 66 Texas 
Law Review (1987–1988), pp. 810–815; M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice’, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. (2001–2002), 
p. 81; C. Tomuschat, ‘Th e Duty to Prosecute International Crimes Committed by Individuals’, 
in H.-J. Cremer et al. (eds.), Tradition und Weltoﬀ enheit des Rechts. Festschriﬀ  für Helmut Stein-
berger (Berlin, Springer, 2002), pp. 315–350; D. Vandermeersch, ‘La compétence universelle’, in 
A. Cassese and M. Delmas-Marty (eds.), Juridictions nationales et crimes internationaux (Paris, 
PUF, 2002), pp. 589–611; P. Gaeta, ‘Il diritto internazionale e la competenza giurisdizionale degli 
Stati per crimini internazionali’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Problemi attuali della giustizia penale 
internazionale (Torino, Giappichelli, 2005), pp. 497–511; S. Zappalà, ‘L’universalità della giuri-
sdizione e la Corte penale internazionale’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Problemi attuali della giustizia 
penale internazionale (Torino, Giappichelli, 2005), pp. 549–559; and the various contributions 
in 1 JICJ (2003), p. 580 et seq.
18 Th is is what emerges from the case law of the domestic criminal courts that have relied on the 
universality principle to prosecute international crimes. See, in particular, Israeli Supreme Court, 
Eichmann case, 29 May 1962, 36 ILR (1968), p. 277; US Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, Dem-
janjuk case, 31 October 1985, 776 F.2d 571; House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle and the Commis-
sioner of Police for the Metropolis and others EX Parte Pinochet (Pinochet I), 25 November 1998, 
19 HRLJ (1998), p. 419; House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis and others EX Parte Pinochet (Pinochet II), 24 March 1999, 20 HRLJ (1999), p. 61; 
Federal Supreme Court, Sokolovic case, 21 February 2001, BGHSt. 46, p. 292; Assize Court of 
Bruxelles, Butare Four case, Verdict of 8 June 2001, <asf.be>; Audiencia Nacional, Scilingo case, 
Decisions of 25 March 1998, 11 May 1998, 4 November 1998, and 27 June 2003, and Judg-
ment of 19 April 2005, <www.derechos.org>; Audiencia Nacional, Cavallo case, Decision of 
12 September 2000, and Mexico Supreme Court, Decision of 11 June 2003, <www.derechos.
org>; House of Lords, Jones case, Judgment of 29 March 2006, <www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060329/ jones.pdf>.
19 See R. Ago, ‘Eighth Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1979), vol. II(1), p. 43; R. Ago, ‘Obliga-
tions Erga Omnes and the International Community’, in J.H.H. Weiler et al. (eds.), International 
Crimes of State. A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (Berlin, De 
Gruyter, 1989), pp. 237–239; M. Spinedi, ‘From One Codiﬁ cation to Another: Bilateralism and 
Multilateralism in the Genesis of the Codiﬁ cation of the Law of Treaties and the Law of State 
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with aggravated state responsibility. Accordingly, in order to study the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes, the following 
analysis will essentially focus on this speciﬁ c regime of state responsibility.
Aggravated state responsibility has emerged under customary international law 
for the purpose of providing for more eﬀ ective means to react against particularly 
serious breaches of international obligations aimed at the protection of collective 
interests of the entire international community. Today, aggravated state responsibil-
ity is supported by international practice and has been codiﬁ ed by the ILC. 
To be more precise, it was in reliance on the developments of international 
practice that Special Rapporteur Ago proposed, in the 1970s, that the ILC should 
codify the distinction between ordinary and aggravated state responsibility.20 
Indeed, in a signiﬁ cant number of cases states not injured by the wrongful act had 
felt empowered to react against the breach of certain fundamental obligations on 
behalf the entire international community. Th e ILC accepted such a distinction 
and included Article 19 (on international crimes of states) in its ﬁ rst draft on state 
responsibility. International crimes were deﬁ ned as wrongful acts resulting “from 
the breach by a state of an international obligation so essential for the protection of 
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized 
as a crime by that community as a whole”.21 As examples of international crimes of 
Responsibility’, 13 EJIL (2002), pp. 1116–8; C. Annacker, ‘Th e Legal Régime of Erga Omnes 
Obligations in International Law’, 46 AJPIL (1994), pp. 131–166; A. Cassese, supra note 3, pp. 
200–1; P. Picone, ‘Obblighi erga omnes e codiﬁ cazione della responsabilità degli Stati’, 88 Riv. 
Dir. Int. (2005), pp. 893–954; S. Villalpando, L’émergence de la communauté internationale dans 
la responsabilité des Etats (Paris, PUF, 2005). See also C.T. Eustathiades, ‘Les sujets du droit inter-
national et la responsabilité internationale. Nouvelles tendances’, 84 RCADI (1953), p. 534.
20 R. Ago, ‘Fifth Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1976), vol. II(1), p. 24 et seq.
21 Th is deﬁ nition recalls the circular deﬁ nition of jus cogens included a few years before in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of states as a whole as a norm from which non derogation is possible” (Article 53). 
Arguably, the Special Rapporteur had in mind a close connection between the notion of jus cogens 
and international crimes of states. Th e basic idea was that some international obligations are so 
important for the entire international community that their breach is particularly repugnant, and 
consequently that a special, diﬀ erent, and particularly serious set of consequences must be attached 
to their breach. Relying on the notion of jus cogens, inevitably the selection of the most important 
international obligations should have led to the establishment of very severe consequences arising 
out the commission of international crimes by states. Th is recalls a quasi-criminal regime of state 
responsibility (for a discussion of previous proposals on state criminal responsibility put forward 
at the beginning of the twentieth century see infra in this Chapter), and Ago was arguably aim-
ing for a quasi-criminal regime of state responsibility for international crimes (see, in particular, 
R. Ago, ‘Le délit international’, 68 RCADI (1939), pp. 415–554; R. Ago, ‘La colpa nell’illecito 
internazionale’, in Scritti giuridici in onore di Santi Romano, vol. III (Padova, Cedam, 1940), pp. 
177–206). 
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states, the ILC cited: aggression, self-determination of peoples, slavery, genocide, 
apartheid, and massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.
Today, there is an ever-increasing practice regarding measures taken to safeguard 
the most important interests of the international community as a whole.22 In 
2001, the ILC at second reading adopted the Articles on State Responsibility. Th e 
expression ‘international crimes’ has disappeared, but there is a speciﬁ c chapter 
dedicated to aggravated state responsibility (Articles 40 and 41) for breaches such as 
aggression, slave trade, genocide, apartheid, torture, basic principles of international 
humanitarian law, and the right of self-determination of peoples.23 
Th e main characteristic of aggravated state responsibility is that it has developed 
around the concept of obligations owed to the international community as a whole. 
For years, the ILC has strived to ﬁ nd an agreement on both the deﬁ nition of the 
most important obligations whose breach would amount to an international crime, 
and the deﬁ nition of the most serious consequences that would attach to the com-
mission of international crimes by states. In the end, the ILC realized that it had to 
adopt a diﬀ erent approach more in line with international practice. Leaving aside 
those controversial ‘substantive’ aspects, it focused instead on ‘procedural’ aspects, 
that is, explaining which subjects are entitled to react against serious breaches of 
obligations owed to the entire international community. Th us, it concentrated 
on a particular category of international norms, i.e., obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole. Accordingly, aggravated state responsibility 
originates from the breach of obligations characterized by a particular structure. 
Contrary to most international norms which establish bilateral relations between 
states, the legal relation24 underlying such obligations is between a state and the 
entire international community. Th erefore, when such obligations are violated, 
the injured party is the international community, which is also the party entitled 
to react against such breaches. 
Surprisingly,25 the ﬁ nal text refers to peremptory norms, and this can be mislead-
ing. However, it must be pointed out that the ILC tends to blur the distinction 
22 See infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
23 ILC commentary on Article 40, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. 
II(2), pp. 112–113, paras. 4–5.
24 P. Allott, Eunomia. New Order for a New World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990) p. 156, 
para. 10.32.
25 Th e ILC had always referred to obligations owed to the international community as a whole until 
the provisional draft adopted in 2000 (see Article 41 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on second reading, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L 600). 
All of a sudden a year later, the ﬁ nal version of Article 40 emerged, referring to “serious breaches 
of peremptory norms of general international law” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, 
YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 112). According to E. Wyler, ‘From ‘State Crime’ to Responsibility 
for ‘Serious Breaches of Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General International Law’, 13 
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between peremptory norms and obligations owed to the entire international 
community, and conceives of these two categories of international obligations as 
substantially overlapping.26 As a matter of fact, over the decades the ILC has always 
referred to the same examples of breaches entailing aggravated state responsibility. 
On the other hand, too much weight must not be given to the formal expression 
ﬁ nally inserted in Article 40. One should rather take into account the kind of regime 
codiﬁ ed in Article 41 and the consequences of serious breaches listed therein.
Article 41 lists four types of consequences to be attached to serious breaches 
within the meaning of Article 40: 1) a duty of co-operation to bring to an end the 
serious breach; 2) a duty not to recognize as lawful a serious breach, and not to 
render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by a serious breach; 
3) ‘ordinary’ consequences entailed by every wrongful state act; 4) further conse-
quences that may be provided for under customary international law.27 
EJIL (2002), p. 1159, the substitution of ‘crimes’ with ‘serious breaches’ “has been nothing more 
than a ‘cosmetic’ change in the law of responsibility”.
26 In the general commentary on Articles 40 and 41 the ILC explains that: “Whether or not per-
emptory norms of general international law and obligations to the international community as a 
whole are aspects of a single basic idea, there is at the very least substantial overlap between them. 
Th e examples which the International Court has given of obligations towards the international 
community as a whole all concern obligations which, it is generally accepted, arise under peremp-
tory norms of general international law. Likewise the examples of peremptory norms given by 
the Commission in its commentary to what became article 53 of the Vienna Convention involve 
obligations to the international community as a whole. But there is at least a diﬀ erence in empha-
sis. While peremptory norms of general international law focus on the scope and priority to be 
given to a certain number of fundamental obligations, the focus of obligations to the international 
community as a whole is essentially on the legal interest of all States in compliance – i.e., in terms 
of the present Articles, in being entitled to invoke the responsibility of any State in breach” (ILC, 
‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), pp. 111–112, para. 7).
27 One can doubt whether Articles 48 and 54 should be included among the consequences of 
aggravated state responsibility. Th ese provisions refer to obligations owed to the international 
community as a whole, but arguably do not codify a reaction by or on behalf of the international 
community as a whole. Requests of reparation can be made or ‘lawful measures’ can be adopted 
only on behalf of the beneﬁ ciaries of the obligations breached. Th is means that the underlying 
idea is to ‘bilateralize’ the legal relation turning the obligation owed to the entire international 
community into an obligation entailing a bilateral relation between the author state and the state 
that decides to act on behalf of the victim (see B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Inter-
est in International Law’, 250 RCADI (1994), pp. 314–8; P.-M. Dupuy, ‘A General Stocktaking 
of the Connections between the Multilateral Dimension of Obligations and Codiﬁ cation of the 
Law of Responsibility’, 13 EJIL (2002), p. 1069; I. Scobbie, ‘Th e Invocation of Responsibility 
for the Breach of ‘Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General International Law’’, 13 EJIL 
(2002), p. 1205). It seems more appropriate to say that it is Article 41 which allows states to act 
on behalf of the international community as a whole. In any case, and independently of the provi-
sion referred to, international law scholars agree that the main feature of the regime of aggravated 
state responsibility is to permit a collective reaction against the breaches of obligations owed to 
the international community as a whole (see infra notes 31–34). 
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Th ese consequences are important to point out that, ﬁ rst, aggravated state 
responsibility has been elaborated not as a set of completely new secondary rules 
but rather as additional consequences to ‘ordinary’ secondary rules (this is the 
so-called ‘délit plus’ approach).28 Th is means that ordinary secondary rules apply 
to every wrongful state act, including serious breaches of obligations owed to 
the international community as a whole. Second, what diﬀ erentiates aggravated 
state responsibility from ordinary state responsibility is not the material content 
of the consequences but the subjects entitled to react against serious breaches. 
Th e basic idea is that the reaction against serious breaches must come from the 
entire international community. According to the ILC, the sense of the additional 
consequences listed in Article 41, and in particular of the duty of co-operation, 
is to state clearly that “what is called for in the face of serious breaches is a joint 
and coordinated eﬀ ort by all states to counteract the eﬀ ects of these breaches”.29 It 
does not matter whether this co-operation takes institutionalized or decentralized 
forms.30 What counts is that the international community adopts an appropriate 
response to those serious breaches. 
International practice shows that a regime of aggravated state responsibility is 
developing under customary law.31 International law scholars point out that there 
28 J. Crawford, ‘First Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.2, para. 73.
29 ILC commentary to Article 41, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. 
II(2), p. 114, para. 3.
30 Accordingly, the ILC leaves open one of the most controversial issues connected to the codiﬁ ca-
tion of aggravated state responsibility, that is, the precise identiﬁ cation of the ways in which the 
international community can react against the breach of its most important obligations. Th is has 
been a matter of signiﬁ cant concern to States (see, in particular, the comments on the Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility by Austria, France, Germany, and Ireland, UN Doc. A/CN.4/488). 
Similarly, it gave rise to a wide debate among international law scholars. See the positions expressed 
by Dupuy, Sinclair, Condorelli, Spinedi, McCaﬀ rey, Ago, Graefrath, Dominicé, and Simma in 
J.H.H. Weiler et al. (eds.), International Crimes of State. A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 
19 on State Responsibility (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1989).
31 It goes beyond the scope of the present discussion to develop a systematic analysis of international 
practice on that particular issue. See P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Observations sur la pratique récente des 
‘sanctions’ de l’illicite’, 87 RGDIP (1983), pp. 505–548; J.I. Charney, ‘Th ird States Remedies in 
International Law’, 10 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1989), pp. 57–101; L. Condorelli, ‘Measures Available 
to Th ird States Reacting to Crimes of State’, in J.H.H. Weiler et al. (eds.), International Crimes of 
State. A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (Berlin, De Gruyter, 
1989), pp. 264–266; L.-A. Sicilianos, Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite. Des contre-mesures à 
la légitime défense (Paris, LGDJ, 1990); K. Hailbronner, ‘Sanctions and Th ird Parties and the 
Concept of International Public Order’, 30 AVR (1992), pp. 2–15; J. Delbrück (ed.), Th e Future 
of International Law Enforcement. New Scenarios – New Law? (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 
1993); J.A. Frowein, ‘Reactions by Not Directly Aﬀ ected States to Breaches of Public International 
Law’, 248 RCADI (1994), pp. 345–437; M. Iovane, La tutela dei valori fondamentali nel diritto 
internazionale (Napoli, Editoriale scientiﬁ ca, 2000), pp. 194–318; D. Alland, ‘Countermeasures 
of General Interest’, 13 EJIL (2002), pp. 1221–1239. 
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is an increasing number of cases in which it is possible to say that the international 
community was able to “speak with one voice”32 and to react against breaches of 
its fundamental obligations.33 Th is is not to play down the fact that the non-insti-
tutionalized nature of the international community may give rise to serious ques-
tions when trying to identify concrete ways in which the international community 
can react against the breach of community obligations.34 Nonetheless, from the 
viewpoint of the present analysis, another aspect is crucial, that is, the assessment 
of aggravated state responsibility. Although there are increasing attempts to seek 
universal condemnations of breaches of community obligations, the assessment of 
aggravated state responsibility is still normally left to the traditional mechanisms of 
state disputes settlement. Accordingly, aggravated state responsibility is likely to be 
addressed by international organizations, arbitral tribunals, international courts, 
and so on, in other words, through mechanisms which are normally diﬀ erent from 
those used to establish individual liability for international crimes.
Finally, it must be recalled that not all breaches of community obligations but 
only those breaches that reach a certain threshold of seriousness entail aggravated 
state responsibility.35 Th us, there may be cases in which the wrongful act does not 
reach the threshold of seriousness necessary to entail aggravated state responsibility, 
and therefore the regime of individual liability for international crimes overlaps 
32 N.H.B. Jørgensen, Th e Responsibility of States for International Crimes (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2000) p. 244, considering that examples in which the international community as a whole 
may be considered to have collectively reacted against breaches of community obligations are the 
Gulf crisis, the South Africa regime of apartheid, and interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
33 M. Iovane, supra note 31, p. 379, referring to generalized countermeasures against the USSR 
(for the invasion of Afghanistan), South Africa, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia (for gross viola-
tions of human rights in Kosovo). Interestingly, G. Perrin, ‘La détermination de l’Etat lésé. Les 
régimes dissociables et les régimes indissociables’, in J. Makarczyk (ed.), Th eory of International 
Law at the Th reshold of the 21st Century. Essays in Honour of K. Skubiszewski (Th e Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 1996), pp. 243–247, notes that “[l]orsque certains Etats occidentaux ont pris 
des mesures à l’encontre de pays qui avaient commis des agressions ou avaient très gravement violé les 
droits de l’homme, ils semblent s’être considérés comme agissant au nom de la légalité internationale et 
n’ont jamais invoqué une atteinte à leur droit subjectif au respect des règles en cause” (p. 245). For an 
evaluation of measures aimed at protecting ‘absolute obligations’, see E. Cannizzaro, Il principio 
della proporzionalità nell’ordinamento internazionale (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 2000), pp. 409–14.
34 Criticism on the ILC’s ‘empty’ codiﬁ cation of state aggravated responsibility has been expressed 
by P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Quarante ans de codiﬁ cation de la responsabilité internationale des Etats. Un 
bilan’, 107 RGDIP (2003), pp. 321 and 343 (“le régime institué se solde par une absence véritable 
de diﬀ érenciation entre la responsabilité de l’Etat pour la violation des normes impératives et celle qu’il 
encourt à raison de la méconnaissance de ses obligations ‘ordinaires’  ”); A. Gattini, ‘A Return Ticket 
to “Communitarisme”, Please’, 13 EJIL (2002), pp. 1181–1199; C.J. Tams, ‘All’s Well Th at Ends 
Well. Comments on the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility’, 62 ZaöRV (2002), pp. 759–808; 
C.J. Tams, ‘Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Speciﬁ c Obligations of the Responsible State?’, 
13 EJIL (2002), pp. 1161–1180. 
35 Th e seriousness requirement will be examined infra in Chapter 3.
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with the traditional regime of ordinary state responsibility. For example, if a state 
organ perpetrates an isolated war crime, this conduct ‘only’ entails ordinary state 
responsibility. While the present analysis will mainly focus on serious breaches 
entailing aggravated state responsibility, crimes entailing an overlap between ordi-
nary state responsibility and individual criminal liability will be taken into account 
as far as they are capable of revealing particular aspects of the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility.36
2. Th e Overlap Between State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes
If it is undeniable that the commission of international crimes entails a dual 
responsibility (of states and individuals) under contemporary international law, 
the present analysis cannot start but from the overlap between these regimes. Th is 
overlap is the source of the questions about the kind of relationship existing between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes. Two aspects must be 
considered to deﬁ ne this overlap with more precision.
First, aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability have a 
common origin. Th ey both stem from the serious breach of obligations owed to 
the international community as a whole.37 Th us, the starting point of the present 
36 See infra Chapters 5 and 8. 
37 Th e concept of erga omnes obligations has been the object of numerous works by international 
law scholars. See, in general, P. Picone, ‘Obblighi reciproci ed obblighi erga omnes nel campo della 
protezione internazionale dell’ambiente marino dall’inquinamento’, in V. Starace (ed.), Diritto 
internazionale e protezione dell’ambiente marino (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1983), pp. 15–135; A. De 
Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes. A Th eoretical Inquiry into the Imple-
mentation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States (Th e Hague, Kluwer, 1996); 
M. Ragazzi, Th e Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1997); C.J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). In the framework of state responsibility, diﬀ erent expressions 
have also been used to refer to more or less the same phenomenon. Cassese refers to ‘community 
obligations’ (A. Cassese, supra note 3, p. 15), while Dupuy speaks of ‘normes communautaires’ 
(P.-M. Dupuy, supra note 31, pp. 536–9). However, there are two ways in which erga omnes obli-
gations have been conceived of, namely, either as obligations towards all states or as obligations 
towards the international community as a whole. From the viewpoint of state responsibility, this 
distinction implies that the holder of the corresponding right of reaction is either any state or 
the international community as a whole. International law scholars are divided on the matter. 
Some seem to support a ‘bilateralized’ conception of erga omnes obligations (see, for example, 
F. Lattanzi, Garanzie dei diritti dell’uomo nel diritto internazionale generale (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1983), 
pp. 123–8; A. Daví, Comunità europee e sanzioni economiche (Napoli, Jovene, 1993), pp. 9 (note 
7), 46 (note 22), 137 (note 156), and 254; M. Byers, ‘Conceptualising the Relationship between 
Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Obligations’, 66 Nord. J. Int’l L. (1997), p. 232), while others adopt 
a ‘communitarian’ conception of such obligations (see, for example, M. Iovane, supra note 31, 
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analysis is that the international legal order provides for two sets of consequences 
(with respect to states and individuals) when the same type of international obli-
gations is not complied with.38 In other words, the relationship between state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes is characterized by a certain unity 
as far as primary norms39 are concerned.
Th is unity does not necessarily mean that primary norms entailing aggravated 
state responsibility are identical to primary norms entailing individual criminal 
responsibility under international law. What can be legitimately assumed at this 
preliminary stage is that the unity of state and individual responsibility at the 
level of primary norms means that both these regimes originate from the breach 
of primary norms aiming at the protection of the same collective interests of the 
entire international community, and having the same structure, that is, establish-
ing a legal relation between the state or the individual and the international com-
munity as a whole.
Th e fact is that this unity apparently breaks down at the stage of secondary norms. 
It seems undeniable that there are two regimes of responsibility entailed by the 
commission of international crimes under international law, that is, aggravated state 
responsibility and individual criminal liability. Arguably, this is due to the particular 
structure of obligations owed to international community as a whole. Th e holder 
of the corresponding right, i.e., the international community as a whole, can react 
against the commission of international crimes by taking measures towards either 
the responsible state or the responsible individual. And it can do so either in an 
pp. 140–1, and 155; A. Bos, ‘Crimes of State: In Need of Legal Rules?’, in G. Kreijen (ed.), State, 
Sovereignty, and International Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 231–2; 
A. Cassese, Diritto internazionale (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006), pp. 24–26; P. Picone, ‘La distinzione 
tra norme internazionali di jus cogens e norme che producono obblighi erga omnes’, 91 Riv. Dir. 
Int. (2008), pp. 5–38).
38 A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in 
International Law’, 52 ICLQ (2003), p. 627 (“Both individual and State responsibility are conse-
quences of breaches of fundamental norms of concern to the international community”); P. Fois, 
‘Sul rapporto tra i crimini internazionali dello Stato e i crimini internazionali dell’individuo’, 87 
Riv. Dir. Int. (2004), pp. 929–954.
39 Th e distinction between primary and secondary norms was proposed as a general criterion to 
codify the law of state responsibility by Special Rapporteur Ago in his ‘Second Report on State 
Responsibility’, YILC (1970), vol. II, p. 179. Primary norms are obligations under international 
law. Secondary norms are the legal consequences attached to the violations of primary obliga-
tions. Th is distinction allowed the ILC to set aside the deﬁ nition of primary obligations entailing 
aggravated state responsibility, so that the codiﬁ cation of state responsibility can concentrate on 
the consequences entailed by the breach of such obligations. See also J. Combacau and D. Alland, 
‘Primary and Secondary Rules in the Law of State Responsibility: Categorising International Obli-
gations’, 16 NYIL (1985), pp. 81–109; J. Crawford, ‘First Report on State Responsibility’, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/490, paras. 12–18; P.-M. Dupuy, supra note 27, p. 1059. For a broader conception 
of secondary rules, see, H.L.A. Hart, Th e Concept of Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 
79–99 (originally published in 1961).
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institutionalized manner or in a decentralized manner. However, this explanation 
provides no direct answer to the crucial issues raised by the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility, that is, whether the primary norms concern-
ing international crimes are identical, and (if so) whether a unity at the level of 
secondary norms can be recomposed.
Second, the overlap between state and individual responsibility must be identi-
ﬁ ed with respect to speciﬁ c categories of international crimes. It seems appropriate 
to start by drawing a comparison between the list of wrongful acts entailing both 
aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability under international 
law. In particular, to sustain such a dual responsibility at least two conditions must 
be fulﬁ lled: 1) the overlap between the material (or objective) elements of breaches 
entailing state and individual responsibility; and 2) the overlap between their sub-
jective elements, that is, the prohibited conduct must be attributable both to an 
individual and to a state. What follows is an examination of the relevant categories 
of international crimes from this perspective.40
A. Aggression
Th e crime of aggression represents one of the most if not the most serious breach 
of fundamental rules of the international community. Th e process leading to the 
elaboration of mechanisms capable of guaranteeing, at least to a certain extent, 
international peace and security has been described as a “long journey”41 fraught 
with obstacles. While the attainment of peace and security has been the primary 
40 Breaches of the right to self-determination of peoples and of the prohibition of apartheid will not 
be taken into account. While these are generally regarded as erga omnes obligations (see ICJ, Case 
concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 102, 
para. 29, and the ILC commentary on Article 40 on State Responsibility, ILC, ‘Report on the 
Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 112, para. 5) whose breach entails aggra-
vated state responsibility, it is diﬃ  cult to maintain that a corresponding crime entails individual 
criminal liability under customary international law: the ILC has decided not to include the crime 
of colonial domination in the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
(ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 47th Session’, YILC (1995), vol. II(2), p. 23, para. 77), and not-
withstanding the fact that the crime of apartheid is explicitly prohibited by the 1973 Convention 
on the Elimination and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (GA Resolution 3068(XXVIII)), 
the Convention has never been applied and arguably does not codify customary international law 
(see J. Dugard, ‘L’apartheid’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 
2000), pp. 349–360). Likewise, piracy cannot give rise to dual responsibility under international 
law: the very deﬁ nition of piracy rules out conduct committed with a public purpose, and conse-
quently piracy only entails individual liability under international law (see A. Cassese, supra note 
4, p. 24; A. Cassese, ‘When May Senior State Oﬃ  cials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some 
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’, 13 EJIL (2002), pp. 857–8, and infra Chapter 3).
41 G. Gaja, ‘Th e Long Journey towards Repressing Aggression’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. I (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 427–441.
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objective of the international community for centuries, it is a relatively new fact 
(but at present well established) that the international legal order prohibits the use 
of force in international relations, and that in particular it prohibits aggression. 
According to the UN Charter,42 the practice of the SC,43 the ICJ case law,44 and 
the 1974 UN Deﬁ nition of aggression,45 it seems undeniable that today states 
committing a very serious violation of international peace trigger an aggravated 
regime of international responsibility.46 
On the other hand, the Nuremberg trial recognized that the commission of crimes 
against peace, i.e., crimes of aggression, entails individual criminal liability under 
international law. Although there have been no convictions since then, individual 
liability for such crimes is conﬁ rmed in the codiﬁ cation of the ILC,47 in the Rome 
Statute for the ICC,48 and by domestic case law.49 
42 See Article 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter, and GA Resolution 2625(XXV), Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted on 24 October 1970.
43 For SC resolutions explicitly dealing with acts of aggression, see Resolutions 83(1950), 326(1973), 
386(1976), 387(1976), 405(1977), 411(1977), 418(1977), 419(1977), 424(1978), 445(1979), 
455(1979), 496(1981), 507(1982), 527(1982), 546(1984), 568(1985), 571(1985), 572(1985), 
573(1985), 580(1985), 581(1986), 611(1988), and 667(1990), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
44 See, in particular, ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nica-
ragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 et seq.; ICJ, 
Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 
p. 226 et seq.; ICJ, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. USA), Judgment, 6 November 2003, ICJ 
Reports 2003, p. 161 et seq.; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136 et seq.; ICJ, Case 
Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, <www.icj-cij.org>.
45 GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), adopted on 14 December 1974. 
46 See, in general, the ILC Commentary on Article 19 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 28th Session’, 
YILC (1976), vol. II(2), p. 95 et seq.) and to Article 40 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
(ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 112).
47 See Article 16 of the Draft Code of Crimes (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC 
(1996), vol. II(2), pp. 44–45), which reads: “An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively 
participates in or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed 
by a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression”.
48 Article 5 of the Rome Statute provides that “1. Th e jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to 
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. Th e Court has 
jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) Th e crime of 
genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) Th e crime of aggression. 2. Th e Court 
shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance 
with articles 121 and 123 deﬁ ning the crime and setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” (A/CONF.183/9, <untreaty
.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>).
49 For a recent case, see House of Lords, Jones case, supra note 18.
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With respect to this crime, the overlap between aggravated state responsibility 
and individual criminal liability is due to the fact that, under international law, acts 
of aggression always entail a dual responsibility. As concerns the material element, 
only acts involving the use of armed force by states amount to aggression and give 
rise to state and individual responsibility under international law.50 As concerns 
the subjective element, the crime of aggression entails both the responsibility of 
the author state, and the criminal liability of the political and military leaders 
of the state who have planned, prepared, initiated, or waged a war of aggression.51 
B. War Crimes
War crimes are probably the most classic example of oﬀ ences under international 
law. Th e prohibition of certain conduct in wartime was recognized long before 
WWII.52 Even at a time in which waging war was considered to be lawful, inter-
national law already provided for rules that aimed to humanize warfare. Not only 
were states held responsible in the case of violation of the laws and customs of 
war,53 but individual liability was also clearly aﬃ  rmed.54 Consequently, when the 
Nuremberg trial was held, criminal liability of individuals for war crimes was not 
a controversial issue. 
After World War II, the importance of international humanitarian law was reaf-
ﬁ rmed, together with the complete ban on the use of force in international relations. 
While the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols provided explicitly for 
the punishment of persons committing ‘grave breaches’, state responsibility for the 
same war crimes was regarded as corresponding to customary international law. Due 
to the ‘intransgressible’ character of the basic rules of international humanitarian 
50 Th e material element of the crime of aggression is discussed at length below (see infra Chapter 3).
51 See infra Chapter 4.
52 Th e Hague regulations on the laws of war date back to the 19th Century. See in general J.W. 
Garner, ‘Punishment of Oﬀ enders against the Laws and Customs of War’, 14 AJIL (1920), pp. 
70–94, and T.L.H. McCormack and G.J. Simpson (eds.), Th e Law of War Crimes: National and 
International Approaches (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997). 
53 State responsibility was explicitly recognized, for the ﬁ rst time, in Article 3 of the Fourth Convention 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War, adopted in 1907. More generally, the ILC has recognized 
aggravated state responsibility for breaches of “the basic rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conﬂ ict” (Commentary on Article 40, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd 
Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 113, para. 5).
54 Individual responsibility for war crimes was ﬁ rst aﬃ  rmed in the Versailles Treaty at the end of 
WWI, and then established during the Leipzig trials (W.A. Schabas, ‘International Sentencing: 
From Leipzig (1923) to Arusha (1996)’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, 
vol. III (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 1999), pp. 171–193). Th e ﬁ rst international conven-
tion providing an international obligation of states to prosecute those responsible for war crimes 
was the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armies in the Field.
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law,55 their violation is viewed as entailing an aggravated state responsibility.56 
In particular, aggravated state responsibility was derived, on the one hand, from 
the conduct of state organs committing such crimes and, on the other, from the 
violation of speciﬁ c obligations concerning the punishment of perpetrators. As a 
result, a dual responsibility for war crimes was, and still is, well-established under 
international law.57 
However, the overlap between state and individual responsibility for the breach 
of such community obligations is not complete. Th e scope of this overlap is dif-
ferent with respect to the subjective and material elements of war crimes. As to the 
former, the overlap between state and individual responsibility is dictated by the 
requirements of state responsibility, as individual war crimes can be committed 
by all individuals – both private individuals and state organs. Such an overlap is 
therefore limited to war crimes committed by state organs.58 Th is means that there 
may be war crimes committed by private individuals which only entail individual 
criminal liability and do not lead to an overlap between state and individual 
responsibility. Conversely, with respect to the material element, the overlap between 
these regimes is limited to customary oﬀ ences entailing individual criminal liabil-
ity.59 Abstractly, state responsibility has a broader scope than individual criminal 
liability. For example, there may be war crimes not amounting to ‘grave breaches’ 
of the Geneva Conventions which only entail state responsibility and do not give 
rise to an overlap between state and individual responsibility under customary 
international law.
C. Crimes against Humanity
Th e third category of the so-called Nuremberg crimes, i.e., crimes against human-
ity,60 also gives rise to a dual responsibility under international law. Both states and 
55 ICJ, Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 
1996, p. 257, para. 79.
56 ILC commentary on Article 40, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. 
II(2), p. 113, para. 5.
57 In particular, aggravated state responsibility is explicitly recognized under the 1977 Protocol I 
(see Article 89). See, in general, H. Lauterpacht, ‘Th e Law of Nations and the Punishment of War 
Crimes’, 21 BYIL (1944), p. 65.
58 Over the last few decades the scope of the breaches considered to be war crimes has evolved, and 
therefore the violations entailing individual and state responsibility under international law have 
widened, particularly as regards the criminalization of war crimes committed in internal armed 
conﬂ icts. Th is reduces the overlap between state and individual responsibility even more for war 
crimes committed by armed opposition groups. See, in general, L. Zegveld, Th e Accountability of 
Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
59 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, paras. 94–99.
60 E. Schwelb, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, 23 BYIL (1946), pp. 178–226; J. Graven, ‘Les crimes 
contre l’humanité’, 76 RCADI (1950), pp. 433–607; R.S. Clark, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, in 
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individuals can incur international liability if they commit such serious breaches 
of community obligations. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the universal 
recognition of the need to protect human rights at the international level has led 
to the agreement of the international community with respect to the erga omnes 
nature of the most fundamental human rights and, accordingly, to the aﬃ  rmation of 
international rules on the aggravated regime of responsibility applicable to states – 
and on the criminal responsibility applicable to individuals – in the case of their 
violation.61 Th is is conﬁ rmed, on the one hand, in national and international case 
law and, on the other, in various international documents embodying rules of cus-
tomary law.62 Regarding the precise scope of the overlap, its limits are very similar 
to those identiﬁ ed with respect to war crimes. In other words, the overlap between 
state and individual responsibility is limited to oﬀ ences constituting crimes against 
humanity and entailing individual responsibility under customary law when such 
crimes are committed by state organs.
D. Genocide and Torture
In light of the developments that international criminal law has undergone in the 
last ﬁ fty years, two further categories have emerged as autonomous international 
crimes giving rise to a dual responsibility under customary international law, 
G. Ginsburg, and V.N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), Th e Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Dordrecht, 
M. Nijhoﬀ , 1990), pp. 177–199; E. Zoller, ‘La déﬁ nition des crimes contre l’humanité’, JDI (1993), 
pp. 549–568; L. Mansﬁ eld, ‘Crimes against Humanity: Reﬂ ections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of 
Nuremberg and a Forgotten Legacy’, 64 Nord. J. Int’l L. (1995), pp. 293–341; Y. Dinstein, ‘Crimes 
against Humanity’, in J. Makarczyk (ed.), Th eory of International Law at the Th reshold of the 21st 
Century. Essays in Honour of K. Skubiszewski (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 
891–908; M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Th e Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 1999); M. Bettati, ‘Le crime contre l’humanité’, in H. Ascensio et al. 
(eds.), Droit international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), pp. 293–317; O. Swaak-Goldman, ‘Crimes 
against Humanity’, in G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Proce-
dural Aspects of International Criminal Law, vol. I (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000), 
pp. 141–168; K. Kittichaisaree, supra note 6, p. 85; A. Cassese, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, in 
A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, 
vol. I (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 353; A. Cassese, supra note 4, pp. 64–95.
61 See J. Graven, supra note 60; M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Th e Normative Framework of International 
Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International 
Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 1999), pp. 617–642.
62 Individual responsibility for crimes against humanity is provided for under Article 18 of the 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of 
its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 49), Article 5 of the ICTY Statute (SC Resolution 
827(1993)), Article 3 of the ICTR Statute (SC Resolution 955 (1994)), and Article 7 of the ICC 
Statute (<www.icc-cpi.int>). Aggravated state responsibility for crimes against humanity has been 
recognized by the ILC with respect to both ‘old’ Article 19 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 28th 
Session’, YILC (1976), vol. II(2), para. 70) and ‘new’ Article 40 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 
53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 112, para. 4).
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namely, genocide63 and torture.64 Th ese crimes can be regarded as originating from 
the broader category of crimes against humanity, but they are generally regarded as 
autonomous crimes characterized by their own deﬁ nition and requirements. Th e 
existence of important conventions on the prohibition of genocide and torture, 
ratiﬁ ed by a large number of states, has undoubtedly played a signiﬁ cant role in the 
emergence of these crimes as separate from other crimes against humanity.65 
With respect to genocide, this oﬀ ence is now included as an independent 
international crime in the most important documents of the last decade, such as 
the ICTY Statute, the ICTR Statute, the Draft Code of Crimes and the Rome 
63 R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1944); J. Graven, supra note 60; M.N. Shaw, ‘Genocide and International Law’, in Y. Din-
stein and M. Tabory (eds.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity. Essays in Honour of Shabtai 
Rosenne (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoﬀ , 1989), pp. 797–820; A. Cassese, ‘La communauté internationale 
et le génocide’, in Mélanges Michel Virally. Le droit international au service de la paix de la justice et 
du développement (Paris, Pedone, 1991), p. 183; J. Verhoeven, ‘Le crime de génocide. Originalité 
et ambiguïté’, 24 RBDI (1991), pp. 5–26; M. Steinberg, ‘Le génocide au XXe siècle: lecture juri-
dique ou historique?’, in A. Destexhe and M. Foret (eds.), Justice internationale. De Nuremberg 
à La Haye et Arusha (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997), pp. 49–64; L.S. Sunga, supra note 6, p. 105; 
J. Verhoeven, ‘La spéciﬁ cité du crime de génocide’, in A. Destexhe and M. Foret (eds.), Justice inter-
nationale. De Nuremberg à La Haye et Arusha (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997), p. 39–47; M. Lippman, 
‘Genocide’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational 
Publishers, 1999), pp. 589–613; V. Morris and M.P. Scharf, Th e International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (Irvington-on-Hudson, Transnational Publishers, 1998), p. 163; K. Boustany and 
D. Dormoy (eds.), Génocide(s) (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1999); R. Maison, ‘Le crime de génocide dans 
les premiers jugements du Tribunal Pénal international pour le Rwanda’, 103 RGDIP (1999), pp. 
129–145; W.A. Schabas, ‘Article 6’, in O. Triﬀ terer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1999), pp. 107–116; D.D. Ntanda Nsereko, 
‘Genocide: A Crime against Mankind’, in G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), 
Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law, vol. I (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000), pp. 113–140; W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law. Th e Crime of 
Crimes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000); K. Kittichaisaree, supra note 6, p. 67; 
A. Cassese, ‘Genocide’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. A Commentary, vol. I (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 335.
64 Z. Haquani, ‘La Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture’, 90 RGDIP (1986), p. 127; J.H. 
Burgers and H. Danelius, Th e United Nations Convention against Torture (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoﬀ , 
1988); R.St.J. Macdonald, ‘International Prohibitions Against Torture and Other Forms of Similar 
Treatment or Punishment’, in Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory (eds.), International Law at a Time of 
Perplexity. Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoﬀ , 1989), p. 385; D.H. Derby, 
‘Torture’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational 
Publishers, 1999), p. 705; E. Delaplace, ‘Torture’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international 
pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), p. 369; A. Cassese, supra note 4, pp. 117–120.
65 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by GA Reso-
lution 260(III) A of 9 December 1948, and Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by GA Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 
1984.
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Statute.66 International case law conﬁ rms that both states and individuals can be 
held responsible for genocide.67 With respect to the autonomous crime of torture, 
the expression ‘oﬃ  cial torture’ is generally used to distinguish this autonomous 
crime from torture as one of the oﬀ ences regarded as a crime against humanity, and 
despite the fact that oﬃ  cial torture gives rise to a separate claim, it continues to be 
considered a crime against humanity. Admittedly, international practice concerning 
oﬃ  cial torture is not abundant, but international scholarship and jurisprudence 
seem to agree that two diﬀ erent crimes, with diﬀ erent deﬁ nitions and requirements, 
now co-exist in international criminal law.68 
Th e deﬁ nition of these crimes, provided for under the two conventions and 
corresponding to customary international law, makes it much easier to identify the 
overlap between state and individual responsibility. With respect to genocide, the 
overlap is limited to criminal acts perpetrated by state organs. Indeed, genocide 
can in principle be committed by private individuals, in which case there is no 
overlap between state and individual responsibility. With respect to torture, there 
is an overlap from the viewpoint of the subjective element, as the deﬁ nition of 
‘oﬃ  cial torture’ establishes that only state organs can commit such a crime. But 
the overlap is limited from the viewpoint of the material element, as aggravated 
state responsibility is established only if the act of oﬃ  cial torture reaches a certain 
degree of seriousness.69
To sum up, there is undoubtedly an overlap between aggravated state responsi-
bility and individual criminal liability with respect to the following international 
crimes: aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture. 
Th us, the carrying out of such prohibited conduct gives rise to a dual responsibility 
under international law. While the overlap between state and individual respon-
sibility for these crimes is not always complete, most of the time the commission 
of international crimes raises the question of the relationship between state and 
individual responsibility under international law.
66 Th ese are Article 4 of the ICTY Statute (SC Resolution 827(1993)), Article 2 of the ICTR Statute 
(SC Resolution 955(1994)), Article 17 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind (ILC; ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 46), and 
Article 6 of the ICC Statute (<www.icc-cpi.int>).
67 Th e analysis of the relevant practice is examined in detail below in Part II.
68 See, in general, A. Cassese, supra note 4, pp. 117–119. With respect to international case law, see 
in particular ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998; with respect to 
national case law, see in particular Pinochet I, and Pinochet II, supra note 18.
69 On this particular aspect, see infra Chapter 3.
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3. Th e Relationship Between State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes in the Works of the ILC
Th e ILC has worked for many years both on the codiﬁ cation of state responsibility 
and on a code of crimes entailing individual criminal liability. Th us, one might 
expect to ﬁ nd in its works a position on the link or connection between these 
two regimes of international responsibility. However, the ILC has not adopted an 
explicit position on the matter.
Th e ILC has been entrusted with the task of studying and codifying separately 
state responsibility and individual criminal liability under international law. Its 
work has led to the adoption of two separate proposals, one in 1996 (Draft Code 
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind), and one in 2001 (Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility). However, there have been, at least to a certain 
extent, some points of contact between these two codiﬁ cation projects.
As concerns the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind, Special Rapporteur Th iam proposed to establish a very close link with the 
codiﬁ cation of aggravated state responsibility. Th e works of the ILC on this matter 
were interrupted in the 1950s and resumed in the early 1980s after international 
crimes of state (former Article 19) had been adopted in the framework of the 
codiﬁ cation of state responsibility. Th us, the new Rapporteur on the Draft Code of 
Crimes proposed to link individual criminal liability to state responsibility by codi-
fying only those international crimes that also amounted to an international crime 
of state according to former Article 19.70 According to the Rapporteur, individual 
criminal liability should arise under international law only for crimes carried out by 
state organs and entailing aggravated state responsibility.71 However, this proposal 
was highly controversial, and the members of the Commission decided in the end 
to reject it, leaving aside the co-ordination between the Draft Code of Crimes and 
the Draft Articles on State responsibility.72 Th e Commission considered that: 
70 In his First Report, Special Rapporteur Th iam deals with the scope of the Draft Code, which 
according to him should only deal with crimes committed by states or with the state complicity. 
Accordingly, he proposed that the Draft Code should address the entire issue of international 
responsibility for international crimes, that is, both state and individual responsibility (see 
D. Th iam, ‘First Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, 
YILC (1983), vol. II(1), pp. 143–157). 
71 In his Th ird Report, Special Rapporteur Th iam explicitly aﬃ  rmed that international crimes can 
only be committed by state organs, and he proposed a deﬁ nition of ‘crimes against the peace and 
security of mankind’ based on Article 19 concerning international crimes of states. Th is provi-
sion was considered to be the general deﬁ nition which should inspire both state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes (see D. Th iam, ‘Th ird Report on the Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, YILC (1985), vol. II(1), pp. 64–70).
72 Th e ILC ﬁ rst declined to codify a regime of international criminal responsibility of states in the 
Draft Code alongside the regime of individual criminal liability for international crimes. State 
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the criminal responsibility of individuals does not eliminate the international respon-
sibility of States for the consequences of acts committed by persons acting as organs or 
agents of the State. But such responsibility is of a diﬀ erent nature and falls within the 
traditional concept of State responsibility. Th e criminal responsibility of the State can-
not be governed by the same regime as the criminal responsibility of individuals.73
On the other hand, with respect to the codiﬁ cation of state responsibility, a major 
point of contact between state and individual responsibility has been taken into 
account at various stages, namely, the possibility of considering the punishment of 
state organs for international crimes to be a special consequence under the regime 
of aggravated state responsibility. 
A proposal in that sense was put forward by Special Rapporteur García-Amador 
at the very beginning of the ILC’s codiﬁ cation work on state responsibility.74 In 
his view, international law at that time included a criminal regime of state respon-
sibility applying to those states that breach certain international obligations, such 
as aggression, genocide, and crimes against humanity. In order to overcome the 
objections according to which criminal sanctions cannot be imposed on a state and 
that, even if it were possible, it would not be fair to sanction the entire population 
for the crimes committed at the state level, García-Amador put forward a simple 
solution: the content of criminal state responsibility should be co-extensive with 
the punishment of those state organs responsible for international crimes.75 Accord-
ingly, individual criminal liability for international crimes was explicitly conceived 
of as eﬀ ectively deﬁ ning the content of criminal state responsibility. 
Some years later, Special Rapporteur Ago rejected such an approach. In pro-
posing to the Commission a distinction between ordinary and aggravated state 
responsibility, he touched upon the question of the role that individual criminal 
liability can play under the aggravated regime of state responsibility. Ago strongly 
relied on the fact that international law provides for the criminal liability of state 
organs who have committed international crimes to show that a new category of 
responsibility for international crime should exclusively be a matter of concern for the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 35th Session’, YILC (1983), vol. II(2), 
pp. 13–15). Th us, the Draft Code “should be devoted exclusively to the criminal responsibility 
of individuals” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 36th Session’, YILC (1984), vol. II(2), p. 11). 
Second, the Commission refused to codify the deﬁ nition of crimes against the peace and security 
of mankind grounded on Article 19 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 37th Session’, YILC (1985), 
vol. II(2), pp. 13–14). Th erefore, the Special Rapporteur proposed a diﬀ erent and neutral deﬁ ni-
tion of the crimes to be included in the Code (see D. Th iam, ‘Fourth Report on the Draft Code 
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, YILC (1986), vol. II(1), pp. 82–83).
73 ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 36th Session’, YILC (1984), vol. II(2), p. 11.
74 See F.V. García-Amador, ‘Rapport sur la Responsabilité des Etats’, YILC (1956), vol. II, pp. 
181–213. 
75 Ibid., pp. 212–213.
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international obligations of exceptional importance has emerged in customary 
international law. However, he pointed out that 
it would be a mistake to assimilate the right or duty accorded to certain States to 
punish individuals who have committed such crimes to the ‘special form’ of interna-
tional responsibility applicable to the State in such cases . . . Punishment of those in 
charge of the State machinery who have unleashed a war of aggression or organized 
an act of genocide does not per se release the State itself from its own international 
responsibility for such acts.76
Th e issue emerged again when the ILC proceeded with the elaboration of the con-
sequences of wrongful state acts. Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz did not hide 
a certain support for a punitive connotation of international responsibility, and 
he proposed to list the punishment of state organs among the special sanctions to 
be directed at the state responsible for international crimes.77 Nonetheless, he had 
to acknowledge the ﬁ rm intention of the ILC to keep separate the codiﬁ cation of 
international ‘civil’ responsibility in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, and 
of international ‘criminal’ responsibility in the Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind.78
Th us, while the ILC could not entirely avoid the question of the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for the serious breaches of obligations 
owed to the international community as a whole, it was not able to agree on a legal 
framework explaining the connection between these two regimes. In the end, it 
opted for the insertion of two ‘without prejudice’ clauses in the 1996 Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind: “Th e fact that the present Code 
provides for the responsibility of individuals for crimes against the peace and secu-
rity of mankind is without prejudice to any question of the responsibility of States 
under international law”;79 and in the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility: 
“Th ese articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility 
under international law of any person acting on behalf of a State.”80
Th ese provisions are very important because they constitute a further acknowl-
edgment of the existence of problems concerning the relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes. Th ey tend to presume a 
separation of secondary rules arising out international crimes committed by states 
and individuals respectively, that is, they presume the independence of these two 
76 See R. Ago, ‘Fifth Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1976), vol. II(1), para. 101.
77 See G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Fifth Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1993), vol. II(1), pp. 51–58, 
and in particular paras. 233–234.
78 Ibid., pp. 54–55.
79 Article 4 of the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind (ILC, ‘Report on 
the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 23).
80 Article 58 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd 
Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 142.
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regimes.81 Indeed, these have been codiﬁ ed in two separate documents and gener-
ally treated as concerning two separate branches of international law. By the same 
token, the two ‘without prejudice’ clauses embodied in the Draft Code of Crimes 
and in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility show that the ILC assumes that 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes are not mutually exclu-
sive. Unfortunately, this presumption is not deﬁ nitive, and these articles are silent 
regarding the precise relationship between state and individual responsibility. In 
the end, the ILC leaves the deﬁ nition of the relationship in question to future 
developments under customary international law.
4. Historical Overview
Th e separation that, according to the ILC, characterizes the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility was not so clear-cut in the past. In the less recent 
scholarship, the two regimes of international responsibility were viewed as closely 
connected to each other. However, a gradual process of separation took place until 
the rapid development of international criminal law in the 1990s brought to the 
surface various practical issues concerning their relationship. 
Th e idea of a ‘higher international justice’ with respect to both states and individu-
als dates back to the beginning of the 20th Century. Th e Versailles Treaty represents 
the ﬁ rst attempt to impose punishment on individuals for the commission of a 
category of international crimes, namely, war crimes, which traditionally entailed 
only state responsibility. Th e Leipzig trials in particular cannot be regarded as a 
successful example of justice as regards individual liability.82 However, the atroci-
ties of World War I and the emergence of a closer international community of 
states led, on the one hand, to the establishment of the League of Nations83 and, 
81 See Commentary on Part Two, Chapter III of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ibid., 
p. 110). See C.J. Tams, ‘Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Speciﬁ c Obligations of the Respon-
sible State?’, supra note 34, pp. 1173–4, and P. De Sena, ‘Immunità dell’individuo-organo dalla 
giurisdizione e responsabilità dello Stato: rapporti e problemi di coordinamento’, in M. Spinedi 
et al. (eds.), La codiﬁ cazione della responsabilità degli Stati alla prova dei fatti (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 
2006), p. 467.
82 Th e Versailles Treaty recognized the individual criminal liability of both the German Emperor 
responsible for “a supreme oﬀ ence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties” (Article 
227) and the persons responsible for war crimes (Article 228). Although the Netherlands refused 
to extradite the German Emperor, and while the ‘special international tribunal’ charged with try-
ing him was therefore never established, the trial of war criminals was left to German domestic 
courts. Th e Leipzig trials revealed the punishment of war criminals to be totally ineﬀ ective when 
decided by domestic courts. See A. Cassese, supra note 4, pp. 327–9.
83 Particularly relevant in this context were Articles 10, 11, 12 and 16 (of the League of Nations 
Covenant) on the use of force. See I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963).
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on the other, to an attempt to draw up guidelines for a normative evolution of 
international law and to the ﬁ rst attempts to elaborate universal frameworks for the 
punishment of international crimes, regardless of whether these were committed 
by states or individuals.84 
It was at this time that international law scholars started setting out their propos-
als to criminalize what were perceived as the most serious international wrongful 
acts.85 Accordingly, alongside states individuals should also be recognized as bearing 
criminal responsibility for the commission of international crimes. For example, 
one proposal aimed at establishing a single institutional mechanism for the pun-
ishment of both state and individual international crimes: focusing substantially 
on aggression and war crimes, states and individuals together were to have been 
held responsible by the PCIJ or a separate criminal Chamber and to face a series 
of international sanctions.86
After World War II, the new international community showed its deﬁ nite willing-
ness to respect some fundamental rules of the international legal order, in particular, 
peace and basic human rights.87 Th ese were embodied in the UN Charter, the 
General Assembly (GA) Declaration on the Nuremberg Principles, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, etc.88 In addition, the UN embraced the elabora-
tion of aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability as regimes 
providing for special consequences for the violation of such fundamental rules. 
With respect to the former, the UN Charter provided for a collective mechanism 
of reaction against states breaching the most important international obligations, 
i.e., threat to peace, breach of the peace and aggression.89 With respect to individual 
84 For an overview of early proposals concerning international criminal law, see D. Th iam, ‘First 
Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, YILC (1983), 
vol. II(1), pp. 144–146.
85 See, for example, V.V. Pella, La criminalité collective des Etats et le droit pénal de l’avenir (Bucharest, 
State Printing Oﬃ  ce, 1926); Q. Saldaña, ‘La justice pénale internationale’, 10 RCADI (1925), 
p. 223; H. Donnedieu de Vabres, supra note 17.
86 See V.V. Pella, supra note 85, pp. 331–333. An interesting comparison could be made between 
these provisions and the modiﬁ cations added by Pella to his proposal immediately after WWII. See 
V.V. Pella, La guerre-crime et les criminels de guerre (Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1964), pp. 116–123. 
State responsibility is proposed with respect to aggression, violations of the Hague law, crimes against 
humanity and terrorism. Individual liability for such international crimes is limited to state organs. 
Individual criminal liability of both state organs and private individuals is proposed with respect 
to violations of the Geneva law, indirect aggression and other oﬀ ences endangering international 
peace. Th e overlap clearly concerns typical state crimes, and state organs’ individual responsibility 
is apparently aimed at guaranteeing an eﬀ ective reaction against collective criminality.
87 P.-M. Dupuy, ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique international’, 297 RCADI (2002), pp. 9–489.
88 P. Alston and H.J. Steiner, Human Rights in Context. Law, Politics, Morals. Text and Materials 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996).
89 See, in general, B. Conforti, Le Nazioni unite (7th edn, Padova, Cedam, 2005), pp. 175–222.
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responsibility, the Nuremberg trial90 established the fundamental precedent for the 
subsequent development of international criminal law,91 which was perceived, at 
least at the beginning, as an accessory or even alien branch of international law.
Th e Nuremberg revolution – that is, the aﬃ  rmation of individual criminal liability 
under international law – is often summarized with the famous quotation from the 
IMT judgment: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced.” 
However, liability of individuals for international crimes was not completely 
detached from state responsibility. Indeed, the trial of the major Nazi war criminals 
was intended to serve some functions that state responsibility could not reach at 
that time, for instance, the eﬀ ective punishment of perpetrators of international 
crimes and the judicial establishment of the involvement of the Th ird Reich in the 
commission of heinous international crimes, thereby (it was hoped) deterring states 
from future violations. Th e close link between state and individual responsibility 
is exempliﬁ ed by, among others, the crime of membership, according to which 
members of groups or organizations could face trial simply on the ground of the 
previous establishment by the IMT of the (entire) group’s criminality. 
Th us, without downplaying the importance of the Nuremberg judgment, it 
is possible to say that, from a historical point of view, this was only the starting 
point from which individual criminal liability was able to evolve as a regime of 
international responsibility increasingly independent from state responsibility, and 
as a regime applicable to all individuals, state organs included.
Th e subsequent eﬀ orts were mainly directed towards the aﬃ  rmation, through 
the establishment of legal rules, of fundamental principles of international criminal 
law. While trials essentially concentrated on the crimes perpetrated by the Axis Pow-
ers, eﬀ orts concentrated on a signiﬁ cant work of codiﬁ cation. In that connection, 
the UN GA rapidly adopted a resolution on the Nuremberg Principles;92 the ILC 
started working on the establishment of an International Criminal Jurisdiction93 
90 International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Judgment, 1 October 1946, 41 AJIL (1947), pp. 
172–333 (‘IMT Judgment’).
91 According to some, this is a natural development of every legal order which sooner or later has to 
abandon mechanisms of collective responsibility and adopt a concept of individual criminality 
in which fault and perpetrator match perfectly. See I. Caracciolo, Dal diritto penale internazionale 
al diritto internazionale penale (Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 2000), p. 3; E. Van Sliedregt, Th e 
Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Th e Hague, 
TMC Asser Press, 2003), p. 344. See also A.G.D. Levy, ‘Criminal Responsibility of Individuals 
and International Law’, 12 Th e University of Chicago Law Review (1945), p. 313.
92 GA Resolution 96(I), UN Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946).
93 See Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 1951, UN Doc. A/2136 
(Oﬃ  cial Records of the General Assembly, 7th Session, Supplement N. 11), and Report of the 
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and on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind;94 
and treaties were concluded on international crimes in the immediate aftermath 
of WWII: the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions. Interestingly, 
these eﬀ orts mainly focused on individual criminal liability. For example, the reports 
on the establishment of an International Criminal Jurisdiction limited its subject 
matter jurisdiction to natural persons only. Similarly, during the drafting of the 
Genocide Convention, a proposal aimed at extending criminal responsibility to 
states was rejected.95 
In the meantime, the ILC had started a massive project of codiﬁ cation concerning 
state responsibility. In 1954, the ILC decided to postpone its work on individual 
criminal liability pending the adoption of the Declaration on the deﬁ nition of 
aggression.96 Th us, despite new occasions to address the problems of the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes, these regimes 
were simply treated separately. While the 1974 Declaration on the deﬁ nition of 
aggression seems to implicitly accept the principle of a dual responsibility under 
international law,97 it essentially focused on state conduct. Other treaties adopted in 
that period maintained a similar separation between state and individual responsibil-
ity for international crimes, like for example the 1973 Apartheid Convention, the 
1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, and the 1984 Torture Convention. As 
already noted, the ILC did not elaborate on the relationship between these regimes 
and refused to establish any explicit connection between state responsibility and 
individual criminal liability either in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility98 or 
in the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security on Mankind, whose 
preparation was resumed in the early 1980s.99 
As a result, state and individual responsibility for international crimes have been 
carefully kept separate. On the one hand, there are the rules governing aggravated 
state responsibility, the assessment of which is left to the traditional mechanisms 
of dispute settlement. On the other hand, under international criminal law, the 
prosecution of individuals is left to international and domestic criminal courts. 
Th is situation might be explained by the exceptional application of international 
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 1953, UN Doc. A/2645 (Oﬃ  cial Records of 
the General Assembly, 9th Session, Supplement N. 12).
94 See ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 6th Session’, YILC (1954), vol. II, p. 140.
95 See N. Ruhashyankiko, ‘Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 of 4 July 1978, paras. 127–135.
96 See GA Resolution 897(IX) adopted on 4 December 1954.
97 See infra Chapter 3.
98 See the ILC Commentary on Article 19, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 28th Session’, YILC 
(1976), vol. II(2), pp. 96 and 110. 
99 See the proposal advanced by Special Rapporteur Th iam, ‘First Report on the Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, YILC (1983), vol. II(2), p. 16.
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criminal law during this period. After the post-WWII trials, prosecution for inter-
national crimes lay dormant for decades. Th us, the question of the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes could be quite 
easily set aside.
Th e present situation is completely diﬀ erent. Th e rapid development of interna-
tional criminal law since the 1990s is well known: the establishment of the ICTY 
and ICTR,100 the adoption of the Draft Code of Crimes,101 the adoption of the 
Rome Statute,102 an ever-increasing domestic case law, and the establishment of the 
so-called ‘mixed tribunals’.103 Great eﬀ orts have been made to codify aggravated 
state responsibility and to entrust the assessment of state responsibility issues to 
international third-party organs.104 In recent practice, the SC – the body whose 
primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security – has 
not hesitated to adopt measures against both states and individuals for the breach of 
community obligations, as will be discussed below.105 Th erefore, it is recent practice 
which reveals a growing number of cases in which the relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes is potentially problematic. 
In particular, it is mainly from the viewpoint of individual criminal liability that 
domestic and international courts have gradually been confronted by practical 
questions arising from this relationship. 
Th ese problems are likely to increase with the policies recently adopted by 
international criminal tribunals. Reliance is now constantly professed on the fol-
lowing scheme: international prosecution should focus on those major responsible 
for international crimes, while minor players should be left to domestic courts.106 
Th is scheme has taken various forms. For example, it was the background political 
justiﬁ cation for the selection of the defendants brought before the ad hoc tribunals 
100 See supra note 13.
101 Th e text was adopted by the Commission at its 48th session, in 1996, and submitted to the GA as 
part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session. Th e report (A/48/10), which 
also contains commentaries on the draft articles, is published in YILC (1996), vol. II(2).
102 See supra note 14.
103 See supra note 15.
104 As for the attempts to codify an institutional mechanism for the assessment of aggravated state 
responsibility see G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Fifth Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1993), vol. 
II(1), p. 1. However, the ILC decided not to include this proposal in the ﬁ nal text adopted in 
2001. With respect to state responsibility in general, one may recall the mechanisms established 
in the ﬁ elds of human rights law, international trade law, international investments law, the law 
of the sea, and so on, as more successful examples of institutionalized third-party adjudication 
systems.
105 See infra Chapter 7.
106 A. Cassese, supra note 4, p. 353, uses the expression: ‘Nuremberg scheme’.
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set up at the end of WWII.107 It now explicitly governs the completion strategies 
of the ICTY108 and ICTR.109 It has also been adopted to co-ordinate the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC with that of domestic courts.110 Such a division of labour between 
domestic and international criminal courts will inevitably lead the latter courts to 
concentrate on the criminal liability of state leaders,111 thus focusing on interna-
tional crimes that automatically entail a dual responsibility under international law. 
Th is is not to say that the relationship between state and individual responsibility 
is limited to international crimes committed by state leaders. But these policies, 
together with the recent development of international criminal law, will produce 
an ever-increasing number of cases raising the question of the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes. 
Th us, when the same conduct is capable of entailing a dual responsibility – of 
states and individuals – under international law, several questions arise concerning 
the mutual relationship between these two regimes. For example, one may doubt 
whether states can be held responsible for international crimes when no state organ 
has previously been convicted for the same oﬀ ence. Conversely, it is possible to 
wonder whether the establishment of individual criminal liability requires a previ-
ous ﬁ nding of state responsibility. More generally, the question can be raised as to 
whether the elements of individual liability for international crimes are the same 
as the elements of aggravated state responsibility. To cite a more speciﬁ c example, 
it is uncertain whether circumstances precluding state responsibility can likewise 
107 While the IMT had jurisdiction over “the major war criminals of the European Axis” (Article 1), 
Control Council Law N. 10 established “a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution 
of war criminals and other similar oﬀ enders, other than those dealt with by the International 
Military Tribunal” (Article 1). Similarly, under Article 1 the IMTFE had jurisdiction over “the 
major war criminals in the Far East”.
108 Despite its initial purpose to deal with all sorts of perpetrators, at the request of the SC (see 
Resolutions 1329(2000), 1503(2003), and 1534(2004) and the statements of the SC President 
S/PRST/2002/21, and S/PRST/2004/28, <www.un.org/Docs/sc>), the ICTY had to elaborate 
a ‘completion strategy’ (Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, June 
2002, annexed to UN Doc. S/2002/678) and decided that all its activity would be concentrated 
“on holding a very limited number of particularly exemplary trials” (ibid., para. 27, emphasis 
added). For the considerable shift in prosecutorial policy entailed by this strategy, see D. Raab, 
‘Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy’, 3 JICJ (2005), pp. 82–102.
109 Th e ICTR Prosecutor made it plain from the beginning that it would be almost impossible for 
the Tribunal to try all those allegedly responsible for the Rwanda genocide, and that it would 
focus on major responsible leaving minor players to domestic courts (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/7, 
28 June 1995). 
110 ICC, ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Oﬃ  ce of the Prosecutor’ (ICC Policy Paper), Sep-
tember 2003, pp. 6–7 (<www.icc-cpi.int>).
111 C. Del Ponte, ‘Prosecuting the Individuals Bearing the Highest Level of Responsibility’, 2 JICJ 
(2004), pp. 515–519.
Th e General Framework   41
be invoked before criminal courts to exclude individual liability for international 
crimes. And the list of unresolved issues could be much longer. 
Th ese problems have generally arisen before international criminal tribunals, 
and most of the time they have been solved on a case-by-case basis.112 Th e solutions 
that have been adopted in practice will be examined in detail below. Two points 
must be stressed here. First, in light of the increasing complexity of the relevant 
issues, it is doubtful that this casuistic approach is still adequate, if certainty and 
consistency in the application of state and individual responsibility for interna-
tional crimes are to be secured. Second, in order to understand the problems aris-
ing from this dual responsibility for international crimes, it is important to carry 
out a preliminary inquiry into the way in which the relationship between these 
regimes can be conceived of from a pure theoretical standpoint. Th e next chapter 
is devoted to the identiﬁ cation of the alternative theoretical approaches that can 
be adopted to explain the relationship between state and individual responsibility 
for international crimes.
112 See A. Cassese and M. Delmas-Marty (eds.), Crimes internationaux et juridictions internationales 
(Paris, PUF, 2002). 

Chapter 2
Th eoretical Approaches to the Relationship 
Between State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes
1. Dual Responsibility for International Crimes
An inquiry into the theoretical approaches to the relationship between state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes must necessarily start from the 
development of the principle of individual criminal responsibility under inter-
national law. It is the emergence of this principle that raised the question of the 
identiﬁ cation of a general legal framework which could explain a dual responsibility 
under international law.
Th e principle of individual criminal liability and, as a consequence, the issue of 
a dual responsibility of states and individuals for international crimes have recently 
attracted the attention of international law scholars. From diﬀ erent perspectives, 
they have addressed some of the questions raised by the relationship between state 
and individual responsibility. Th ese are, for example, the risks of an increasing focus 
on individual responsibility at the detriment of state responsibility for the same 
acts1 or more generally of a compartmentalized conception of state and individual 
responsibility under international law,2 the question of whether the establishment 
of state organs’ liability for international crimes also entails state responsibility,3 the 
1 M.D. Evans, ‘International Wrongs and National Jurisdiction’, in M.D. Evans (ed.), Remedies 
in International Law: Th e Institutional Dilemma (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), pp. 173–190; 
A. Pellet, ‘La responsabilité pénale individuelle, alternative aux sanctions collectives?’, in 
V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed.), United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Th e Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 2001), pp. 105–116.
2 A.A. Cançado Trinidade, ‘Complementarity between State Responsibility and Individual Respon-
sibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: Th e Crime of State Revisited’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), 
International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 
2005), pp. 253–270.
3 C. Dominicé, ‘La question de la double responsabilité de l’Etat et de son agent’, in E. Yakpo and 
T. Boumedra (eds.), Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 1999), pp. 143–157.
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diﬀ erent degrees of the relationship between state and individual responsibility,4 
the underdevelopment of aggravated state responsibility for international crimes 
when compared to individual criminal liability,5 the impact of the development 
of international criminal law on state responsibility,6 and the question of the 
application of similar defences under both state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes.7 
However, these works address isolated issues and do not aim at elaborating a 
comprehensive theoretical framework which could explain the various connections 
between state and individual responsibility. Th ey rely on implicit assumptions 
concerning the origin of this relationship which are seldom explicitly set out. But 
at least they seem to point to the same direction with respect to certain main char-
acteristics of this relationship.8 Th e ﬁ rst is dual attribution, as there are certain acts 
which are attributable both to states and individuals and entail a dual responsibil-
ity under international law. Th e second is complementarity: individual and state 
responsibility for international crimes are viewed as complementary regimes, and 
the emphasis is generally on the fact that individual criminal responsibility cannot 
exhaust state responsibility for the same serious wrongful acts.
4 P.-M. Dupuy, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsi-
bility of the State’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
A Commentary, vol. II (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1085–1099.
5 A. Bos, ‘Crimes of State: In Need of Legal Rules?’, in G. Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty, and 
International Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 221–237.
6 A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in 
International Law’, 52 ICLQ (2003), pp. 615–640.
7 L. Condorelli, ‘Responsabilité Etatique et Responsabilité Individuelle pour Violations Graves du 
Droit International Humanitaire’, in L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man. Essays on 
International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Th e Hague, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2003), pp. 211–219.
8 Th ese points are made not only by the authors just cited (supra notes 1–7), but also by other inter-
national law scholars, in particular, S. Rosenne, ‘State Responsibility and International Crimes: 
Further Reﬂ ections on Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 30 NYU J. Int’l 
L. Pol. (1997–1998), pp. 145–166; M. Kamto, ‘Responsabilité de l’Etat et responsabilité de 
l’individu pour crime de génocide. Quels mécanismes de mise en œuvre?’, in K. Boustany and 
D. Dormoy (eds.), Génocide(s) (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1999), pp. 487–511; V.D. Degan, ‘Responsibil-
ity of States and Individuals for International Crimes’, in S. Yee and W. Tieya (eds.), International 
Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essay in Memory of Li Haopei (London, New York, Routledge, 
2001), pp. 202–223; P. Fois, ‘Sul rapporto tra i crimini internazionali dello Stato e i crimini interna-
zionali dell’individuo’, 87 Riv. Dir. Int. (2004), pp. 929–954; D. Caron, ‘State Crimes: Looking at 
Municipal Experience with Organizational Crime’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility 
Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), pp. 23–30; P.S. 
Rao, ‘International Crimes and State Responsibility’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsi-
bility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), pp. 63–80; 
H. Gros Espiell, ‘International Responsibility of the State and Individual Criminal Responsibility 
in the International Protection of Human Rights’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility 
Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), pp. 151–160.
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Th ese main characteristics correspond to the conception of the ILC underlying 
the separate codiﬁ cation of state and individual responsibility as witnessed by the 
two ‘without prejudice’ clauses examined above. As already noted, these general 
statements are not enough to explain the relationship between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes. 
In addition, these works contain what may at ﬁ rst appear to be diverging views. 
Th e clearest example concerns the alternative between exhaustion and no exhaustion, 
that is, whether there are cases in which individual responsibility can exhaust state 
responsibility. Although in principle it is aﬃ  rmed that individual criminal liability 
is not a substitute for state responsibility, particular circumstances are examined 
which seem to justify a diﬀ erent conclusion. For example, it is maintained that, 
in the case of international crimes committed by isolated state organs, “there may 
be good reasons to allocate responsibility exclusively to individuals”,9 or that the 
punishment of those state organs can be regarded as a remedy under the law of 
state responsibility.10 
Th e question that naturally arises is whether these exceptional circumstances can 
be reconciled with the general statement concerning the complementarity of state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes. In order to fully appreciate 
and inquire further into this issue (and more generally into the problems resulting 
from the relationship between state and individual responsibility for international 
crimes), it is of fundamental importance to identify and set out explicitly the various 
theoretical approaches by which this relationship can be understood. Coming back 
to our example, if exhaustion is a priori excluded, this may imply that individual 
and state responsibility are governed by totally diﬀ erent international norms. On 
the other hand, if the possibility of exhaustion is accepted, this means that there 
is an overlap between secondary norms, because individual responsibility can be 
part of the remedies provided for under state responsibility. 
Th e next section contains an overview of the works of international law scholars 
that can be used as a starting point in extrapolating the theoretical approaches 
underlying the conception of the relationship between state and individual respon-
sibility for international crimes.
2. Diverging Approaches to the Relationship Between State and 
Individual Responsibility for International CrimeS
Identifying the general approaches to the relationship between state and indi-
vidual responsibility is not an easy task. Essentially, the literature on this issue is 
 9 A. Nollkaemper, supra note 6, p. 622.
10 S. Rosenne, supra note 8, p. 163.
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fragmentary, international law scholars have very diﬀ erent conceptions of the 
international legal order, and their views on this relationship have generally been 
expressed in relation to speciﬁ c contexts. What follows is an attempt to identify 
more general lines of reasoning as far as the relationship between state and indi-
vidual responsibility is concerned. 
On the one hand, there is today the tendency to emphasize the diﬀ erence between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes and to stress the pecu-
liarities of international criminal law. On the other hand, more traditional views 
insist on the primary role played by states under international law and try to bring 
individual criminal liability back within the framework of state responsibility as a 
special consequence for the commission of international crimes by state organs.
A. Th e Separation of State and Individual Responsibility
A ﬁ rst approach that can be traced back in the works of international law scholars 
essentially focuses on the diﬀ erences between state and individual responsibility 
for international crimes. While no explicit theory on the relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes is put forward, this approach 
responds to the concrete need to prosecute those responsible for international 
crimes and to develop, both logically and practically, a regime of individual criminal 
liability separate and independent from state responsibility. 
In the aftermath of WWII, some authors welcomed the attribution to individu-
als of a certain role in international law and focused essentially on the newborn 
individual liability for international crimes. Th ey seemed to take for granted, at 
least to a certain extent, the independence of international criminal law from state 
responsibility.11
11 See, in particular, H. Donnedieu de Vabres, ‘La théorie des délits de droit des gens en droit pénal 
interétatique’, 28 RDISDP (1950), p. 159; J. Graven, ‘Principes fondamentaux d’un code répressif 
des crimes contre la paix et la sécurité de l’humanité’, 28 RDISDP (1950), p. 173; C.T. Eustathia-
des, ‘Les sujets du droit international et la responsabilité internationale. Nouvelles tendances’, 84 
RCADI (1953), p. 397; S. Glaser, ‘Culpabilité en droit international pénal’, 99 RCADI (1960), 
p. 467. Th e evolution of Lauterpacht’s position on the subject is well known: in the sixth edition 
of Oppenheim’s International Law (London, Longmans, 1940), he recognized the existence under 
customary international law of the principle of individual criminal liability. Generally, the debate 
arising from the aﬃ  rmation of individual criminal liability under international law has focused 
on whether individuals can be regarded as international subjects (see, in particular, I. Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 
561–564, and 580–581; C.G. Tornaritis, ‘Th e Individual as a Subject of International Law and 
International Criminal Responsibility’, in M.C. Bassiouni and V.P. Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on 
International Criminal Law (Springﬁ eld, Th omas, 1973), pp. 103–121; J.A. Barberis, ‘Nouvelles 
questions concernant la personnalité juridique internationale’, 179 RCADI (1983), p. 181; 
C. Dominicé, L’ordre juridique international entre tradition et innovation. Recueil d’études (Paris, 
PUF, 1997), pp. 121–122; F. Malekian, ‘International Criminal Responsibility’, in M.C. Bassiouni 
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More recently, the works of some international law scholars who have addressed 
the question of the relationship between state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes seem to agree that it is crucial to dissociate the conduct of 
the state from that of its organs.12 Dupuy points out that the Nuremberg judgment 
consisted of a twofold revolution: 
a) du point de vue de la responsabilité internationale, l’aﬃ  rmation de celle de l’individu-
organe apparaît en rupture avec les règles classiques de la responsabilité de l’Etat, puisqu’en 
principe, les agissements illicites de l’agent de l’Etat ayant agi comme tel restent imputés à 
l’Etat pour le compte duquel il a exercé ses fonctions. Pour autant, le fait que ces indivi-
dus-organes soient déclarés personnellement responsables n’exonère pas l’Etat concerné de 
sa propre responsabilité en droit international . . .
b) du point de vue du droit pénal international, l’Accord de Londres du 8 août 1945 
portant statut du TMI introduisait une autre innovation majeure. Jusque-là, en eﬀ et, le 
droit international pénal ne concernait que les infractions commises par les individus à 
titre privé, . . . et non les infractions commises en tant qu’agent étatique, en raison même 
du jeu des règles d’imputation rappelées ci-dessus.13
In other words, while in traditional international law there were only a very few 
cases of private individuals’ responsibility, after 1945 the dissociation led to the 
establishment of a general principle of individual responsibility for breaches of inter-
national obligations, whether committed by private individuals or by state organs. 
(ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 1999), p. 153; L.S. 
Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights Violations (Dordrecht, 
M. Nijhoﬀ , 1992), p. 139; F.A. Satchivi, Les sujets de droit. Contribution à l’étude de la reconnais-
sance de l’individu comme sujet direct du droit international (Paris-Montréal, L’Harmattan, 1999), 
p. 78; T. Scovazzi, Corso di diritto internazionale, Parte I, (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 2000), pp. 76–77; 
B. Conforti, Diritto internazionale (7th edn, Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 2006), pp. 19–21). An 
inquiry into the legal status of individuals under international law goes beyond the scope of the 
present analysis. In addition, this question does not per se provide any clariﬁ cation on the relation-
ship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. Here, it will simply be 
assumed that today certain obligations are directed at individuals under international law.
12 See L.S. Sunga, supra note 11, p. 48 (“Th e Nuremberg trials also demonstrate that international 
resolve can be suﬃ  ciently compelling in modern times to result in the prosecution and punish-
ment of individuals for the systematic commission of gross violations of human rights. Th is was a 
complete rejection of the extreme positivist assertion that the State, supreme within its own sphere, 
sovereign and equal to other States in international law, shields its oﬃ  cials from international 
sanctions by virtue of State privileges and immunities. Th e political resolve of the international 
community to punish individuals responsible for crimes committed in World War II translated 
into penal sanctions. Th ese sanctions were enforced notwithstanding that the acts in question were 
committed pursuant to oﬃ  cial orders backed by the full legal authority of the State. Moreover, 
the Nuremberg trials symbolized the possibility that such a trial might be carried out in future.”); 
S. Rosenne, supra note 8, p. 156; A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 271.
13 P.-M. Dupuy, Droit international public (7th edn, Paris, Dalloz, 2004), p. 523.
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Moreover, as regards the relationship between state and individual responsibility 
for international crimes, such an assumption inevitably leads to the conclusion 
that individual criminal liability is distinct from state responsibility.14 
Explicitly dealing with the question of the “relationship between State responsi-
bility in the classic sense and individual responsibility for acts that are themselves 
violations of international law”,15 Rosenne starts his analysis from the general 
assumption concerning the “dissociation of international criminal law from the 
law of international responsibility”.16 Th e validity of such an assumption is then 
demonstrated by both international documents and case law:17 reference is made to 
the two ‘without prejudice’ clauses incorporated in the ILC Draft Code of Crimes 
and Draft Articles on State Responsibility,18 and to the case law of the ICJ19 and 
of the ICTY.20 Accordingly, Rosenne assumes that international crimes of the 
individual “stand on their own and are not necessarily attributable to a State in a 
manner which would implicate the law of State responsibility.”21 In other words, 
the dissociation in question gives rise to a dual responsibility at the international 
level – of the state and of the individual – and these regimes of responsibility for 
international crimes must be considered to be mutually independent.
Similarly, the importance of taking into account the dissociation described 
above as a basic assumption when establishing the relationship between state and 
14 Ibid., pp. 523, and 527. In particular, Dupuy refers to the 1996 decision of the ICJ in the Case 
Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 11 July 1996, 
ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595 et seq. See also P.-M. Dupuy, supra note 4, p. 1091 (“Identifying the 
international individual responsibility of natural persons who have committed crimes in inter-
national law . . . leads to a responsibility system where everything leads one to believe, in the state 
of incompleteness and of evolution that the matter ﬁ nds itself in, that it will end by increasingly 
dissociating the respective responsibility systems for the individual and the State.”).
15 S. Rosenne, supra note 8, p. 156.
16 Ibid., p. 164.
17 Ibid., pp. 159–160.
18 See supra the Introduction.
19 ICJ, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), supra note 14, para. 32. S. Rosenne, supra 
note 8, p. 159 (“an individual can be tried and punished for an act which is a crime according 
to international law even if the impugned act cannot be attributed to a State or entity such as to 
engage its international responsibility”).
20 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 606. S. Rosenne, supra note 8, 
p. 160 (“the obligations of individuals under international humanitarian law are independent and 
apply without prejudice to any questions of State responsibility under international law”).
21 S. Rosenne, supra note 8, p. 157. See also S. Rosenne, ‘War Crimes and State Responsibility’, in 
Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory (eds.), War Crimes in International Law (Th e Hague, M. Nijhoﬀ , 
1996), pp. 65–106.
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individual responsibility is acknowledged by Cassese.22 Th us, the main reason 
for considering individual criminal liability as something separate from state 
responsibility lies in the basic assumption regarding the dissociation between the 
conduct of the state and that of its organs.23 Th is dissociation may seem to be an 
abstract concept. However, in concrete terms it implies that when a state organ 
is on trial, it is not normally perceived so much as the state but as an individual. 
If a member of the government is charged with persecution, for example, what 
is ascertained is the prohibited personal conduct of the accused amounting to a 
crime against humanity, not the state policy or the general organization according 
to which crimes have been committed and in which the accused may have had a 
greater or lesser role. 
Th e dissociation between the conduct of the state and that of its organs is a 
fundamental element to be taken into account when examining the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility under international law. If rejected, 
international crimes committed by state organs can only be regarded as conduct 
attributable to a state.24 On the contrary, if accepted, the dissociation between 
the conduct of the state and that of its organs entails the possibility of aﬃ  rming 
a general principle of criminal liability of all individuals under international law, 
regardless of whether they are private individuals or state organs. 
Another consideration helps to understand the way in which the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes is conceived 
of by a part of international law scholars. Th is concerns the emphasis put on the 
speciﬁ c features of international criminal law. International criminal law focuses 
only on the conduct of natural persons,25 and it is governed by the principle of 
personal guilt.26 Th erefore, it concentrates on the establishment of very personal 
22 A. Cassese, supra note 12, p. 271: “Individuals behaving contrary to the most fundamental legal 
standards may be held criminally responsible regardless of whether they have acted in an oﬃ  cial 
capacity, that is, both when they were State organs and when they acted as private individuals; their 
link with a State may be relevant (in the case of genocide, aggression, or crimes against humanity, 
when normally their action tends to be promoted, supported, acquiesced in, or condoned, by 
State authorities); legally, however, this link is not indispensable.” (emphasis added).
23 Even if the dissociation in question is not explicitly demonstrated, many scholars seem to assume 
it to be the basic reason for the strict separation between state and individual responsibility under 
international law. See, for example, L.S. Sunga, supra note 11, pp. 132–133; C. Dominicé, supra 
note 3, p. 144; B. Conforti, supra note 11, p. 189; T. Scovazzi, supra note 11, p. 77.
24 See infra in this Chapter.
25 See supra Chapter 1, note 8.
26 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 136–137, 
and 159–178; K. Ambos, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law: 
A Jurisprudential Analysis – From Nuremberg to The Hague’, in G. Kirk McDonald and 
O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law, 
vol. I (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp. 8, 14, 21, and 28.
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requirements, such as the actus reus and the mens rea of the accused, and it results 
in the punishment of the culprit independently of his position in the state appa-
ratus.27 When all these elements are collectively taken into account, international 
criminal law may naturally appear as a regime completely independent from state 
responsibility. 
In the infrequent works on international criminal law that have addressed 
the question of the relationship between state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes, at least two general points are explicitly made. First, indi-
vidual criminal liability and aggravated state responsibility are separate.28 Th is 
‘separation’ is not investigated any further, but it seems naturally connected to or 
inferred from the second point explicitly made, that is, that the two regimes of 
international responsibility in question are diﬀ erent. In particular, these regimes 
diﬀ er with respect to: the subjects which can commit international crimes; the 
contents of the responsibility implied by the commission of international crimes; 
and the enforcement mechanism which should guarantee compliance with primary 
international rules.29
International criminal law is conceived of as a special branch of international 
law which prohibits certain conduct in order to protect some fundamental collec-
tive interests of the international community, and which establishes a direct legal 
relationship between the international community as a whole and all individuals. 
Th is cosmopolitan perspective has been expressed as follows:
It seems unquestionable that in recent times a number of international rules have come 
into being that directly impose obligations upon individuals. . . . Th us individuals are at 
27 Individual criminal liability can in no way be inferred merely from the position of the accused in 
the state apparatus. In addition, the ad hoc tribunals have rejected the view according to which 
sentencing must reﬂ ect the higher or lower position of the accused in the state hierarchy (ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., AC, Judgment, 20 February 2001, para. 847).
28 See, in particular, S. Plawski, Etude des principes fondamentaux du droit international pénal (Paris, 
LGDJ, 1972), p. 64; M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Th e Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: 
A Th eoretical Framework’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, 
Transnational Publishers, 1999), p. 19; I. Caracciolo, Dal diritto penale internazionale al diritto 
internazionale penale (Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 2000), pp. 130, 222, and 225.
29 M. Kamto, supra note 8, p. 490, puts the question in analogous terms, although his analysis is 
limited to the crime of genocide (“Th éoriquement, responsabilité pénale de l’individu et responsabilité 
pénale de l’Etat pour crime de génocide peuvent être envisagées de façon autonome. D’abord, il existe 
une diﬀ érence de nature entre les deux sujets dont la responsabilité peut ainsi être engagée. Ensuite la 
mise en œuvre de cette responsabilité obéit à des règles diﬀ érentes. Enﬁ n, les conséquences juridiques 
de cette responsabilité ne sont pas les mêmes pour l’un et l’autre sujet.”). See also P. Gaeta, ‘On What 
Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?’, 18 EJIL (2007), p. 643. For a similar 
view expressed in more general terms, see P.-M. Dupuy, supra note 4; A. Cassese, supra note 12, 
pp. 271–272; and G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (Th e Hague, TMC Asser 
Press, 2005), pp. 35–36.
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present under many international obligations, some solely relating to armed conﬂ ict, 
others (those on crimes against humanity, genocide, aggression, terrorism, torture) 
also concerning peacetime. Th ese obligations are incumbent upon all individuals of 
the world: they are all obliged to refrain from breaching the aforementioned rules; if 
they do not do so, they are accountable for their transgression. Th is is so regardless of 
whether the national legal system within which individuals live contains a similar or 
the same obligation (translated into national legislation). In other words, this is an 
area where the international legal system enters into direct contact, as it were, with 
individuals, without the medium of national legal systems.30
Th e main feature of such an approach is that it completely removes the relation-
ship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. Legally, 
there is no link between these regimes.31 Th e major development international 
criminal law has undergone since the Nuremberg judgment is that it can now 
apply to all individuals, in particular because it recognizes that core crimes can 
also be perpetrated by private individuals independently of any connection with 
state responsibility.32 
General statements on the diﬀ erence and separateness of state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes do not provide a clear picture of the relation-
ship between these two regimes. To say that these regimes are diﬀ erent and separate 
might not exclude some kind of relationship between them, but at the same time 
it does not reveal which are the characteristics of such a relationship, if any. 
Sometimes, international law scholars have also advanced more explicit views 
on this issue. In a recent comment to the Genocide case, Gaeta deals with this 
issue, and maintains that primary norms entailing individual criminal liability for 
genocide or war crimes are diﬀ erent from the primary norms entailing aggravated 
30 A. Cassese, supra note 12, p. 79 (emphasis added).
31 Ibid., p. 271.
32 According to J. Graven, ‘Les crimes contre l’humanité’, 76 RCADI (1950), p. 566: “C’est une 
singulière erreur de perspective et un rétrécissement regrettable de la notion juridique, d’aﬃ  rmer et 
vouloir faire admettre que l’Etat seul peut être l’auteur de ce crime du droit des gens parce que celui-ci 
serait le résultat d’un « acte de souveraineté criminel » ou parce que le crime ne se concevrait pas sans « un 
ordre ou une tolérance étatique », comme la doctrine a eu tendance à l’admettre au début, ou encore, 
selon la thèse française oﬃ  cielle, parce qu’ « aux gouvernants seuls remontent l’initiative et la décision 
de l’entreprise criminelle », les exécutants n’étant « que de vulgaires meurtriers et assassins, gouvernés 
par le droit commun » et ne relevant pas du droit international. En eﬀ et, cette initiative, cette décision, 
cet ordre ou cette tolérance n’existent pas nécessairement toujours. Des crimes contre l’humanité peuvent 
fort bien être commis indépendamment de la volonté de l’Etat ou même contre elle, par l’eﬀ et de haines 
raciales, politiques ou religieuses latentes, éclatant à la suite de quelque incident, d’une propagande 
murmurée, d’une action secrète ou d’une provocation privée, et la triste et longue histoire des pogroms 
et des lynchages, parallèle à celle des déportations et des exterminations étatiques, en fournirait maints 
exemples. Il faut déﬁ nitivement sortir de la notion du « complot » ou « plan étatique » introduite dans le 
statut de Nuremberg et qui, plus ou moins toujours présente à l’arrière-plan des constructions juridiques, 
en gêne et fausse le juste développement.”
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state responsibility for ‘similar’ serious breaches.33 Th erefore, “the two forms of 
responsibility are fully independent of each other from the start”.34 A similar, more 
nuanced position is taken by Pellet, who admits the possibility that, “sauf pour le 
crime d’agression, les déﬁ nitions que donne des diﬀ érents crimes contre la paix et la 
sécurité de l’humanité . . . ne renvoient pas nécessairement à un crime correspondant 
de l’Etat.”35
B. Individual Criminal Responsibility as Part of State Responsibility
A careful review of the literature reveals an alternative approach to the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. In fact, there 
are international law scholars who have explicitly dealt with this issue. Th e com-
mon element of these works is that they focus on the close connection between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes, and try to recompose a 
unity at the level of secondary norms concerning the breach of the most important 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole.
In the aftermath of WWII, international law scholars were confronted, for the 
ﬁ rst time, with a development of the highest importance, namely, the aﬃ  rmation 
of the principle of individual criminal liability under international law. Th ere was 
an urgent need to explain why and how international rules were suddenly also 
being applied to individuals. Some of these authors appraised the emergence of 
individual criminal liability under international law according to the available 
conceptual framework, but abstained, at least in the beginning, from calling the 
familiar conceptual categories into question. Th ey used the traditional approach 
at their disposal: a state-oriented conception of the international legal order. 
Th ese few attempts generally ended up considering individual criminal liability to 
be part of the regime of aggravated state responsibility, that is, as a special sanction36 
33 P. Gaeta, supra note 29, pp. 631–648.
34 Ibid., p. 641. See also, A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2008), pp. 129–130.
35 A. Pellet, ‘La responsabilité des dirigeants pour crime international de l’Etat. Quelques remarques 
sommaires au point de vue du droit international’, in G. Doucet (ed.), Terrorisme, victimes et 
responsabilité pénale internationale (Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 2003), p. 207.
36 Th e term ‘sanction’ is used here simply to put the emphasis on the punitive function which gener-
ally applied to individual criminal liability when regarded as a particular consequence of wrongful 
state acts. For a general analysis of the subject, see M.L. Forlati Picchio, La sanzione nel diritto 
internazionale (Padova, Cedam, 1974); G. Abi-Saab, ‘De la sanction en droit international. Essai 
de clariﬁ cation’, in J. Makarczyk (ed.), Th eory of International Law at the Th reshold of the 21st 
Century. Essays in Honour of K. Skubiszewski (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 61; 
E. Cannizzaro, Il principio della proporzionalità nell’ordinamento internazionale (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 
2000), p. 384; M. Spinedi, ‘La responsabilité de l’État pour ‘crime’: une responsabilité pénale?’, 
in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), pp. 103–113.
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for the responsible state.37 Th is is because, as a general assumption, this approach 
presumes that only states can commit international crimes. Traditionally, only 
states were regarded as international subjects. While it was not possible to deny 
that individuals were actually prosecuted for the commission of international 
crimes, individual criminal liability was nonetheless viewed as a reaction against 
the responsible state. Th us, individual accountability was simply conceived of as 
one of the consequences attached to the commission of wrongful acts by states. 
According to Sperduti, the prosecution of state organs for war crimes was con-
ceived of as a reprisal against the state responsible for these violations of fundamental 
international obligations.38 Th is ‘speciﬁ c reprisal’ was only possible, according to 
Sperduti, as a reaction against particularly grave breaches of international law. It 
was thus considered to be a form of aggravated state responsibility, i.e., an other-
wise unlawful reaction by the injured state, authorized on an exceptional basis by 
international law because it constituted a reaction to a breach of a fundamental 
obligation owed to the international community as a whole.39 
Th e origin of aggravated state responsibility is – as it is normally aﬃ  rmed – the 
violation of an obligation owed to the international community as a whole. However, 
while Sperduti identiﬁ es the source of this special regime of international responsi-
bility as the breach of ‘community’ obligations, he conﬁ nes its implementation to 
a strictly bilateral framework.40 Th us, individual liability for international crimes is 
a speciﬁ c reprisal directed against the state responsible for the violation of the most 
important obligations arising under international law, a reprisal consisting of the 
punishment of its organs. From this perspective, only the injured state is entitled to 
adopt such an exceptional countermeasure. Individual criminal liability is thereby 
brought back into the traditional framework of bilateral state responsibility. Sperduti 
37 The origins of this traditional approach can be traced back to the works of Anzilotti. See 
D. Anzilotti, Corso di diritto internazionale (Roma, Athenaeum, 1923); and G. Arangio-Ruiz, 
Diritto internazionale e personalità giuridica (Bologna, Cooperativa libraria universitaria, 1972). For 
a somewhat diﬀ erent conception of the phenomenon, see G. Carella, La responsabilità dello stato per 
crimini internazionali (Napoli, Jovene, 1985); G. Carella, ‘Il Tribunale penale internazionale per 
la ex Iugoslavia’, in P. Picone (ed.), Interventi delle Nazioni Unite e diritto internazionale (Padova, 
Cedam, 1995), p. 463 et seq. Starting from a number of widely shared assumptions – that the 
breach of community obligations are international wrongful acts, that individual criminal liability 
is provided under a set of international secondary rules, and that the punishment of individuals 
is not a sanction for state crimes – she concludes that individual accountability for international 
crimes is only a matter of domestic law, and that no relationship exists between the responsibility 
of states at the international level and the criminal liability of individuals at the domestic level. 
Th e punishment of individuals is the object of an international obligation addressed to the states 
only, and it must be carried out within their domestic legal orders.
38 G. Sperduti, L’individuo nel diritto internazionale (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1950), pp. 175–6.
39 Ibid., p. 173.
40 Ibid., pp. 173–4.
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denies any relation established under international law between the individual and 
the entire international community: the breach is always a wrongful state act and 
the reaction is strictly directed against the responsible state. Individuals completely 
disappear from the analysis.41
From this early perspective, the power to punish individuals, even foreign state 
organs, derives from state sovereignty and criminal law is the province of domestic 
legal orders, not international law. Th e limited role of international law, according 
to Sperduti, is to provide for a justiﬁ cation42 when exercising national criminal 
jurisdiction would otherwise be in breach of customary rules on immunity. On 
this view, when state organs are charged with international crimes before foreign 
national courts, international law allows the judge to disregard the customary protec-
tion to which states are entitled. Indeed, Sperduti regards organs’ exemption from 
jurisdiction as being directly derived from the attribution of their behaviour to the 
state.43 Under this approach, state organs are merely instruments for state activities. 
Since, according to Sperduti, a general principle of international law provides for 
the obligation to respect state organization, organs’ activities must be considered 
to be state activities and cannot be attributed to the individual. Accordingly, state 
activities are completely out of the reach of foreign jurisdictions. When a grave 
breach is committed by a state, international law exceptionally allows the injured 
state to exercise criminal jurisdiction over foreign organs by means of reprisal.
Th us, in Sperduti’s conception, individual liability for international crimes is 
transposed into the framework of a bilateral relationship between states – the injured 
state and the responsible state. All in all, in the traditional view, international law was 
strictly conﬁ ned to the regulation of reciprocal state behaviour. It may have seemed 
natural, therefore, to frame this new phenomenon (individual criminal liability) 
according to the existing conception of international law. Th us, Sperduti proposed 
to conceive of individual liability for international crimes (i.e., the attribution of 
state activities directly to state organs in breach of the obligation to attribute such 
behaviour to the state) as a special form of state responsibility.
A systematic analysis of the international literature shows that a similar view – 
sometimes designated as the ‘privative sanction’ or ‘privative guarantee’ theory44 – has 
41 Ibid., p. 187.
42 Th e term ‘justiﬁ cation’ is used here to indicate the legal requirement which under international law 
transforms a wrongful act into a countermeasure characterized by its “légalité globale” (D. Alland,
Justice privée et ordre juridique international. Etude théorique des contre-mesures en droit international 
public (Paris, Pedone, 1994), pp. 59–60).
43 G. Sperduti, ‘Sull’esenzione degli Stati stranieri dalla giurisdizione’, 27 Giurisprudenza completa 
della Corte suprema di cassazione. Sezioni civili (1948), p. 593.
44 Th is particular expression is used to refer to sanctions consisting of the possibility for the injured 
state to lawfully suspend the binding force of a legal norm attributing a subjective right to the 
responsible state. Th at is why the sanction results in being ‘privative’.
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been subscribed to by other scholars.45 Moreover, this theory has also been adopted 
by some scholars who explicitly relied upon it to aﬃ  rm the criminal responsibility 
of states under international law. It has been held that, while states cannot bear 
criminal sanctions, states’ criminal behaviour can be sanctioned by punishing the 
responsible organs. Individual criminal liability under international law can be con-
ceived of as a special sanction for grave state violations. In particular, international 
criminal law supplies state responsibility with a regime of criminal responsibility 
which could not be elaborated with respect to states. Th e mechanism allowing for 
the conception of individual punishment as a sanction against the criminal state 
is the one described above: the perpetration of the state crime allows the injured 
state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over the responsible organs, disregarding 
the right of the responsible state to have its eﬀ ective organization respected.
According to García-Amador, state responsibility under modern international 
law is no longer conﬁ ned to a regime of civil responsibility, as it can also have a 
criminal character.46 In particular, the most important consequence of this new 
kind of state responsibility is the punishment of those state organs responsible for 
the breach of fundamental international obligations.
Th e origin of this new regime of criminal responsibility of states corresponds 
to the one identiﬁ ed by Sperduti: the importance of the international obligation 
which has been breached.47 Th e diﬀ erence between the two approaches lies in the 
fact that the latter considers the consequences of such violations, i.e., individual 
criminal liability, to be a “sanction pénale” against the responsible state or, better 
yet, a substitute for criminal sanctions, which can hardly be applicable to states.48 
45 See M.L. Forlati Picchio, supra note 36, p. 41 (note 72), and pp. 257–258 (note 184). According 
to Wengler, the victim state or third states can punish foreign state organs who have committed 
genocide, war crimes or the crime of aggression, notwithstanding the fact that they were acting in 
their oﬃ  cial capacity, because in such cases “the suspension of the immunity rule is itself a legal 
sanction provided for in international law” (W. Wengler, ‘Public International Law. Paradoxes of 
a Legal Order’, 158 RCADI (1977), p. 25). A similar view has been expressed with respect to the 
punishment of war criminals before WWI by G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied 
by International Courts and Tribunals (London, Stevens & Sons Limited, 1968), pp. 453–4.
46 F.V. García-Amador, ‘Rapport sur la Responsabilité des Etats’, YILC, vol. II, 1956, p. 180. See 
the analysis of García-Amador’s position by G. Nolte, ‘From Dionisio Anzilotti to Roberto Ago: 
Th e Classical International Law of State Responsibility and the Traditional Primacy of a Bilateral 
Conception of Inter-state Relations’, 13 EJIL (2002), p. 1096.
47 F.V. García-Amador, ‘Rapport sur la Responsabilité des Etats’, YILC, vol. II, 1956, p. 184. In par-
ticular, the examples he gives all concern the traditional categories of the most serious breaches of 
international law – crimes against humanity, genocide, aggression – giving rise to both aggravated 
state responsibility and individual criminal liability.
48 “[C]ette nouvelle conception aurait le grand avantage de vaincre la répugnance parfaitement justiﬁ ée 
que l’on éprouvait à imposer des sanctions à une collectivité nationale toute entière, absolument étrangère 
à l’acte punissable. D’autre part, le châtiment du coupable ne serait pas en soi incompatible avec la 
conception traditionnelle, selon laquelle ce châtiment est un des éléments de la « satisfaction ». A cet égard, 
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Th us, except for the particular aim of aﬃ  rming state criminal responsibility, García-
Amador reaches the same conclusion as Sperduti, i.e., that international criminal 
responsibility of state organs (“les auteurs d’actes illicites qui engagent la responsabilité 
civile de l’Etat”) is an exception, provided for by international law, to the general 
principle protecting states from external interference. What is slightly diﬀ erent is 
the principle invoked thereto. Sperduti’s obligation to respect state organization is 
replaced by the duty of non-interference. However, both principles can be regarded 
as corollaries of the more general rule on sovereign equality of states.
A very similar approach was put forward by Drost.49 Starting from the assumption 
that states can commit international crimes but that criminal law cannot be applied 
to states, he reached the conclusion that state criminal responsibility overlaps with 
the criminal responsibility of its organs.50 Th us, the prosecution of state organs 
charged with international crimes by foreign tribunals becomes possible through 
an exception to the principle regarding diplomatic immunity.51
After these ﬁ rst attempts aiming to bring back the newly established regime 
of international criminal law into the framework of traditional bilateral state 
responsibility, an analogous conception of the relationship between state and 
individual responsibility can still be found in more recent works of international 
law scholars.
Modern commentators take into account important developments that have 
occurred in international law in the last decades. Th ese include, ﬁ rst of all, the 
universal recognition of the category of obligations owed to the international com-
l’innovation porterait plus sur la forme que sur le fond. Un autre argument serait décisif: cette solution 
serait entièrement conforme à la pratique des accords internationaux qui déﬁ nissent et règlementent la 
répression des delicta juris gentium, accords en vertu desquels l’Etat s’engage à punir ses propres ressor-
tissants; elle serait conforme également au système inauguré par la Convention sur le génocide à propos 
des « crimes contre la paix et la sécurité de l’humanité ». On ne pourrait donc faire valoir qu’une seule 
objection contre la suggestion de Lauterpacht: la solution qu’il envisage suppose une ingérence dans les 
aﬀ aires qui relèvent exclusivement de la compétence nationale de l’Etat. Pour répondre à cette nouvelle 
objection, aussi valable que celle que l’on a fait valoir contre l’idée d’inﬂ iger des sanctions à l’Etat, on 
pourrait exiger que le fait « punissable » soit punissable en vertu du droit international. En réalité, 
à partir du moment où l’on admet la notion de responsabilité pénale de l’individu, on ne peut contester 
qu’il y ait lieu de punir les auteurs d’actes illicites qui engagent la responsabilité civile de l’Etat, si ces 
actes constituent de véritables délits internationaux” (ibid., pp. 212–213, emphasis added).
49 P.N. Drost, Humanicide. International Governmental Crime Against Individual Human Rights 
(Leiden, Sythoﬀ , 1959).
50 “[C]ollective crime is essentially a combination of individual crimes to be repressed by the judicial 
establishment of numerous cases of individual liability to personal punishment. . . . Th e criminality 
of a human group dissolves into the criminality of its human members since there exists neither 
a group’s body nor a group’s mind to be held criminally responsible for the incriminated deeds 
performed in concerted action by the combined members of the group.” (ibid., pp. 295, and 
297).
51 Ibid., p. 311.
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munity as a whole. Th e aﬃ  rmation of jus cogens and erga omnes obligations had a deep 
impact on international law, and in particular on the law of state responsibility.52 
Th us, the protection of fundamental values of international law could no longer be 
conﬁ ned to the strait-jacket of a bilateral regime of responsibility. A mechanism of 
reaction against serious breaches of the most important international obligations 
became an urgent need. Th is led to the elaboration of the doctrine of aggravated 
state responsibility. On the other hand, international criminal law was regarded 
as aiming at the protection of fundamental values belonging to the international 
community as a whole. International rules providing for individual criminal 
liability were therefore listed among erga omnes obligations, and even jus cogens.53 
Consequently, the conceptual framework under examination had to be adapted to 
such new circumstances in order to maintain its cogency. Th us, the fundamental 
change in more recent contributions does not concern the basic mechanism of the 
‘speciﬁ c reprisal’, but the fact that individual criminal liability becomes one of the 
consequences (if not the sole consequence) of aggravated state responsibility.
Lattanzi essentially adheres to the conception of individual criminal liability as 
a form of aggravated responsibility of states, and refers to the same mechanism 
as the one Sperduti had aﬃ  rmed decades before.54 However, this mechanism is 
adapted to the new conceptual framework. Th e indication of serious breaches giv-
ing rise to special consequences turns here into an explicit reference to jus cogens 
norms.55 Particularly, delicta juris gentium – crimes against peace, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity – are listed among the most important international rules 
protecting the fundamental values of the international community as a whole 
and therefore giving rise to an aggravated regime of state responsibility, where the 
52 See supra the Introduction. Such developments have been welcomed by many, but they have also 
been the subject of strong criticism. See, in particular, P. Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law’, 77 AJIL (1983), p. 413.
53 See, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998, paras. 
151–7; House of Lords, Pinochet II, supra Chapter 1, note 18, p. 88; M.C. Bassiouni, Le fonti e 
il contenuto del diritto penale internazionale. Un quadro teorico (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1999), p. 65. 
54 F. Lattanzi, Garanzie dei diritti dell’uomo nel diritto internazionale generale (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1983), 
p. 357. See also F. Lattanzi, ‘Riﬂ essioni sulla competenza di una Corte penale internazionale’, 76 
Riv. Dir. Int. (1993), p. 661. First, the general assumption is that individuals have no internation-
al legal personality (F. Lattanzi, Garanzie dei diritti dell’uomo nel diritto internazionale generale, 
p. 354, note 4). Second, the repression of individual crimes is exclusively attributed to domestic 
legal systems (ibid., pp. 353–4). Th erefore, no individual criminal liability is provided for under 
international law (ibid.). Th e punishment of state organs is strictly derived from the commission 
by states of particularly serious breaches of international obligations. International crimes – war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace – are particularly serious wrongful state 
acts, and only entail individual liability if they are perpetrated by states. Consequently, the sanction 
provided for by international law is directed against the responsible state, i.e., its organization.
55 Ibid., p. 352.
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criminal liability of state organs represents only one of the possible special conse-
quences for the commission of state crimes.56 In other words, the punishment of 
state organs ﬁ nds its place among the special consequences of ‘international crimes’ 
as codiﬁ ed by the ILC in Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
adopted in 1976.57 
Furthermore, the general framework of the relationship between state and indi-
vidual responsibility for international crimes is no longer the strictly bilateral regime 
of ordinary state responsibility, but the new regime of aggravated state responsi-
bility, which entails a relationship between the author state and the international 
community as a whole. Th e punishment of state organs by a foreign tribunal is no 
longer a ‘speciﬁ c reprisal’ of the injured state. It becomes a measure that every state 
can adopt on behalf of the entire international community, that is, a decentralized 
sanction by an implicitly delegated agent. Indeed, since the regime of aggravated 
state responsibility lacks an institutional mechanism of reaction against the breach 
of obligation owed to the international community as a whole, Lattanzi maintains 
that under international law every state has a subjective right to react against such 
serious breaches.58
More recently, a similar theory has been advocated by Maison, who has taken 
into account a further evolution of the international community, that is, the process 
of institutionalization of international criminal law,59 in particular, international 
criminal tribunals.60 While Maison excludes, on the one hand, that “l’individu – en 
tant que tel – se trouve directement obligé par le droit international ”,61 and, on the 
other, that international tribunals’ power to prosecute individuals for international 
56 Ibid., pp. 419–422.
57 Ibid., p. 533.
58 In particular, the decentralized sanction against international crimes consists of the fact that the 
author state is no longer protected under international law, and that the other states can accord-
ingly prosecute its organs (ibid., p. 419). With respect to ‘other states’, she speciﬁ es that general 
international law allows any state to punish those responsible for international crimes (ibid., 
p. 417).
59 R. Maison, La responsabilité individuelle pour crime de l’Etat en droit international public (Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 2004). Maison starts from the assumption that international crimes are prohibited by 
peremptory norms of international law (ibid., pp. 11–17). Th erefore, it is their special nature that 
justiﬁ es an aggravated regime of state responsibility and, in particular, a centralized reaction of the 
international community towards the responsible state (ibid., pp. 18–19). Crimes against peace, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes are regarded as collective criminal phenomena, that is, 
essentially state crimes (ibid., p. 28). Individual accountability of state organs is accordingly simply 
an indirect sanction for the responsible state. Th e legal relation which is taken into account is that 
between the international community as a whole and the responsible state.
60 Th e international courts she takes into account are essentially the IMT, the IMTFE, the ICTY, 
the ICTR, and the ICC. 
61 R. Maison, supra note 59, p. 3. Th us, individual criminal liability cannot be regarded as a separate 
regime under international law.
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crimes is simply carried out “au nom commun des diﬀ érents Etats y participant”,62 she 
concludes that institutional repression of international crimes is a special sanction 
of the international community against the author state.63 Th us, the new element 
consists of the fact that the punishment of state organs is considered to be a direct 
and centralized reaction of the international community as a whole.
What is the nature of this reaction? As the legal relation arising from the com-
mission of an international crime is no longer considered to be a bilateral relation 
between the injured state and the responsible state, the mechanism of the ‘speciﬁ c 
reprisal’ seems to be unworkable. Maison holds that this reaction consists of a dif-
ferent mechanism, namely, the breach of the international customary obligation 
which prohibits every state from exercising its jurisdiction over a foreign state.64 Th e 
sanction for the commission of international crimes is therefore the imposition of 
compulsory jurisdiction over the author state, since such a compulsory jurisdiction 
is normally illegal under customary international law.65 After all, such a mechanism 
is not so diﬀ erent from the ‘speciﬁ c reprisal’ examined above. Certainly, it focuses 
on jurisdiction rather than immunity. However, the breach – by the injured state 
or the international community – concerns the ‘respect of state internal organiza-
tion’ or the principle par in parem non habet jurisdictionem, which is a corollary of 
sovereignty. Th us, the commission of state crimes allows, as a sanction, a certain 
degree of intrusion into state sovereignty. Th is actually would consist of the fact 
that international tribunals have to assess the requirements of state responsibility for 
62 Ibid., pp. 10–11. 
63 See also R. Maison, ‘Les poursuites pénales internationales comme modalité de réparation du 
crime d’Etat’, in Studi di diritto internazionale in onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, vol. I (Napoli, 
Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 2004), p. 808 et seq. For a similar view, see M. Iovane, La tutela dei valori 
fondamentali nel diritto internazionale (Napoli, Editoriale scientiﬁ ca, 2000), pp. 542–564, aﬃ  r-
ming that the establishment of the ICTY is a centralized sanction of the international community 
against the responsible state. By contrast, he maintains that the establishment of the ICTR could 
not be explained in the same manner (ibid., pp. 564–566).
64 R. Maison, supra note 59, pp. 407–8 (“Cette théorie des représailles, formulée dans le cadre de la 
poursuite d’agents étrangers devant le juge interne, ne peut être appliquée telle quelle à l’institution de 
poursuites internationales. En eﬀ et, on a constaté que le juge pénal international n’est jamais tenu de 
respecter les règles immunitaires classiques. La ‘sanction’ de l’illicite étatique ne consiste donc pas dans 
la levée au cas par cas de l’immunité d’actes de fonction mais dans l’institution même d’une juridiction 
internationale obligatoire, dont le principe est exceptionnel. Imposer à un Etat le jugement de ses actes 
par l’intermédiaire de l’accusation pénale de ses agents peut sans doute être appréhendé comme une mesure 
de représailles, au sens où cette imposition constitue un acte normalement illicite, qui tire sa validité 
de la perpétration par cet Etat d’une infraction internationale. Cependant, le caractère centralisé de la 
décision d’instituer un tribunal ad hoc ou de saisir la nouvelle juridiction permanente d’actes d’un Etat 
non partie à son Statut correspond mal à la notion juridique de représailles fréquemment attachée à une 
relation non institutionnalisée. Une telle décision s’intègre plus évidemment au régime de responsabilité 
découlant du crime d’Etat.”).
65 Ibid., pp. 417–419.
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international crimes, since international crimes are collective criminal phenomena 
and they can only prosecute state organs.66
Similar views seem to be shared by other international law scholars who have 
indirectly dealt with more speciﬁ c questions raised by the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes. 
A certain tendency to conceive of individual liability for international crimes 
as a part of the wider legal framework of interstate responsibility for breaches of 
erga omnes obligations can be perceived in the work of Picone. It is well known 
that this author is among those who developed the idea that breaches of erga omnes 
obligations entail a decentralized reaction performed by states acting on behalf of 
the international community as a whole.67 It is in the frame of this sophisticated 
theory that he has also addressed the speciﬁ c question of the legal foundations of 
the establishment of the ICTY.68 In particular, the prosecution of state organs by 
the ad hoc tribunal is seen as a speciﬁ c sanction adopted by the SC on behalf of the 
international community as a whole against states that have committed atrocities – 
i.e., serious breaches of erga omnes obligations – during the conﬂ ict in the Bal-
66 Unfortunately, when attempts are made to locate such a sanction in the regime of aggravated 
state responsibility, individual criminal liability is vaguely associated with a very broad concept 
of reparation for wrongful acts: “[elle] trouve sa place dans un régime sui generis de réparation du 
crime d’Etat. Alors seulement, elle est amenée à remplir sa fonction principale de satisfaction, tandis 
qu’associée à d’autres mesures contraignantes elle garantit également la non-répétition de l’illicite, 
en laissant subsister, lorsqu’elle peut être mise en œuvre, une obligation collective de restitution ou de 
compensation des dommages créés par l’illicite” (ibid., p. 510, emphasis added).
67 See P. Picone, Comunità internazionale e obblighi erga omnes: studi critici di diritto internazionale 
(Napoli, Jovene, 2006).
68 See P. Picone, ‘Sul fondamento giuridico del Tribunale penale internazionale per la ex Iugoslavia’, 
51 Comunità Internaz. (1996), p. 3 et seq. Th e legal basis of the establishment of the ICTY by 
the SC has been identiﬁ ed by international law scholars either in the UN Charter or in custom-
ary international law. Th ere have also been authors pronouncing against its legitimacy. See, in 
general, A. Bernardini, ‘Il Tribunale penale internazionale per la (ex) Iugoslavia: considerazioni 
giuridiche’, 4 I diritti dell’uomo, cronache e battaglie (1993), pp. 15–25; A. Pellet, ‘Le Tribunal 
criminel international pour l’ex Yougoslavie’, 98 RGDIP (1994), pp. 7–60; C. Tomuschat, ‚Ein 
internationales Strafgerichtshof als Element einer Weltfriedensordnunng’, 49 Europa Archiv (1994), 
pp. 61–70; G. Carella, ‘Il Tribunale penale internazionale per la ex Iugoslavia’, supra note 37; 
F.L. Kirgis, ‘Th e Security Council’s First Fifty Years’, 89 AJIL (1995), p. 506–539; G. Arangio-Ruiz, 
‘Th e Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Territory of Yugoslavia 
and the Doctrine of Implied Powers of the United Nations’, in F. Lattanti and E. Sciso (eds.), 
Dai Tribunali penali internazionali ad hoc a una Corte permanente (Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 
1996), pp. 31–45; T. Christakis, L’ONU, le Chapitre VII et la crise Yougoslave (Paris, Montchrestien, 
1996), pp. 187–204; P. Palchetti, ‘Il potere del Consiglio di sicurezza di istituire tribunali penali 
internazionali’, 79 Riv. Dir. Int. (1996), p. 413; D. Shraga and R. Zacklin, ‘Th e International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, 7 EJIL (1996), pp. 501–518; M.C. Vitucci, Il Tribunale ad hoc 
per la ex Iugoslavia e il consenso degli Stati (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1998); B. Conforti, Le Nazioni unite 
(7th edn, Padova, Cedam, 2005), pp. 219–222.
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kans.69 Th e emphasis is put on the role of the SC as a ‘material organ’ of the entire 
international community, and on the power it has under customary law to adopt 
punitive measures against those states seriously breaching erga omnes obligations. 
Th e establishment of the ICTY and the punishment of state organs (who have 
committed international crimes) appears to be conceived of as a sanction imposed 
on the wrongful state and not on the individual.70 International crimes are com-
mitted by states,71 and the establishment of the ICTY can be seen as an interstate 
measure essentially aiming at sanctioning the author state or states.72
In his book on the immunity of state organs under international law, De Sena 
addresses the problem of the punishment of state organs who have committed 
international crimes.73 In principle, he rejects the existence of a general rule estab-
lishing the immunity ratione materiae of state organs under customary law,74 and 
accordingly he accepts that both international tribunals and domestic courts can 
prosecute those organs charged with international crimes without breaching the 
rules on functional immunity. Th erefore, the punishment of state organs should not 
be regarded as speciﬁ c countermeasures against the responsible state.75 However, 
when state organs are accused of crimes committed by the entire state apparatus, 
they are responsible for conduct which is substantially attributable to the state. To 
be more precise, with respect to ‘state crimes’ the punishment of state organs by 
the competent tribunal must be based on the preliminary ﬁ nding that a serious 
breach of community obligations has been committed by the state.76 Only states 
can commit such crimes, and state organs are punished on behalf of the author 
state.77 On the other hand, state organs can be prosecuted before international 
tribunals for ‘state crimes’ since this can be regarded as a special centralized sanc-
69 P. Picone, ‘Interventi delle Nazioni Unite e obblighi erga omnes’, in P. Picone (ed.), Interventi delle 
Nazioni Unite e diritto internazionale (Padova, Cedam, 1995), p. 551 (note 116); P. Picone, supra 
note 68, p. 12.
70 P. Picone, supra note 68, p. 8.
71 Ibid., p. 16.
72 Ibid., p. 15.
73 P. De Sena, Diritto internazionale e immunità funzionale degli organi statali (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 
1996).
74 Ibid., p. xviii. Th e traditional approach is to recognize a certain immunity on the part of state 
organs acting in their oﬃ  cial capacity. See, in general, A. Cassese, supra note 12, pp. 90, and 93–97. 
On the particular question concerning the prosecution of state organs for international crimes, 
and the way in which the lifting of this immunity can be justiﬁ ed under international law in this 
particular case, see infra Chapter 8, note 1.
75 P. De Sena, supra note 73, p. 184. 
76 Ibid., p. 186.
77 Th erefore, he admits that the immunity of the state itself can (exceptionally) shield those state 
organs who are responsible for ‘state crimes’ from prosecution before domestic courts of other 
countries (ibid., pp. xix, 176, and 178).
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tion adopted by the entire international community against the wrongful state, 
and not the individual.78 
Finally, a more recent analysis is carried out by May, who nonetheless limits his 
theoretical inquiry to crimes against humanity.79 He starts his analysis from the 
assumption that states must protect a basic minimum of individual rights. Th us, 
sovereignty can legitimately be breached by the entire international community if 
states commit international crimes, since these crimes are violations of this minimum 
protection provided under peremptory international law.80 According to what he 
calls the ‘international harm’ principle,81 the international community has a legal 
interest to react against crimes committed by states or targeting a whole social group. 
In particular, when such crimes are committed by states, sovereignty dissolves, and 
state organs can be prosecuted. Th us, international criminal tribunals must ﬁ rst 
demonstrate the special interest of the international community before establishing 
individual criminal liability. Accordingly, they must focus on the most serious inter-
national crimes only and exclude from prosecution individually-oriented crimes.82 
In particular, a link must always be established between the individual conduct of 
the accused and the collective criminal context. Th is should in principle exclude 
the responsibility of non-state organs and of minor players who are not suﬃ  ciently 
linked to the larger criminal policy of the state. Prosecution should concentrate 
on state leaders, that is, those persons who have devised the state criminal policy 
and have ordered the carrying out of international crimes.83 
78 Ibid., pp. 185 and 187 (note 105). It must be noted that De Sena distinguishes two diﬀ erent cat-
egories of international crimes. On the one hand, there are typical ‘individual crimes’ which entail 
a form of individual criminal liability that is completely independent from state responsibility. Th is 
is the case, for instance, of certain war crimes and of the crime of ‘oﬃ  cial torture’. On the other 
hand, there are ‘state crimes’, namely, what De Sena calls crimes attributable “to the entire state 
organization” (ibid., pp. 149–166). And the typical state-oriented scheme displayed by this author 
is limited to this latter category of international crimes. For example, the IMT and the prosecu-
tion of Nazi criminals is considered to be one of the various measures taken at the end of WWII 
to secure the “systematic dismantlement of the entire German state organization” (ibid., p. 185, 
emphasis added). Similarly, the establishment of the ICTY is better understood as a sanction 
adopted by the international community as a whole – through the Security Council – against those 
states taking part in the Balkan conﬂ ict, rather than a form of punishment of those individuals 
responsible for the international crimes committed in such a context (ibid., p. 187, note 105).
79 L. May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
80 Ibid., pp. 68–71.
81 Ibid., pp. 80–95.
82 Ibid., pp. 115–138.
83 Ibid., pp. 139–156. Inevitably, May is particularly unsatisﬁ ed with existing elements of crimes 
against humanity (and genocide) which do not manifest the collective nature of this international 
crime (ibid., pp. 157–176). While command responsibility is proposed as the ideal form of indi-
vidual criminal liability for the purpose of prosecuting state leaders, he pleads for an extended 
conception of defences in order to shield minor players from punishment (ibid., pp. 179–200).
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3. Th e Individual-Oriented and State-Oriented Conceptual Schemes
It is important to point out that it is diﬃ  cult to generalize as regards the positions 
of the international law scholars examined above. Th ese views are not only very 
diﬀ erent, but they have also been elaborated in the framework of very diﬀ erent 
conceptions of the international legal order. However, it seems possible to use these 
views as a valid starting point from which to identify the conceptual schemes that 
can abstractly order the relationship between state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes. Indeed, the purpose of this section is to understand, from a 
purely theoretical viewpoint, the range of (extreme) conceptions of this relationship. 
Th is inquiry into the theoretical schemes that can govern the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes is essential because it 
provides for the general framework in which to locate and discuss the practical 
problems concerning this relationship.
Ideally, two opposed conceptual schemes can be applied to the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. At one end of 
the spectrum, there is a conception grounded on the complete separation of these 
regimes and putting the emphasis on their mutual diﬀ erences. At the other hand, 
by contrast, there is a conception which focuses on the close connections between 
these regimes and considers them to be the two parts of a unitary system of conse-
quences to be attached to the most serious breaches of community obligations.
A. Individual-Oriented Conceptual Scheme
What may be called an ‘individual-oriented conceptual scheme’ starts from the 
basic assumption concerning the dissociation between the conduct of the state and 
that of its organs. It takes into account the particular characteristics of international 
criminal law which are regarded as completely diﬀ erent from those of state responsi-
bility, and it leads to the conclusion that individual accountability for international 
crimes is totally independent of aggravated state responsibility.
Th is individual-oriented scheme essentially focuses on the autonomy of individual 
criminal liability. International crimes of individuals can be committed, established 
and punished independently of the attribution of state responsibility for the same 
wrongful acts. State and individual responsibility are totally independent because 
they are governed by diﬀ erent primary and secondary norms under international 
law. Individual criminal liability for international crimes is established having 
regard only to very personal elements, such as the actus reus and the mens rea of the 
accused, and not because of the particular position in state hierarchy or because 
of the contribution to a broader criminal activity carried out at the state level. 
While aggravated state responsibility is a collective responsibility to be attributed 
to a collective entity, individual criminal liability is a personal responsibility to be 
attributed individually to any oﬀ ender. 
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On the other hand, the individual-oriented scheme does not deny the parallel 
existence of an aggravated regime of state responsibility for international crimes. 
In order for such a terminology not to be misleading, it must be clariﬁ ed that this 
approach does not exclude the possibility of an overlap between state and indi-
vidual responsibility, in the sense that certain wrongful acts may give rise to a dual 
responsibility under international law. However, this overlap has no legal eﬀ ect 
in the establishment of individual criminal liability, which is completely separate 
from that of state responsibility. 
It is from this point of view that, in its more radical version, the individual-ori-
ented scheme denies any relationship between state and individual responsibility 
for international crimes. Th ey both deal with the commission of international 
crimes, and both states and individuals are responsible under international law, but 
no connection or link can be established between the rules governing aggravated 
state responsibility and individual criminal liability respectively. Accordingly, the 
problems that may be associated with such a relationship should be solved in dif-
ferent ways from the standpoint of individual criminal liability and from that of 
aggravated state responsibility respectively, since the overlap between these regimes 
is legally irrelevant. To be more precise, the mere idea of a relationship is abstractly 
unacceptable, because (by deﬁ nition) there can be no relationship between two 
completely separate regimes.
Th is conceptual scheme essentially focuses on international criminal law, its 
basic assumption and its main features which profoundly diﬀ erentiate it from 
state responsibility. State and individual responsibility for international crimes 
stem from diﬀ erent sets of international law rules, and therefore are established 
by diﬀ erent bodies, according to diﬀ erent rules, diﬀ erent requirements, diﬀ er-
ent purposes, and give rise to diﬀ erent consequences for the responsible subject. 
Th e fact that the same serious breach of community obligations can also give 
rise to aggravated state responsibility is generally considered, from this point of 
view, to be irrelevant. In the end, this approach leads to the conclusion that no 
relationship between state and individual responsibility needs to be taken into 
account.
B. State-Oriented Conceptual Scheme
From an opposite perspective, the relationship between state and individual respon-
sibility for international crimes tends to fade out in a scheme which is totally state-
oriented. International crimes are committed by states, and individual criminal 
liability for serious breaches of obligations owed to the international community 
as a whole is understood as a form of aggravated state responsibility. 
What may be called a ‘state-oriented conceptual scheme’ relies on a basic assump-
tion positing the identity between the state conduct amounting to an international 
crime and that of its organs. Th is assumption implies that there is only one subject 
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responsible under international law: the state. Private individuals cannot be held 
responsible for international crimes, nor can state organs be held responsible when 
acting in their private capacity. State organs can only be punished when their conduct 
is attributable to the state. Indeed, under this basic (ﬁ ctive) assumption there is 
only one wrongful act: that of the author state. Th is has a signiﬁ cant consequence: 
individuals cannot be prosecuted for crimes not reaching the threshold of serious 
breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a whole entailing 
aggravated state responsibility. 
Th erefore, individual criminal liability should depend on the establishment of 
a generalized context of state criminality, i.e., the serious breach giving rise to the 
international responsibility of the author state. Individual and state responsibility 
are so closely connected that the same requirements must be met. If the criteria 
for establishing individual criminal liability and aggravated state responsibility 
are the same, this also means that state organs should be punished according to 
their participation in this broad context, and according to their oﬃ  cial position in 
the state apparatus. Indeed, the assumption of identical criteria implies that state 
leaders should bear greater responsibility than low-ranking oﬀ enders. Th is can be 
problematic from the standpoint of international criminal law, because individual 
liability can turn into a form of vicarious responsibility.
In addition, the basic assumption of the identity between the conduct of the 
state and that of its organs implies that, under international law, there is only one 
set of consequences attached to the serious breach of community obligations, that 
is, aggravated state responsibility. In particular, this regime provides for the pos-
sibility to breach state organs’ immunity or to impose a compulsory jurisdiction 
over the responsible state by prosecuting its organs. Th is is regarded as a special 
sanction because these acts would otherwise be prohibited under international 
law. Individual criminal liability does not give rise to a separate regime of interna-
tional responsibility. Individuals, or rather state organs, are currently prosecuted 
for international crimes, but this should not be regarded as an emerging form of 
international criminal law. It is simply an indirect and speciﬁ c expression of state 
responsibility. 
According to this conceptual scheme, individual criminal liability is a special 
secondary rule provided for under the regime of aggravated state responsibility. Th e 
commission of international crimes consequently gives rise to a particular relation-
ship between the author state and the entire international community. Th us, the 
punishment of the responsible state organs is considered to be a centralized reac-
tion by the international community against the author state. Most importantly, 
the establishment of individual criminal liability implies the assessment of the 
requisites of aggravated state responsibility, since the punishment of individuals 
strictly depends upon their participation in the wider context of state criminality. 
Th e unity posited with respect to the subjects of international law is maintained 
until the end, at the stage of the establishment of international responsibility: the 
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same sets, not only of primary norms but also of secondary norms, govern both 
state and individual responsibility.
It is from this point of view that, in its more radical version, the state-oriented 
scheme denies any relationship between state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes. Th e regime of international responsibility arising out of the 
breach of obligations owed to the international community as a whole is conceived 
of by means of a single theoretical perspective: there is one subject, one wrongful 
act, one set of consequences. Th erefore, there is only one international responsibility 
regime: aggravated state responsibility. Th is is because individual responsibility is 
brought back into the framework of aggravated state responsibility. State organs 
are prosecuted but this is merely a special consequence of state crimes. Individual 
criminal liability is a metaphor, in the literal sense of this word. In reality, when 
organs face trial for international crimes, a sanction is imposed on their state. 
4. Concluding Observations
Th e theoretical schemes identiﬁ ed above represent two ideal paradigms for the 
relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. 
As such, they can hardly be sustained in their theoretical comprehensiveness, and 
rather more nuanced views can be envisaged. However, this eﬀ ort of conceptual-
ization is important because it reveals the basic underlying assumptions as well as 
the pros and the cons of the two opposite perspectives of the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility. 
Th e individual-oriented scheme takes into account recent developments of 
international criminal law and puts the emphasis on the fact that the two regimes 
of international responsibility for core crimes serve parallel functions within their 
respective spheres. Accordingly, the problems that may be entailed by the relation-
ship between international criminal law can receive totally diﬀ erent solutions, and 
the latter can develop its own rules in perfect independence from the former.
On the other hand, the state-oriented scheme focuses on the close connec-
tions that may link state and individual responsibility for international crimes. In 
particular, it has the advantage of recomposing the normative unity of the regime 
concerning international crimes at the stage of secondary rules, even though this 
is only a relative unity.84 Th erefore, the problems emerging from the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility can consistently be solved according 
to the principles governing state responsibility.
84 Th e price to be paid is that crimes committed by individuals in their private capacity – whether 
private individuals or state organs – are totally disregarded. Th erefore, a separate regime of criminal 
liability must be established in domestic legal orders to deal with the latter class of crimes.
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However, both these conceptual schemes have in common a major drawback. 
While the individual-oriented scheme a priori denies any relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes, the state-oriented scheme 
ends up nullifying this relationship, as it is completely ‘internalized’ in the regime of 
aggravated state responsibility. In both cases, the result is that, in fact, no relationship 
between state and individual responsibility needs to be taken into account. 
It will be shown and discussed in due course that these radical views of the rela-
tionship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes are not 
reﬂ ected in international practice, which seems more complex and multifaceted by 
far, and which pays more attention to the points of contact between these regimes. 
To give an example, while international law ﬁ nally seems prepared to take into 
account individuals, international practice shows that its present challenge is to 
ﬁ nd ways to deal eﬃ  ciently with collective criminality. Unlike municipal law,85 
international criminal law contemplates only individuals as perpetrators. How-
ever, it focuses most of the time on crimes committed at the collective level, and 
international jurisprudence shows that it is developing speciﬁ c tools to address this 
kind of collective crimes. From a comparative perspective this may be problematic, 
since the theoretical schemes described above do not allow the particular features 
of crimes committed by, for instance, members of criminal organizations, corpora-
tions or military and paramilitary groups, to be duly taken into account. Organized 
criminal phenomena are diﬃ  cult to appraise with the tools of individual criminal 
liability, and they cannot necessarily be framed in terms of state action. Th us, it 
may be extremely diﬃ  cult to establish either individual or state responsibility for 
crimes committed by perpetrators who have participated in a collective criminal 
enterprise, and who share with many other perpetrators the criminal intent.86
85 Domestic case law displays diﬀ erent approaches with respect to collective responsibility for inter-
national crimes. At present, legal entities cannot be held criminally liable under international 
criminal law, but US courts, for example, have recognized that not only natural persons but also 
legal entities can face civil liability when they are found to have committed international crimes 
(see US District Court, Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, pp. 890–892; US District Court, Tachiona 
v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, pp. 309–316). Th us, “non-state entities should be deemed 
individuals for the purposes of eﬀ ectively applying statutes like the ATCA and the TVPA” (ibid., 
p. 313). Most interestingly, reference is made to the development of international law in the area 
of human rights in order to justify the imposition of liability (provided for under domestic law) 
on organized non-state actors (responsible for crimes provided under international law). Th e view 
has been expressed that domestic case law already shows a tendency to recognize the liability of 
legal entities for international crimes, and that a similar development at the international level 
cannot be excluded in the future. See G. Acquaviva, ‘Verso una responsabilità delle multinazionali 
per gravi violazioni dei diritti umani? Note in margine a Doe v. Unocal ’, 57 Comunità Internaz. 
(2002), pp. 593–611, and references therein. 
86 See infra Chapters 3 and 4, and, more generally, Chapter 6.
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Th us, the next step is to leave in the background these conceptual schemes. Th e 
following analysis will concentrate instead on the points of contact between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes, and on the connections 
between them which increasingly emerge in international practice.
Part II
Th e Overlap Between State and Individual 
Responsibility for International Crimes in 
International Practice

Chapter 3
Th e Overlap of the Material Element:
Th e Seriousness Requirement
International practice shows that international crimes are most of the time carried 
out with the substantial involvement of states.1 International crimes are oﬀ ences 
which require to be carried out on such a large scale that the participation or at 
least the support of the state apparatus has often been present. Th us, the material 
element – that is, the conduct amounting to an international crime – represents 
the most important point of contact between state and individual responsibility 
for international crimes.
Th is is also reﬂ ected in the deﬁ nition of international crimes provided under 
customary international law. On the one hand, aggravated state responsibility 
requires the wrongful act to be serious. On the other hand, individual liability 
arises under customary international law for criminal conduct mostly carried out 
in a widespread or systematic manner. In particular, some international crimes 
demonstrate by deﬁ nition a general pre-requisite concerning the seriousness of 
the oﬀ ence. 
Th erefore, it becomes very important to see how this seriousness requirement is 
capable of establishing a relationship between state and individual responsibility. 
In particular, the present inquiry must focus on the way in which the general pat-
tern of state criminality is actually taken into account when establishing individual 
criminal liability. Th is question is crucial to determine whether individuals are 
internationally responsible only for crimes committed in such a widespread and 
systematic manner as to require the involvement of the entire state apparatus. If 
so, it remains to be established whether international criminal tribunals ﬁ rst assess 
aggravated state responsibility or at least a state policy in carrying out international 
crimes before convicting the responsible state organs. Otherwise, the question 
concerns the extent to which the broader criminal context can play a role in hold-
ing individuals accountable for international crimes. 
1 See E. Van Sliedregt, Th e Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (Th e Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2003), pp. 4–5.
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Before trying to answer these questions, the notion of seriousness requires some 
preliminary clariﬁ cation. Two diﬀ erent concepts of seriousness are generally used 
with respect to international crimes, and a clear distinction between the two needs 
to be made.
1. Two Diﬀ erent Concepts of Seriousness
From a very general point of view, all international crimes – no matter whether 
they entail aggravated state responsibility or individual criminal liability – can be 
considered the most serious breaches of fundamental international obligations owed 
to the international community as a whole. At ﬁ rst, gravity is associated with the 
importance of the international obligation breached. From this point of view, gravity 
is a characteristic pertaining to the nature of the primary norm. Th is undoubtedly 
reveals a point of contact between state and individual responsibility. 
Indeed, it was in accordance with this general conception of gravity that Article 
19 on state crimes was drafted.2 Only breaches of the most important primary 
rules should entail a special regime of state responsibility.3 International crimes 
are therefore breaches of a selected group of international rules, which are per se 
of fundamental importance. Th e prohibition of aggression, colonial domination, 
genocide, apartheid and so on are per se fundamental obligations of the international 
legal order. In Ago’s conception, the breach of one of these obligations is per se an 
international crime, and does not need to fulﬁ l any further requirement to lead to 
aggravated state responsibility.4
2 See supra the Introduction.
3 In his Fifth Report, Special Rapporteur Ago made it extremely clear that: “it seems undeniable that 
today, for the international community as a whole, such acts violate principles formally embodied 
in the Charter, and even if the Charter is not taken into account, principles which are now so 
deeply embedded in the consciousness of mankind that they have become particularly important 
rules of general international law. It also seems undeniable that world opinion regards the acts in 
question as genuine ‘crimes’, i.e., wrongful acts which are more serious than others, and that they 
must therefore entail more serious legal consequences . . . Th is is a substantive distinction, related to 
the diﬀ erence in the content of international obligations and to the fact that, while all of them are 
important and while respect for all of them must be ensured, some of them are recognized today 
as being of more fundamental value than others for inter-State society as a whole, and observance 
of these must therefore be guaranteed by laying a heavier responsibility on those infringing them.” 
(R. Ago, ‘Fifth Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1976), vol. II(1), pp. 39 and 50).
4 In Article 19, drafted by Ago, the word ‘serious’ only appears in paragraph 3, giving some exam-
ples of international crimes of state. In the commentary on Article 19, such a requirement is 
considered by the ILC to be implicit in all the examples of paragraph 3, except for the “breach 
of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being”. In this 
case, an additional requirement must be met for the breach to constitute an international crime. 
Moreover, it must be carried out on a widespread scale, that is, the breach “it must take the form 
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Accordingly, the general deﬁ nition of international crimes of state did not refer 
to concrete standards of seriousness, but to a general criterion making it possible 
to shortlist certain international primary norms essential for safeguarding com-
munity interests. Th is criterion is the particular importance attached to certain 
obligations by the international community as a whole. Article 19 (2), provided 
for the following deﬁ nition of state crimes: “An internationally wrongful act 
which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential 
for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that 
its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an 
international crime”.5
In other words, the general criterion of gravity results in a selection made by 
the international community as whole among international obligations aimed 
at safeguarding its fundamental interests. As already discussed, aggravated state 
responsibility arises as a result of the breach of the most important obligations 
owed to the entire international community.6
Th e same is true with respect to international criminal responsibility of indi-
viduals. It only arises out of the breach of the most important obligations owed 
to the international community as a whole. At the beginning of the 1980s, when 
the ILC resumed its work on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, it referred to the same general criterion of gravity adopted 
in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility in selecting international crimes giv-
ing rise to individual criminal liability.7 In more general terms, it is possible to say 
that individual liability for international crimes is limited to the perpetration of 
the most grave violations of international community obligations. Th us, in order 
to establish the existence under customary law of a war crime entailing individual 
criminal liability, the ICTY required (inter alia) the violation to be serious, “that 
is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values”.8
On the one hand, gravity is a criterion used for selecting primary norms whose 
breach will give rise to a particular regime of individual or state responsibility. 
of a large-scale or systematic practice adopted in contempt of the rights and dignity of the human 
being” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 28th Session’, YILC (1976), vol. II(2), p. 121). 
5 Ibid., p. 89. For a similar opinion, according to which the gravity requirement was implicit in 
international crimes of states, see G. Carella, La responsabilità dello stato per crimini internazionali 
(Napoli, Jovene, 1985), p. 249. 
6 See supra Chapter 1.
7 D. Th iam, ‘First Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the peace and Security of Mankind’, 
YILC (1983), vol. II(1), p. 137. See also the discussion of the members of the ILC on the issue, 
YILC (1983), vol. I, p. 2 et seq.
8 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 94. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Martić, TC, Review of the 
Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, 8 March 1996, para. 19; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić, TC, Judgment, 
5 December 2003, paras. 106–112.
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Moreover, it highlights the fact that aggravated state responsibility and individual 
criminal liability share the same normative source, i.e., the category of obliga-
tions owed to the international community as a whole.9 However, such a general 
criterion is not very useful in establishing the material relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes. Despite the fact that these 
regimes derive from the breaches of the same kind of international obligations, it 
does not necessarily follow that they are governed by the same principles or that 
they serve the same purposes.
On the other hand, seriousness is an operational criterion embodying concrete 
standards which permit the identiﬁ cation of those international wrongful acts 
giving rise to either aggravated state responsibility or individual criminal liability. 
From this point of view, seriousness is a requirement provided under a regime of 
international responsibility, that is, secondary norms, in order to attach particular 
consequences to certain (serious) wrongful acts.10 
In the context of an inquiry into the relationship between state and individual 
responsibility, it is very important to keep these two concepts separate.11 Th e ﬁ rst 
 9 See supra Chapter 1. 
10 Interestingly, the distinction between these two diﬀ erent conceptions of seriousness were pointed 
out by the Czech Republic in its Comment on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, suggesting 
that a regime of aggravated state responsibility should be grounded on the second conception of 
seriousness (UN Doc. A/CN.4/488, p. 134). See also P.-M. Dupuy, ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique 
international’, 297 RCADI (2002), p. 365; and S. Villalpando, L’émergence de la communauté 
internationale dans la responsabilité des Etats (Paris, PUF, 2005), pp. 246–259.
11 To give an example, Article 89 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
speaks of ‘serious violations’, and this raises doubts about the diﬀ erence between ‘grave breaches’ 
and ‘serious violations’ (T. Meron, ‘Lex Lata: Is there already a Diﬀ erentiated Regime of State 
Responsibility in the Geneva Conventions?’, in J.H.H. Weiler et al. (eds.), International Crimes 
of State. A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (Berlin, De Gruyter, 
1989), p. 231; L. Condorelli, ‘Th e Continuity between Certain Principles of Humanitarian Law 
and the Concept of Crimes of States’, in J.H.H. Weiler et al. (eds.), International Crimes of State. 
A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1989), 
p. 236). ‘Grave breaches’ are selected breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols entailing individual criminal liability under international law (according to Article 85 of 
Protocol I, they “shall be regarded as war crimes”). Th us, the term ‘grave’ refers to the importance 
of certain primary norms and is used to select those breaches that will give rise to a particular 
regime of individual liability (with respect to breaches of Common Article 3 see, ICTR, Prosecutor 
v. Kamuhanda, TC, Judgment, 22 January 2004, para. 73). On the other hand, the term ‘serious’ 
is used to refer to a characteristic of the wrongful act and consequently to establish a threshold 
(within the regime of state responsibility) beyond which certain consequences can be attached 
to the serious violation (“the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, 
in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter”). 
Th e importance of the distinction between these two concepts of seriousness was pointed out by 
the United Kingdom and France in their comments to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
(UN Doc. A/CN.4/488).
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one pertains to the nature of certain primary norms, and is essential to acknowledge 
a common origin of both aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal 
liability. Th e second one fundamentally is an operational criterion provided for 
under secondary norms, and according to which certain prohibited conduct can 
trigger international responsibility. When this threshold is crossed, state and indi-
vidual responsibility are generally established with respect to the same facts, and 
making a distinction between the two can become very diﬃ  cult. It is on this second 
concept of seriousness that the following pages will mainly focus.
A. Th e Seriousness Requirement under Aggravated State Responsibility
Aggravated state responsibility diﬀ ers from ordinary state responsibility because 
it requires that the breach of an obligation owed to the international community 
as a whole be serious.12 According to Article 40 (2) of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility: “A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or 
systematic failure by the responsible State to fulﬁ l the obligation”.
Th is additional requirement was not present in the former Article 19, except 
for paragraph 3 (c). Indeed, in 1976, seriousness was limited to human rights 
breaches. Accordingly, in order to constitute an international crime, the “breach 
of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human 
being” should be carried out “on a widespread scale”. In particular, the ILC explained 
in the Commentary that this additional requirement was necessary to avoid the 
broadening of the concept of international crimes beyond the actual scope of 
customary international law.13 Th us, only gross violations of human rights would 
entail aggravated state responsibility, while isolated violations would give rise to 
ordinary state responsibility. 
On the other hand, it seemed obvious that all other breaches listed in paragraph 
3 constituted per se international crimes.14 No further requirement was needed to 
consider aggression, establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domina-
tion, slavery, genocide and apartheid as international crimes of state. Indeed, these 
breaches have traditionally been considered typical state crimes, in the sense that 
they have historically been perpetrated on a very large scale and with the indispen-
sable involvement of the state apparatus. 
12 N.H.B. Jørgensen, Th e Responsibility of States for International Crimes (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 106–116; C.J. Tams, ‘All’s Well Th at Ends Well. Comments on the ILC’s Articles 
on State Responsibility’, 62 ZaöRV (2002), p. 773.
13 ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 28th Session’, YILC (1976), vol. II(2), p. 121.
14 Due to their controversial status under customary law, breaches of international obligations “of 
essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as 
those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas” will not be dealt with here. 
See J. Crawford, ‘First Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.1, para. 49.
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A seriousness requirement extending to all breaches of obligations “owed to the 
international community as a whole and essential for the protection of its funda-
mental interests” appears in the draft articles provisionally adopted by the Drafting 
Committee in 2000.15 At that time, the ILC was revising the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility in order to have them adopted at second reading by 2001. 
In particular, the ILC had to deal with the strong criticism aimed at international 
crimes of state. Th us, in redrafting Article 19, the Commission was inevitably faced 
with a diﬀ erent panorama. International criminal law had undergone some major 
developments and had increasingly become emancipated from state responsibil-
ity. In 2000, the Draft Code of Crimes had been adopted, international ad hoc 
tribunals had been established, the ICC statute had been signed, the Nuremberg 
judgment was no longer an isolated international judicial precedent, an increas-
ingly extensive international and national case law had applied and clariﬁ ed a 
wide range of fundamental rules of international criminal law, and a whole set of 
principles had been recognized as the core legal ground for this relatively new ﬁ eld 
of international law. 
Th erefore, in revising the Draft Articles, the ILC had to deal somehow with the 
problem of the relationship between aggravated state responsibility and individual 
criminal liability. While the ILC essentially avoided addressing this problem, the 
seriousness requirement can be regarded as a useful means to reach indirectly such 
an end. Th e seriousness requirement can be seen as a link between aggravated state 
responsibility and individual criminal liability. Crimes entailing individual criminal 
liability under international law can also give rise to aggravated state responsibil-
ity if they are committed by state organs, and if they reach a certain threshold of 
seriousness. 
However, in its Commentary the ILC did not explicitly justify the generaliza-
tion of the seriousness requirement to all categories of international crimes entail-
ing aggravated state responsibility. Th e Commission carefully made clear that no 
criminal responsibility of states is provided for under customary law; that only 
individuals can be held criminally accountable for international crimes; and that 
the codiﬁ cation of aggravated state responsibility must therefore be strictly limited 
to breaches of an uncontroversial category of international obligations and to seri-
ous breaches. Arguably, the generalization of the seriousness requirement oﬀ ered 
an additional safeguard against the criticism concerning this part of its work. In 
practice, the seriousness requirement tends to narrow down the class of wrongful 
acts triggering aggravated state responsibility.16
15 UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.600, 21 August 2000, Article 41.
16 Th e same rationale seems to lie at the basis of the resolution adopted in 2005 by the Institute of 
International Law on ‘Obligations erga omnes in International Law’ (71 Annuaire de l’Institut de 
Droit International (2005), pp. 287–289). According to Article 5 of the resolution, only “widely 
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Th e main problem with that requirement is to identify its precise contents in 
the framework of aggravated state responsibility. As pointed out above, the ILC 
explained in 1976 that violations of human rights would entail aggravated state 
responsibility only if carried out as a “large scale or systematic practice”. Although 
it recalled a wording familiar to international criminal law provisions, the Com-
mission put the emphasis on the ‘practice’ element. A similar view can be found in 
the commentary on Article 40 of the Draft Articles ﬁ nally adopted in 2001.17
It must be noted that in establishing this general requirement of seriousness, 
the Commission maintained that certain breaches are per se serious and by their 
very nature entail aggravated state responsibility. According to the Commission, an 
operational criterion of seriousness is already provided for under certain primary 
norms, such as the prohibition of aggression or genocide. In other words, the mate-
rial element of breaches such as aggression and genocide by deﬁ nition require a 
gross or systematic violation of fundamental international rules.18 Th erefore, these 
primary norms are characterized by their particular importance for the protection 
of community interests and by a deﬁ nition which already includes an operational 
criterion of seriousness. 
With respect to other breaches of obligations owed to the entire international 
community, an additional requirement of seriousness must be fulﬁ lled in order 
to trigger aggravated state responsibility. Th e contents of this seriousness require-
ment corresponds, according to the ILC commentary, to a certain degree of state 
involvement. Although the Commission puts a certain emphasis on the intent 
of the responsible state as an indicium of seriousness, the analysis of this aspect 
can be postponed until the next chapter. It is important here to concentrate on 
acknowledged grave breaches of an erga omnes obligation” can trigger special consequences under 
international law.
17 “Th e word ‘serious’ signiﬁ es that a certain order of magnitude of violation is necessary in order 
not to trivialize the breach and it is not intended to suggest that any violation of these obligations 
is not serious or is somehow excusable. But relatively less serious cases of breach of peremptory 
norms can be envisaged, and it is necessary to limit the scope of this chapter to the more serious 
or systematic breaches. Some such limitation is supported by State practice. . . . To be regarded as 
systematic, a violation would have to be carried out in an organized and deliberate way. In contrast, 
the term ‘gross’ refers to the intensity of the violation or its eﬀ ects; it denotes violations of a ﬂ agrant 
nature, amounting to a direct and outright assault on the values protected by the rule. Th e terms 
are not of course mutually exclusive; serious breaches will usually be both systematic and gross. 
Factors which may establish the seriousness of a violation would include the intent to violate the 
norm; the scope and number of individual violations, and the gravity of their consequences for the 
victims” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 113, paras. 
7 and 8, emphasis added).
18 Ibid., para. 8 (“It must also be borne in mind that some of the peremptory norms in question, most 
notably the prohibitions of aggression and genocide, by their very nature require an intentional 
violation on a large scale”). For a more detailed analysis of these crimes, see infra in this Chapter.
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operational criteria permitting us to establish when wrongful acts amount to ‘seri-
ous breaches’. While the Commission intends to exclude isolated breaches from 
conduct giving rise to aggravated state responsibility, it puts the emphasis on the 
pattern of violations that may occur and on their magnitude. Th is points to the need
for a sum of prohibited conduct to be planned or actually carried out at the state 
level. Th us, the seriousness requirement results not merely in a collection of wrong-
ful acts but in a systematic infringement of fundamental community obligations. 
Th is is something more than the collective perpetration of an international crime. 
Th e seriousness requirement involves a signiﬁ cant participation of the state in the 
breach of the most important obligations owed to the international community as a 
whole. Some commentators refer to breaches committed by the state as a whole or 
by the whole state system.19 When serious breaches are carried out as an extensive 
practice of state organs so as to show a general involvement of the state apparatus, 
then aggravated state responsibility applies. 
An analysis of the relevant international practice conﬁ rms this interpretation of 
the seriousness requirement under state responsibility. Th e Velásquez case20 represents 
a signiﬁ cant example of the way in which the seriousness requirement has actu-
ally been established by the IACHR. In particular, the case is important because 
it shows how a practice of wrongful acts can concretely be taken into account to 
establish a serious breach entailing aggravated state responsibility. Th e case origi-
nated in a petition against Honduras, which was supposedly responsible for the 
violation of the American Convention on Human Rights and, in particular, for the 
disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez. While focusing on a single disappearance, 
the case is noteworthy because the Court accepted a particular approach of the 
Commission in proving the facts underlying the petition. Th is approach relied on 
the existence of a practice of disappearances supported or tolerated by the Govern-
ment of Honduras. Th e Court accepted that: “If it can be shown that there was an 
oﬃ  cial practice of disappearances in Honduras, carried out by the Government 
or at least tolerated by it, and if the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez can be 
linked to that practice, the Commission’s allegations will have been proven to the 
Court’s satisfaction”.21
19 Some scholars even advocate the need to revisit the rules on attribution as far as aggravated state 
responsibility is concerned. See A. Bos, ‘Crimes of State: In Need of Legal Rules?’, in G. Kreijen 
(ed.), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 
234–237; A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility 
in International Law’, 52 ICLQ (2003), p. 632; D. Caron, ‘State Crimes: Looking at Municipal 
Experience with Organizational Crime’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: 
Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), p. 30.
20 IACHR, Velásquez Rodriguez case, supra the Introduction, note 7.
21 Ibid., p. 60. A similar approach was followed by the Commission and accepted by the Court in 
the Godinez Cruz case (IACHR, Godinez Cruz, Judgment, 20 January 1989, Annual Report of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Ser. C, No. 5 (1989)).
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Consequently, the decision concentrated on the existence of such a state practice. 
In particular, the Court relied on precise elements to establish that the practice of 
disappearances had been proven. Th ese were the number of disappearances dur-
ing a limited period of time; the fact that those disappearances followed a similar 
pattern; the fact that it was public and notorious knowledge in Honduras that 
the kidnappings were carried out by military personnel or the police, or persons 
acting under their orders; and the fact that the disappearances were carried out in 
a systematic manner. Finally, the Court found that “the kidnapping and disappear-
ance of Manfredo Velásquez falls within the systematic practice of disappearances 
referred to by the facts”.22
Interestingly, this approach shows how state involvement in gross violations of 
human rights can be proven. In particular, the Court relied on the general context 
in which the events took place, and on the cumulative eﬀ ect of various facts put 
together. Accordingly, it based its judgment not only on the systematic practice of 
disappearances, but also on the complete failure of the judicial system and of the 
executive branch to carry out serious investigations and punish those responsible. 
Th us, the Court was able to recognize that Honduras had been involved in the 
violation of the Convention.23 
In Velásquez, the Court was not asked in principle to establish aggravated state 
responsibility, but in the end it indirectly found that a serious breach had been 
committed by a state. Th us, this case shows how the seriousness requirement can be 
applied. While the circumstances of speciﬁ c events can be controversial, an extensive 
practice of disappearances and omissions by a substantial part of the state apparatus 
can lead to a showing that organized violations of a ﬂ agrant nature, amounting 
to a direct and outright assault on the values protected by human rights obliga-
tions – in the words of the ILC – have taken place. In other words, the seriousness 
requirement of aggravated state responsibility emerges when taking into account 
not particular conduct but a general pattern of events. Th e Court has adopted the 
same approach in more recent cases in which it has ascertained the commission of 
patterns of state serious breaches giving rise to aggravated state responsibility.24
22 IACHR, Velásquez Rodriguez case, supra the Introduction, note 7, p. 65.
23 Ibid., pp. 72–73 (“not all levels of the Government of Honduras were necessarily aware of those 
acts, nor is there any evidence that such acts were the result of oﬃ  cial orders. Nevertheless, those 
circumstances are irrelevant for the purpose of establishing whether Honduras is responsible 
under international law for the violations of human rights perpetrated within the practice of 
disappearances.”).
24 See IACHR, Case of Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, supra the Introduction, note 7, and Case 
of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment of 29 April 2004, Annual Report of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 105 (2004). For a similar view, see P. Gaeta, 
‘On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?’, 18 EJIL (2007), pp. 
635–637.
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Another example is provided by the Report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur.25 It is true that the Commission narrowly deﬁ ned its mandate, 
and in principle only dealt with individuals’ liability for international crimes com-
mitted in Darfur between 2003 and 2005.26 However, in the light of the cumulative 
eﬀ ect of the widespread breaches committed at the state level, the report clearly 
points to the existence of Sudan’s aggravated responsibility for gross violations of 
human rights committed in Darfur.27
Finally, the recent Opinion of the ICJ on the Israeli Wall 28 can be brieﬂ y taken 
into account. Arguably, this is the ﬁ rst time the Court has dealt with the conse-
quences of the regime of aggravated state responsibility. Th e Court did not mention 
Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC codiﬁ cation work but indirectly referred to them 
when coming to the examination of the “legal consequences of the internationally 
wrongful acts ﬂ owing from Israel’s construction of the wall as regards other States”.29 
Indeed, since Israel had seriously breached obligations owed to the international 
community as a whole, “all other States are under an obligation not to recognize 
the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. Th ey are also under 
an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created 
by such construction.”30 
Th ese are the special consequences provided for under Article 41. Th erefore, 
such consequences can only be entailed by a serious wrongful act as deﬁ ned in 
Article 40. On the one hand, the conduct of Israel amounted to a violation of an 
erga omnes obligation and thus met the ﬁ rst meaning of gravity, that referring to 
the importance of the primary norms breached.31 On the other hand, the conduct 
25 ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004’, Geneva, 25 January 
2005, </www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf>.
26 SC Resolution 1564(2004) requested the Secretary General to investigate “reports of violations 
of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties”. However, the 
Commission limited its mandate to the establishment of violations committed by natural persons, 
thus excluding issues of state responsibility (ibid., paras. 2–11).
27 Th e Commission found that the consistent pattern of indiscriminate attacks against the civilian 
population was substantially carried out by state de jure or de facto organs of Sudan (ibid., paras. 
185–186, 240, 332, 406–407). Moreover, the Commission found that the police and the judiciary 
of Sudan took no action to prevent or punish the crimes against humanity committed in Darfur 
(ibid., paras. 419–455). Other oﬃ  cial bodies took inappropriate action to that eﬀ ect (ibid., paras. 
456–487).
28 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra 
Chapter 1, note 44.
29 Ibid., para. 154 (emphasis added).
30 Ibid., para. 159. For the Court, such special consequences are due to “the character and the 
importance of the rights and obligations involved”.
31 Ibid., paras. 155–157.
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of Israel also represented a serious breach in terms of its magnitude: it was a serious 
breach of the self-determination principle,32 of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law.33 Th e Court repeatedly underscored the widespread eﬀ ects of the 
wrongful act on the Palestinian population. In particular, the Court explained, the 
construction of the wall will have a tremendous impact on the Palestinian popula-
tion because it is “tantamount to de facto annexation”;34 it has led to the destruction 
or requisition of properties; it imposes substantial restrictions on the freedom of 
movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory; and it impedes 
the exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to health, to education 
and to an adequate standard of living.35 As with the Velásquez case, the seriousness 
requirement of aggravated state responsibility emerges when taking into account 
not particular conduct but a general pattern of events.
So understood, the seriousness requirement constitutes a clear dividing line 
between ordinary and aggravated state responsibility. On the one hand, there are 
crimes in whose respect a seriousness requirement is directly provided for under 
primary norms. Th ese are breaches that per se entail aggravated state responsibility. 
On the other hand, there are crimes that need not be serious by deﬁ nition. While 
isolated breaches of such crimes can give rise to ordinary state responsibility, a 
practice of serious breaches will give rise to aggravated state responsibility.
B. Th e Seriousness Requirement under International Criminal Law
International crimes generally entail a widespread and systematic violation. Th ey 
are planned, prepared, organized, and executed by a multiplicity of oﬀ enders. Such 
criminal policies could hardly have been successful without the substantial involve-
ment of a state apparatus. Th eir characteristic feature is not only the violation of 
universal principles of fundamental importance, but also the magnitude of their 
eﬀ ects. As the War Crimes Commission put it at the end of WWII: 
Only crimes which either by their magnitude and savagery or by their large number or 
by the fact that a similar pattern was applied at diﬀ erent times and places, endangered 
the international community or shocked the conscience of mankind, warranted inter-
vention by States other than that on whose territory the crimes had been committed, 
or whose subjects had become their victims.36
32 Ibid., para. 122.
33 Ibid., para. 137.
34 Ibid., para. 121.
35 Ibid., paras. 132–134.
36 UNWCC, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws 
of War (London, H.M. Stationery Oﬃ  ce, 1948), p. 179.
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However, not all crimes need be carried out in a ‘serious’ manner to entail individual 
criminal liability. One must look at primary norms prohibiting international crimes 
to see whether they require a certain degree of seriousness to be met.
Th e elements of international crimes are deﬁ ned under customary international 
law. Th ese elements diﬀ er with respect to the various categories of international 
crimes. Some international crimes – in order to establish individual criminal liabil-
ity – require a general pre-condition regarding the magnitude of the prohibited 
conduct to be met.37 Others do not, and may be perpetrated by single individuals 
in perfect isolation. Th us, the seriousness requirement may or may not be a point 
of contact between aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability. 
Accordingly, the relationship between state and individual responsibility as far as 
the seriousness requirement is concerned must be established on a case-by-case 
basis, having regard to each speciﬁ c category of international crimes.
Th e deﬁ nition of ‘oﬃ  cial torture’ does require a certain link with state responsibil-
ity: only state organs can commit this international crime.38 However, no serious-
ness requirement must be fulﬁ lled for an act of torture to give rise to individual 
criminal liability under international law.39 As the ICTY clearly acknowledged in 
Furundžija,40 conduct amounting to oﬃ  cial torture would normally only entail 
individual criminal liability. However, when “carried out as an extensive practice of 
State oﬃ  cials”, individual criminal liability cumulates with aggravated state respon-
sibility. Th us, although torture is necessarily committed by “person[s] acting in an 
oﬃ  cial capacity”, it is nonetheless true that this crime can be carried out in perfect 
isolation and on an individual basis by persons acting on their own initiative.41 
Th erefore, individual criminal liability for torture is independent of aggravated 
state responsibility for the same conduct. Indeed, this is the classic example of 
an international crime which, being committed by individual state organs, does 
not necessarily also entail aggravated state responsibility. For example, while the 
ECHR in the Selmouni case42 recognized that a French policeman was responsible 
37 See supra the Introduction.
38 Ibid.
39 Article 1, para. 1, of the Torture Convention reads: “For the purposes of this Convention, the term 
‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suﬀ ering, whether physical or mental, is intention-
ally inﬂ icted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information 
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suﬀ ering is inﬂ icted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public oﬃ  cial or other person acting in an oﬃ  cial capacity. It 
does not include pain or suﬀ ering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 
See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998, paras. 134–165.
40 Ibid., para. 142.
41 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 118.
42 ECHR, Selmouni v. France, Judgment, 28 July 1999, <www.echr.coe.int/ECHR>. 
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for torture, this is not suﬃ  cient to attribute aggravated responsibility to France: 
the wrongful act must be ‘gross or systematic’ in order to entail aggravated state 
responsibility.43 At any rate, it must be noted that the absence of a seriousness 
requirement does not exclude the fact that single acts of torture as deﬁ ned by 
the Convention can well entail ordinary state responsibility alongside individual 
criminal liability.
A similar conclusion can be reached with respect to war crimes, that is, another 
category of international crimes generally regarded as individual crimes.44 Th e actus 
reus of war crimes not only consists of speciﬁ c prohibited acts, but also includes a 
general pre-requisite, namely, a nexus with an armed conﬂ ict, be it international or 
internal.45 It will be inquired below whether and to what extent that general pre-
requisite – as applied in international case law – establishes a connection between 
state and individual responsibility for war crimes. However, the deﬁ nition of war 
crimes does not provide for any seriousness requirement as understood in aggravated 
state responsibility. A single act of rape committed in perfect isolation can, for 
example, amount to a war crime. Th e concept of seriousness underlying some war 
43 A. Nollkaemper, supra note 19, p. 623 (“the threshold ‘serious’ in Article 40 serves precisely to 
exclude breaches that are not ‘gross’ or ‘systematic’. Th e acts therefore would fall under the normal 
reparatory scheme of the law of state responsibility”).
44 P. De Sena, Diritto internazionale e immunità funzionale degli organi statali (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1996), 
p. 157; M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Th e Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 85; P.-M. Dupuy, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of 
the Individual and International Responsibility of the State’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. II (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 1088.
45 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., TC, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 193; ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Aleksovski, TC, Judgment, 25 June 1999, paras. 42–45; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Judg-
ment, 15 July 1999, para. 251; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, paras. 
69–70; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., TC, Judgment, 22 February 2001, paras. 402 and 407; 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, TC, Judgment, 26 February 2001, paras. 32–33; ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, TC, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 51; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, 
TC, Judgment, 29 November 2002, paras. 32–38; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, 
TC, Judgment, 31 March 2003, paras. 176–180; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, TC, Judgment, 31 
July 2003, paras. 569–570, 575–576; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić et al., TC, Judgment, 17 October 
2003, paras. 105–106. Similarly, the nexus between the armed conﬂ ict and the alleged war crimes 
has been considered an essential requirement in the ICTR case law (ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 640–641; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 
TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 185–189, 601–615; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, TC, 
Judgment, 6 December 1999, paras. 104–105; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, TC, Judgment, 27 
January 2000, paras. 259–262, and 973; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, TC, Judgment, 7 June 
2001, paras. 105–106; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gerard Ntakirutimana, TC, Judgment, 
21 February 2003, paras. 859–861; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, TC, Judgment, 22 January 
2004, paras. 733–744); however, the existence of such a nexus has been established only once 
(ICTR, Prosecutor v. Semanza, TC, Judgment, 15 May 2003, paras. 368–369, and 516–522).
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crimes, namely those deﬁ ned as ‘grave breaches’, is not an operational standard but 
a characteristic pertaining to the nature of the primary norm.46 Grave breaches are 
selected oﬀ ences considered to be violations of norms so important for the inter-
national community as a whole that they give rise to individual criminal liability.47 
Th us, a distinction can be made between grave breaches and other breaches entail-
ing ‘only’ state responsibility.48 Moreover, in the Nuremberg judgment, war crimes 
were simply regarded as international oﬀ ences, that is, prohibited actions under 
international law implying the criminal liability of the oﬀ ender.49 Accordingly, no 
reference to a ‘widespread or systematic’ requirement is made either in the ICTY 
Statute50 or in the ICTR Statute,51 and no further requirement of seriousness is 
required for war crimes in the ICTY and ICTR case law.52 
It must be added that other elements of international practice seem to assign a 
certain role to the seriousness requirement with respect to war crimes. Article 20 of 
the 1996 Draft Code explicitly limits war crimes to acts “committed in a system-
atic manner or on a large scale”.53 Th us, the seriousness requirement is generally 
required under the Draft Code to punish individuals for war crimes. Does this 
correspond to a new development in international criminal law? According to the 
ILC’s commentary on Article 20, this further requirement does not correspond 
to the customary deﬁ nition of war crimes, and was added with the speciﬁ c aim of 
46 For a discussion on the meaning of grave breaches see H. Fischer, ‘Grave Breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions’, in G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and 
Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law, vol. I (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
2000), pp. 70–72; G. Abi-Saab and R.-M. Abi-Saab, ‘Les crimes de guerre’, in H. Ascensio et al. 
(eds.), Droit international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), pp. 280–281.
47 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 94.
48 See supra note 11. 
49 See Article 6 of the London Charter and the IMT Judgment, supra Chapter 1, note 90, pp. 221, 
and 248.
50 See Article 2 and 3 of the ICTY Statute (SC Res. 827(1993)).
51 See Article 4 of the ICTR Statute (SC Res. 955 (1994)).
52 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 573; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 
TC, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 195; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 
2000, para. 70; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, TC, Judgment, 31 March 2003, para. 
225, note 600. See, in particular, Y. Dinstein, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, in J. Makarczyk (ed.), 
Th eory of International Law at the Th reshold of the 21st Century. Essays in Honour of K. Skubiszewski 
(Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 891; and S.R. Ratner and J.S. Abrams, Account-
ability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), 
p. 88.
53 ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 56.
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narrowing the scope of the Draft Code, which focuses only on crimes against the 
peace and security of mankind characterized by a certain level of seriousness.54 
Th e conclusion that international criminal law does not require a further ele-
ment of seriousness in the case of war crimes is consonant with Article 8 (1) of 
the 1998 ICC Statute. Th e chapeau of the article reads as follows: “Th e Court 
shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as 
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes”.55 In 
principle, the Court has jurisdiction over all the violations of the laws and customs 
of war listed in the following paragraphs of Article 8, even in the case of isolated 
breaches. However, this provision draws the attention of the Court to the most 
serious war crimes, those committed in accordance with a state policy or on a large 
scale. Abstractly speaking, the chapeau Article 8 does not establish an additional 
requirement to hold individuals criminally liable for war crimes under international 
law. Indeed, scholars seem to agree that a seriousness requirement is not necessary 
to implement individual accountability for war crimes under international law, 
and that Article 8 of the ICC Statute does not provide for such further require-
ment.56 In practice, however, this provision can have the eﬀ ect of narrowing the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.57 While asking the ICC to focus on particularly ‘serious’ 
war crimes does not modify the legal elements of this category of international 
crimes, it can actually have an impact on the prosecution policy and lead the Court 
to substantially limit its jurisdiction over war crimes.58
Crimes against humanity are international crimes requiring by deﬁ nition a certain 
threshold of seriousness to be met. Th eir constitutive elements include a general 
pre-requisite concerning the magnitude of the criminal oﬀ ence to be demonstrated 
beyond any reasonable doubt in order to convict the accused for such crimes. Today, 
it is well established that they must be carried out in a ‘widespread or systematic’ 
54 Ibid., p. 57, para. 5, “Th ese general criteria for war crimes under the Code are based on the view 
that crimes against the peace and security of mankind are the most serious on the scale of inter-
national oﬀ ences and that, in order for an oﬀ ence to be regarded as a crime against the peace and 
security of mankind, it must meet certain additional criteria which raises its level of seriousness. 
Th ese general criteria are provided in the chapeau of the article: the crimes in question must have 
been committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale” (emphasis added).
55 A/CONF.183/9, <www.icc-cpi.int> (emphasis added).
56 See, in general, H. Fischer, supra note 46, p. 83; for an isolated opinion expressing the opposite 
point of view, see J. Barboza, ‘International Criminal Law’, 278 RCADI (1999), p. 158.
57 See infra note 76, as far as the war crime of plunder is concerned. It is to that very eﬀ ect that 
the USA proposed to amend Article 8. See M.P. Scharf, ‘Results of the Rome Conference for an 
International Criminal Court’, ASIL Insights, August 1998, <www.asil.org>.
58 See supra the Introduction.
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manner.59 Article 3 of the ICTR Statute,60 Article 18 of the 1996 Draft Code,61 
and Article 7 of the 1998 ICC Statute62 are all explicit with regard to the need for 
such a condition to be met.63 Moreover, even if Article 5 of the ICTY Statute64 
59 R. Dixon, ‘Article 7 – Chapeau’, in O. Triﬀ terer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1999), p. 126; M. Bettati, ‘Le crime contre 
l’humanité’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), p. 297; 
O. Swaak-Goldman, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, in G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Gold-
man (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law, vol. I (Th e Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 157; S.R. Ratner and J.S. Abrams, supra note 52, p. 58; 
K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 
96–97; A. Cassese, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. I (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 
pp. 356–360; Y. Jurovics, Réﬂ exions sur la spéciﬁ cité du crime contre l’humanité (Paris, LGDJ, 2002), 
p. 274; A. Cassese, supra note 41, p. 64. 
60 Article 3 reads: “Th e International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute per-
sons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against the civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: 
a) murder; b) extermination; c) enslavement; d) deportation; e) imprisonment; f ) torture; g) rape; 
h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; i) other inhumane acts” (SC Res. 955 
(1994), emphasis added).
61 Article 18 reads: “A crime against humanity means any of the following acts, when committed 
in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any 
organization or group: a) murder; b) extermination; c) torture; d) enslavement; e) persecution on 
political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds; f ) institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or 
religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulting 
in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population; g) arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer 
of population; h) arbitrary imprisonment; i) forced disappearance of persons; j) rape, enforced 
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse; k) other inhumane acts which severely damage 
physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and severe bodily harm” 
(ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 47, emphasis added).
62 Article 7, para. 1 reads: “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of 
the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: a) murder; b) extermination; c) enslavement; 
d) deportation or forcible transfer of population; e) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of 
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; f ) torture; g) rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity; h) persecution against any identiﬁ able group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as deﬁ ned in paragraph 3, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection 
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
i) enforced disappearance of persons; j) the crime of apartheid; k) other inhumane acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suﬀ ering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health” (A/CONF.183/9, <www.icc-cpi.int>, emphasis added).
63 Although this further element was not present in the Nuremberg Charter, the IMT placed emphasis 
on the Nazi policy lying behind the commission of crimes against humanity (see IMT Judgment, 
supra Chapter 1, note 90, pp. 224–225, and 243–246).
64 Article 5 reads: “Th e International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible 
for the following crimes when committed in armed conﬂ ict, whether international or internal in 
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does not explicitly require seriousness, a well-established judicial interpretation 
given to the term ‘population’ implies that the criminal act should be committed 
systematically or on a large scale before individual criminal liability can apply.65 
Th e rationale underlying such a general pre-requisite of crimes against humanity is 
to exclude individual criminal liability for isolated or random acts.66 Th us, in order 
to hold an individual accountable for crimes against humanity, an international 
tribunal or a domestic court will have to establish beyond any reasonable doubt 
that the prohibited conduct was either widespread or systematic.
With respect to the crime of genocide, things are a little bit more complicated. 
No reference is made in the deﬁ nition of this crime to the systematic or widespread 
quality of the prohibited conduct.67 However, in order to be held accountable 
under international criminal law, the accused charged with genocide must have 
carried out the actus reus with the special intent to destroy the protected group, 
and this special intent can be inferred from the fact that genocide has been carried 
out according to a preconceived plan or policy.68 Th us, a seriousness element is 
inherent in the crime of genocide, even if in a very peculiar way. Indeed, it is only 
character, and directed against any civilian population: a) murder; b) extermination; c) enslave-
ment; d) deportation; e) imprisonment; f ) torture; g) rape; h) persecutions on political, racial and 
religious grounds; i) other inhumane acts” (SC Res. 827(1993)).
65 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 644.
66 Commentary on Article 18 of the Draft Code of Crimes, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th 
Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), pp. 49–50, paras. 3 to 5. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al.,
AC, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 93; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, TC, Judgment, 26 
February 2001, paras. 174 and 179; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, TC, Judgment, 29 November 
2002, para. 35.
67 When taking into account the deﬁ nitions of genocide, it emerges that they all reproduce the 
deﬁ nition embodied in the Genocide Convention (“genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to the 
members of the group; c) deliberately inﬂ icting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”). See Article 4 
of the ICTY statute (SC Res. 827(1993)), Article 2 of the ICTR statute (SC Res. 955(1994)), 
Article 6 of the ICC statute (A/CONF.183/9, <www.icc-cpi.int>), and Article 17 of the Draft 
Code of Crimes (ILC; ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 46). 
See E. Zoller, ‘La déﬁ nition des crimes contre l’humanité’, JDI (1993), p. 549.
68 See Israeli District Court, Enigster Case, 4 January 1952, 18 ILR (1951), p. 542; M.C. Bassiouni, 
Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoﬀ , 1992); W.A. 
Schabas, ‘Le génocide’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), 
p. 319; D.D. Ntanda Nsereko, ‘Genocide: A Crime against Mankind’, in G. Kirk McDonald and 
O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law, vol. I
(Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 127; S.R. Ratner and J.S. Abrams, supra note 
52, p. 37; Y. Jurovics, supra note 59, pp. 316–319.
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indirectly that the existence of a criminal plan or policy will be useful to prove the 
mens rea of the accused.69
Finally, a seriousness requirement is implicit in the deﬁ nition of the crime of 
aggression. Although this deﬁ nition does not explicitly include a seriousness require-
ment, the material element of the crime of aggression entailing individual criminal 
liability is the state act of aggression. And, as already noted, aggression is generally 
considered per se to be a ‘serious’ breach. Th is special relationship between state 
and individual responsibility will be examined in some detail below. 
2. Th eoretical Approaches to the Seriousness Requirement
Th e seriousness requirement is one of the most signiﬁ cant points of contact between 
aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability for international 
crimes. If we take, for example, a general practice of deportation carried out by 
state organs reaching the threshold of seriousness described above, this wrongful 
act can entail aggravated state responsibility. With respect to the same conduct, 
single state organs can be held accountable for crimes against humanity. But the 
collective criminal phenomenon seems to have paramount importance also in the 
establishment of individual criminal responsibility. Indeed, state organs’ respon-
sibility can only be established in connection with the broader criminal context: 
crimes against humanity require the ‘widespread or systematic’ character of the 
oﬀ ence to be proven. 
While seriousness is a general requirement under aggravated state responsibility, 
as far as individual criminal liability is concerned a similar element can only be 
identiﬁ ed having a look at speciﬁ c primary norms prohibiting international crimes. 
Th is diversity raises various questions concerning the relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for the same serious wrongful acts. In particular, it is 
unclear whether the same conduct is capable of entailing both state and individual 
responsibility. One may doubt whether state and individual responsibility can still 
be regarded as completely independent. Does the establishment of the general pre-
requisites necessary to hold individuals accountable for certain international crimes 
amount to an establishment of aggravated state responsibility for the same serious 
wrongful act? In other words, the question is whether the contents of these general 
pre-requisites under international criminal law and of the seriousness requirement 
in aggravated state responsibility is identical.
If we refer back to the general conceptual schemes elaborated in Part I, two 
diverging approaches can be adopted. According to the state-oriented scheme, 
that is, assuming that international crimes can only be committed by states, the 
69 See infra Chapter 4.
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punishment of state organs merely is an indirect consequence of aggravated state 
responsibility.70 Accordingly, only with respect to breaches committed with the 
involvement of the state apparatus can state organs be held accountable on behalf 
of the state. Th erefore, the link between individual action and state action must 
be so close that the general pre-requisites under international criminal law must 
correspond to the seriousness requirement under aggravated state responsibility.71 
International prosecution should only focus on state-sponsored crimes and not on 
individualized international crimes.72 
By contrast, the individual-oriented scheme relies on the assumption of a dissocia-
tion between the conduct of the state and that of its organs. While international law 
provides for a twofold attribution of international crimes to states and individuals, 
individual liability and state responsibility are regarded as independent regimes. 
Under international criminal law, individuals are directly accountable for the crimes 
they have personally perpetrated: criminal liability is a personal liability which 
must be established according to the personal and intentional participation of the 
accused in the criminal act. Accordingly, the general pre-requisites under certain 
categories of international crimes should essentially be assessed having regard to 
the personal conduct of the accused. Th is does not preclude elements of the general 
criminal context from being taken into account, but they may be considered only 
to the extent that they can be useful to the establishment of the criminal liability 
of the accused. Th e focus should be on individuals’ conduct, not on state action. 
Th e criminal liability of single state organs must be assessed having regard to the 
speciﬁ c elements of each international crime as provided for under international 
criminal law. Th erefore, the general pre-requisites under international criminal 
70 See supra Chapter 2.
71 L. May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 115 and, more generally, Chapters 7 and 8. Th e author is very critical even with respect 
to the “three uncontroversial elements of crimes against humanity [1) directed against a civilian 
population, 2) part of a State or group policy, and 3) systematic or widespread]”, which allegedly 
do not link “the acts of an individual to the collective crime in a way that will support prosecution 
of that individual” (ibid., p. 120). Apart from the fact that international tribunals have explicitly 
denied that the state policy is an element of crimes against humanity (see infra in the main text), 
May claims that a much closer connection between state and individual responsibility must be 
taken into account by international tribunals.
72 Ibid., p. 82. Ideally, May argues, state organs can only be prosecuted when the crime is state-spon-
sored and when there is a group-based harm (p. 90). For example, with respect to rape, he ﬁ nds 
it diﬃ  cult to justify convictions for rape as a war crime, while state organs can properly be held 
accountable for rape as a crime against humanity – and in particular – persecution since this is 
clearly a group-based crime constituting an assault on the international community (pp. 96–113). 
See also R. Maison, La responsabilité individuelle pour crime de l’Etat en droit international public 
(Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2004), pp. 245–246, who, faced with an international case law prepared to 
deal with all international crimes (including individualized crimes), can only criticize the absence 
of a suﬃ  ciently close link between individual action and state criminal policy.
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law and the seriousness requirement under aggravated state responsibility can be 
conceived of in diﬀ erent ways, and individual criminal liability can be established 
totally independently from aggravated state responsibility for the same crime. 
Th ese approaches lead to two diﬀ erent notions of the seriousness requirement: 
either the same requirement applies to both state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes, or two diﬀ erent notions of seriousness are applicable in these 
regimes. Th e following analysis will concentrate on the way in which the seriousness 
requirement has actually been applied in international case law and international 
practice to evaluate whether a connection between state and individual responsibil-
ity has somehow been taken into account. 
3. Th e Seriousness Requirement as Applied in International Case Law
In examining the relationship between the seriousness requirement under aggravated 
state responsibility and the general pre-requisites under international criminal law, 
it is opportune to treat the various categories of international crimes separately.
A. War Crimes
As already noted, the deﬁ nition of war crimes includes, as a general pre-requisite, 
the condition that these crimes must be perpetrated in connection with an inter-
national or internal armed conﬂ ict. However, a ﬁ nding that certain prohibited 
conduct is related to an armed conﬂ ict does not amount to a ﬁ nding that the 
seriousness requirement (as deﬁ ned in aggravated state responsibility) has been 
fulﬁ lled. In the words of the ICTY,
nor is it necessary that the crime alleged . . . be part of a policy or of a practice 
oﬃ  cially endorsed or tolerated by one of the parties to the conﬂ ict, or that the act be 
in actual furtherance of a policy associated with the conduct of war or in the actual 
interest of a party to the conﬂ ict; the obligations of individuals under international 
humanitarian law are independent and apply without prejudice to any questions of the 
responsibility of States under international law. Th e only question, to be determined in 
the circumstances of each individual case, is whether the oﬀ ences were closely related 
to the armed conﬂ ict as a whole.73
Th e ICTY seems thus to conceive of war crimes as theoretically and practically 
independent from aggravated state responsibility for the same conduct. Th e serious-
ness requirement as provided for under aggravated state responsibility needs not 
73 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 573 (emphasis added); ICTY, Prosecu-
tor v. Delalić et al., TC, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 195; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, TC, 
Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 70; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, TC, Judgment, 
31 March 2003, para. 225, note 600.
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be fulﬁ lled to hold individuals accountable for war crimes. International case law 
requires war crimes to be committed in connection with military activity, in the 
framework of the broader criminal context represented by international or internal 
armed conﬂ icts. However, war crimes need not be planned or executed on a large 
scale at the state level to give rise to individual criminal liability. Th us, no link is 
required with aggravated state responsibility.
Interestingly, the same is true with respect to customary war crimes not explicitly 
listed in the ICTY Statute but which can nevertheless entail individual criminal 
liability. Th e Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunal in Tadić identiﬁ ed four con-
ditions for an oﬀ ence to be subject to prosecution before the ICTY under Article 
3. In particular, according to the third condition, “the violation must be ‘serious’, 
that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, 
and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim”.74 Th is apparently 
deals both with the importance of the primary rule breached (the ﬁ rst concept 
of seriousness) and with an operational requirement on the magnitude of eﬀ ects 
of the criminal conduct (the second concept of seriousness). However, this third 
condition has been applied as essentially requiring the conduct to be in breach of 
an obligation of particular importance for the international community. Although 
in its subsequent case law the ICTY has not examined the third Tadić condition in 
much detail,75 it seems that the Tribunal has never required war crimes to be carried 
out according to a state policy or in a widespread and systematic manner.76 
74 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 94.
75 See, in particular, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić, TC, Judgment, 5 December 2003, paras. 106–112.
76 While prosecution under Article 3 certainly does not depend on the fulﬁ lment of a seriousness 
requirement such as that provided for under aggravated state responsibility, it is more doubtful 
whether the third Tadić condition requires the damage of the victim to be extensive. With respect 
to the war crime ‘attack on civilians’, for instance, no such multiplicity of victims is required. See 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, TC, Judgment, 31 January 2005, para. 289, where the attack resulted 
in the death of two civilians. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, 
para. 180, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, TC, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 328. On the 
other hand, with respect to the war crime ‘attack on civilian objects’, the ICTY seems to require 
the damage to be extensive. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, TC, Judgment, 31 January 2005, para. 
280. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, AC, Judgment, 17 December 2004, paras. 
40–68. With respect to plunder as a war crime, a diﬀ erent approach has been taken. While the 
deﬁ nition of this crime under customary international law does not include such a seriousness 
threshold that must be met, the ICTY requires a certain ‘seriousness’ to be demonstrated because 
Article 1 of the ICTY Statute limits the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to “persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law” (emphasis added). See ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Naletilić and Martinović, TC, Judgment of 31 March 2003, paras. 612–614. On this particular 
issue, see G. Acquaviva, ‘Unlawful Transfer, Unlawful Labour, Plunder, and Persecution: Th e 
State of the Law in Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic’, 3 Th e Global Community Yearbook of 
International Law & Jurisprudence (2003), pp. 152–154. 
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While war crimes do not require a general seriousness pre-requisite to be met, 
a particular connection between state and individual responsibility can nonethe-
less exist with respect to certain war crimes. For example, employing poisonous 
weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suﬀ ering or bombarding 
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings77 are war crimes which seem to 
presuppose the existence of a regular army having at its disposal a signiﬁ cant arsenal, 
and which imply a certain preconceived method of warfare.78 Or, to give a diﬀ erent 
example, one may think of the war crime prohibiting “the passing of sentences and 
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, aﬀ ording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized 
as indispensable”.79 More generally, alongside typical individual war crimes (such 
as killing a combatant who has surrendered or raping a civilian), there are certain 
categories of war crimes which are peculiar to the state military apparatus. Th e lat-
ter apparently need to be carefully planned and organized in advance; they involve 
questions of state military strategy or presuppose the existence of a state apparatus; 
and they should be carried out in a precise and organized manner by the army. In 
particular, conduct during hostilities is carefully decided, prepared, and organized 
at the highest levels of the military hierarchy.
Th us, doubts can be raised about the existence of a closer relationship between 
individual and state responsibility with respect to similar war crimes and, in par-
ticular, the violations of international obligations regulating the conduct of warfare. 
For example, the so-called ‘Hague law’ was drafted having essentially in mind 
the conduct of states, and not of individuals. Early conventions on international 
humanitarian law80 established bilateral obligations between the Contracting Par-
ties, their implementation resting upon the instructions of Commanders-in-Chief 
of the belligerent armies. An obligation to adopt ‘or recommend’ national criminal 
77 See Articles 23 and 25 of the 1899 Hague Convention (II) with respect to the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land as well as Articles 23 and 25 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land.
78 Interestingly, such war crimes are not listed among the “serious violations of the laws and customs 
of war applicable in armed conﬂ icts not of an international character” in the ICC Statute (see 
Article 8, para. 2 (e), A/CONF.183/9, <www.icc-cpi.int>). For a critical position on this point, 
see A. Cassese, supra note 41, pp. 61–62.
79 Article 8 (2) (c) (iv) of the ICC Statute (A/CONF.183/9, <www.icc-cpi.int>).
80 Th is reference is to agreements preceding the 1949 Geneva Conventions, such as the 1864 Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, the 
1899 Hague Convention (II) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the 1906 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies 
in the Field, the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armies in the Field, and the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War.
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legislation to deter violations of these Conventions ﬁ rst appeared in 1906,81 their 
breach entailing only (ordinary) state responsibility.82 For these reasons, it is gener-
ally recognized that obligations arising under these instruments were chieﬂ y aimed 
at state conduct,83 and individual criminal liability for these particular war crimes 
seemed to be closely linked to aggravated state responsibility.
War crimes have mainly been dealt with by the ICTY. In particular, individuals 
have generally been found guilty of individual war crimes such as wilful killing, 
torture or inhumane treatment, wilfully causing great suﬀ ering or serious injury to 
body and health, and other grave breaches under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute. 
On very few occasions have individuals been charged with war crimes involv-
ing (by deﬁ nition) a broader criminal context. Th e relevant case-law84 shows that 
international tribunals, when convicting the defendant on trial, had to rely con-
siderably on the general context in which these particular war crimes were carried 
out. Individuals have rarely been found guilty of war crimes such as “attack on 
civilian population”.85 Th e defendants were all political or military leaders charged 
with widespread notorious crimes committed during the Balkan conﬂ ict against 
the civilian population, namely, ethnic cleansing in the Laška Valley, the siege of 
Sarajevo, the attack on Dubrovnik, and the Zagreb bombing. To establish their 
criminal liability, the ICTY largely relied on notorious facts, the general context 
in which the crimes were perpetrated, and in particular the de jure position of 
these accused. However, it must be stressed that, in Kordić, the Appeals Chamber 
adopted a rigorous approach and excluded the responsibility of the appellants for 
81 Only in 1929 was an explicit obligation to prosecute those responsible for breaches of humanitar-
ian law enshrined in Article 29 of the Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.
82 See Article 3 of the IV Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War, 1907. Individual 
criminal liability for ‘grave breaches’ of humanitarian law was explicitly established for the ﬁ rst time 
in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (Articles 49–50 of Convention I and II, Articles 129–130 
of Convention III, and Articles 146–147 of Convention IV).
83 See, in general, P. Fois, ‘Sul rapporto tra i crimini internazionali dello Stato e i crimini internazionali 
dell’individuo’, 87 Riv. Dir. Int. (2004), pp. 936–937.
84 For an example of a case in which this type of war crimes has been unsuccessfully pleaded by the 
Prosecution, see the Blaškić case (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, paras. 
661–678). Th e accused was charged with the bombing of the town of Zenica. When coming to 
deal with typical military facts, such as the kind of weapons used, the location of troops, and the 
weapons actually at the disposal of the parties, the establishment of individual participation and 
thus responsibility proved very diﬃ  cult and the accused was acquitted. 
85 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, TC, Judgment, 26 February 2001; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Galić, TC, Judgment, 5 December 2003; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, TC, Judgment, 31 May 
2005; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Martić, TC, Judgment, 12 June 2007.
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a number of attacks considered to be legitimate military targets or in which no 
targeting of civilians could be established beyond doubt.86
Judicial practice is too scarce to draw general consequences. Most of these cases 
have focused essentially on attacks on the civilian population or civilian objects, 
while other more signiﬁ cant war crimes, such as crimes concerning the methods 
of warfare, have so far not been the object of international proceedings. However, 
these few cases are interesting because they at least show that the broader context of 
state criminality can have a crucial role in the establishment of individual liability 
for certain categories of war crimes.
B. Crimes against Humanity
As illustrated above, crimes against humanity are predicated on the ‘widespread or 
systematic’ character of the criminal conduct to be demonstrated. It is now well 
established in legal scholarship and jurisprudence that these conditions are not 
cumulative.87 Th e following discussion thus deals with them separately.
It is generally considered that a criminal act is widespread when there is a multi-
plicity of victims.88 Th e widespread character of the criminal act therefore pertains to 
the magnitude of the event giving rise to individual criminal liability. Even a single 
86 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, AC, Judgment, 17 December 2004. Th e convictions of 
Galić and Strugar have been conﬁ rmed on appeal (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić, AC, Judgment, 
30 November 2006, and ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, AC, Judgment, 17 July 2008).
87 Th e fact that these are alternative conditions has been regularly pointed out in the international 
case law. See, in particular, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, paras. 646–647; 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 207; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, 
TC, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 628; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 September 
1998, paras. 578–579; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 21 May 
1999, para. 123; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, TC, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 203; ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, TC, Judgment, 7 June 2001, para. 77. Th e point is normally considered 
uncontroversial in the works of international law scholars. See D. Robinson, ‘Deﬁ ning ‘Crimes 
against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference’, 93 AJIL (1999), p. 47; O. Swaak-Goldman, supra 
note 59, p. 157; D. Robinson, ‘Th e Context of Crimes against Humanity’, in R.S. Lee (ed.), Th e 
International Criminal Court. Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley, 
Transnational Publishers, 2001), pp. 62 and 72; A. Cassese, supra note 59, p. 366; Y. Jurovics, 
supra note 59, p. 279.
88 R. Dixon, supra note 59, p. 126; M. Bettati, supra note 59, p. 298; O. Swaak-Goldman, supra 
note 59, p. 158; D. Robinson, ‘Th e Context of Crimes against Humanity’, supra note 87, p. 63; 
K. Kittichaisaree, supra note 59, p. 96; Y. Jurovics, supra note 59, p. 280. See also ICTR, Prosecu-
tor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 580; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and 
Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 123; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, TC, Judg-
ment, 6 December 1999, para. 69; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., TC, Judgment, 22 February 
2001, para. 428; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, TC, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 35.
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instance of criminal conduct might reach such a threshold of magnitude.89 Th us, 
this speciﬁ c condition does not necessarily establish a close connection between 
individual and state responsibility, since crimes against humanity of a certain 
magnitude can be committed not only by private individuals but also outside of 
a preconceived state policy.
A much closer link with aggravated state responsibility can exist when crimes 
against humanity are perpetrated in a systematic way. Indeed, it is generally under-
stood that the systematic character of crimes against humanity can be inferred from 
a similar pattern of prohibited conduct that is carried out according to a methodical 
plan or policy.90 In other words, the commission of inhumane acts must be repeated 
or continuous. Th is necessarily requires a relatively broad number of persons to be 
involved in the perpetration of the criminal act. Accordingly, the connection with 
aggravated state responsibility is due to the fact that individual liability attaches 
to crimes carried out at the state level. However, recent case law seems to hold the 
view that under international criminal law:
neither the attack nor the acts of the accused need to be supported by any form of 
‘policy’ or ‘plan’. Th ere is nothing under customary international law which requires 
the imposition of an additional requirement that the acts be connected to a policy or 
plan. At most, the existence of a policy or plan may be evidentially relevant, but it is 
not a legal element of the crime.91
89 Commentary on Article 18 of the Draft Code of Crimes, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th 
Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), pp. 49–50, para. 4. Th is is a diﬀ erent hypothesis from that in 
which the criminal act targets a single victim but nonetheless can be considered to be part of a 
systematic policy of targeting the civilian population. 
90 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 648; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, 
TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 203; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., TC, Judgment, 22 
February 2001, para. 429; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 
579–581; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 123. 
See also R. Dixon, supra note 59, p. 126; M. Bettati, supra note 59, p. 299; O. Swaak-Goldman, 
supra note 59, p. 158; D. Robinson, ‘Th e Context of Crimes against Humanity’, supra note 87, 
p. 63; K. Kittichaisaree, supra note 59, p. 96; Y. Jurovics, supra note 59, pp. 281–288; A. Cassese, 
supra note 41, p. 65.
91 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, TC, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 36. See also ICTY, Pros-
ecutor v. Galić, TC, Judgment, 5 December 2003, para. 147; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić et al., TC, 
Judgment, 17 October 2003, para. 44; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, TC, Judgment, 
31 March 2003, para. 234; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., TC, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 
98; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, TC, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 58; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Kordić and Čerkez, TC, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 182; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac 
et al., TC, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 432 (see, in particular, note 1109).
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Moreover, there is consent among scholars on the assumption that crimes against 
humanity can be carried out by private groups or organizations.92 In this case, a 
connection with aggravated state responsibility is more diﬃ  cult to establish.
International case law does not require evidence of a state policy to convict 
individuals for crimes against humanity, and it explicitly rejects any link with 
aggravated state responsibility. For example, in Limaj the ICTY dealt with crimes 
allegedly perpetrated by the Kosovo Liberation Army, and accepted that crimes 
against humanity can be committed “by a non-state actor with extremely limited 
resources, personnel and organization”.93
However, what may appear at ﬁ rst sight to be a clear diﬀ erence between individual 
and state responsibility for international crimes can prove to be a much closer link 
when one takes into account the way in which the general pre-requisite for crimes 
against humanity is actually applied in the international case law. 
As noted above, the seriousness requirement in relation to aggravated state 
responsibility is essentially associated with the establishment of a practice of similar 
wrongful acts carried out by state organs.94 In other words, it must be found that 
a sum of events points to the existence of a state policy in carrying out certain 
breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a whole. On the 
other hand, in the establishment of individual criminal liability, the international 
case law has generally adopted a diﬀ erent approach in this respect. What interna-
tional (and domestic) criminal courts must establish beyond doubt is the criminal 
conduct of single individuals, that is, a personal participation in the perpetration 
of international crimes. Th us, their inquiry in principle focuses on the personal 
92 Article 18 of the ILC Draft Code of Crimes (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC 
(1996), vol. II(2), p. 49); Article 7 of the ICC Statute (A/CONF.183/9, <www.icc-cpi.int>); 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 551; ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 205 (“Trial Chambers I and II of both this Tribu-
nal and the ICTR have constantly refused to characterize a crime against humanity as an ‘act of 
criminal sovereignty’”); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 580; 
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, TC, Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 69; ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 125; Y. Dinstein, supra note 52, 
p. 906; M.C. Bassiouni, supra note 44, p. 275; O. Swaak-Goldman, supra note 59, pp. 158–159; 
K. Kittichaisaree, supra note 59, p. 98; A. Cassese, supra note 59, p. 367; Y. Jurovics, supra note 
59, pp. 416–417; A. Cassese, supra note 41, p. 83.
93 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Limaj, TC, Judgment, 30 November 2005, para. 191 (“Th e existence of a 
‘policy’ to conduct an attack against a civilian population is most easily determined or inferred 
when a State’s conduct is in question; but absence of a policy does not mean that a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population has not occurred. Although not a legal element of 
Article 5, evidence of a policy or plan is an important indication that the acts in question are not 
merely the workings of individuals acting pursuant to haphazard or individual design, but instead 
have a level of organizational coherence and support of a magnitude suﬃ  cient to elevate them into 
the realm of crimes against humanity.” Ibid., para. 212).
94 See supra in this Chapter.
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conduct of the oﬀ ender and on the diﬀ erent events in which he or she has taken 
part.95 Accordingly, the ‘widespread or systematic’ criterion must be assessed ﬁ rst 
of all in the light of the individual behaviour of the alleged perpetrator. In par-
ticular, the criminal court will ascertain whether the individual has committed a 
crime of a particular magnitude96 or whether he or she has carried out a plurality 
of crimes according to a similar pattern.97 For example, in Vasiljević the Appeals 
Chamber concentrated on the conduct of the accused to establish his liability for 
crimes against humanity: 
Th e Appeals Chamber does not subscribe to the views of the Appellant that the Trial 
Chamber erred in ﬁ nding him guilty of persecution ‘solely on the basis of one inci-
dent’. First, the Drina River incident consists of the murder of ﬁ ve people and the 
inhumane acts inﬂ icted on two others. Th is incident cannot be described as a single 
act but rather as a series of acts.98
95 A particular position is apparently held by M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Th e Normative Framework of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International 
Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 1999), p. 625 (“if it is established that 
a state has developed a policy, or carried out a plan, or engaged in acts whose outcomes include 
the crimes contained in the deﬁ nition of crimes against humanity, then those persons in the 
bureaucratic apparatus who brought about, or contributed to, that result could be charged with 
complicity to commit crimes against humanity”).
96 Th is is what happened in the Erdemović case (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, TC, Judgment, 
29 November 1996), in which the Trial Chamber found that a crime against humanity had been 
committed. Th e criminal act was of extreme gravity due, ﬁ rst of all, to the magnitude of the mass 
execution in which the oﬀ ender had taken part. Indeed, Erdemović was found to be responsible for 
“killing between 10 and 100 people”, when “during a ﬁ ve-hour period on 16 July 1995” approxi-
mately 1,200 unarmed civilians had been killed (para. 85). With respect to the ICTR case law, 
most of the accused participated in attacks against the Tutsi group, which resulted in thousands of 
deaths (see, for example, ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, TC, Judgment, 6 December 1999, paras. 
299–304; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, TC, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 756).
97 Th e systematic character of crimes against humanity has been assessed by the ICTY and ICTR in 
a number of cases. For example, in Kupreškić (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., TC, Judgment, 
14 January 2000), the ICTY established the existence of the seriousness requirement of crimes 
against humanity (persecution, murder and other inhumane acts) with respect to the individual 
participation of each member of a military group in the attack on the small village of Ahmici in 
central Bosnia (paras. 749–833). Th e Trial Chamber focused on the personal conduct of each 
accused. In particular, it found that the attack against the Muslim civilian population was well 
planned and well organized (ibid., para. 761). Th erefore, the seriousness requirement referred 
to the personal conduct of the accused individuals and the Chamber did not establish whether 
such criminal conduct could ﬁ t into a more general context of state policy. With respect to the 
ICTR case law, for example, in the Musema case the accused was found guilty of extermination. 
In particular, the Trial Chamber established the widespread and systematic character of this crime 
against humanity taking into account not only the number of victims but also the repeated attacks 
against the Tutsi in which the accused took part (ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, TC, Judgment, 
27 January 2000, paras. 693, 746–751, 754, 796, 945, and 949–951).
98 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, AC, Judgment, 24 February 2004, para. 113.
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Th us, when possible, the ad hoc tribunals have established the general pre-requisite 
of crimes against humanity focusing only on the criminal conduct charged in the 
indictment. Th ey have veriﬁ ed whether the personal conduct of the accused was 
widespread or systematic, leaving no room for any link with state responsibility.
However, international case law has also accepted that a single act can be regarded 
as a crime against humanity, if it takes place within the necessary context. For 
example, a single murder can be part of a pattern that amounts to ethnic cleansing. 
In Kupreškić, the ICTY expressed this concept as follows: 
In general terms, the very nature of the criminal acts over which the International 
Tribunal has jurisdiction under Article 5, in view of the fact that they must be ‘directed 
against any civilian population,’ ensures that what is to be alleged will not be one 
particular act but, instead, a course of conduct. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, 
a single act has comprised a crime against humanity when it occurred within the 
necessary context. For example, the act of denouncing a Jewish neighbour to the Nazi 
authorities – if committed against a background of widespread persecution – has been 
regarded as amounting to a crime against humanity.99
In such a case, the ‘seriousness’ criterion for crimes against humanity is established 
by criminal courts by reference to the broader criminal context, and thus does 
not strictly depend on the personal conduct of the accused. Th is is an approach 
completely diﬀ erent from the ﬁ rst one examined above. It allows criminal courts to 
establish individual liability for crimes against humanity with respect to conduct not 
per se widespread or systematic but with respect to a criminal context representing 
the factual framework in which the accused has committed single prohibited acts. 
To say that criminal courts can deduce individual liability from a general criminal 
context require only one further step. 
All depends on the weight actually given to this general criminal context in 
establishing individual criminal liability. If international criminal tribunals focus 
on the personal conduct of the accused and on its widespread or systematic char-
acter, then no link with collective criminality will be taken into account, and the 
widespread or systematic criterion for crimes against humanity will, in a certain 
sense, be ‘individualized’. By contrast, if the emphasis is placed on the pattern 
of attacks against the civilian population and on the fact that the accused is a 
member of the group responsible for such widespread or systematic attacks, then 
99 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 550 (emphasis added). 
Th e ICTY already had the occasion to clarify that: “Crimes against humanity . . . must be widespread 
or demonstrate a systematic character. However, as long as there is a link with the widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against 
humanity. As such, an individual committing a crime against a single victim or a limited number 
of victims might be recognized as guilty of a crime against humanity if his acts were part of the 
speciﬁ c context identiﬁ ed above.” (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, TC, Review of the indictment 
pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 3 April 1996, para. 30).
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individual liability for crimes against humanity will be closely connected to and 
made dependent upon the general criminal context. Th is second approach widely 
characterizes the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals.
C. Crimes against Humanity: Th e Role of the General Criminal Context
An interesting development has emerged from the ICTY case law. Th e Tribunal 
has generalized the approach adopted in previous judgments, holding that the 
widespread or systematic requirement for crimes against humanity does not concern 
the conduct of the accused but only the violence carried out against the civilian 
population, that is, the general criminal context. 
In Kunarac,100 the ICTY had to establish the criminal liability of three members 
of a Bosnian Serb military unit who were charged with war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed against the Bosnian Muslim population. With respect 
to the ‘seriousness’ criterion of crimes against humanity, the Trial Chamber stated 
that “only the attack, not the individual acts of the accused must be widespread or 
systematic”.101 In addition, the prohibited conduct of the accused needs only be a 
part of this attack and, all other conditions being met, a single or relatively limited 
number of acts on his or her part would qualify as a crime against humanity unless 
those acts are isolated or random. A single act can be regarded as a crime against 
humanity if it takes place in the relevant context. Th is position has been upheld 
by the Appeals Chamber.102
It is not an easy task to evaluate this position of the ICTY concerning the wide-
spread or systematic requirement for crimes against humanity. On the one hand, 
it must be said that ad hoc tribunals have been careful about broadening recourse 
100 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., TC, Judgment, 22 February 2001.
101 Ibid., para. 431 (emphasis added).
102 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., AC, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 96; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, AC, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 101; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, AC, Judgment, 22 
March 2006, paras. 245–251. Th e signiﬁ cant role played by the general criminal context in the 
establishment of individual liability for crimes against humanity is conﬁ rmed by the case law 
which has dealt with the particular issue of the actus reus of persecution. Apart from those listed 
in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, ‘other’ criminal acts can qualify as persecution if they are of 
the same level of seriousness. Th is gravity test has been understood as requiring that, in order to 
amount to persecution, the relevant act must consist of a gross or blatant denial, on discrimina-
tory grounds, of a fundamental right under international customary or treaty law. In particular, 
the determination of acts amounting to persecution “must be evaluated not in isolation but in 
context, by looking at their cumulative eﬀ ect”, even though the underlying act may not constitute 
a violation of international law (See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., TC, Judgment, 14 January 
2000, para. 622, and ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, TC, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 434). 
Th erefore, in order to be regarded as serious, and in order to amount to persecution, certain acts 
need to be part of a systematic or widespread attack against the civilian population. In other 
words, they will be established essentially having regard to the general criminal context.
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to the general criminal context in ﬁ nding individuals accountable for crimes 
against humanity. Th e existence of a general criminal context – of a widespread 
or systematic attack against the civilian population – is not enough. To convict 
the accused it must be proved that there is a link between this general context and 
his or her personal conduct: the acts of the accused need be a part of the attack.103 
International tribunals have adopted a rigorous approach in considering this link. 
Most of the accused persons found guilty of crimes against humanity before the 
ICTY and ICTR committed acts that could have been considered serious. Th us, 
it has generally been possible for these tribunals to focus on the widespread or 
systematic nature of the personal conduct of the accused. If we take, for example, 
the accused persons in Kunarac, they were found guilty of torture and rape in a 
number of cases which could be regarded as widespread or systematic independently 
of the general context in which they had been carried out. Similarly, in Blaškić 
the Appeals Chamber reviewed the Trial Chamber judgment,104 and established 
Blaškić’s criminal liability not with respect to the systematic attacks carried out by 
his troops, but with regard to the conduct of the accused in each attack.105 Th us, 
it is possible to say that international case law has generally displayed a rigorous 
approach in the establishment of the widespread or systematic pre-requisite of 
crimes against humanity, which is perfectly understandable in the light of the basic 
principle of personal liability. 
Nonetheless, it may reasonably be assumed that the abovementioned interpreta-
tion of the widespread or systematic requirement for crimes against humanity has 
facilitated the task of ad hoc tribunals in ascribing individual liability for crimes 
committed at the collective level. Th e widespread or systematic nature of the attack 
is therefore the element of crimes against humanity which allows international tri-
bunals to take the collective dimension of these crimes into account. It represents 
the link between individual and collective criminality. It is a signiﬁ cant tool at the 
disposal of criminal tribunals that have to deal mainly with this sort of ‘system’ 
criminality. Indeed, the ad hoc tribunals have generally addressed large scale atroci-
ties, and the establishment of the ‘seriousness’ criterion for crimes against humanity 
103 See, in particular, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, TC, Review of the indictment pursuant to Rule 61
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 3 April 1996, para. 30; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac 
et al., AC, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 96.
104 Th e general pre-requisite of crimes against humanity was ascertained with respect to the conduct 
of the accused as well as that of his subordinate military personnel. In particular, a certain attention 
was drawn to the pattern of attacks they carried out on various Bosnian villages (ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 467).
105 As a consequence of this approach, the Appeals Chamber acquitted him under various counts. 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, AC, Judgment, 29 July 2004.
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has not been particularly problematic. Suﬃ  ce it to recall here some more recent 
cases of the ICTY dealing with crimes against humanity.106
Th e case law of the ICTY provides ample evidence of the signiﬁ cant role played 
by the general criminal context in the establishment of individual criminal liability 
for crimes against humanity.
In Naletilić, the ICTY considered serious crimes committed in Mostar and the 
surrounding region by Bosnian Croats against the Muslim civilian population.107 
Th e Trial Chamber had no diﬃ  culty in ﬁ nding that, at the time relevant to the 
indictment, there was a widespread and systematic attack against the Muslim 
population. Th ousands of Muslims were forced to leave their homes. A large 
number of prisoners of war and civilian prisoners were held at detention centres 
in the area. Th e Tribunal was thus satisﬁ ed that the acts of the defendants – two 
military commanders who participated in the ﬁ ghting – directly contributed to 
the overall aim of the campaign against the civilian population.
In another important case,108 the ICTY was called on to hear charges of (inter 
alia) crimes against humanity allegedly carried out by a political leader of the 
Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia Herzegovina. Th e ICTY considered that the 
relevant events which took place in the municipality of Prijedor constituted a 
carefully planned attack against the civilian population which culminated in large 
scale killings of non-Serbs, or at least in their detention. Th e Tribunal was also 
satisﬁ ed that the conduct of the accused was closely linked to the general criminal 
context. Th e accused had participated in a joint criminal enterprise whose purpose 
was to carry out a discriminatory campaign to ethnically cleanse the municipality 
of Prijedor by deporting and persecuting Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. 
In particular, Stakić
played a crucial role in the co-ordinated co-operation with the police and army in 
furtherance of the plan to establish a Serbian municipality in Prijedor. In addition, 
[he was] one of the main actors in the persecutorial campaign, actively participated in 
setting up and running [the camps], and took an active role in the organization of the 
massive displacement of the non-Serb population out of Prijedor municipality.109
In Simić, three defendants were charged under a theory of joint criminal enterprise 
for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the Bosanski Šamac 
and Odžak municipalities. Simić was the Bosnian Serb President of the Bosanski 
Šamac Crisis Staﬀ  and of the War Presidency; Tadić was a member of the Crisis 
106 All cases dealing with crimes against humanity brought before the ICTR concern conduct which 
has also entailed charges of genocide, because carried out in a context of notorious widespread 
and systematic atrocities.
107 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, TC, Judgment, 31 March 2003, paras. 238–244.
108 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, TC, Judgment, 31 July 2003, paras. 628–630.
109 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, AC, Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 78. 
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Staﬀ  and of the Exchange Commission; and Zarić had served in various positions 
(Assistant Commander for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Morale and Information 
of the 4th Detachment, Chief of National Security Service in Bosanski Šamac, 
Deputy to the President of the War Council for Security Matters in Odžak, and 
Assistant Commander of the 2nd Posavina Brigade for Morale and Information) 
and reported directly to the Crisis Staﬀ . Th e Tribunal found that the defendants 
had participated in a joint criminal enterprise and that their acts were part of a 
widespread and systematic attack against Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. 
Th e attack had been planned and carried out in an organized manner. Hundreds 
of non-Serbs had unlawfully been detained, a large number of them were subjected 
to torture or to cruel and inhumane treatment, and hundreds of them had been 
deported or forcibly transferred.110
In Brđanin, the ICTY was satisﬁ ed that “there was a widespread or systematic 
attack against the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian population in 
the Bosnian Krajina during the period relevant to the Indictment”.111 In several 
instances, mass killings took place and a policy of ethnic cleansing was systemati-
cally implemented by the Bosnian Serbs. Tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims 
and Bosnian Croats had forcibly been expelled according to a general pattern of 
conduct. Th e acts committed by the accused had been part of this widespread and 
systematic attack against the civilian population.
Similarly, in Blagojević, both defendants were high-ranking oﬃ  cers in brigades 
which took part in the attack on the Srebrenica enclave. Th e attack had been directed 
against the Bosnian Muslim civilian population and was clearly widespread and 
systematic. It aﬀ ected approximately 40,000 people. Th e underlying crimes with 
which the indictment was concerned were part of the attack.112
In some cases it can be more problematic to establish a link between the gen-
eral criminal context and the conduct of an individual defendant. In particular, 
when the accused has a leadership position, there may be a physical and structural 
remoteness between him and the general criminal context. Th is has not prevented 
international tribunals from ﬁ nding a link between the conduct of the accused and 
the widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, at the ‘cost’ of 
relying on a more ﬂ exible form of liability.113
110 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić et al., TC, Judgment, 17 October 2003, paras. 978–982. 
111 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, TC, Judgment, 1 September 2004, paras. 159–162. 
112 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005, paras. 550–554.
113 In Brđanin, for example, the Trial Chamber found a link with the criminal context, but considered 
‘aiding and abetting’ to be the most appropriate form of liability (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, 
TC, Judgment, 1 September 2004, paras. 354–355: “JCE is not an appropriate mode of liability 
to describe the individual criminal liability of the Accused, given the extraordinarily broad nature 
of this case, where the Prosecution seeks to include within a JCE a person as structurally remote 
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Th is case law shows that, in a number of cases, the ‘seriousness’ criterion in 
relation to crimes against humanity has been applied in a more ﬂ exible way which 
seems indispensable for taking into account of the collective dimension of inter-
national crimes such as crimes against humanity. When the personal conduct of 
the accused is not per se widespread and systematic, the ad hoc tribunals employ a 
two-step analysis. Th ey ﬁ rst examine the general criminal context, and then they 
proceed to a determination of whether the individual conduct of the accused ﬁ ts 
into that broader picture. Th is methodology introduces a precise link between 
individual liability and collective responsibility. Moreover, international tribunals 
may establish that certain crimes have been committed at the collective level ‘once 
and for all’, so that in subsequent cases the notorious criminal context may be taken 
as a kind of judicial notice.114 
Th is methodology raises the question of whether the establishment of individual 
responsibility for crimes against humanity necessarily corresponds to a ﬁ nding of 
a serious wrongful act, as deﬁ ned under aggravated state responsibility. Due to the 
kind of jurisdiction they exercise, international criminal tribunals take into account 
the general criminal context as a sort of preliminary issue which is necessary to 
ascribe individual liability. Th ey do not investigate whether the collective criminal 
phenomenon is the result of a state conduct or of the conduct of group of private 
individuals, because this is not required under international criminal law. Interna-
tional criminal tribunals focus on collective criminality with the speciﬁ c purpose of 
identifying a nexus with the conduct of the accused. While systematic or large scale 
attacks against the civilian population generally imply an involvement of the state 
apparatus, the existence of an overlap in the establishment of individual and state 
responsibility for crimes against humanity can only be decided on a case-by-case 
basis, and the factual circumstances of each case will be crucial. In some cases the 
general criminal context taken into account to hold individual oﬀ enders account-
able for crimes against humanity concerns the conduct of non-state actors.115 In 
other cases, international criminal tribunals explicitly refer to a general criminal 
context taking place at the state level, as in the Darfur case currently before the 
ICC.116 What can be stressed is that international criminal tribunals increasingly 
establish the discussed pre-requisite of crimes against humanity having regard to 
the general criminal context rather than the personal conduct of the accused, that 
is, with respect to facts that could be regarded as serious under aggravated state 
responsibility. As a matter of legal interpretation, the seriousness requirement for 
from the commission of the crimes charged in the Indictment as the Accused”). For a discussion 
of this case and, more generally, of joint criminal enterprise, see infra Chapter 6.
114 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
115 See, for example, the Limaj case, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
116 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecu-
tion Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007, paras. 65–67.
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crimes against humanity relates to the general criminal context, and accordingly 
it is established in a very similar way with respect to both state and individual 
responsibility.
D. Genocide 
According to the well-established deﬁ nition of genocide, the existence of a speciﬁ c 
plan to destroy a protected group does not constitute an element of the crime.117 
Th us, under international criminal law there is no formal seriousness requirement. 
However, genocide is by nature a collective crime. Its deﬁ nition requires the (total 
or partial) physical destruction of the targeted group to be carried out. Th us, it is 
collective in the sense that the victim is a group. But such a criminal goal would 
probably be achieved only if the perpetrator is a group as well. Historically, genocide 
has always been perpetrated by groups, or better by states. Th e problematic aspect 
of genocide is that its collective nature from the viewpoint of the perpetrator is not 
translated into a precise element in the deﬁ nition of the crime.118
As far as state responsibility is concerned, it is not disputed that genocide entails 
aggravated state responsibility. But no seriousness requirement is explicitly cited 
with respect to this crime in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. According 
to the ILC, genocide is per se a serious breach of community obligations. Th us, 
the question is whether the participation of one state organ in the commission of 
genocide is suﬃ  cient to trigger aggravated state responsibility. While it cannot be 
excluded that isolated acts of state organs amounting to genocide entail ordinary 
state responsibility,119 the answer is arguably negative. One may think of historical 
precedents or of analogous crimes, such as oﬃ  cial torture, which can be carried out 
by isolated state organs but which entail aggravated state responsibility only if car-
ried out according to a widespread state practice. Moreover, the fact that genocide 
must be regarded by deﬁ nition as a serious breach under Article 40 means that its 
117 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 94; ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, AC, Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 48; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, TC, Judgment, 
2 August 2001, para. 572. On this particular aspect, see J. Verhoeven, ‘Le crime de génocide. 
Originalité et ambiguïté’, 24 RBDI (1991), p. 25; W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law. 
Th e Crime of Crimes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 208–209; K. Kittichai-
saree, supra note 59, p. 76; A. Cassese, ‘Genocide’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. I (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 
p. 350 (“in case of genocide, international rules do not require the existence of a widespread or 
systematic practice as a legal ingredient of the crime”).
118 See G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the 
Darfur Case’, 3 JICJ (2005), p. 546; and J.D. Ohlin, ‘Th ree Conceptual Problems with the 
Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise’, 5 JICJ (2007), p. 73.
119 One may think for example of a genocide committed by state A with the contribution of a single 
state organ of state B. While state A incurs aggravated state responsibility, state B ‘only’ incurs 
ordinary state responsibility. On this speciﬁ c aspect, see infra Chapter 8. 
Th e Material Element   105
collective nature has been taken into account, and that a signiﬁ cant involvement 
of the state apparatus must be established in order to ﬁ nd aggravated responsibil-
ity. If the seriousness requirement is to be regarded as implicit in the deﬁ nition of 
genocide, this is because by its very nature this crime requires, in the words of the 
ILC, “an intentional violation on a large scale”. 
Th e approach to the collective nature of genocide under international criminal law 
is diﬀ erent. As noted above, in order to hold individuals accountable for genocide 
there is no need to demonstrate a genocidal policy or that the prohibited conduct 
has been carried out by a group of perpetrators. Abstractly speaking, even a single 
person can destroy the targeted group:
Such a case is theoretically possible. Th e murders committed by the accused are suf-
ﬁ cient to establish the material element of the crime of genocide and it is a priori 
possible to conceive that the accused harboured the plan to exterminate an entire 
group without this intent having been supported by any organization in which other 
individuals participated. In this respect, the preparatory work of the Convention 
of 1948 brings out that premeditation was not selected as a legal ingredient of the 
crime of genocide, after having been mentioned by the ad hoc committee at the draft 
stage, on the grounds that it seemed superﬂ uous given the special intention already 
required by the text and that such precision would only make the burden of proof 
even greater. It ensues from this omission that the drafters of the Convention did not 
deem the existence of an organization or a system serving a genocidal objective as a 
legal ingredient of the crime. In so doing, they did not discount the possibility of a 
lone individual seeking to destroy a group as such.120
Due to its nature and purpose, international criminal law focuses on the establish-
ment of personal liability. Th is explains how it is possible to interpret the deﬁ ni-
tion of genocide as to include cases of isolated perpetrators, since no seriousness 
requirement is provided for under the customary deﬁ nition of genocide.121 In 
principle, the collective nature of genocide needs not be taken into account from 
the viewpoint of the perpetrator.122 
Th e Darfur case clearly epitomizes the abstract possibility of adopting two 
diverging approaches as far as individual and state responsibility for genocide are 
concerned. Th e Commission of Inquiry concludes that genocide has not occurred 
in Sudan. In particular, it holds that no state genocidal policy existed, and that 
the crimes (against humanity)123 committed by the Sudanese Government and the 
militias under its control were not carried out with the aim to physically destroy 
120 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 100.
121 P.N. Drost, Th e Crime of State. Genocide (Leiden, Sythoﬀ , 1959), p. 85.
122 Increasingly, scholars criticize this approach and urge the collective nature of genocide to be taken 
into account. See G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, supra note 118, pp. 545–550; C. Kress, ‘Th e 
Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent’, 3 JICJ (2005), pp. 565–577. 
123 ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004’, supra note 25, 
para. 519.
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the relevant targeted group.124 As already mentioned, the Commission decided to 
focus on individual criminal liability, but various passages in the report exclude a 
direct (aggravated) responsibility of Sudan, even though some of its organs might 
be implicated in the commission of that crime. Indeed, at the same time the Com-
mission did not rule out “the possibility that in some instances single individuals, 
including Government oﬃ  cials, may entertain a genocidal intent”,125 and it would 
be for the competent court to establish the criminal liability for genocide of these 
individuals, in the absence of any involvement of Sudan in the commission of 
this crime. As will be discussed in the next chapter, in practice it is much more 
diﬃ  cult to accept these diverging approaches when looking at the way in which 
the psychological element is actually established.
In practice, the collective nature of genocide is crucial in ascribing individual 
accountability for this crime. For obvious reasons, the ICTR has mainly dealt with 
the crime of genocide. Its case law conﬁ rms this rigorous approach, focusing on 
the personal conduct of the accused regardless of any link with a state genocidal 
policy. However, the ICTR has tried not only accused persons who have committed 
ﬂ agrant acts of genocide, but also individuals that have carried out acts amounting 
to genocide because they were part of a broader genocidal context. In particular, 
the ICTR deemed it necessary, in each trial in which the alleged act of genocide 
was part of a broader criminal context, for the Prosecution to demonstrate that 
genocide was carried out in Rwanda and that the accused took part in this geno-
cidal campaign.126 As already noted with respect to crimes against humanity, this 
approach allows the Tribunal to ascribe individual liability relying on the general 
criminal context, and establishes a connection between individual and collective 
criminality. 
But the ICTR has taken one signiﬁ cant step further, and in a recent decision 
it took judicial notice that genocide occurred in Rwanda, that genocide was a 
notorious fact.127 In rejecting the strictly individual approach of the Trial Chamber 
(according to which the Tribunal should only focus on the personal involvement 
124 Ibid., para. 518.
125 Ibid., para. 520.
126 See, in particular, ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 78–129, 
and Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 31–54. Th e case 
law of the ICTR concerning genocide will be examined in detail below (see infra Chapter 4). 
127 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., AC, Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Deci-
sion on Judicial Notice, 16 June 2006. By contrast, the ICTY has displayed a more rigorous 
approach to the matter, admitting only factual ﬁ ndings (and not legal ﬁ ndings) as adjudicated 
facts of which it can take judicial notice. See, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, TC, 
Decision on Prosecution Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated facts and for Admission of 
Written Statements of Witnesses pursuant to Rule 92bis, 28 February 2003.
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of the defendant charged with genocide),128 the Appeals Chamber recognized that 
the genocide occurred in Rwanda in 1994 was a crime committed at the collec-
tive level, and stressed the importance of this general criminal context for under-
standing the individual’s actions and establishing individual criminal liability not 
only with respect to genocide but also other international crimes, such as crimes 
against humanity.129 Indeed, as a consequence of having established once and for 
all that the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi group is a ‘part of world history’, 
the Prosecution no longer needs to demonstrate the criminal context in which the 
accused participated with single prohibited acts to convict him for genocide. Th is 
approach has the eﬀ ect not only of taking into account the collective dimension 
of the crime of genocide but also of establishing a clear relationship between indi-
vidual and collective criminality. It is the collective criminal phenomenon which 
is established ﬁ rst, and only then individual liability is ascribed to those who have 
participated in the genocidal campaign. In this case, it is diﬃ  cult to deny that the 
judicial notice of the Rwanda genocide – coupled with the fact that the ICTR has 
convicted high-ranking organs of the state – points to an aggravated responsibility 
of the state.
Finally, there is an indirect way in which the collective nature of genocide can 
be taken into account. Genocide as a speciﬁ c intent crime requires the perpetrator 
of the prohibited conduct to have acted with the intent to destroy the targeted 
group. However, it is very diﬃ  cult to prove the genocidal intent when genocide 
is not committed in a systematic manner or according to a preconceived plan.130 
Th erefore, international and national criminal tribunals have constantly aﬃ  rmed 
that the dolus specialis can be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of 
fact, and speciﬁ cally from the massive and/or systematic nature of the criminal 
128 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., AC, Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Deci-
sion on Judicial Notice, supra note 127, para. 33.
129 Ibid., paras. 35–36.
130 A divergent view seems to be expressed in the Elements of Crimes prepared in connection with 
the ICC Statute. Indeed, the PrepCom has listed among the elements of genocide a further 
requirement, namely, that “the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar 
conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself eﬀ ect such destruction” (UN 
Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>). However, this additional 
element seems inconsistent with the deﬁ nition of genocide under both customary law and Article 
6 of the ICC Statute (A. Cassese, supra note 117, p. 349). Th e reason for the introduction of such 
an additional condition can be found in the drafting history of the Elements of Crimes. Arguably, 
the requisite context was introduced in order to balance the recognition by the PrepCom that a 
single act (e.g. the ‘initial’ criminal act) can constitute genocide (V. Oosterveld, ‘Th e Elements 
of Genocide – Th e Context of Genocide’, in R.S. Lee (ed.), Th e International Criminal Court. 
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 2001), 
pp. 45–47; W.A. Schabas, supra note 117, p. 234). Th erefore, it is not possible to say that the 
Elements of Genocide always make responsibility conditional on the contextual element described 
above.
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acts.131 Accordingly, the general criminal context can have a certain indirect role 
in establishing individual criminal liability for genocide, but this particular aspect 
will be examined in the next chapter.132
E. Aggression
Th e crime of aggression is certainly the international crime characterized by the 
closest connection between state and individual responsibility.133 Th e ﬁ rst state-
ments which regarded aggressive war as an international crime addressed a state 
responsibility issue.134 Only later, in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, were indi-
131 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 477, 523–524, and 
728–730; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 93; 
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, TC, Judgment, 6 December 1999, paras. 60–62; ICTR, Prosecu-
tor v. Musema, TC, Judgment, 27 January 2000, paras. 166–167; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadžić 
and Mladić, TC, Review of the Indictments pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 94; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999, 
para. 101; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 572. 
132 See infra Chapter 4.
133 S. Glueck, Th e Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War (New York, Knopf, 1946); H. Donnedieu de 
Vabres, ‘Le procès de Nuremberg devant les principes modernes du droit pénal international’, 
70 RCADI (1947), p. 477; G.A. Finch, ‘Th e Nuremberg Trial and International Law’, 41 AJIL 
(1947), p. 20; B.V.A. Röling, Th e Tokyo Trial and Beyond. Reﬂ ections of a Peacemonger (Cambridge 
MA, Polity Press, 1993), pp. 65–70; J. Hogan-Doran and B.T. Van Ginkel, ‘Aggression as a Crime 
under International Law and the Prosecution of Individuals by the Proposed International Criminal 
Court’, 43 NILR (1996), p. 321; M.C. Bassiouni and B.B. Ferencz, ‘Th e Crime Against Peace’, in 
M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 1999), 
p. 313; M. Dumée, ‘Le crime d’agression’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal 
(Paris, Pedone, 2000), p. 251; B.B. Ferencz, ‘Th e Crime of Aggression’, in G. Kirk McDonald 
and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law, 
vol. I (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 33; S.R. Ratner and J.S. Abrams, supra 
note 52, pp. 124–128; A. Cassese, supra note 41, pp. 111–116; M. Lippman, ‘Th e History, 
Development, and Decline of Crimes Against Peace’, 36 Th e George Washington International 
Law Review (2004), p. 957; S. Solera, Deﬁ ning the Crime of Aggression (London, Cameron May, 
2007).
134 In 1762, Rousseau already deﬁ ned war in the following terms: “La guerre n’est donc point une 
relation d’homme à homme, mais une relation d’Etat à Etat, dans laquelle les particuliers ne sont 
ennemis qu’accidentellement, non point comme hommes ni même comme citoyens, mais comme soldats; 
non point comme membres de la patrie, mais comme ses défenseurs. Enﬁ n chaque Etat ne peut avoir 
pour ennemis que d’autres Etats et non pas des hommes, attendu qu’entre choses de diverses natures on 
ne peut ﬁ xer aucun vrai rapport” (J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social (Paris, Gallimard, 1993), Livre 
I, Chapitre IV (originally published in 1762)). See C. Eagleton, ‘Faut-il proscrire seulement les 
guerres d’agression ou toutes les guerres?’, 36 RGDIP (1932), p. 498; R.J. Alfaro, ‘La question 
de la déﬁ nition de l’agression’, 29 RDISDP (1951), p. 367; I. Brownlie, International Law and 
the Use of Force by States (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963); B.V.A. Röling, ‘International Law and 
the Maintenance of Peace’, 4 NYIL (1973), p. 1; B. Broms, ‘Th e Deﬁ nition of Aggression’, 154 
RCADI (1977), p. 299; A.M. Rifaat, International Aggression. A Study of the Legal Concept: Its 
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viduals prosecuted for the crime of aggression. Henceforth, the development of 
international rules relating to such violations had to serve a double purpose: the 
identiﬁ cation of the conduct giving rise to state responsibility and that giving rise 
to individual criminal liability. Th e former, however, remains the characterizing 
feature of the norms concerning aggression, as this is primarily considered a mat-
ter that concerns states. In 2004, the ICJ still conceives of aggression essentially 
in terms of a relationship between states: self-defence entails an interstate legal 
relation and it can only be validly invoked in case of an armed aggression “by one 
State against another State”.135
Th e fact that aggression does not entail a legal relation between states and 
individuals does not exclude the possibility that the international prohibition 
of (interstate) aggression may also concern individuals. However, it implies that 
individual liability for aggression presupposes state responsibility, and persons can 
be convicted for aggression only if a state act of aggression has taken place. Th is 
establishes a very close connection between aggravated state responsibility and 
individual criminal liability for aggression. In order to establish this relationship 
precisely, three major aspects are relevant, that is, the material element, the serious-
ness requirement, and the subjective element of the crime in question. While the 
subjective element will be examined below,136 the focus here will be on the ﬁ rst two 
elements, bearing in mind that the seriousness requirement is generally considered 
to be implicit in the deﬁ nition of aggression.
Th e main problem in the identiﬁ cation of such a relationship concerns the exact 
deﬁ nition of aggression with respect to both state and individual responsibility. 
Neither Article 16 of the 1996 Draft Code nor Article 5 of the ICC Statute gives 
a deﬁ nition of aggression. Th e works leading to these texts essentially refer back to 
the Nuremberg judgment and to the 1974 GA Deﬁ nition of Aggression.137
Th e Nuremberg Charter deﬁ nes crimes against peace as the planning, prepara-
tion, initiation and waging of aggressive war. However, no precise deﬁ nition of 
Development and Deﬁ nition in International Law (Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 
1979); J. Zourek, ‘Enﬁ n une déﬁ nition de l’agression’, 20 AFDI (1974), p. 9; Y. Dinstein, War, 
Aggression and Self-Defence (2d edn., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994); N.A. Nyiri, 
Th e United Nations’ Search for a Deﬁ nition of Aggression (New York, Peter Lang, 1989).
135 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra 
Chapter 1, note 44, para. 139. Consequently, Israel cannot invoke self-defence with respect to 
acts of terrorism carried out by private individuals. However, it is worth recalling that in recent 
time the use of force by or against non-state actors has increasingly attracted the attention of 
international law scholars. For a general discussion of this question with respect to a recent case 
of international practice, see E. Cannizzaro, ‘Entités non-étatiques et régime international de 
l’emploi de la force. Une étude sur le cas de la réaction israélienne au Liban’, 111 RGDIP (2007), 
p. 331. 
136 See infra Chapter 4.
137 GA Resolution n. 3314 (XXIX) adopted on 14 December 1974.
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‘aggressive war’ was given in the judgment. Th e only general deﬁ nition of aggressive 
war we can infer from the judgment is that of an illegal use of armed force by state 
A to attack state B.138 By contrast, ‘aggressive acts’ seemed to imply a simple threat 
to use armed force and under such circumstances individual criminal liability was 
apparently excluded. Accordingly, the Nuremberg Charter, as interpreted by the 
IMT, criminalized as crimes against peace acts by individuals leading to an armed 
attack by state A against state B, and the consequences of maintaining a domina-
tion of state B. Indeed, not only were German leaders convicted for the launch-
ing of twelve aggressive wars but also for crimes against peace, which included 
the carrying out of occupation policies. Th e exclusion of acts of aggression from 
crimes against peace was challenged in the subsequent Nuremberg proceedings.139 
However, a broad interpretation of the material element of the crime of aggression 
has arguably been rejected both in the ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes and in the GA 
Deﬁ nition of Aggression.
Article 16 of the 1996 Draft Code reads as follows: “an individual who, as leader 
or organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of 
aggression.” Except for the fact that it simply speaks of aggression and not of war of 
aggression, this provision completely relies on the Nuremberg precedent. Th e previ-
ous provision on the crime of aggression, drafted by the ILC in 1954, embodied a 
much broader and much more controversial deﬁ nition. Article 2(1) provided that 
“any act of aggression” is a crime against the peace and security of mankind, includ-
ing “activities calculated to foment civil strife” (Article 2(5)), “annexation” (Article 
2 (8)) and “coercive measures of an economic or political character” (Article 2(9)). 
However, this Article was deleted during the second lecture of the Draft Code of 
Crimes and neither new Article 16 nor its commentary provide for a deﬁ nition of 
aggression. Th e ILC has preferred to refer to the concept of aggression used in the 
Nuremberg judgment and not to codify highly controversial scenarios of aggression. 
138 ‘Against another state’ because war, in general, is a matter involving states, and aggressive wars, in 
particular, are considered to be the violation of the distinctive feature of states: their sovereignty. 
‘Illegal’ because the use of armed force is in violation of international law: Germany violated not 
only speciﬁ c treaties but also a general customary rule prohibiting the use of war as a means of 
pursuing national politics. ‘Th rough the use of armed force’ because, according to the International 
Military Tribunal, other situations where armed force was not used – the Austrian Anschluss, for 
example – were considered simply to be acts of aggression and not wars of aggression.
139 In the Ministries case (US Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Von Weizsäcker et al., 14 April 1949, 
16 ILR (1949), pp. 344–362), the American Military Tribunal held that the invasions of Austria 
(1938) and Czechoslovakia (1939) were acts of aggression and accordingly crimes against peace 
(at 347). Th ese nations surrendered without ﬁ ring a shot. Th e charge of aggression therefore 
concerned an overwhelming military threat, and individual responsibility for crimes against peace 
was aﬃ  rmed even in the absence of the use of armed force.
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Moreover, a certain vagueness can also serve the purpose of leaving the door open 
for future developments under customary law. 
When compared to international criminal law documents, the GA Deﬁ nition 
of Aggression had a much wider scope. It had to identify situations which could 
give rise to both state and individual responsibility. Th e deﬁ nition of aggression 
is also an important document since – adopted by consensus – it focused only on 
non-controversial issues which could be agreed upon by the entire international 
community. Th e clear outcome of such a process of negotiation was the exclusion 
from the deﬁ nition of aggression of interpretations which aimed at broadening 
the concept of use of force beyond that of armed force, or the deﬁ nition of crimes 
against peace beyond aggressive wars. 
Th e deﬁ nition took armed force as its basic concept. As stated generally in the 
preamble, aggression is the “most serious and dangerous illegal use of force”. In this 
deﬁ nition, ‘illegal’ means action that is not justiﬁ ed by the UN Charter. Th us, in 
the light of Article 51, which is the only exception to the use of force embodied in 
the Charter, the deﬁ nition of aggression concerned the most serious and dangerous 
uses of force justifying individual or collective self-defence. Opinions in favour 
of the inclusion of highly controversial issues such as anticipatory self-defence, 
economic aggression or ideological aggression were rejected because of a lack of 
unanimity.140 On the other hand, there was a general agreement in favour of the 
inclusion of indirect aggression141 and the consequences of aggression in terms of 
territorial acquisition or other advantages deemed unlawful.142 
In the end, the GA agreed upon a deﬁ nition of armed aggression which does not 
broaden the notion applied in Nuremberg. Indeed, Article 5 of the deﬁ nition is 
clearly inspired by that precedent. Arguably, Article 5 deals with the consequences 
of aggression with respect to both states and individuals. In particular, it establishes 
individual criminal liability in the case of wars of aggression, using the same word-
ing as the IMT did. Th is was done explicitly – at the insistence of the U.K. – in 
order to avoid the criminalization of further aggressive acts.143 Th e result was the 
exclusion from Article 5 of simple threats to use armed force, in accordance with 
the general concept of aggression adopted in the deﬁ nition. 
One problematic aspect in Article 5(2) is that it uses two diﬀ erent wordings to 
address the issues of state and individual responsibility respectively. While ‘aggres-
sion’ gives rise to state responsibility, only ‘wars of aggression’ give rise to individual 
liability. Th us, after the adoption of the deﬁ nition, the debate focused on the 
140 B.B. Ferencz, Deﬁ ning International Aggression. Th e Search for World Peace. A Documentary History 
and Analysis (Dobbs Ferry N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1975), p. 30.
141 See Article 3(g) of the GA Deﬁ nition of Aggression.
142 See Article 5(3) of the GA Deﬁ nition of Aggression.
143 B.B. Ferencz, supra note 140, p. 43.
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puzzling question of the identiﬁ cation of the diﬀ erence between aggression and 
war of aggression.144 Nonetheless, it seems that the easiest solution is to consider 
that there is one unitary notion – concerning the most serious cases of illegal use 
of armed force, such as those listed in Article 3 – of aggression giving rise to both 
aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability under international 
law. Th is conclusion is conﬁ rmed by the general reference to ‘aggression’ or ‘act 
of aggression’ indistinctly in the 1996 Draft Code and in the work of the bodies 
charged to elaborate a deﬁ nition of aggression under the ICC Statute.
With respect to the ICC Statute, Article 5 on the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the Court gives no deﬁ nition of aggression. Th e Final Act of the Rome conference 
established a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom)145 and entrusted it with the 
task of drafting the elements of all crimes falling under the Court’s jurisdiction 
(1999–2002).146 With the entry into force of the Statute, the Assembly of the 
States Parties decided to continue and complete the work on the crime of aggres-
sion,147 and established a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
(SWGCA).148 Th us, the PrepCom ﬁ rst and subsequently the SWGCA have been 
entrusted with the diﬃ  cult task of preparing a provision on aggression. In their 
proposals, an act of aggression “means an act referred to in the GA Resolution 33 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974 which is determined to have been committed by 
the State concerned”.149
Th us, there is a complete overlap between the act of aggression giving rise to 
aggravated state responsibility and the crime of aggression giving rise to individual 
criminal liability. In particular, aggression is limited to the serious breaches listed 
in Article 3 of the UN GA Resolution, while acts such as economic aggression or 
144 See the diﬀ erent views expressed by J. Stone, Conﬂ ict through Consensus (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977); B.B. Ferencz, supra note 140, pp. 43–44; and Y. Dinstein, supra note 
134, p. 126. 
145 Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome Conference, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>.
146 For the ﬁ nal proposal, see UN Doc. PCNICC72002/2/Add.2, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index
.html>.
147 ICC-ASP/1/Resolution 1, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
148 ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex II, p. 371, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
149 See UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, pp. 3–4, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>, and 
ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, p. 8, <www.icc-cpi.int>. In the SWGCA, two options have been 
put forward as concerns the deﬁ nition of the actus reus of the crime of aggression: referring to 
either a state ‘armed attack’ or to a state ‘act of aggression’. Th e latter solution was generally agreed 
upon provided that a seriousness threshold is included in the deﬁ nition of the act of aggression. 
Th us, the document just referred to proposes to qualify an act of aggression as an act “which, 
by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations” (ibid., p. 11).
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the threat to use armed force are excluded from this deﬁ nition. Th us, the concrete 
situations constituting such overlaps are the cases of aggression as deﬁ ned by the 
GA in 1974, including the consequences of maintaining an occupation. How-
ever, it is not possible to exclude any future broadening of such a deﬁ nition, due 
for example to a broad interpretation of Article 5 by the ICC relying on judicial 
precedents such as the Ministries case.150
Th e second aspect to be taken into account when establishing the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for aggression is the seriousness require-
ment. Abstractly, this requirement should establish the dividing line between acts of 
aggression giving rise to aggravated state responsibility and prohibited uses of force 
entailing ‘only’ ordinary state responsibility. It seems however that the seriousness 
requirement is always fulﬁ lled in the crime of aggression. According to the 1974 
Deﬁ nition, aggression is the most serious use of force. Moreover, the seriousness 
criterion is generally deemed implicit in the deﬁ nition of aggression.151 Th is is 
conﬁ rmed in other provisions of the deﬁ nition. In particular, Article 3 (g), which 
deals with indirect aggression, explicitly requires a certain degree of gravity to be 
met. Indeed, initially indirect aggression was one of the controversial issues hinder-
ing the achievement of an agreement among the members of the ILC. Finally, an 
agreement on the inclusion of indirect aggression was reached but only on condi-
tion that the wrongful act is characterized by a degree of seriousness analogous to 
that of an armed attack.152
With respect to individual criminal liability for aggression, a seriousness require-
ment must be fulﬁ lled as well. International practice and the studies on aggres-
sion point to a complete overlap between the material element of aggression in 
state and individual responsibility. While perfectly possible in theory, at present 
international criminal law does not provide for the criminal liability of individuals 
who have carried out act of aggression not reaching a certain degree of seriousness. 
Th erefore, the seriousness requirement can consequently be considered implicit 
also in individual criminal liability for aggression. Th is is conﬁ rmed not only by 
the fact that the 1974 Deﬁ nition addresses the issue of both state and individual 
150 See the discussion in the PrepCom, UN Doc. PCNICC/2002WGCA/DP.2, <untreaty.un.org/
cod/icc/ index.html>, and the SWGCA, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, p. 3, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
151 See the ILC Commentary on Article 19 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 28th Session’, YILC 
(1976), vol. II, p. 112) and Article 40 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC 
(2001), vol. II(2), p. 112).
152 B.B. Ferencz, supra note 140, p. 39.
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responsibility, but also by the ILC works on the Draft Code,153 and the recent work 
of the Preparatory Committee for the ICC.154
All these factors taken together establish a very close relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for aggression. In both cases the criminal act is the 
same, and individual criminal liability arises from the same serious breach entailing 
aggravated state responsibility. Th erefore, it seems impossible to speak of dissocia-
tion or complete autonomy of individual criminal liability as far as the crime of 
aggression is concerned. Rather, individual accountability seems closely connected 
to aggravated state responsibility arising out of the same conduct. 
4. Concluding Observations
On closer scrutiny, the seriousness requirement – once limited to human rights 
breaches and then extended to all breaches giving rise to aggravated state responsi-
bility – can play a dual role. On the one hand, it establishes a dividing line between 
ordinary and aggravated state responsibility. Once the threshold of seriousness is 
crossed, individual criminal liability overlaps with aggravated state responsibil-
ity. On the other hand, it establishes a connection between these two regimes 
of international responsibility. In particular, it provides for a criterion according 
to which typical individual crimes, that is, crimes which can be perpetrated by 
single individuals in isolation from the state apparatus, can nevertheless trigger 
aggravated state responsibility. In other words, seriousness ﬁ lls the gap between a 
rapidly developing international criminal law, which tends towards an ‘atomization’ 
of international accountability, and aggravated state responsibility, which focuses 
on collective criminal phenomena. Th ese two roles were clearly acknowledged by 
the ICTY in the Furundžija case.155 Conduct amounting to oﬃ  cial torture would 
normally only lead to individual criminal liability. However, when “carried out as 
an extensive practice of State oﬃ  cials”, individual criminal liability overlaps with 
aggravated state responsibility. 
In principle, the seriousness requirement in aggravated state responsibility is dif-
ferent from the pre-requisites under international criminal law. Th ese pre-requisites 
are diﬀ erent with respect to each category of international crimes. Sometimes there 
153 Commentary on Article 16 of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of 
its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), para. 5). Moreover, the Draft Code conﬁ rms the need 
for a seriousness requirement in order to hold a state responsible for aggression. In particular, 
the conduct of the state must be “a suﬃ  ciently serious violation of the prohibition contained in 
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations.”
154 See UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/ index.html>. See also supra 
note 148.
155 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para. 142.
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is no such requirement to be met. In general, no state involvement is ever required 
in order to ﬁ nd a person accountable for international crimes. Th e perspective from 
which international criminal courts look at widespread and systematic crimes is 
inevitably diﬀ erent from the perspective one assumes when establishing aggravated 
state responsibility. Th is requirement can be ‘individualized’, and established hav-
ing regard to the personal conduct of the oﬀ ender, that is, whether his or her acts 
evidence a pattern of similar criminal acts or whether they reach a certain threshold 
of magnitude. On the other hand, an inquiry into the seriousness requirement of 
aggravated state responsibility implies the establishment of a state practice, that is, 
a sum of criminal acts committed by state organs. 
A clear example of these diﬀ erent approaches is provided by the ICTY investiga-
tion on the crimes supposedly committed by NATO in Kosovo. It is well-known 
that, according to the report of the Prosecutor – which was exceptionally made 
public – “there was no deliberate targeting of civilians or unlawful military targets 
by NATO during the campaign”.156 First, the investigation focused on a few selected 
incidents from the many it was provided with. Second, the analysis was carried 
out by reference to each single incident, in order to ascertain individual liability. 
Th ird, the Committee charged with the investigation did not take into account the 
general pattern of military conduct. In particular, it explicitly refused to evaluate the 
cumulative eﬀ ect of such incidents in establishing whether NATO was responsible 
for breaches of international law on the conduct of warfare. While referring to the 
Kupreškić decision,157 which could have justiﬁ ed such an approach, the Commit-
tee decided that “the mere cumulation of such instances, all of which have been 
lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a crime”, but then the Committee 
never went through such an inquiry. Th us, it found that no single incident was in 
breach of international law. Arguably, if the Tribunal had adopted an approach 
similar to that used to assess the seriousness requirement under aggravated state 
responsibility (that is, evaluating the sum of these ‘incidents’), this could have led 
to a completely diﬀ erent solution.158
International criminal tribunals have made plain that they are not competent to 
establish state responsibility.159 Th ey are not even entrusted with the establishment 
156 ICTY, Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign, supra the Introduction, note 4.
157 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 526.
158 See E. Cannizzaro, ‘Le operazioni aeree della NATO contro la Repubblica federale di Iugoslavia 
e il diritto umanitario’, 84 Riv. Dir. Int. (2001), pp. 133–135. 
159 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., TC, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 230. See also 
Y. Jurovics, supra note 59. Th is seems to be a well-established rule under international criminal 
law. Accordingly, with the notable exception of Articles 9 and 10 of the Nuremberg Charter on 
the crime of membership, the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals is always limited to 
natural persons. See Article 1 of the ICTY Statute (S.C. Res. 827(1993)), Article 1 of the ICTR 
Statute (S.C. Res. 955(1994)), Article 1 of the ICC Statute (<www.icc-cpi.int>), Article 1 of 
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of the historical truth, as stated in Krstić.160 Interestingly, this case is one of the two 
ICTY cases upon which the ICJ essentially relied in ﬁ nding that genocide in fact 
occurred in Srebrenica.161 Th is is a good example of the inevitable link between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes that can be established 
through the seriousness requirement. It is true that international criminal courts 
do not investigate issues of state responsibility and are very rigorous in applying 
the principle of individual criminal liability. However, when they establish facts 
pertaining to the general criminal context, and in particular facts in which a state 
is involved, this can have a deep impact in the parallel establishment of aggravated 
state responsibility for international crimes.162 
In practice, the foregoing analysis has revealed that at a closer look the seriousness 
of the prohibited conduct amounting to an international crime represent a signiﬁ -
cant point of contact between state and individual responsibility. A case-by-case 
analysis of the various categories of international crimes shows a general overlap 
of the prohibited conduct entailing state and individual responsibility.
First, there are international crimes whose deﬁ nition does not require a ‘serious-
ness’ element to be met to entail individual criminal liability. Th is is the case for 
example of oﬃ  cial torture or certain war crimes. If committed by state organs, such 
crimes trigger both ordinary state responsibility and individual criminal liability. 
Only once the seriousness threshold is crossed, individual liability will overlap with 
aggravated state responsibility. Accordingly, both individual and state responsibility 
will arise in regard to the same serious conduct.
the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (UN Doc. S/2000/915), Article 1 of the Law 
establishing extraordinary chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, <www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt>. 
See supra Chapter 3. Th e same point is made by France in its comments to the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility (UN Doc. A/CN.4/488, p. 68).
160 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 2: “Th e events of the nine days 
from July 10–19 1995 in Srebrenica defy description in their horror and their implications for 
humankind’s capacity to revert to acts of brutality under the stresses of conﬂ ict. In little over one 
week, thousands of lives were extinguished, irreparably rent or simply wiped from the pages of 
history. Th e Trial Chamber leaves it to historians and social psychologist to plumb the depths 
of this episode of the Balkan conﬂ ict and to probe for deep-seated causes. Th e task at hand is a 
more modest one: to ﬁ nd, from the evidence presented during the trial, what happened during 
that period of about nine days and, ultimately, whether the defendant in this case, General Krstić, 
was criminally responsible, under the tenets of international law, for his participation in them. 
Th e Trial Chamber cannot permit itself the indulgence of expressing how it feels about what hap-
pened in Srebrenica, or even how individuals as well as national and international groups not the 
subject of this case contributed to the tragedy. Th is defendant, like all others, deserves individualized 
consideration and can be convicted only if the evidence presented in court shows, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that he is guilty of acts that constitute crimes covered by the Statute of the Tribunal” (emphasis 
added).
161 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1.
162 See infra Chapter 7.
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Second, there are international crimes which are per se serious, and which by 
deﬁ nition require the involvement of the state in their perpetration. Th is is notably 
the case with aggression, a crime in which individual criminal liability is depen-
dent upon the previous establishment of aggravated state responsibility. Moreover, 
despite the dearth of international practice concerning such cases, there may be 
certain war crimes in which the establishment of a substantial involvement of the 
state military apparatus proves essential to ascribing individual criminal liability.163 
Th ese categories of international crimes entail a clear overlap between aggravated 
state responsibility and individual criminal liability, since the same conduct trigger 
both kinds of international responsibility.
Th ird, there are international crimes characterized by a collective dimension 
which nonetheless does not necessarily imply an involvement at the state level. 
While this seriousness element seems diﬀ erently reﬂ ected in the rules governing 
state and individual responsibility respectively, international practice shows a cor-
respondence in the establishment of the serious conduct entailing both kinds of 
international responsibility for crimes like genocide or crimes against humanity. 
In particular, international case law increasingly tends to focus on the collective 
dimension of these international crimes.
Due to its primary function of establishing personal liability and to the whole set 
of principles elaborated accordingly, international criminal law might seem at ﬁ rst 
not prepared to deal eﬃ  ciently with ‘system’ criminality.164 International crimes are 
generally carried out at the collective level, if not with a substantial involvement of 
states, and it can be very diﬃ  cult to ascribe individual liability for similar oﬀ ences. 
However, international criminal tribunals have been prepared at least to adopt a 
particular methodology to establish individual criminal responsibility: individuals 
who have committed single prohibited acts can be convicted where their conduct 
ﬁ ts into a broader criminal context that the tribunal has previously ascertained. 
Indirectly, this requires the international criminal tribunal to establish ﬁ rst that 
international crimes have been committed at the collective level. Th e assessment 
of the general criminal context largely correspond to a ﬁ nding of a serious breach 
which could entail aggravated state responsibility, if carried out by state organs. 
Th ere are even cases in which the state involvement in the criminal context has 
been explicitly taken into account. If this particular methodology does not lead to 
an identity in the establishment of aggravated state responsibility and individual 
criminal liability (in the sense that it is not required to establish aggravated state 
163 For a comparative analysis between aggression and war crimes, see Y. Dinstein, ‘Th e Distinctions 
between War Crimes and Crimes against Peace’, in Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory (eds.), War Crimes 
in International Law (Th e Hague, M. Nijhoﬀ , 1996), p. 1 et seq.
164 B.V.A. Röling, ‘Th e Signiﬁ cance of the Laws of War’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Current Problems of 
International Law (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1975), pp. 137–139.
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responsibility ﬁ rst, in order to ascribe then individual liability), nonetheless it marks 
a signiﬁ cant point of contact between the two regimes, since the same criminal 
context is relevant to establish both kinds of international responsibility.
Chapter 4
Th e Overlap of the Psychological Element:
Mens Rea v. Fault
Turning to the psychological element of international crimes, international prac-
tice shows that this can represent another important point of contact between 
aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability. Th is element is 
normally qualiﬁ ed as mens rea under international criminal law, and as fault with 
respect to state responsibility.
In the former case, the mens rea is a fundamental ingredient of individual liability 
for international crimes, as international criminal law is grounded on the principle 
of personal culpability. Accordingly, the psychological participation in the oﬀ ence 
must always be proved for the accused to be convicted of international crimes. In 
other words, the mens rea is a basic element of individual criminal liability.1 Th ere are 
various degrees of mens rea under international criminal law,2 but this fundamental 
requirement must always be established beyond reasonable doubt. Th e mens rea is 
a characterizing feature of criminal law in the sense that it is universally recognized 
that no person can be held criminally liable if no psychological participation can be 
shown on his part. Th e same is true with respect to international criminal law.3
Under the law of state responsibility the existence of a fault requirement is more 
controversial. However, there may be international crimes requiring the proof of a 
psychological element also to establish aggravated state responsibility.
Th is overlap raises the question of the relationship between state and individual 
responsibility as far as the psychological element is concerned. Taking, for example, 
genocide and assuming that a psychological element – a genocidal intent – is required 
under both international criminal law and aggravated state responsibility, then the 
question is whether the state genocide intent is identical to the mens rea that must 
be established with respect to individual perpetrators, or whether the collective 
intent of the state is something diﬀ erent from the mens rea of a natural person.
1 See supra the Introduction.
2 See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 
159–178.
3 Ibid., p. 137.
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In order to address this question, the analysis will brieﬂ y concentrate on the 
more controversial deﬁ nition of the psychological element under the law of state 
responsibility, and the way in which the relationship between state and individual 
responsibility with respect to this element can be abstractly conceived of. Th en the 
relevant international practice will be examined in some detail.
1. Th e Psychological Element and State Responsibility
With respect to state responsibility, the question of fault has always been a very 
controversial issue. International law scholars are split between supporters of fault 
as a requirement under state responsibility, and those aﬃ  rming that no such an 
element is necessary to establish states’ international responsibility.4 
Th e ILC codiﬁ cation work does not seem to have put an end to the debate. It 
is true that Article 2 does not list fault among the elements of state internationally 
wrongful acts.5 However, diverging views have been expressed according to which 
fault still has a certain role to play in the law of state responsibility. 
4 See, in particular, D. Anzilotti, Teoria generale della responsabilità dello Stato nel diritto internazionale 
(Firenze, Lumachi, 1902); G. Sperduti, ‘Sulla colpa in diritto internazionale’, 3 Comun. e Stud. 
(1950), pp. 79–104; A. Carlebach, Le problème de la faute et sa place dans la norme du droit inter-
national (Paris, LGDJ, 1962); I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 166; R. Luzzatto, ‘Responsabilità e colpa in diritto internazionale’, 51 
Riv. Dir. Int. (1968), pp. 53–107; R. Ago, ‘La colpa nell’illecito internazionale’, in Scritti giuridici in 
onore di Santi Romano, vol. III (Padova, Cedam, 1940), pp. 177–206; C. Lombois, ‘La culpabilité en 
droit international’, 24 Annales de l’Université des sciences sociales de Toulouse (1976), pp. 137–149; 
P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Le fait générateur de la responsabilité internationale des Etats’, 188 RCADI (1984), 
pp. 9–183; P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Faute de l’Etat et “fait internationalement illicite’’ ’, 5 Droits (1987), pp. 
51–63; P. De Sena, ‘Condotta di singoli organi e condotta dell’apparato statale in tema di colpa 
nell’illecito internazionale’, 71 Riv. Dir. Int. (1988), pp. 525–553; G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Second Report 
on State Responsibility’, YILC (1989), vol. II(1), p. 1 et seq.; G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘State Fault and the 
Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility: Questions of Attribution and Relevance’, in 
Mélanges Michel Virally. Le droit international au service de la paix de la justice et du développement 
(Paris, Pedone, 1991), pp. 25–42; J. Salmon, ‘L’intention en matière de responsabilité internationale’, 
in Mélanges Michel Virally. Le droit international au service de la paix de la justice et du développement 
(Paris, Pedone, 1991), pp. 413–422; A Gattini, ‘La notion de la faute à la lumière du projet de 
convention de la Commission du droit international sur la responsabilité internationale’, 3 EJIL 
(1992), pp. 253–284; G. Palmisano, ‘Colpa dello Stato e colpa dell’organo nella responsabilità 
internazionale: spunti critici di teoria e di prassi’, 19–20 Comun. e Stud. (1992), pp. 623–755; 
G. Palmisano, ‘Les causes d’aggravation de la responsabilité des Etats et la distinction entre “crimes” 
et “délits” internationaux’, 98 RGDIP (1994), pp. 629–674; A. Gattini, ‘Smoking/No Smoking: 
Some Remarks on the Current Place of Fault in the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 
10 EJIL (1999), pp. 397–404. 
5 Article 2 reads: “Th ere is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) Constitutes a
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On the one hand, fault has been regarded as an element of attribution, when 
the primary norm breached so requires. In other words, attribution of a wrongful 
act to the state means both attribution of prohibited conduct under international 
law carried out by a state organ, and attribution of the intent of the state organ.6 If 
no intent of the organ can be proved, attribution of the prohibited conduct alone 
would not be suﬃ  cient to entail state responsibility. Th us, state fault corresponds 
to the mens rea of the state organ. Th is conception is grounded on ancient state 
practice concerning injuries to aliens. When the ILC started its codiﬁ cation work, 
international practice on state responsibility substantially concerned cases of inju-
ries to aliens in which state responsibility was invoked for isolated wrongful acts 
committed by a state to the detriment of another state’s nationals. With respect 
to similar cases, it is arguably possible to equate the conduct of the state with that 
of the organ committing the international wrongful act. Th us, the old conception 
according to which there is a perfect identity between the legal person (the state) 
and the physical person (the monarch) was still regarded as applicable, at least 
with respect to isolated wrongful acts. In similar cases, it is argued, it is possible to 
identify state fault with the organs’ mens rea.7
On the other hand, the codiﬁ cation of circumstances precluding wrongfulness is 
regarded by some authors as requiring that, at least indirectly, no fault of the state 
ought to be present in order to engage its international responsibility.8 In other 
words, it is for the author state to prove the absence of fault on its part, i.e., it can 
invoke certain circumstances precluding wrongfulness,9 while the injured state 
only has to demonstrate the two requirements listed in Article 2. However, this 
alternative conception does not directly entail a problem of relationship between 
state fault and individual mens rea. Accordingly, it can temporarily be set aside.10
Turning to aggravated state responsibility, in principle no element of fault is 
required under this regime of secondary norms. Aggravated state responsibility is 
characterized by the seriousness of the state wrongful act,11 and it seems diﬃ  cult to 
require, in addition, proof of a psychological element of the entire state apparatus. 
Indeed, the ILC codiﬁ cation of state responsibility conﬁ rms that, in principle, fault 
 breach of an international obligation of the State” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, 
YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 34). 
 6 See R. Ago, supra note 4.
 7 P. De Sena, supra note 4.
 8 See B. Conforti, Diritto internazionale (7th edn, Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 2006), pp. 333–4; 
A. Gattini, ‘La notion de la faute à la lumière du projet de convention de la Commission du droit 
international sur la responsabilité internationale’, supra note 4, p. 253.
 9 Th ese are provided under Articles 20 to 25 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
(ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), pp. 72–80).
10 Circumstances precluding wrongfulness will be examined in detail infra in Chapter 5.
11 See supra Chapter 3.
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has no role under such a special form of state responsibility. Article 40 does not 
mention fault12 and Article 26 excludes the possibility of invoking circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness in case of serious breaches.13 Th erefore, a general require-
ment of fault is not taken into account either directly as an element of aggravated 
state responsibility, or indirectly as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness.
However, to say that fault has no role in aggravated state responsibility may be 
problematic since there are certain international crimes which by deﬁ nition can 
only be carried out with a speciﬁ c intent. In other words, there may be primary 
norms prohibiting certain conduct which require an additional element (fault) to 
be met, for example the norm prohibiting genocide. Th us, one may ask whether 
aggravated state responsibility for genocide requires the additional proof that the 
state apparatus has acted with the intent to destroy the targeted group. Arguably, 
it does. At least this is the answer generally provided by international law schol-
ars,14 and conﬁ rmed by the few elements of international practice on the subject, 
such as the Commission for Historical Clariﬁ cation’s Report on Guatemala,15 the 
position adopted by Serbia-Montenegro in 1999 before the ICJ,16 the Report of 
12 Article 40 (1) reads: “Th is Chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a 
serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international 
law” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 112).
13 Article 26 reads: “Nothing in this Chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which 
is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international 
law” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 84).
14 See, in general, A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 271.
15 Th e Report was adopted on February 1999, and para. 111 of the Conclusions dealing with the 
proof of the genocidal intent reads: “Considering the series of criminal acts and human rights 
violations which occurred in the regions and periods indicated and which were analysed for the 
purpose of determining whether they constituted the crime of genocide, the CEH concludes that 
the reiteration of destructive acts, directed systematically against groups of the Mayan population, 
within which can be mentioned the elimination of leaders and criminal acts against minors who 
could not possibly have been military targets, demonstrates that the only common denominator 
for all the victims was the fact that they belonged to a speciﬁ c ethnic group and makes it evident 
that these acts were committed ‘with intent to destroy, in whole or in part’ these groups (Article 
II, ﬁ rst paragraph of the Convention)”, <shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html>.
16 ICJ, Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Request for the Indication 
of Provisional Measures, Order, 2 June 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, para. 35 (“Yugoslavia contends 
moreover that the sustained and intensive bombing of the whole of its territory, including the most 
heavily populated areas, constitutes ‘a serious violation of Article II of the Genocide Convention’; 
whereas it argues that ‘the pollution of soil, air and water, destroying the economy of the country, 
contaminating the environment with depleted uranium, inﬂ icts conditions of life on the Yugoslav 
nation calculated to bring about its physical destruction’; whereas it asserts that it is the Yugoslav 
nation as a whole and as such that is targeted; and whereas it stresses that the use of certain weapons 
whose long-term hazards to health and the environment are already known, and the destruction 
of the largest part of the country’s power supply system, with catastrophic consequences of which 
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the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur,17 and ﬁ nally the ICJ itself.18 Th is raises the 
problem of the relationship between aggravated state responsibility and individual 
criminal liability. 
Th e question is how the fault element is to be determined when speciﬁ c intent 
crimes have been committed by a state. In line with what has already been said, 
there are two options. A ﬁ rst option is to consider that the speciﬁ c intent of the state 
corresponds to the dolus specialis of the responsible state organs. In other words, 
state fault is identiﬁ ed with the mens rea of the state organ breaching a primary 
obligation requiring such an additional element to be met. Th e major problem 
concerning this option is that aggravated state responsibility normally arises out of 
the commission of serious breaches of community obligations, of complex wrongful 
acts carried out by a plurality of state organs, of a general involvement of the state 
apparatus. Under such circumstances, it is diﬃ  cult to identify state fault with the 
psychological attitude of single state organs. Should we take into account the intent 
of state leaders?19 Or would that of low-ranking oﬃ  cials be enough? With respect 
to isolated international crimes, it might be possible to identify state fault and the 
organs’ intent and therefore to consider that not only the material conduct but also 
the speciﬁ c intent of the organ are attributed to the state in order to establish its 
responsibility. However, in general, international crimes require the involvement 
of the entire state apparatus, and this line of reasoning is much more diﬃ  cult to 
accept.20 In such cases, it is almost impossible to equate the mens rea of the state 
with that of single state organs, since this psychological element is scattered among 
a plurality of perpetrators.21 
Th erefore, the second option is to conceive of the speciﬁ c intent of the state as a 
‘collective fault’ which can be inferred from the overall pattern of criminal state acts. 
In other words, state fault is no longer connected to the psychological attitude of 
individual state organs, but it is a more ‘objective’ standard concerning the purpose 
the Respondent must be aware, ‘impl[y] the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Yugoslav 
national group as such’”).
17 See supra Chapter 3, note 25. As already noted, while the Commission decided in principle to 
focus on individual criminal liability only, its report contained various statements concerning state 
responsibility for the same international crimes.
18 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, paras. 186–189.
19 For a similar view as far as the crime of genocide is concerned, see W.A. Schabas, Genocide in Inter-
national Law. Th e Crime of Crimes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 441.
20 P. De Sena, supra note 4, p. 525 et seq.
21 L. Cavicchioli, ‘Sull’elemento soggettivo nei crimini contro la pace e la sicurezza dell’umanità’, 76 
Riv. Dir. Int. (1993), pp. 1047–1097. See more generally P.-M. Dupuy, ‘International Criminal 
Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsibility of the State’, in A. Cassese et al. 
(eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. II (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 1096; A.B. Loewenstein and S.A. Kostas, ‘Divergent Approaches to 
Determining Responsibility for Genocide’, 5 JICJ (2007), p. 847.
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of a legal entity (the state) which can be demonstrated by the existence, for example, 
of a criminal policy carried out by the state apparatus.22 With respect to genocide, 
it is particularly problematic to identify the state collective intent with the mens 
rea of single state organs. Th us, it can be argued that such a collective intent rather 
corresponds to an additional objective element of the serious wrongful act, which 
can “be ascertained by induction through a global analysis of the criminal actions 
taken by the state against the targeted group”.23 Th is approach has been upheld by 
the ICJ in its recent judgment concerning the Genocide case.24
To sum up, from the standpoint of state responsibility, the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility as far as the mens rea/fault requirement is con-
cerned can be problematic with respect to isolated crimes, if one accepts that fault 
is a necessary ingredient of state responsibility, and even more problematic with 
respect to collective crimes requiring a speciﬁ c intent because of the very diﬀ erent 
nature of the concepts of mens rea and fault under international criminal law and 
state responsibility respectively. 
2. Th eoretical Approaches to the Psychological Element
Generally, even those international law scholars who have explicitly addressed the 
issue of the relationship between state and individual responsibility for interna-
tional crimes have paid very little attention to the psychological element. Th is is 
probably due to the fact that the psychological element represents one of the most 
important diﬀ erences between state and individual responsibility for international 
crimes, since no such element is generally required under aggravated state respon-
sibility,25 but this argument is not elaborated further. From a purely theoretical 
22 See G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘State fault and the forms and degrees of international responsibility: Ques-
tions of attribution and relevance’, supra note 4; G. Palmisano, ‘Colpa dell’organo e colpa dello 
Stato nella responsabilità internazionale: spunti critici di teoria e prassi’, supra note 4, p. 623; 
G. Palmisano, ‘Les causes d’aggravation de la responsabilité des Etats et la distinction entre ‘crimes’ 
et ‘délits’ internationaux’, supra note 4, p. 667.
23 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Oral pleadings, 20 April 2006, CR/2006/34, para. 
33. Th is is the position advanced by Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the diﬀ erent position of Serbia 
and Montenegro, see infra note 26.
24 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, paras. 242 and 373. Having carefully taken 
into account the ﬁ ndings of the ICTY relating to genocide, the Court concluded that Bosnia had 
not established “the existence of that intent on the part of the Respondent, either on the basis 
of a concerted plan, or on the basis that the events reviewed above reveal a consistent pattern of 
conduct which could only point to the existence of such intent” (para. 376).
25 See, in particular, A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State 
Responsibility in International Law’, 52 ICLQ (2003), p. 633; A. Viviani, Crimini internazionali 
e responsabilità dei leader politici e militari (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 2005), p. 64.
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standpoint, it is however possible to describe two diverging theoretical positions 
to this issue by relying on the basic assumptions of the individual-oriented and 
the state-oriented approaches.
Th e basic assumption of the individual-oriented conceptual scheme posits the 
dissociation between the conduct of the state and that of its organs. Th us, on the 
one hand, mens rea represents one of the fundamental requirements of interna-
tional criminal law. As noted above, it is indispensable to prove beyond doubt 
the psychological participation of the accused in order to convict him or her for 
international crimes. On the other hand, the regime of state responsibility may or 
may not require a fault element to be met. However, this is completely irrelevant 
from the viewpoint of international criminal law. Criminal liability is established 
with respect to natural persons, not the state, and this is done totally independently 
of the establishment of either ordinary or aggravated state responsibility. Even if 
the mens rea element overlapped with the fault requirement, this would entail no 
relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes.
An opposite solution would derive from the state-oriented conceptual scheme. 
Th e basic assumption of this scheme posits the identity between the conduct of the 
state and that of its organs. State organs are held accountable under international 
criminal law for serious wrongful acts committed by the state. In this perspective, 
it is the participation in the state crime which is criminalized under international 
law, and this requires consistency between the elements of international crimes 
entailing the criminal liability of state organs and the elements of serious wrong-
ful acts entailing aggravated state responsibility. Th erefore, if international crimes 
require a psychological element to be met this must be established in the same way 
under both state responsibility and individual liability. According to the diﬀ erent 
theories of state fault examined above, there are two options.
First, one may share the view according to which state fault corresponds to the 
mens rea of the state organ that committed the serious wrongful act.26 Th erefore, 
establishing state responsibility preliminarily requires an inquiry into the psychologi-
cal attitude of state organs. As pointed out above, this methodology can be applied 
to cases of isolated international crimes or to special international crimes entailing 
only the criminal liability of state leaders, that is, those organs which represent the 
state and with which the state can be identiﬁ ed.27 On the other hand, this meth-
odology is hardly applicable to crimes characterized by a general involvement of 
the state apparatus. In this case, it is diﬃ  cult to say which state organs have the 
intent necessary to entail aggravated state responsibility.
26 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Oral pleadings, 15 March 2006, Statements 
by Serbia and Montenegro, CR/2006/20, paras. 345–347. 
27 See infra in this Chapter.
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Alternatively, state fault can be conceived of as a collective fault to be established 
in a more objective way, and in particular it can be inferred from the general context 
of state criminality. Th us, having ascertained the collective intent of the state –
for instance, a state policy aimed at carrying out certain speciﬁ c intent crimes –
the criminal liability of those state organs which have participated in the commis-
sion of these crimes should be more easily established, since their mens rea can be 
inferred from this ‘collective intent’.28 For example, if it is found that a state has 
carried out a genocidal policy, then state organs having murdered members of 
the targeted group can be said to have had the necessary genocidal intent if they 
knew about the state policy, with no need to prove that they personally intended 
to destroy the targeted group. Th is diﬀ erent methodology requires criminal tri-
bunals to establish the general context of state criminality ﬁ rst, and then to hold 
state organs accountable for the role they actually played in this broader criminal 
context.29 As a result, both state fault and state organs’ mens rea can be proved in 
the same, more objective way, which in the end facilitates the establishment of the 
psychological element required by some speciﬁ c intent crimes.
Th erefore, according to the former view state fault is identiﬁ ed with the mens 
rea of the responsible state organ, while according to the latter the mens rea of the 
responsible state organs is proved through the collective fault of the author state. 
3. Th e Psychological Element as Applied in the International Case Law
From the standpoint of the relationship between state and individual responsibil-
ity for international crimes, the psychological element is problematic since it is 
uncertain whether it is a common element of state and individual responsibility 
28 Some international scholars argue that no dolus specialis is required and a lower standard of mens 
rea must be accepted with respect to state organs (at least state leaders) when their psychological 
attitude can be inferred from the broader context of state criminality. Th is approach is primarily 
adopted by supporters of the state-oriented approach. See L. May, Crimes Against Humanity: A 
Normative Account (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 8. However, it must 
be recalled that a similar approach is also shared by those scholars who would like to see the ele-
ments of genocide applied according to its collective dimension. Th us, the speciﬁ c intent should 
be a collective intent shared by the members of the criminal group and it should be suﬃ  cient to 
convict single perpetrators having knowledge of this collective speciﬁ c intent. See A.K.A. Greena-
walt, ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent: Th e Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation’, 99 Colum. 
L. Rev. (1999), pp. 2259–2294; J.R.W.D. Jones, ‘Whose Intent is it Anyway?’, in L.C. Vohrah 
et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man. Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese 
(Th e Hague, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2003), p. 467; C. Kress, ‘Th e Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent’, 3 
JICJ (2005), p. 573; H. Van Der Wilt, ‘Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. 
Domestic Jurisdiction’, 4 JICJ (2006), pp. 241–244.
29 See supra Chapter 3.
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or whether two diﬀ erent requirements apply under these regimes. Th e present 
section will examine the relevant international practice focusing only on those 
international crimes that require such an element to be met under both state and 
individual responsibility. Th erefore, it will not include international crimes, such 
as crimes against humanity, which certainly require a psychological element to 
be demonstrated under international criminal law, but which do not require an 
analogous element to be met under state responsibility. 
With respect to isolated crimes, the problematic aspect essentially concerns the 
regime of state responsibility, that is, whether it requires or not a fault element to be 
met. If no fault element is provided for under state responsibility, then no question 
of relationship with international criminal law arises. By contrast, assuming that it 
does, state and individual responsibility can be reconciled through the approach 
described above that identiﬁ es state fault with the mens rea of the responsible state 
organ. In other words, the same psychological requirement would be applicable 
to establish both ordinary state responsibility and individual criminal liability for 
isolated crimes, such as torture or certain war crimes.
Finally, there are collective crimes requiring a speciﬁ c intent to be demonstrated 
to entail both state and individual responsibility. Th e analysis of international case 
law concerning these category of international crimes is particularly interesting. 
Th e proof of the psychological element with respect to crimes committed by large 
organized groups of perpetrators, i.e., crimes committed in collective frameworks, 
including state apparatuses, is particularly diﬃ  cult. On closer examination, it seems 
possible to discern cases in which the separation between state and individual 
responsibility tends to blur as far as the psychological element is concerned. Indeed, 
recent international case law shows an interesting development with respect to 
certain international crimes in which the mens rea is established in a more ‘objec-
tive’ way, by taking into account elements of the general criminal context or the 
conduct of persons other than the accused but taking part in the commission of 
the oﬀ ence. On the other hand, there are international crimes, in whose respect 
there seems to be a perfect overlap between state and individual responsibility also 
with respect to the mens rea/fault requirement.
A. Genocide
Th e crime of genocide can generally be carried out only by organized groups of 
perpetrators. As already noted, international tribunals have taken into account the 
collective nature of the crime of genocide in the establishment of material element 
of this crime.30 Th is is also true with respect to the required mens rea of the accused, 
that is, the genocidal intent. 
30 See supra Chapter 3.
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Genocide requires the accused to have the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such”. According to a well-established 
case law, it is certainly possible to demonstrate genocidal intent with circumstantial 
evidence, but the proof of such a particularly high level of mens rea can nonethe-
less be particularly problematic. Indeed, knowledge is not enough. As the ICTY 
aﬃ  rmed in Jelisić, “[t]he Akayesu Trial Chamber found that an accused could not 
be found guilty of genocide if he himself did not share the goal of destroying in 
part or in whole a group even if he knew that he was contributing to or through 
his acts might be contributing to the partial or total destruction of a group”.31
In general, an inquiry into genocidal intent is supposed to mainly focus on the 
personal conduct of the oﬀ ender such as “words or deeds or a pattern of purposeful 
action that deliberately, consistently, and systematically targets victims on account 
of their membership of a particular group while excluding the members of other 
groups”.32 For example, in the so-called Media Case 33 the ICTR found Nahimana, 
Barayagwiza, and Ngeze guilty of genocide for their leading role in the creation 
and control of those Rwandan media (RTLM and Kangura) that broadcast a mes-
sage of ethnic hatred and called for violence against the Tutsi population. Th us, 
in establishing the speciﬁ c intent of the accused, the Trial Chamber was able to 
focus essentially on “their individual statements and acts, as well as the message 
they conveyed through the media they controlled”.34 Indeed, each of the accused 
had made statements that evidenced their genocidal intent.35
Notwithstanding such cases in which the speciﬁ c intent of genocide can be 
established quite easily simply by relying on the personal statements and acts of 
the accused, it can be “very diﬃ  cult in practice to provide proof of the genocidal 
intent of an individual if the crimes committed are not widespread and if the 
crime charged is not backed by an organization or a system”.36 Th is explains why 
a signiﬁ cant role can be recognized to the general context in the establishment 
of the dolus specialis characterizing the crime of genocide. Indeed, it is now well 
established that the genocidal intent can be inferred not only directly – having 
regard to the acts and utterances of the accused – but also from the general context. 
As the ICTR said in Akayesu:
Th e Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in 
a particular act charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable 
31 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 86 (referring to ICTR, Pros-
ecutor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 544–547).
32 K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 74.
33 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., TC, Judgment, 3 December 2003.
34 Ibid., para. 957.
35 Ibid., paras. 966–969.
36 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 101. See also ICTR, Prosecutor 
v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 94.
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acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts were com-
mitted by the same oﬀ ender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities 
committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact 
of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership 
of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups, can enable the 
Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act.37
In other words, the mens rea of the accused can be inferred from the collective 
conduct of persons other than the accused himself, even if such persons are uniden-
tiﬁ ed.38 In particular, one factor of this collective criminal conduct seems to be of 
paramount importance in establishing the psychological attitude of the accused, 
namely, the existence of a plan or policy giving rise to acts covered by the deﬁ ni-
tion of genocide. As already noted, the genocidal policy is not a legal ingredient 
of the crime of genocide.39 Nonetheless, “in the context of proving speciﬁ c intent, 
the existence of a plan or policy may become an important factor in most cases. 
Th e evidence may be consistent with the existence of a plan or policy, or may even 
show such existence, and the existence of a plan or policy may facilitate proof of 
the crime.”40
To a certain extent, modern case law also accepts that the dolus specialis of the 
accused may be deduced from acts not amounting by themselves to genocide, such 
37 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 523.
38 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, AC, Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 34; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, 
TC, Judgment, 1 September 2004, para. 707.
39 Th is results from the wording of Article 4 of the Genocide Convention (“persons committing 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public oﬃ  cials or private individuals”) as well as the interpreta-
tion generally given to it. Th is was explicitly held by the US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 
Kadić v. Karadžić, Decision on subject matter jurisdiction, 13 October 1995, 70 F.3d 232; the 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 100 (“that the drafters of the 
Convention did not deem the existence of an organization or a system serving a genocidal objec-
tive as a legal ingredient of the crime. In so doing, they did not discount the possibility of a lone 
individual seeking to destroy a group as such.”), and is generally acknowledged by international 
law scholars. See, in particular, J. Verhoeven, ‘Le crime de génocide. Originalité et ambiguïté’, 
24 RBDI (1991), p. 12; M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law 
(Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp. 246–247; M. Lippman, ‘Genocide’, in M.C. 
Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 1999), 
p. 609; D.D. Ntanda Nsereko, ‘Genocide: A Crime against Mankind’, in G. Kirk McDonald and 
O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law, vol. I
(Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 134; K. Kittichaisaree, supra note 32, p. 77. 
However, this does not prevent a few international law scholars from still considering genocide 
to be an international crime necessarily committed with the state involvement. See J. Verhoeven, 
‘Le crime de génocide. Originalité et ambiguïté’, supra in this note, p. 26; R. Maison, ‘Le crime 
de génocide dans les premiers jugements du Tribunal Pénal international pour le Rwanda’, 103 
RGDIP (1999), pp. 144–145.
40 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, AC, Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 48.
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as the deliberate destruction of mosques and houses belonging to the members of 
the targeted group.41 Accordingly, the task of international tribunals in establishing 
genocidal intent may be facilitated by relying on various factors pertaining to the 
broader criminal context, and giving the general background in which genocide is 
committed. Th ese are the existence of a genocidal policy, of widespread prohibited 
acts directed against the targeted group, and even of attacks against that group not 
amounting to its physical destruction.
Now, when looking at international case law and the way in which the genocidal 
intent has actually been established, one must admit that international tribunals 
have been cautious in relying too widely on the general criminal context.
On the one hand, the ICTR held that genocidal intent must be established ﬁ rst 
having regard to the personal conduct of the accused.42 And, where possible, the 
Tribunal has inferred the genocidal intent from ‘direct evidence’43 consisting of 
the personal conduct of the accused, his statements, and his participation in acts 
amounting to genocide. In other words, there are cases in which the Tribunal was 
able to deduce the mens rea from a ‘pattern of purposeful action’ of the accused.44 
41 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 580 (“Th e Trial Chamber is aware 
that it must interpret the Convention with due regard for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. 
It therefore recognizes that, despite recent developments, customary international law limits the 
deﬁ nition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of all or part 
of the group. Hence, an enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological characteristics of 
a human group in order to annihilate these elements which give to that group its own identity 
distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the deﬁ nition of genocide. Th e Trial 
Chamber however points out that where there is physical or biological destruction there are often 
simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group as 
well, attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy 
the group. In this case, the Trial Chamber will thus take into account as evidence of intent to 
destroy the group the deliberate destruction of mosques and houses belonging to members of 
the group.”). See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, TC, Review of the Indictments 
pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, paras. 94–95, ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 524.
42 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Baghilishema, TC, Judgment, 7 June 2001, para. 63 (“evidence of the context 
of the alleged culpable acts may help the Chamber to determine the intention of the Accused, 
especially where the intention of a person is not clear from what that person says or does. Th e 
Chamber notes, however, that the use of context to determine the intent of an accused must be 
counterbalanced with the actual conduct of the Accused. Th e Chamber is of the opinion that the 
Accused’s intent should be determined, above all, from his words and deeds, and should be evident 
from patterns of purposeful action.”).
43 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, AC, Judgment, 19 September 2005, para. 82.
44 ICTR, Kayishema and Ruzindana, AC, Judgment, 1 June 2001, paras. 158–159. For similar cases 
see ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, TC, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 927; ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Nahimana et al. (‘Media Trial’), 3 December 2003, paras. 957–969; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, 
TC, Judgment, 1 December 2003, para. 828; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, TC, Judgment, 16 
May 2003, para. 419; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gerard Ntakirutimana, TC, Judgment, 
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From the viewpoint of international criminal law, an individualized approach –
in which the mens rea of the accused is established having regard to his personal 
conduct – is certainly preferable. Th is approach is undoubtedly respectful of the 
fundamental principle of personal guilt.
On the other hand, there are cases in which it was not possible to establish the mens 
rea of the accused in this direct way. Th us, international ad hoc tribunals accepted 
that, alternatively, it is possible to infer the genocidal intent of the accused from 
the general criminal context. Th is is ﬁ rst reﬂ ected in the methodology generally 
adopted to prove such a particular requirement. International tribunals generally 
start by considering the general context in which genocide has been perpetrated 
and, in particular, whether a genocidal plan or policy existed at the time covered 
by the Indictment. Only then is the personal conduct of the accused taken into 
account. If the general context indicates that a genocidal policy has been elaborated 
and executed, then it is much easier to establish individual criminal liability. On 
the contrary, to prove that the accused alone wanted to commit genocide is very 
diﬃ  cult, if not almost impossible. In this sense the importance of the broader 
criminal context clearly emerges from a comparative analysis of the overall work 
of the ICTY and ICTR.
B. Genocide: Th e Role of the General Criminal Context
In Rwanda, the notorious fact that genocide was perpetrated against the Tutsis 
was a preliminary issue of considerable importance for the allocation of individual 
criminal liability. Since its ﬁ rst case (Akayesu), the ICTR examined the historical 
events in Rwanda and established that genocide had been committed against the 
Tutsis. Almost all the accused before the ICTR have been convicted for genocide, 
and their dolus specialis has been established accordingly.
Th e ICTY took the same methodological approach. For example, in Blagojević 
the Tribunal held: “the Trial Chamber will ﬁ rst determine whether genocide was 
committed in July 1995 following the fall of the Srebrenica enclave, and if it deter-
mines that it was committed, it will consider the legal requirements for complicity 
in genocide”.45
When compared to what happened in Rwanda, the general criminal context 
during the Balkan conﬂ ict did not indicate a clear case of genocide. It was very 
controversial whether the ethnic cleansing campaign in the former Yugoslavia 
actually amounted to genocide. Th us, even if it could rely on a general criminal 
context, establishing the speciﬁ c intent of the alleged perpetrators of genocide in 
21 February 2003, paras. 789, and 793; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Muhimana, TC, Judgment, 28 April 
2005, paras. 513–518. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999, 
paras. 102–108).
45 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 638.
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the Balkan conﬂ ict has been a challenging task for the ICTY. Indeed, only in a 
few cases has the Prosecutor charged persons with genocide, and the Tribunal has 
never found that the accused possessed the requisite genocidal intent.46 Th ese cases 
are particularly interesting since the mens rea of the accused charged with genocide 
was either absent or impossible to establish merely taking into account his personal 
conduct, and the Tribunal had to turn to the general criminal context. 
Th e case law of the ad hoc tribunals can be classiﬁ ed in three groups as far as the 
genocidal intent is concerned. First, there are cases in which no genocidal context 
was established, and the accused possessed no genocidal intent. In most cases dealing 
with genocide, the ICTY was not able to establish either the existence of a geno-
cidal plan or the genocidal intent of the accused persons, who nonetheless all had 
a discriminatory intent.47 In particular, in Stakić and Brđanin the ICTY aﬃ  rmed 
that the political agenda of Bosnian Serb leaders was aimed at the removal and 
not at the physical destruction of the victim group,48 and accordingly the accused 
showed a discriminatory not a genocidal intent. In Krajišnik, the ICTY proceeded 
with a two-stage inquiry into genocidal intent, both at the level of the material 
perpetrators of the relevant crimes and at the level of the leadership of the Srpska 
Republic, which included the accused. Th e Tribunal found that the required intent 
had not been demonstrated by the Prosecution at any level.49 
Second, there are cases in which the genocidal context was actually established, 
but the accused possessed no genocidal intent. In Krstić and Blagojević, the ICTY 
has in fact found that genocide occurred in Bosnia.50 However, it was not able to 
ﬁ nd beyond any reasonable doubt that either Krstić or Blagojević had a genocidal 
intent. Th us, in Blagojević the Tribunal convicted the accused for complicity in 
46 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 107; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Stakić, TC, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 554; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, TC, Judgment, 
1 September 2004, para. 989; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, AC, Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 134; 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 786; and ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, TC, Judgment, 27 September 2006, paras. 867–869.
47 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 75; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, 
TC, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 826; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, TC, Judgment, 1 September 
2004, para. 1053, and 1070; and ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, TC, Judgment, 27 September 
2006, para. 1118.
48 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, TC, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 553; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, 
TC, Judgment, 1 September 2004, para. 981.
49 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, TC, Judgment, 27 September 2006, paras. 867–869, and 1091–1094. 
Interestingly, the Tribunal aﬃ  rmed that the “peculiarity of the present case, which involves multiple 
levels of actors, is that a crime committed by a person of low political or military rank without 
genocidal intent may nevertheless be characterized as an act of genocide if it was procured by a 
person of higher authority acting with that intent” (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, TC, Judgment, 
27 September 2006, para. 857). 
50 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 599; and ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 677.
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genocide.51 An aider or abettor only needs to know that the principal perpetra-
tors harboured the genocidal intent. Th e Krstić case is more complex. In the trial 
judgment the ICTY found that genocide had been committed by Bosnian Serb 
forces, and that Krstić shared the genocidal intent with other participants in a 
joint criminal enterprise aimed at the destruction of the Bosnian Muslim popula-
tion of Srebrenica.52 However, the Appeals Chamber reversed the trial judgment. 
According to the Appeals Chamber, the evidence showed that the accused knew 
of the existence of a genocidal plan, but this was not suﬃ  cient to infer that he also 
shared this speciﬁ c intent with the principal perpetrators of the said joint criminal 
enterprise.53 Since the accused did not have genocidal intent, the appropriate form 
of his responsibility was aiding and abetting.54
Th ird, there are cases in which genocidal context was established, and the 
accused had the requisite genocidal intent. Th ese are cases in which the impos-
sibility of inferring genocidal intent from the personal conduct of the accused is 
‘counterbalanced’ this time with a wide reliance on the broader criminal context. 
As noted above, the ICTR has proved the genocidal intent having mainly regard to 
the personal conduct of the accused. Th e ICTR has generally viewed that the acts 
of genocide entailing the individual criminal liability of the accused as part of the 
broader criminal context in Rwanda. However, it had the occasion to specify that 
the genocidal intent was established taking into account the personal conduct of 
the accused and not merely inferred from the overall genocidal campaign.55 More 
interesting are those cases in which the general context played a substantial role 
before the ICTR. Th us, in Kayishema, notwithstanding the contrary view of the 
51 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005, paras. 785–786.
52 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 633.
53 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, AC, Judgment, 19 April 2004, paras. 100–134.
54 Aiding and abetting as a form of complicity does not require speciﬁ c intent to be demonstrated 
but only requires the accused to be aware, to know that the principal perpetrator has the requisite 
dolus specialis.
55 Th e Appeals Chamber in Rutaganda explicitly held that “the Appellant was not convicted of the 
crime of genocide on the basis of any particular theory of guilt by association. Paragraph 399 of 
the Trial Judgment clearly shows that the Trial Chamber found that the Appellant was possessed 
of the speciﬁ c intent based on his speciﬁ c acts, namely his direct participation in the widespread 
massacres committed against the members of the Tutsi group, and his ordering and abetting 
the commission of crimes against the Tutsi. Th e Trial Chamber also noted that the victims were 
systematically selected on account of their membership of the Tutsi group. Viewed in its context, 
the additional reference to the Appellant’s position of authority underscores the impact of his 
presence at the scene of the crimes and his exceptional ability to aid and abet the commission of 
the said crimes against members of the Tutsi group, due to the position of inﬂ uence he held in the 
community. Furthermore, it emerges from the Trial Judgment that the Trial Chamber considered 
the impact of the general context of the acts aimed at destroying the Tutsi group after having 
noted, based on the Appellant’s acts, that he had indeed the speciﬁ c intent.” (ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Rutaganda, AC, Judgment, 26 May 2003, paras. 529–530).
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Appeals Chamber,56 the Trial Chamber seems to rely essentially on the existence 
of a genocidal plan implemented at prefecture levels (Kayishema was the Prefect 
of Kibuye), on the number of victims, on the methodical character of the planned 
and programmed massacres, on the superior position of the accused, and on the 
utterances by the accused and other individuals.57 Similarly, in Ndindabahizi the 
ICTR strongly relies on the general context, the superior position of the accused 
(Minister of Government), and on the fact that he “was well aware that his remarks 
and actions were part of a wider context of ethnic violence, killing and massacres 
in Rwanda during this period.”58 Finally, in Simba genocidal intent was established 
as follows: “Given the scale of the killings and their context, the only reasonable 
conclusion is that the assailants who physically perpetrated the killings possessed 
the intent to destroy in whole or in part a substantial part of the Tutsi group. Th is 
genocidal intent was shared by all participants in the joint criminal enterprise, 
including Simba.”59
In the description of the Tribunal, the conduct of the accused appears to be 
essentially characterized as aiding and abetting and his mens rea corresponds to 
knowledge. However, the Trial Chamber convicted him for participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise, and strongly relied on the general criminal context to infer that 
all the participants thereto must have shared the genocidal intent.60 In comparison, 
a more rigorous approach has been adopted by the ICTY in the just mentioned 
Krstić case. As already noted, the Trial Chamber ﬁ nding on the genocidal intent of 
the accused61 was reversed by the Appeals Chamber because all that could be reason-
ably inferred from the facts pleaded at trial was that the accused had knowledge of 
the genocidal intent of the other perpetrators, but did not share it. 
Th is case law shows above all that there are no cases in which the accused was 
found to have the requisite genocidal intent, in the absence of a broader genocidal 
context. Th at is, the genocidal intent has always been established in connection to 
the existence of a genocidal campaign. Accordingly, the general criminal context 
has played a pivotal role in establishing the genocidal intent of the accused. In 
fact the dolus specialis of the defendant charged with genocide can be substantially 
56 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, AC, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 148.
57 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 527–540.
58 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, TC, Judgment, 15 July 2004, para. 463.
59 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Simba, TC, Judgment, 13 December 2005, para. 416.
60 Th e conviction of Simba has been conﬁ rmed on appeal: ICTR, Prosecutor v. Simba, AC, Judgment, 
27 November 2007, para. 269.
61 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 572. (“the killings were planned: 
the number and nature of the forces involved, the standardised coded language used by the units 
in communicating information about the killings, the scale of the executions, the invariability 
of the killing methods applied, indicate that a decision was made to kill all the Bosnian Muslim 
military aged men.”). See also paras. 606–645.
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inferred the general criminal context when it is shown that he or she took part in 
the genocidal campaign. 
Th e ad hoc tribunals have adopted a methodology according to which the general 
context is investigated ﬁ rst, and only subsequently is the mens rea of the accused 
established in connection to that general context. Th us, there are cases in which 
the genocidal intent is substantially inferred from the general criminal context, 
and therefore established in a more ‘objective’ manner, and even independently 
from the intent of the material perpetrators.62 Th is methodology has been both 
criticized and strongly supported.63 In any case, a more ‘objective’ mens rea can be 
essential in dealing with collective crimes like genocide, which are characterized 
by a collective intent. Otherwise, this particular psychological element would be 
almost impossible to prove in most cases. Even though the genocidal context does 
not correspond to a state policy, this dramatically reduces the distance between 
individual criminal liability and aggravated state responsibility. Both the speciﬁ c 
intent of the accused and state fault are established, with respect to genocide, hav-
ing regard to the same general criminal context.64 
Finally, there is another way of facilitating the establishment of individual crimi-
nal liability for genocide which characterizes certain cases brought before the ad 
hoc tribunals. Th ey have relied on modes of liability requiring a lower psychologi-
cal element to be met. Genocidal intent is particularly diﬃ  cult to demonstrate 
because of the collective dimension of the crime of genocide. Th erefore, relying on 
particular modes of liability speciﬁ cally elaborated to deal with collective crimes, 
whose elements are shared by a multiplicity of perpetrators, can make it easier to 
establish this speciﬁ c intent. For example, an accused can be charged with ‘aiding 
and abetting’ in the commission of genocide, a form of liability which only requires 
knowledge of the genocidal campaign. Th e same is arguably true with respect to 
‘joint criminal enterprise’.65 Of course, the accused charged under joint criminal 
enterprise needs to have had genocidal intent, but the psychological element is 
62 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
63 Strong criticism has been expressed by G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental 
Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’, 3 JICJ (2005), pp. 545–548. See also R. Maison, 
supra note 39, p. 139; W.A. Schabas, supra note 19, pp. 222–224; S.R. Ratner and J.S. Abrams, 
Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 37; Y. Jurovics, Réﬂ exions sur la spéciﬁ cité du crime contre l’humanité (Paris, LGDJ, 2002), 
pp. 320–321; A. Cassese, ‘Genocide’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. I (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 344. For the 
opposite view, see supra note 28.
64 In this respect, it is interesting to compare the Genocide case decided by the ICJ (see supra the 
Introduction, note 1) and the ICTY judgment in Krajišnik (supra note 49). More generally, the 
relation between the establishment of state and individual responsibility for the same international 
crimes is examined below (see infra Chapter 7). 
65 See infra Chapter 6.
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shared by the members of this enterprise. Th us, it is much easier to demonstrate 
that the accused shared the speciﬁ c intent with other perpetrators than to prove he 
alone intended to destroy the targeted group by his actions. 
Similarly, one may share the view that command responsibility does not require 
proof of genocidal intent on the part of the commander, who must only have 
knowledge that his subordinates have committed genocide.66 Th e issue is still 
controversial since international tribunals at ﬁ rst took diverging positions. Th e 
ICTR has generally convicted those responsible for genocide under both Article 
6(1) and Article 6(3) of its Statute. Th erefore, in these cases genocidal intent was 
already demonstrated. On one occasion, it had convicted an accused for genocide 
under the doctrine of command responsibility, without showing its genocidal 
intent.67 Th e ICTY, on the other hand, at ﬁ rst excluded the possibility of relying 
on command responsibility where the commander or his subordinates do not have 
genocidal intent.68 However, in two more recent judgments the Tribunal seems to 
have reviewed its position, holding that command responsibility does not require 
a showing that the accused has genocidal intent.69
Th us, under certain modes of liability which speciﬁ cally aim at collective forms 
of perpetration of international crimes, individuals can be convicted for genocide 
without showing that they individually possessed a genocidal intent. Th eir mens 
rea is essentially established having regard to the general criminal context, that 
is, the same facts that could be investigated to establish state fault. Th is conﬁ rms 
the fundamental role played by the general criminal context in the ascertainment 
of individual criminal responsibility, and points out a signiﬁ cant similarity in the 
establishment of state and individual responsibility for genocide. 
66 Command responsibility takes into account the case of crimes carried out by members of an 
organized group – be it a military group or otherwise. Under such circumstances, a lower thresh-
old of mens rea with respect to genocide can be justiﬁ ed in the light of the ‘institutional’ role of 
superiors and of the broader and more complex framework in which such collective crimes are 
generally carried out. See A. Cassese, supra note 2, p. 211, and W.A. Schabas, supra note 19, pp. 
226–229. For a more critical approach, see K. Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, in A. Cassese 
et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. I (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 871.
67 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., TC, Judgment, 25 February 2004, para. 654. Th e conviction 
of Imanishimwe for genocide under Article 6(3) of the ICTR St. was set aside by the Appeals 
Chamber because the relevant charges had not been properly pleaded in the indictment (ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., AC, Judgment, 7 July 2006, paras. 164–165).
68 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, TC, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 559.
69 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, TC, Judgment, 1 September 2004, para. 718; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 686.
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C. War Crimes
Generally, war crimes are not speciﬁ c-intent crimes. However, there are some pri-
mary norms prohibiting conduct amounting to war crimes and requiring such a 
dolus specialis. A recent case before the ICTY has in fact dealt with a speciﬁ c intent 
war crime. Th is case merits a closer examination because the Tribunal has widely 
relied on the general criminal context to infer the mens rea of the accused. 
In Galić, an international tribunal for the ﬁ rst time convicted an individual for 
the ‘crime of terror against the civilian population’. Indeed the Tribunal found that 
such a crime has legal basis under a rule of customary international law.70 General 
Galić has been held responsible for having ordered a “protracted campaign of shell-
ing and sniping upon civilian areas of Sarajevo and upon the civilian population 
thereby inﬂ icting terror and mental suﬀ ering upon its civilian population”. 
Th e Trial Chamber of the ICTY did not list seriousness among the elements of 
this particular violation of the laws and customs of war.71 However, the Prosecutor 
insisted on demonstrating that this crime was carried out in a widespread and sys-
tematic manner. Although unnecessary, this additional element was ﬁ nally essential 
to proving the mens rea of the accused. Indeed, the crime of terror against the civil-
ian population was treated by the Trial Chamber as a speciﬁ c-intent crime, thus 
requiring a dolus specialis to be demonstrated. In this case, it had to be established 
that the accused had the speciﬁ c intent of terrorizing the civilian population. 
As with the cases dealing with genocide examined above, the general context 
and the proof of a widespread pattern of criminal conduct has substantially helped 
the Prosecutor in proving such a particular mens rea.72 In Galić, the Trial Chamber 
ﬁ rst established that the accused knew that his subordinates had committed the 
crimes proved at trial having due regard to their ‘seriousness’.73 Th is allowed the 
Tribunal to ﬁ nd Galić’s command responsibility.74 Th en, the Tribunal turned to 
70 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić, Trail Chamber, TC, Judgment, 5 December 2003.
71 Ibid., para. 133.
72 Ibid., paras. 703–706, and 741–747. Th e same reasoning was accepted and applied by the IACHR 
in Velásquez (supra Chapter 3, note 20 and accompanying text) where it had to establish state 
responsibility for serious breaches of human rights. 
73 See supra Chapter 3.
74 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić, TC, Judgment, 5 December 2003, paras. 703–705: “it would be 
inconceivable that given the importance of artillery assets for a Corps commander, especially one 
with an infantry disadvantage, the Accused was not fully appraised of the use of SRK artillery. 
At a minimum, and as mentioned by witnesses, the daily ammunition expenditure had to be 
recorded and be known. Th e Trial Chamber has already made ﬁ ndings in relation to the widespread 
character of unlawful activities. Th ese criminal activities had to be carried out by using a vast amount 
of ammunition. Th e rate of use of ammunition which would have been in excess of what was required 
for regular military operations, is among the reasons which allow the Trial Chamber to infer that the 
Accused knew of criminal activities by his troops. Th e Trial Chamber is convinced that the Accused, 
as a Corps commander, was in full control of SRK artillery assets and knew of the rate of use of 
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his direct responsibility for having ordered the unlawful campaign of sniping and 
shelling civilians in Sarajevo. And the speciﬁ c intent of the accused was essentially 
inferred from the general context:
According to the Majority, there is an irresistible inference to be drawn from the 
evidence on the Trial Record that what the Trial Chamber has found to be wide-
spread and notorious attacks against the civilian population of Sarajevo could not 
have occurred without it being the will of the commander of those forces which 
perpetrated it and that the lack of measures to prevent illegal sniping and shelling 
activities was deliberate.75
Th e crime of terror against the civilian population is a particular crime requiring 
a certain organization and various persons for its execution. Th e speciﬁ c intent is 
necessarily scattered among the perpetrators, and this element may be diﬃ  cult to 
prove unless the general context is duly taken into account.76 As noted above, this 
approach may be very useful in ascribing individual liability for collective crimes. 
From a more general perspective, this results in establishing a closer connection 
between state and individual responsibility. At a minimum, even with respect to 
certain collective war crimes, this case shows the need to establish some form of 
co-ordination between these two regimes of international responsibility, which 
cannot be achieved by relying too rigorously on the principle of individual criminal 
liability alone.
D. Aggression
Th e crime of aggression merits particular attention. As already noted, aggression 
is characterized by a complete overlap between aggravated state responsibility and 
individual criminal liability as far as the material element is concerned. Th e same 
is true with respect to the subjective element. 
Indeed, only political and military leaders can be held accountable for this crime 
under international criminal law. It must be stressed that, in theory, nothing pre-
vents the international legal order from regarding aggression as an international 
crime which can also be committed by private individuals.77 However, international 
ammunition. Th ird, in view of the circumstances which prevailed during the conﬂ ict, the notoriety 
of certain of the incidents scheduled in the Indictment and the systematic character of these criminal 
acts which extended over a prolonged period of time, in conjunction with the media coverage of which 
the SRK Corps command was aware, renders the Accused’s professed ignorance untenable. Th e Trial 
Chamber ﬁ nds that General Galić, beyond reasonable doubt, was fully appraised of the unlawful 
sniping and shelling at civilians taking place in the city of Sarajevo and its surroundings.” (emphasis 
added).
75 Ibid., para. 742. See also paras. 745–746.
76 For a similar case, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, TC, Judgment, 12 December 2007.
77 In this sense, see L. Condorelli, ‘Conclusions Générales’, in M. Politi and G. Nesi (eds.), Th e Inter-
national Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004), pp. 156–157.
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practice reveals a completely diﬀ erent conception of aggression, which is strictly 
deﬁ ned in terms of state action. 
Th e Nuremberg judgment held that possible perpetrators of crimes against peace 
were members of a government, persons having high-level posts in the military, 
diplomats, politicians and industrialists.78 While the IMT tried those individu-
als who were in control and who had established the German policy resulting in 
crimes against peace, the subsequent trials had to deal with the same oﬀ ences but 
the defendants were either low-ranking oﬃ  cers or private individuals. In particular, 
the question of who could be held accountable for aggression was examined in the 
Farben case.79 Th e issue was addressed in practical terms: the Tribunal held that it 
was not possible to depart from the concept that only ‘major war criminals’ may 
be held liable for waging wars of aggression; otherwise, the result would be the 
possibility of collective guilt and mass punishments.80 “Th e participation [of the 
defendants] was that of the followers and not leaders. If we lower the standard of 
participation to include them, it is diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd a logical place to draw the line 
between the guilty and the innocent among the great mass of German people.”81
Th us, the Tribunal decided not to depart from the mark already set by the IMT, 
according to which only ‘high public oﬃ  cials’ and ‘high military oﬃ  cers’ can be 
responsible for the crime of aggression. 
International criminal law has not departed from this principle, and today 
aggression is commonly regarded as a ‘leadership crime’.82 Th is has the practical 
78 IMT Judgment, supra Chapter 1, note 90, p. 223.
79 US Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Krauch and Others (Farben case), 29 July 1948, 15 ILR (1948), 
p. 678 et seq.
80 Ibid., p. 669 (“Under such circumstances there would be no practical limitation on criminal 
responsibility that would not include, on principle, the private soldier on the battleﬁ eld, the 
farmer who increased his production of foodstuﬀ s to sustain the armed forces, or the housewife 
who conserved fats for the making of munitions. Under such a construction the entire manpower 
of Germany could, at the uncontrolled discretion of the indicting authorities, be held to answer 
for waging wars of aggression”).
81 Ibid., p. 670.
82 Domestic criminal courts have underscored this speciﬁ c feature of the crime of aggression (see, 
for example, Audiencia Nacional, Scilingo case, Sentencia por crimenes contra la humanidad en 
el caso Adolfo Scilingo, 19 April 2005, <www.derechos.org>). On the other hand, this nature of 
the crime of aggression has been codiﬁ ed by the ILC in Article 16 of the Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind. According to the ILC commentary, “the perpetrators 
of an act of aggression are to be found only in the categories of individuals who have the necessary 
authority or power to be in a position potentially to play a decisive role in committing aggression” 
(ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 45, para. 2; see also 
M. Dumée, ‘Le crime d’agression’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal (Paris, 
Pedone, 2000), p. 251). Th is clearly shows a complete adherence to the approach of the Nurem-
berg judgment and subsequent trials. Moreover, the fact that aggression is a leadership crime was 
one of the few uncontroversial starting points of the PrepCom working on Article 5 of the ICC 
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eﬀ ect of excluding the criminal responsibility of subordinates. In other words, the 
crime of aggression exceptionally provides for a complete defence of superior orders 
which can be invoked by all state organs unless it is demonstrated that they had 
the necessary authority or power to potentially play a decisive role in committing 
aggression. Only decision-makers can be held accountable; all other participants 
are excused. Th e individuals who can be held accountable are those who repre-
sent the state. State leaders are responsible for deciding state policy, and they can 
entirely posses the required mens rea. Th erefore, they are the only ones who can 
properly bear the responsibility on behalf of the state, even if they have not com-
mitted any atrocity with their own hands. By contrast, it is a priori excluded that 
executioners in the broad sense possess the requisite mens rea and the defence of 
obedience to superior orders is consequently available to all of them. It is the fact 
that aggression can only be committed by the state apparatus which justiﬁ es such 
a diﬀ erent conclusion.
Th is brings us to the psychological element of the crime of aggression. While there 
is a complete overlap between state and individual responsibility with respect to both 
the material and the subjective elements of this crime, it is still possible to wonder 
whether these regimes diﬀ er as far as the psychological element is concerned. 
International criminal law requires the mens rea of the accused to be established, 
even in case of aggression. Indeed, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging 
of aggression must be intentional. However, the problem with the psychological 
element of aggression (animus aggressionis) is that this requirement can be inter-
preted in two diﬀ erent ways, that is, as requiring on the part of the accused either 
a speciﬁ c intent to commit aggression or simple knowledge that his conduct is 
contributing to the perpetration of aggression. If we rely on the only precedents to 
date, the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments, no speciﬁ c intent is necessary to hold 
the perpetrator criminally accountable for aggression.83 To convict the accused 
Statute, see UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, p. 4, para. II, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index
.html> (“the perpetrator was in a position eﬀ ectively to exercise control over or to direct the politi-
cal and military action of the State which committed an act of aggression”). Th e PrepCom lists 
only two principles governing individual liability for aggression which are well-established, and 
the ﬁ rst one is the “principle under which the crime of aggression is committed by political or 
military leaders of a State” (UN Doc. PCNICC/2001/L.1/Rev.1, 9 March 2001, p. 20, <untreaty
.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>). Th e same view has been conﬁ rmed in the work of the SWGCA, 
see ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, p. 3, <www.icc-cpi.int>. Th e debate in SWGCA concerns the 
better placement of the leadership clause. While most members agree that it should be included 
in the deﬁ nition of the crime of aggression, other members stress the importance to replicate the 
leadership clause in Article 25 dealing with principle of individual criminal responsibility and the 
modes of liability for international crimes. Indeed, the leadership nature of the crime of aggression 
implies that some modes of liability would hardly be applicable to this crime.
83 Th is is the view generally shared by international law scholars. See J. Hogan-Doran and B.T. Van 
Ginkel, ‘Aggression as a Crime under International Law and the Prosecution of Individuals by the 
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persons for aggression, the IMT relied on the fact that they had knowledge of 
Hitler’s aggressive plans.84
In principle, the same controversial issue concerns aggravated state responsibil-
ity for aggression since it is possible to think either that no state fault must be 
demonstrated or that the state activity must evidence a speciﬁ c aggressive purpose. 
However, it is generally held that no speciﬁ c intent needs to be demonstrated to 
establish aggravated state responsibility for aggression.85 Th e same result emerges 
from international practice. In particular, the relevant case law of the International 
Court of Justice shows that no speciﬁ c intent is required on the part of a state to 
show that it has committed aggression.86
Accordingly, the psychological element remains a distinguishing feature of 
individual criminal liability, when compared to aggravated state responsibility, also 
with respect to the crime of aggression. While state responsibility for aggression 
can be proved in an objective manner, to hold a state military or political leader 
accountable for this crime requires the proof of his or her mens rea. On the other 
hand, in order to establish this psychological element an international criminal 
tribunal will probably rely on the general criminal context. In the end, even if the 
psychological element is a distinguishing feature of international criminal law, it is 
possible to assume that the surrounding context (state aggression) will be crucial to 
demonstrate the knowledge of state leaders that their behaviour is contributing to 
the commission of an act of aggression. Th is is not to say that state and individual 
responsibility for aggression will automatically coincide. For example, the accused 
can invoke defences excluding that he or she participated in the commission of 
the crime with the requisite mens rea.87 However, this does not eliminate the fact 
Proposed International Criminal Court’, 43 NILR (1996), p. 336; Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and 
Self-Defence (2d edn., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 139–140; A. Cassese, 
supra note 2, p. 115; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (Th e Hague, TMC Asser 
Press, 2005), p. 399.
84 See IMT Judgment, supra Chapter 1, note 90, in particular with respect to the defendants Schact, 
Bormann, and Streicher. According to T. Taylor, Th e Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (New York, 
Knopf, 1992), Chapter 8, the IMT required a speciﬁ c intent only for the crime of conspiracy to 
commit aggression. 
85 R.J. Alfaro, ‘La question de la déﬁ nition de l’agression’, 29 RDISDP (1951), p. 380; J. Stone, 
Aggression and World Order (London, Stevens & Sons Limited, 1958), p. 141; J. Zourek, ‘Enﬁ n 
une déﬁ nition de l’agression’, 20 AFDI (1974), p. 26; B.B. Ferencz, Deﬁ ning International Aggres-
sion. Th e Search for World Peace. A Documentary History and Analysis (Dobbs Ferry N.Y., Oceana 
Publications, 1975), p. 31; B. Broms, ‘Th e Deﬁ nition of Aggression’, 154 RCADI (1977), p. 345; 
J. Hogan-Doran and B.T. Van Ginkel, supra note 83, p. 336; Y. Dinstein, supra note 83, p. 131; 
M. Lippman, ‘Th e History, Development, and Decline of Crimes Against Peace’, 36 Th e George 
Washington International Law Review (2004), p. 1036.
86 See the jurisprudence of the ICJ cited supra Chapter 1, note 44. 
87 See infra Chapter 5.
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that the psychological element of the accused charged with aggression can widely 
be inferred from the general criminal context, as noted with respect to other 
international crimes. And individual and state responsibility for aggression will 
largely overlap also with respect to this element. It is not to be forgotten that, 
according to the preparatory works, the ICC will try state leaders for aggression 
only after the establishment of state responsibility for aggression.88 Th erefore, it 
would in principle be able to rely on this previous assessment in ﬁ nding both the 
material and the psychological element of individual criminal liability for the 
same crime.
On the other hand, the view has been expressed that aggression should be 
regarded as a speciﬁ c intent crime.89 Th us, in order to hold political and military 
leaders accountable for aggression it must be shown that they intended, for example, 
to achieve territorial gains or to obtain economic advantages. Th is also implies 
that the state act of aggression needs to be carried out with an analogous speciﬁ c 
intent. Th e purpose of the present analysis is not to criticize this peculiar approach, 
but to see what impact it can have in terms of the relationship between state and 
individual responsibility for aggression. 
Arguably, this approach reveals an even closer relationship between state and 
individual responsibility, because state fault would in the end correspond to the 
dolus specialis of the state organs whose conduct is attributed to the state. Aggres-
sion is a particular international crime because criminal liability is limited to a few 
state leaders, that is, those decision-makers who represent the state. Accordingly, 
the mens rea of the accused can more easily be identiﬁ ed with state fault.90 If there 
is a substantial equivalence between the conduct of the state and that of a limited 
number of its organs, state fault may be equated with that of a few isolated state 
organs.91 Th e crime of aggression is rooted on the basic assumption of identity 
between the conduct of the state and its political and military leaders, that is, 
those organs who can be held responsible on its behalf. Not only is the actus reus 
necessarily a state serious breach of obligations owed to the entire international 
community, but the only persons who can be held criminally liable are those high-
est ranking organs representing the state as a whole and deciding the state general 
88 See infra Chapter 7.
89 S. Glaser, ‘Culpabilité en droit international pénal’, 99 RCADI (1960), pp. 504–505. It should 
be added that the work of the PrepCom for the ICC is not always clear as to whether a speciﬁ c 
intent is required in the deﬁ nition of the crime of aggression. One of the options of this deﬁ nition 
(option 1, variation 2) requires the armed attack amounting to aggression to be carried out “with 
the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of” the victim 
state (UN Doc. PCNICC/2001/L.1/Rev.1, 9 March 2001, p. 17, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index
.html>).
90 See supra in this Chapter.
91 On this point, see J. Stone, supra note 85, p. 141.
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policies. Th us, assuming that aggravated state responsibility for aggression requires 
a speciﬁ c intent to be demonstrated, according to this line of reasoning state fault 
will correspond to the dolus specialis of state leaders. And the establishment of state 
and individual responsibility for aggression would almost coincide.
Th is approach is interesting because it essentially relies on a unitary notion of 
aggression under both state and individual responsibility. Th en, the question of the 
speciﬁ c intent nature of this crime must be solved consistently under both regimes 
of responsibility. In this regard, an alternative view has been proposed, according 
to which the dolus specialis of aggression could only be required under interna-
tional criminal law, and not under the law of state responsibility.92 Th is approach 
is interesting because it splits the unitary notion of aggression into two separate 
concepts,93 one applicable to state conduct and the other applicable to individual 
conduct. Accordingly, it would be possible to keep a certain separation between 
state and individual responsibility also with respect to the crime of aggression.
To sum up, the crime of aggression is particularly interesting because it reﬂ ects 
a very close relationship – or even an equivalence – between state and individual 
responsibility with respect to both the subjective and the psychological element. 
In particular, the latter element is certainly a distinguishing feature of individual 
criminal liability, but the foregoing analysis shows how diﬃ  cult it is to conceive 
of individual liability for aggression in a way completely separated from state 
responsibility for the same wrongful act. A ﬁ rst option is to consider that there is 
not a necessary legal link between state and individual responsibility for aggres-
sion because the psychological element is not required under the former. Th en, 
the relationship between these regimes will largely depend on the way in which 
the mens rea of state leaders is proved to establish their criminal liability. Arguably, the
general criminal context (state aggression) can have a crucial role in showing the 
psychological element of aggression, as happens with respect to other international 
crimes. Th e second option is to consider that state and individual responsibility 
for aggression do share a common psychological element (dolus specialis). In this 
case, a very close relationship between these regimes is due to the fact that state 
fault can be identiﬁ ed with the psychological attitude of those few state leaders 
that can be held accountable for aggression.94 
92 A. Cassese, supra note 2, p. 116.
93 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 
152–161.
94 However, it is diﬃ  cult to justify this second option on the basis of past and more recent international 
practice. Th e SWGCA for example seems opposed to the inclusion of a clause which would limit 
the deﬁ nition of aggression to acts having “the object or result of establishing a military occupation 
of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof” (see ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, 
pp. 12, and 21, <www.icc-cpi.int>).
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4. Concluding Observations
Th e analysis of the psychological element of international crimes conﬁ rms that in 
principle, the mens rea marks a diﬀ erence between aggravated state responsibil-
ity and individual criminal liability. Indeed, the assessment of aggravated state 
responsibility is generally independent of the establishment of individual criminal 
liability which requires an additional element (mens rea) to be demonstrated. And 
international criminal tribunals generally apply the principle of personal guilt in 
a very rigorous manner.
However, recent international case law shows interesting cases in which the two 
regimes tend to be more closely connected, and the mens rea/fault element can 
represent a point of contact between them. 
On the one hand, certain international crimes require a speciﬁ c intent to be 
met and the analysis of international practice has shown that this element can be 
established in a more ‘objective’ way. Th is happens in particular with respect to 
collective crimes because the proof of the dolus specialis is particularly diﬃ  cult. 
Th us, in order to demonstrate this requirement, international tribunals have been 
willing to rely on elements of the general criminal context, such as the conduct of 
persons other than the accused or even acts not amounting to the crime entailing 
individual criminal liability. In particular, this has led international criminal tribu-
nals to adopt a two-step inquiry into the speciﬁ c intent of the accused: they ﬁ rst 
take the general criminal context into account, and then they evaluate the personal 
conduct of the accused in the light of this surrounding context to see whether it 
shows the necessary speciﬁ c intent. Th is inevitably leads to a shift in the emphasis 
(in the tribunals’ approach) from the psychological attitude of the accused to the 
broader criminal context. Taking into account the general context in the establish-
ment of individual liability is an important tool for allocating individual criminal 
liability with respect to crimes of a collective nature. 
In practice, this approach brings the ascertainment of individual criminal liability 
closer to the ascertainment of aggravated state responsibility. Th e psychological 
element is established in very similar ways under both regimes. Th is does not mean 
that it is the same requirement. State fault, if required, is ascertained through an 
examination of the general conduct of the state, and patterns of behaviour that 
characterize such conduct. Under international criminal law, the focus is on the 
personal conduct of the accused, even though the general criminal conduct is crucial 
to infer his or her speciﬁ c intent. However, the emphasis put on the existence of a 
systematic pattern of criminal behaviour or a criminal policy dramatically reduces 
the distance that in principle characterizes the establishment of state fault, on the 
one hand, and the mens rea of a state organ, on the other. Th is inquiry into the 
general criminal context do not correspond to an establishment of aggravated state 
responsibility, and such an establishment is not a preliminary requirement to hold 
state organs accountable for international crimes. Th e relevant criminal context 
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(useful to infer the dolus specialis of the accused) can consist of the behaviour of 
non-state actors, for example. In other words, the collective criminal context does 
not necessarily take place at the state level. However, when state and individual 
responsibility are to be investigated with respect to the same crimes, this collective 
dimension can establish a direct link between the two regimes of responsibility for 
international crimes, in particular, as regards the way in which the psychological 
element is ascertained. At least with respect to the relevant conduct, both the mens 
rea of the accused and state fault for the same crimes will be proved in a similar 
way, that is, focusing on the same collective criminal context. 
On the other hand, with respect to isolated international crimes, state fault can 
correspond to the mens rea of the responsible state organ. Th is case is not particularly 
relevant because isolated crimes do not give rise to an overlap between aggravated 
state responsibility and individual criminal liability. However, international crimes 
committed by isolated state organs may trigger ordinary state responsibility.95 
Th erefore, this case shows an analogous overlap of the psychological element even 
though it concerns the relationship between individual liability and ordinary state 
responsibility. 
An exception is represented by the crime of aggression. Under international 
criminal law, only a few state leaders can be held accountable for this crime. From 
the standpoint of the material element, aggression can hardly be viewed as an isolated 
crime. However, from the standpoint of the subjective element, individual criminal 
liability for aggression can only be imposed on a few decision-makers whose intent 
is essential to establish state fault. Th erefore, the psychological element of this crime 
is likely to be established in the same way under both regimes. 
If no fault element is required to establish aggravated state responsibility for 
aggression, the mens rea of the accused can largely be inferred from the general 
criminal context (state aggression). Even in the absence of a common legal ingredi-
ent, the psychological element required under international criminal law can be 
established in a more ‘objective’ way relying on the facts that would constitute the 
seriousness requirement under aggravated state responsibility. 
Alternatively, if we consider that state and individual responsibility for aggres-
sion do share the same psychological element, then the relationship between these 
regimes is even closer. Th e mens rea of state leaders charged with aggression is 
likely to be used as the main proof of the existence of state fault. Th erefore, two 
apparently separated requirements can be regarded as analogous and be established 
almost in the same way.
95 Th is particular relationship between ordinary state responsibility and individual criminal liability 
is examined below. See infra Chapter 8.

Chapter 5
Defences and Circumstances Precluding 
Wrongfulness
Th e previous chapters have dealt with the basic elements of state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes and with the problems stemming from their 
relationship as far as these basic elements are concerned. It is now opportune, for 
the sake of completeness, to take into account other elements of state and indi-
vidual responsibility such as defences and circumstances precluding wrongfulness. 
Indeed, both these regimes provide for particular circumstances under which either 
wrongfulness or liability are precluded. For example, a state can claim that it has 
used force in self-defence and avoid a determination that its conduct amounted 
to an act of aggression. Similarly, an individual can in principle invoke duress and 
avoid punishment. 
Th e present analysis is limited to the relationship between defences in  international 
criminal law and circumstances precluding wrongfulness in state responsibility. It 
will not address the particular issue of the distinction between justiﬁ cations and 
excuses under international criminal law,1 and between circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness and circumstances precluding responsibility in state responsibility.2 
From the comparative viewpoint of this analysis, it is not necessary to deal with these 
speciﬁ c distinctions. More general aspects will be taken into account here: whether 
there is an overlap between certain defences and the corresponding circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness, whether the same notions are actually applied under both 
state and individual responsibility, and whether they can be regarded as an additional 
point of contact between these two regimes of international responsibility.
1 See in general G.P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (New York-Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1998).
2 Here the expression ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’ will be used simply because it is the 
one adopted by the ILC in its codiﬁ cation work on State Responsibility. Th is does not mean that 
certain circumstances listed in Articles 20 to 25 are arguably better understood as circumstances 
precluding responsibility. For a comprehensive analysis of circumstances precluding wrongful-
ness under state responsibility, see R. Ago, ‘Eighth Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1979), 
vol. II(1), p. 3 et seq., and YILC (1980), vol. II(1), p. 13 et seq.
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1. Th eoretical Approaches to the Relationship Between Defences and 
 Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness
From the viewpoint of the relationship between aggravated state responsibility and 
individual criminal liability, defences and circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
raise two main questions. First, assuming that the same circumstance amounts 
to a defence under international criminal law and to a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness under state responsibility, one may wonder whether this circum-
stance must necessarily be interpreted and applied in the same way. Second, one 
may ask whether circumstances precluding wrongfulness can play a role under 
international criminal law, and, in addition to defences, prevent individuals from 
being punished for international crimes, even if these circumstances belong to a 
diﬀ erent ﬁ eld of international law.
Th e ﬁ rst question is whether a consistent application of state and individual 
responsibility must be guaranteed as far as defences and circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness are concerned. For example, if duress3 is invoked by a state organ 
accused of having committed an international crime and distress,4 the correspond-
ing circumstance precluding wrongfulness under state responsibility, is invoked by 
the state, should duress and distress be interpreted and applied in the same way? 
If so, the unlawful conduct will either simultaneously entail state and individual 
responsibility (since it does not meet the common requirements of duress and 
distress) or be excused and engage neither state nor individual responsibility. In 
this way, a co-ordination between state and individual responsibility is established. 
3 On the notion of duress, see in general A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 242 et seq. Th e ICTY mentions as essential conditions for duress to be 
accepted: “1) the act charged was done to avoid an immediate danger both serious and irreparable; 
2) there was no adequate means of escape; 3) the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil” 
(ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, TC, Judgment, 29 November 1996, para. 17). Th e ICC Statute 
refers to duress in the following terms: “Th e conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death 
or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and the 
person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend 
to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be: i) Made 
by other persons; or ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person’s control” (Article 
31, 1, d, <www.icc-cpi.int>).
4 Th e notion of distress is deﬁ ned in the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Article 24 reads: 
“1) Th e wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation 
of distress, of saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care. 
2) Paragraph 1 does not apply if: a) Th e situation of distress is due, either alone or in combination 
with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or b) Th e act in question is likely to 
create a comparable or greater peril” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), 
vol. II(2), p. 78).
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By contrast, if duress and distress are interpreted and applied diﬀ erently, the same 
conduct could entail either state or individual responsibility without necessarily 
entailing the other.
Th e second question essentially concerns the possibility for individuals to avoid 
international criminal liability, not by invoking the defences provided for under 
international criminal law, but by claiming that their conduct is not unlawful under 
the regime of state responsibility, that is, by invoking a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness. Th e classical example would be the crime of aggression. If state A 
launches an armed attack against state B and this attack can be regarded as a lawful 
reaction in self-defence, then state A is not responsible for aggression. Arguably, 
in the absence of an act of aggression on the part of state A, political and military 
leaders of that state cannot be held individually accountable for the crime of 
 aggression. Th us, the question revolves around the possibility to conceive of cases 
in which individuals might invoke a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of 
the state conduct to avoid their personal punishment, as in the case of aggression. 
For example, can individuals charged with international crimes claim that their 
conduct amounted, for example, to a lawful reprisal?
From a theoretical point of view, these issues are diﬀ erently addressed by the 
individual-oriented and state-oriented conceptual schemes. 
According to the state-oriented conceptual scheme and its assumptions, indi-
vidual criminal liability is in fact a measure indirectly aimed at sanctioning the 
wrongful state. State organs cannot be punished for conduct not amounting to state 
serious wrongful acts, that is, for acts not entailing aggravated state responsibility 
under international law. Accordingly, the responses to the two questions raised 
above should logically be consistent. Defences and the corresponding circum-
stances precluding wrongfulness should be interpreted and applied in the same 
way; otherwise individual liability might apply independently of state responsibil-
ity. By the same token, circumstances precluding wrongfulness should have a role 
in international criminal law and should preclude individual liability alongside 
traditional defences.
On the other hand, according to the individual-oriented conceptual scheme, 
individual criminal liability under international law may well exist even if no cor-
responding state responsibility can be established. Th us, defences can certainly be 
conceived of and applied in a manner which is diﬀ erent from that used under state 
responsibility with respect to the corresponding circumstances precluding wrongful-
ness.5 For example, the personal conduct of the accused may be excused by duress, 
5 See, in particular with respect to self-defence, G.-J. Knoops, Defenses in Contemporary International 
Law (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 2001), p. 211 (“Th e fact . . . that a State may legitimately 
use force in self-defense does not automatically imply that its military personnel, agents or other 
nationals are endowed with the private right to use force in self-defense and are therefore allowed 
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while state responsibility can nonetheless be aﬃ  rmed since it is  entailed by a wider 
criminal conduct carried out by the state which does not meet the requirements 
of distress. On the other hand, individual criminal liability can arguably be pre-
cluded only by those defences expressly provided under international criminal law. 
Since state and individual responsibility are regarded as totally separated, circum-
stances precluding the wrongfulness of state conduct can hardly have an impact on 
the diﬀ erent issue of individual accountability, unless there is a corresponding 
defence under international criminal law. Of course, from this point of view, 
the critical question is to identify with precision such defences under customary 
international law.
Undeniably, these approaches address the problem of the relationship between 
defences and circumstances precluding wrongfulness according to diverging criteria 
and lead to conﬂ icting results. In the end, they both deny any relationship between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes. However, the analysis 
of international practice reveals a diﬀ erent scenario. Defences and circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness are governed by diﬀ erent sets of secondary rules, but 
at the same time they represent a point of contact between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes.
2. Overlapping Defences and Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness
International case law, and in particular modern case law, has rarely dealt with 
defences. Before international ad hoc tribunals, the accused persons have generally 
pleaded not guilty for not having committed the crime, and at most they have 
claimed to have an alibi. Of course, the rigorous approach of these tribunals has 
not encouraged a wide reliance on defences on the part of the accused. However, 
a few cases can be relevant to the present analysis.
Th e Erdemović case6 is probably the most interesting one. Erdemović was a soldier 
responsible for having killed dozens of Muslims during the conﬂ ict in the former 
Yugoslavia. Before the ICTY, he invoked duress as an excuse for his conduct, since 
he maintained that he was threatened to do so. 
In 1997, the Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc tribunals found that duress does 
not aﬀ ord a complete defence for crimes involving the killing of innocent human 
beings.7 Th is narrow interpretation of duress can raise concern when taking into 
account the relationship between state and individual responsibility for international 
to commit, under this shield, international crimes. Th e concept of individual criminal and com-
mand responsibility must be assessed independently from the use of force by a State”).
6 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, TC, Judgment, 29 November 1996.
7 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, AC, Judgment, 7 October 1997, para. 19. 
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crimes. Indeed, if distress is not interpreted in the same way as duress, then the 
same conduct will entail the personal liability of the state organ under international 
criminal law, but will not also give rise to state responsibility due to the broader 
scope of distress under the latter regime. 
One commentator has been very critical regarding such a possible consequence.8 
Gaeta strongly aﬃ  rms the need “to co-ordinate the relevance of duress in both 
ﬁ elds of international law, namely State responsibility and international criminal 
liability”, and to give equal weight to duress in both of these ﬁ elds.9 Unfortunately, 
Erdemović-like situations are not so clear-cut and merit a closer examination from 
two diﬀ erent perspectives.
One may ﬁ rst look at the deﬁ nition of duress and distress from the viewpoint 
of the relationship between ordinary state responsibility and individual criminal 
liability. When state responsibility arises out of isolated breaches of state organs, it 
seems correct to support the need for a co-ordination between state and individual 
responsibility. Th e conduct of the state overlaps with the conduct of one of its or-
gans, and therefore the two wrongful acts are identiﬁ cal. Gaeta gives an interesting 
example: the case of a killing of a prisoner of war by a state oﬃ  cial (soldier) forced 
to do so by a civilian, who threatens that otherwise he will kill both the soldier and 
the prisoner of war.10 Th e soldier will be charged with a typical ‘individual’ war 
crime committed independently of any broader involvement of the state apparatus.11 
And in these circumstances he will probably invoke duress. On the other hand, 
if the soldier has been forced by a civilian, it seems perfectly correct to consider 
that the state has nothing to do with the crime and that distress can be invoked to 
preclude the wrongfulness of the state conduct. Th us, the co-ordination between 
state and individual responsibility will depend on the interpretation given to duress 
and distress respectively. In similar cases, it is arguably correct to maintain that 
distress should be interpreted in the same way as duress, since the same conduct 
gives rise to both ordinary state responsibility and individual criminal liability. In 
particular, independently of the fact that one may or may not share the approach 
of the ICTY in Erdemović, in this case a defence is invoked to exclude the mens 
 8 P. Gaeta, ‘War Crimes Trials Before Italian Criminal Courts: New Trends’, in H. Fischer et al. (eds.), 
International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law: Current Developments 
(Berlin, Spitz, 2001), p. 751 et seq. 
 9 Ibid., pp. 763–764.
10 Ibid.
11 See B.V.A. Röling, ‘Aspects of the Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War’, in 
A. Cassese (ed.), Th e New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conﬂ ict (Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 
1980), p. 203; P.-M. Dupuy, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and Interna-
tional Responsibility of the State’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. II (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1093. Th e 
classiﬁ cation of international is discussed below in Chapter 9.
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rea of the state organ whose conduct is attributable to the state. Th erefore, it is 
diﬃ  cult to see how, when turning to ordinary state responsibility, distress can be 
interpreted in a diﬀ erent way from the same circumstance which can exclude the 
liability of the state organ.
From the viewpoint of the relationship between aggravated state responsibil-
ity and individual criminal liability, things are arguably diﬀ erent. If we take the 
facts in the Erdemović case, it dealt with a completely diﬀ erent crime. In 1995, 
the Srebrenica safe area12 fell to the Bosnian Serb forces and thousands of Muslim 
civilians tried to ﬂ ee the area. But the Bosnian Serb forces were able to separate 
an undetermined number of Muslim men from the women and children and 
transport them by bus out of the enclave to various locations where they were to 
be executed.13 While Erdemović was found guilty since duress was not regarded as 
a complete defence with respect to such a grave crime, on the other hand, it seems 
impossible for the state to invoke distress with respect to a wrongful act such as 
that in which Erdemović took part. Due to the magnitude of the crime and the 
broad involvement of the Serb forces, Erdemović was clearly not implicated in 
a typical isolated individual crime. From the standpoint of state responsibility, 
the relevant conduct is not limited to Erdemović’s action, but it corresponds to a 
much broader criminal context, which includes the preparation and organization 
of the crime, the participation of various state organs, the order of the superior, 
the execution by various subordinates, and the number of victims. When consid-
ered in its entirety, this conduct is arguably suﬃ  cient to fulﬁ l the requirements of 
 aggravated state responsibility. 
However, while the ICTY in Erdemović apparently guarantees a certain co-
 ordination between state and individual responsibility – because both the state 
and the state organ are accountable – this merely derives from the nature of the 
crime and not from an identical interpretation of duress and distress. It is perfectly 
possible to share the criticism of the Erdemović solution with regard to duress, to 
support the possibility for individuals to rely on duress even in such circumstances,14 
and to hold that aggravated state responsibility does not necessarily cumulate with 
individual criminal liability. Duress and distress can be interpreted in diﬀ erent ways 
because they are deﬁ ned with respect to two completely diﬀ erent conducts: duress 
refers to the personal conduct of the accused, whereas distress (allegedly) refers to 
the overall activity of the state, and not to the conduct of an isolated state organ 
as far as serious breaches are concerned. Th us, with respect to collective crimes it 
12 See SC Res. 819(1993), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
13 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, TC, Judgment, 29 November 1996, paras. 77, 78 and 80.
14 See the Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese appended to the 1997 Erdemović judg-
ment, <www.un.org/icty>.
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is abstractly possible for a state organ to successfully invoke duress, while the state 
cannot claim to have acted in distress.
A. Th e Scope of the Overlap Between Defences and Circumstances Precluding 
Wrongfulness
More generally, with respect to serious breaches of community obligations  entailing 
aggravated state responsibility, it seems almost impossible for the state to invoke 
those circumstances precluding wrongfulness which are typical of isolated wrong-
ful acts, such as distress, necessity or force majeure. For example, it is diﬃ  cult to 
justify genocide or crimes against humanity because of “the occurrence of an 
 irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making 
it  materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation”. Indeed, 
aggravated state responsibility is deﬁ ned in terms of collective involvement of the 
state in the carrying out of the wrongful act, and it is mainly due to the seriousness 
requirement that most of the time circumstances precluding wrongfulness cannot 
operate with respect to serious breaches. 
Th us, a connection between state and individual responsibility, as far as defences 
and circumstances precluding wrongfulness are concerned, is very unlikely to arise. 
In practice the overlap between defences and circumstances precluding wrongful-
ness is very limited. Th is is essentially due to the fact that most circumstances pre-
cluding wrongfulness cannot be applied with respect to serious breaches entailing 
aggravated state responsibility. According to the ILC, such serious breaches have 
a peremptory character and in no case can their wrongfulness be precluded by 
those circumstances applying to ordinary state responsibility.15 Even leaving aside 
the peremptory character of certain primary obligations, it is clear that the factual 
preconditions of certain circumstances precluding wrongfulness are such as to be 
applied only with respect to isolated wrongful acts, and not with respect to serious 
breaches entailing aggravated state responsibility. For example, this is the case of 
distress, necessity or force majeure. Moreover, the application of certain other cir-
cumstances can be excluded simply by taking into account the non- reciprocal nature 
of obligations owed to the entire international community. Th us, the  wrongfulness 
of serious breaches cannot be precluded, for example, by consent of the injured 
state,16  because this circumstance only operates at the bilateral level. As far as 
15 See Article 26 which reads: “Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a 
State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of gen-
eral international law” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), 
p. 84).
16 Th e same reasoning can be applied to countermeasures. Article 50 of the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility excludes the lawfulness of countermeasures prohibited under international 
humanitarian law (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 131). 
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non-reciprocal obligations are concerned, the consent of one state (or more generally 
a bilateral circumstance precluding wrongfulness) does not exclude the wrongful-
ness of the serious breach with respect to all other states.
Consequently, as far as defences and circumstances precluding wrongfulness are 
concerned, the overlap between state and individual responsibility is essentially 
limited to self-defence. Indeed, both customary law and the UN Charter provide 
for the inherent right of states to act in (individual and collective) self-defence in 
case of aggression. One may see self-defence as part of the primary norm deﬁ ning 
(that is, limiting the deﬁ nition of ) state aggression rather than a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness. In both cases, the rationale for self-defence is the same: 
the legal order exceptionally admits a derogation to the norm protecting a col-
lective interest (international peace) allowing an individual interest perceived as 
fundamental (the survival of the state) to prevail over the former.17 
On the other hand, self-defence can also be regarded as a speciﬁ c defence under 
international criminal law, a defence having the same rationale as self-defence 
under the law of state responsibility. In Kordić, the ICTY explicitly dealt with the 
deﬁ nition of self-defence and aﬃ  rmed that it is provided for under customary 
international law:
Th e notion of self-defence may be broadly deﬁ ned as providing a defence to a person 
who acts to defend or protect himself or his property (or another person or person’s 
property) against attack, provided that the acts constitute a reasonable, necessary and 
proportionate reaction to the attack. Th e Trial Chamber notes that the Statute of the 
International Tribunal does not provide for self-defence as a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility. ‘Defences’ however form part of the general principles of 
criminal law which the International Tribunal must take into account in deciding 
the cases before it.18 
Similarly, both the ad hoc tribunals have rejected the tu quoque argument with respect to interna-
tional humanitarian norms embodying absolute, non-reciprocal obligations. See ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Kupreškić et al., TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000, paras. 515–520, and ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Gacumbtsi, TC, Judgment, 17 June 2004, para. 165. Th is issue is discussed in more detail infra 
in this Chapter.
17 G.P. Fletcher, supra note 1. Th is explains why, under such exceptional circumstances, particular 
requirements, like proportionality, are essential to strike a balance between the private and the 
collective interests involved.
18 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, TC, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 449. Th en in paras. 
450–451 the Trial Chamber explained that “Paragraph (1)(c) of Article 31 of the Statute of the 
ICC, entitled ‘Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility’, which provides for the exclusion of 
criminal liability in situations where a person acts reasonably to defend himself or another person, 
or certain types of property, reads: ‘1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsi-
bility provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that 
person’s conduct: . . . (c) Th e person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person 
or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another 
person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission against an imminent 
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Th us, the possibility for individuals charged with international crimes to invoke 
self-defence under international criminal law is conﬁ rmed in the most recent 
 international case law, in the ICC Statute, and in the ILC codiﬁ cation of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind.19
From a comparative point of view, self-defence is very interesting because it has 
two diﬀ erent meanings under state and individual responsibility, but at the same 
time it can be regarded as a point of contact between these two regimes. 
On the one hand, self-defence under international criminal law is arguably dif-
ferent from self-defence under state responsibility. According to the ILC:
It is important to distinguish between the notion of self-defence in the context of 
criminal law and the notion of self-defence in the context of Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations. Th e notion of self-defence in the criminal law context relieves 
an individual of responsibility for a violent act committed against another human 
being that would otherwise constitute a crime such as murder. In contrast, the notion 
of self- defence in the context of the Charter of the United Nations refers to the lawful 
use of force by a State in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence, and which would therefore not constitute aggression by that State.20
and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the 
other person or property protected. Th e fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation 
conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility 
under this subparagraph’. Th e principle of self-defence enshrined in this provision reﬂ ects provisions 
found in most national criminal codes and may be regarded as constituting a rule of customary 
international law. Article 31(1)(c) of the ICC Statute sets forth two conditions which must be 
met in order for self-defence to be accepted as a ground for excluding criminal liability: (a) the act 
must be in response to ‘an imminent and unlawful use of force’ against an attack on a ‘protected’ 
person or property; (b) the act of defence must be ‘proportionate to the degree of danger’. In rela-
tion to the speciﬁ c circumstances of war crimes, the provision takes into account the principle of 
military necessity.” Th is position was then upheld by the Appeals Chamber in its judgment of 17 
December 2004, paras. 835–838.
19 See Article 14 and, in particular, para. 8 of its commentary: “Self-defence was recognized as a pos-
sible defence in some of the war crime trials conducted after the Second World War. Th e United 
Nations War Crimes Commission concluded that ‘A plea of self-defence may be successfully put 
forward, in suitable circumstances, in war crime trials as in trials held under municipal law’. Th e 
plea of self-defence may be raised by an accused who is charged with a crime of violence committed 
against another human being resulting in death or serious bodily injury. Th e notion of self-defence 
could relieve an accused of criminal responsibility for the use of force against another human being 
resulting in death or serious injury if this use of force was necessary to avoid an immediate threat 
of his own death or serious injury caused by that other human being. Th e right of an individual 
to act in self-defence is implicitly recognized in the saving clause contained in the Convention on 
the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (article 21)” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work 
of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 40).
20 Ibid.
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Th e same distinction was taken into account by the ICTY in Kordić.21 As mentioned 
above, the Trial Chamber relied on a notion of individual self-defence and excluded 
the possibility that “military operations in self-defence” could provide a justiﬁ cation 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law. Th us, in principle two 
diﬀ erent and separate notions of self-defences apply under international criminal 
law and state responsibility.22
B. Th e Particular Case of the Crime of Aggression
On the other hand, self-defence plays a very peculiar role as regards the crime of 
aggression. Indeed, with respect to aggression both state and individual respon-
sibility arise out the same serious breach: a state act of aggression. Accordingly, 
the circumstance that is capable of justifying both state and individual conduct 
is arguably the same. To be more precise, it is the customary notion of state self-
defence which excludes an armed attack from being qualiﬁ ed as aggression under 
international law. Th erefore, if the conduct cannot be regarded as an unlawful act 
of aggression, neither aggravated state responsibility nor individual criminal liability 
can arise at the international level.23
With respect to the crime of aggression, there is arguably only one notion 
of self-defence which applies to both state and individual responsibility. Th is is 
due to the particular nature of this crime. Th e sole act which can be qualiﬁ ed as 
aggression is the state wrongful act. Individuals are not held criminally account-
able for ‘personal’ acts of aggression, but for acts of “aggression committed by a 
State”.24 Individual criminal liability of political and military leaders derives from 
the fact that they represent the state and they are the ultimate decision-makers to 
whom responsibility for aggression can be ascribed. Th ose particular individuals, 
and only those, are responsible for the state aggressive policy. Th is reveals a clear 
21 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, TC, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 452.
22 A similar approach is adopted by L. Condorelli, ‘Responsabilité Etatique et Responsabilité Indi-
viduelle pour Violations Graves du Droit International Humanitaire’, in L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), 
Man’s Inhumanity to Man. Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Th e Hague, 
M. Nijhoﬀ , 2003), p. 218.
23 Th e ILC in its commentary on Article 16 of the Draft Code of Crimes aﬃ  rms that, “[i]ndividual 
responsibility for such a crime is intrinsically and inextricably linked to the commission of aggres-
sion by a State. Th e rule of international law which prohibits aggression applies to the conduct of 
a State in relation to another State. Th erefore, only a State is capable of committing aggression by 
violating this rule of international law which prohibits such conduct” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work 
of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 43).
24 Article 16 of the Draft Code of Crimes (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC 
(1996), vol. II(2), p. 42). For a particular interpretation of the international law rule on self-defence 
which goes back to domestic criminal law concepts, see G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, Defending 
Humanity. When Force is Justiﬁ ed and Why (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008).
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point of contact between state and individual responsibility for aggression. Th is 
particular crime is deﬁ ned in terms of state action, and when (state) self-defence 
applies, no wrongful act can be said to exist under international law. Accordingly, 
no individual can be held criminally accountable for a legitimate use of force under 
international law.
C. Concluding Remarks
Th e foregoing analysis prompts three general remarks with respect to the relation-
ship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes as far as 
the deﬁ nition of defences and circumstances precluding wrongfulness is concerned. 
First, there is a very limited overlap between aggravated state responsibility and 
individual criminal liability, which essentially concerns self-defence and, as will 
be discussed below, countermeasures. It is true that a broader overlap character-
izes the relationship between ordinary state responsibility and individual criminal 
liability, and there may be a need to apply defences and circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness in a consistent way. But this need for co-ordination derives from 
factual circumstances. When international crimes are the result of isolated acts of 
state organs, it seems reasonable to interpret these norms consistently and qualify 
the same relevant conduct consistently in order to have either both state and indi-
vidual responsibility engaged or none of them. On the other hand, the seriousness 
of international crimes and the non-reciprocal nature of obligations owed to the 
entire international community explain the very limited overlap between aggra-
vated state responsibility and individual criminal liability as far as defences and 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness are concerned. 
Second, it is possible to interpret defences and circumstances precluding wrong-
fulness diﬀ erently, because they refer to two diﬀ erent kinds of conduct: the former 
apply to a serious wrongful state act, whereas the latter have to do with individual 
conduct amounting an international crime. Even self-defence can be seen as a 
general principle embodying two diﬀ erent notions, one applicable to states and 
the other one to individuals. Th us, state and individual responsibility for inter-
national crimes can in principle be regarded as separate regimes also with respect 
to defences and circumstances precluding wrongfulness. However, a ﬁ rst point of 
contact between these regimes concerns the notion of self-defence as applicable 
to the crime of aggression. 
Th ird, the particular nature of the crime of aggression derives from its deﬁ ni-
tion under customary international law. Th e primary norm deﬁ ning aggression 
excludes the wrongfulness of armed attacks carried out in self-defence. Accord-
ingly, no state serious wrongful act can be said to have been carried out where the 
use of armed force is a reaction to a previous act of aggression. Th e conduct of the 
state is perfectly lawful under international law. Th is primary norm (concerning 
state conduct) is also the basis for establishing individual liability for the crime of 
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aggression. Th erefore, it seems correct to maintain that, in the absence of a state 
act of aggression, no state leader can be held criminally liable for aggression. Th is 
means that the very same notion of (state) self-defence is applicable to both state 
and individual responsibility under international law.
3. Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness and International Criminal 
Law
Th e crime of aggression is an example of a crime allowing individuals to invoke a 
defence not expressly provided under international criminal law, a circumstance 
(self-defence) pertaining to the deﬁ nition of the lawfulness of state action, a cir-
cumstance which has nothing to do with their private conduct. Th is brings us 
to the second problematic aspect of the relationship between aggravated state 
responsibility and individual criminal liability as far as circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness are concerned, namely, whether circumstances precluding wrongful-
ness can actually play a role under international criminal law.
Th e question an international criminal tribunal may have to deal with is whether, 
in establishing the criminal liability of an accused who has participated in the 
commission of a crime carried out at the state level, it can take into account the 
fact that the corresponding state conduct is not unlawful under international law 
due to a circumstance precluding its wrongfulness, and therefore whether it must 
acquit the accused. In other words, there may be cases in which certain conduct in 
principle gives rise to both state and individual responsibility, but whose wrong-
fulness may be precluded under state responsibility. In this case, the question is 
whether the (state) circumstance precluding wrongfulness can be relied upon to 
exclude individual criminal liability as well. 
According to the overlap identiﬁ ed above, it does not seem to be controversial 
for (state) self-defence to be applicable with respect to the crime of aggression. A 
more problematic situation concerns countermeasures and, in particular, so-called 
belligerent reprisals. In general, it must be recalled that under the law of state 
responsibility there are certain “obligations which by reason of their character 
must not be the subject of countermeasures at all”.25 In particular, the ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility separately lists obligations for the protection of 
fundamental human rights (Article 50 (1) (b)), and obligations of a humanitar-
ian character prohibiting reprisals (Article 50 (1) (c)). It is generally accepted 
and recognized that the former include genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
25 Commentary on Art. 50 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), 
p. 131, para. 2).
Defences and Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness   159
torture.26 For example, genocide cannot justify counter-genocide.27 Th us, with 
respect to certain obligations owed to the entire international community there is 
a general and absolute prohibition of reprisals under international law. Th e breach 
of these non-reciprocal obligations always entails state responsibility, even if the 
serious breach is committed in response to the breach of the same obligations by 
another state. Consequently, with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity 
and torture, there is no room left for invoking the countermeasure argument under 
international criminal law. 
Apparently, this conclusion does not extend to war crimes. However, it is not 
entirely clear to what extent individuals charged with war crimes are entitled to rely 
on the belligerent reprisal defence to avoid punishment. To answer this question, 
it is ﬁ rst necessary to ascertain whether and to what extent belligerent reprisals can 
preclude state responsibility. 
Going back to the ILC codiﬁ cation of state responsibility, it emerges that inter-
national humanitarian law is treated separately from fundamental human rights 
law. More interestingly, while Article 50 (1) (b) sets out a general prohibition of 
countermeasures, Article 50 (1) (c) has a narrower scope and refers only to those 
humanitarian law obligations already prohibiting reprisals. As the ILC explains in 
its commentary, “the paragraph reﬂ ects the basic prohibition of reprisals against 
individuals, which exists in international humanitarian law.”28
Th us, to establish whether and to what extent states can take countermeasures in 
this particular ﬁ eld of international law, we must look at its speciﬁ c provisions. Th is 
is a very controversial question.29 Th e 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 clearly set out a prohibition of reprisals against protected persons 
and objects in situations of international armed conﬂ icts. But reprisals have not 
been formally prohibited in certain areas, namely, methods and means of warfare 
and internal armed conﬂ icts. Moreover, the absolute prohibition of reprisals against 
the civilian population has continued to be a matter of considerable controversy. In 
26 Commentary on Art. 26 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), 
p. 85, para. 5).
27 As the ICJ noted, “in no case could one breach of the Convention serve as an excuse for another” 
(Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order, 17 December 1997, 
ICJ Reports 1997, p. 258, para. 35).
28 Commentary on Article 50 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. 
II(2), p. 132, para. 8, emphasis added).
29 See F. Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals (Leiden, M. Nijhoﬀ , 1971); R. Bierzanek, ‘Reprisals as a 
Means of Enforcing the Laws of Warfare: Th e Old and the New Law’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Th e 
New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conﬂ ict (Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 1980), pp. 232–257; 
C. Greenwood, ‘Th e Twilight of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals’, 20 NYIL (1989), pp. 35–69; 
F. Kalshoven, ‘Belligerent Reprisals Revisited’, 21 NYIL (1990), pp. 43–80.
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particular, certain reservations to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols apparently 
assume the lawfulness of reprisals in kind taken in extreme circumstances.30 
Recent international case law has cast some light on the long-debated question 
of belligerent reprisals. Th e ICTY has taken the view that there is a general and 
absolute prohibition of reprisals against the civilian population under customary 
international law, notwithstanding the international or internal character of the 
armed conﬂ ict. A ﬁ rst statement in that sense can be found in the Martić decision.31 
But it is in Kupreškić that the Tribunal dealt in more detail with this question. In 
particular, it carefully examined the opinio juris before concluding that a rule has 
emerged under customary law providing for the absolute prohibition of reprisals 
against civilians in all armed conﬂ icts.32 Th is conclusion is perfectly consistent with 
30 See, for example, the UK reservation to the 1977 Additional Protocol: “If any adverse party makes 
serious and deliberate attacks against the civilian population or civilians or civilian objects, the 
United Kingdom will regard itself as entitled to take measures otherwise prohibited to the extent 
that it considers such measures necessary for the sole purpose of compelling the adverse party to 
cease committing violations, but only after formal warning to the adverse party requiring cessation 
of the violations has been disregarded and then only after a decision taken at the highest level of 
government.”
31 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Martić, TC, Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, 8 March 1996, 
para. 17 (“the rule which states that reprisals against the civilian population as such, or individual 
civilians, are prohibited in all circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful behaviour of the 
other party, is an integral part of customary international law and must be respected in all armed 
conﬂ icts”).
32 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000, paras. 531–534 (“First, even 
before the adoption of the First Additional Protocol of 1977, a number of States had declared 
or laid down in their military manuals that reprisals in modern warfare are only allowed to the 
extent that they consist of the use, against enemy armed forces, of otherwise prohibited weapons – 
thus a contrario admitting that reprisals against civilians are not allowed. In this respect one can 
mention the United States military manual for the Army (Th e Law of Land Warfare), of 1956, as 
well as the Dutch ‘Soldiers Handbook’ (Handboek voor de Soldaat) of 1974. True, other military 
manuals of the same period took a diﬀ erent position, admitting reprisals against civilians not in 
the hands of the enemy belligerent. In addition, senior oﬃ  cials of the United States Government 
seem to have taken a less clear stand in 1978, by expressing doubts about the workability of the 
prohibition of reprisals against civilians. Th e fact remains, however, that elements of a widespread 
opinio necessitatis are discernible in international dealings. Th is is conﬁ rmed, ﬁ rst of all, by the 
adoption, by a vast majority, of a Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly in 1970 which stated 
that ‘civilian populations, or individual members thereof, should not be the object of reprisals’. A 
further conﬁ rmation may be found in the fact that a high number of States have ratiﬁ ed the First 
Protocol, thereby showing that they take the view that reprisals against civilians must always be 
prohibited. It is also notable that this view was substantially upheld by the ICRC in its Memoran-
dum of 7 May 1983 to the States parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Iran-Iraq war 
and by Trial Chamber I of the ICTY in Martić. Secondly, the States that have participated in the 
numerous international or internal armed conﬂ icts which have taken place in the last ﬁ fty years 
have normally refrained from claiming that they had a right to visit reprisals upon enemy civilians 
in the combat area. It would seem that such claim has been only advanced by Iraq in the Iran-Iraq 
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and conﬁ rmed by the ICTY case law on the deﬁ nition of the war crime ‘attack on 
civilian population’. Notwithstanding early uncertainties,33 the ICTY case law now 
regards the prohibition against attacking civilians and civilian objects as an absolute 
prohibition that may not be derogated from because of military necessity.34 
Th is general prohibition refers to reprisals against civilian population and objects 
and also extends to internal armed conﬂ ict.35 According to the ICTY, reprisals 
against civilians are always prohibited and cannot be regarded as a circumstance 
war of 1980–1988 as well as – but only in abstracto and hypothetically, by a few States, such as 
France in 1974 and the United Kingdom in 1998. Th e aforementioned elements seem to support 
the contention that the demands of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, as manifested 
in opinio necessitatis, have by now brought about the formation of a customary rule also binding 
upon those few States that at some stage did not intend to exclude the abstract legal possibility of 
resorting to the reprisals under discussion. Th e existence of this rule was authoritatively conﬁ rmed, 
albeit indirectly, by the International Law Commission. In commenting on sub-paragraph d of 
Article 14 (now Article 50) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which excludes from the 
regime of lawful countermeasures any conduct derogating from basic human rights, the Commis-
sion noted that Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions ‘prohibits any reprisals 
in non-international armed conﬂ icts with respect to the expressly prohibited acts as well as any 
other reprisal incompatible with the absolute requirement of humane treatment’. It follows that, in 
the opinion of the Commission, reprisals against civilians in the combat zone are also prohibited. 
Th is view, according to the Trial Chamber, is correct. However, it must be supplemented by two 
propositions. First, Common Article 3 has by now become customary international law. Secondly, 
as the International Court of Justice rightly held in Nicaragua, it encapsulates fundamental legal 
standards of overarching value applicable both in international and internal armed conﬂ icts. 
Indeed, it would be absurd to hold that while reprisals against civilians entailing a threat to life 
and physical safety are prohibited in civil wars, they are allowed in international armed conﬂ icts 
as long as the civilians are in the combat zone.”). It must be recalled that the Trial Chamber held 
that international humanitarian law “is however an area where opinio iuris sive necessitatis may 
play a much greater role than usus” (ibid., para. 527). 
33 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 180, and ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Kordić and Čerkez, TC, Judgment, 14 February 2001, para. 328. In these cases the ICTY implicitly 
held that attack on the civilian population could have been justiﬁ ed by military necessity.
34 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić, TC, Judgment, 5 December 2003, paras. 41–62; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, AC, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 109; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, AC, Judg-
ment, 17 December 2004, para. 54 (NB: see corrdigendum of 26 January 2005); ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Strugar, TC, Judgment, 31 January 2005, para. 280; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Martić, TC, Judgment, 
12 June 2007, paras. 66–72. On the other hand, in the Draft Code of Crimes the ILC apparently 
excludes the possibility that military necessity could be considered a defence under international 
criminal law (Commentary on Article 14, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC 
(1996), vol. II(2), p. 41, para. 11).
35 For a very critical position towards the ICTY case law concerning belligerent reprisals, see 
F. Kalshoven, ‘Reprisals and the Protection of Civilians: Two Recent Decisions of the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal’, in L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man. Essays on International Law in 
Honour of Antonio Cassese (Th e Hague, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2003), pp. 481–510.
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precluding wrongfulness under state responsibility.36 Th is consequently excludes 
the possibility that reprisals against civilians could have an indirect impact on 
 international criminal law, that in other words individuals charged with war crimes 
could invoke such circumstances as a defence.
Yet the ICTY has not completely ruled out the lawfulness of other kinds of bel-
ligerent reprisals. Indeed, in Kupreškić it felt the need to spell out those fundamental 
requirements that should be met to regard belligerent reprisals as lawful: 
It should also be pointed out that at any rate, even when considered lawful, reprisals 
are restricted by; (a) the principle whereby they must be a last resort in attempts to 
impose compliance by the adversary with legal standards (which entails, amongst 
other things, that they may be exercised only after a prior warning has been given 
which has failed to bring about the discontinuance of the adversary’s crimes); (b) the 
obligation to take special precautions before implementing them (they may be taken 
only after a decision to this eﬀ ect has been made at the highest political or military 
level; in other words they may not be decided by local commanders); (c) the principle 
of proportionality (which entails not only that the reprisals must not be excessive 
compared to the precedent unlawful act of warfare, but also that they must stop as 
soon as that unlawful act has been discontinued) and; (d) ‘elementary considerations 
of humanity’ (as mentioned above).37
Th e main question thus concerns the precise identiﬁ cation of the types of bel-
ligerent reprisals which are not prohibited under international humanitarian law. 
Taking into account the general prohibitions set out in the above-mentioned case 
law, belligerent reprisals are arguably lawful and can be envisaged “in the choice 
of weapons and in the methods of combat used against military objectives”.38 Th is 
means, for example, that a state can validly claim to have used prohibited weapons 
as a reprisal against the enemy state which had previously breached international 
humanitarian law obligations. 
From the standpoint of the relationship between state and individual respon-
sibility, this leaves open the question of the possibility for an individual charged 
with certain war crimes to claim that his conduct amounted to a lawful belligerent 
reprisal. Can a state organ be convicted for a war crime with respect to a conduct that 
would be regarded as a lawful reprisal of the state under international humanitarian 
law? In other words, is the international norm on belligerent reprisal directed only 
at states, or it also applies to individuals? In the absence of international case law 
explicitly dealing with this subject, the question can only be addressed abstractly, 
36 It must be stressed that in Kordić and Čerkez (AC, Judgment, 17 December 2004, para. 54) the 
ICTY quotes the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons case (supra Chapter 1, note 44) to conclude that this 
‘intransgressible’ principle of customary international law consistently applies to all states and 
individuals (para. 78).
37 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 535.
38 ICRC Commentary to Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, para. 1985, <www.icrc.org>.
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according to the general approach one adopts with respect to the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility. 
Th e ﬁ rst option is to try to include lawful belligerent reprisals among the jus-
tiﬁ cations of international criminal law.39 However, such an approach might be 
problematic because, if one adopts a rigorous individual-oriented approach, the 
defendants would be permitted to invoke only those defences expressly provided 
for under international criminal law. To hold that belligerent reprisals amount to 
a defence under international criminal law, it must be demonstrated that a cus-
tomary rule with such a content exists at present. Th is is however a very hard task. 
International practice on the subject is very poor: the ILC in its commentary to 
the Draft Code of Crimes does not mention the problem; the statutes of interna-
tional criminal tribunals and courts are silent on the subject; the few post-WWII 
trials which have dealt with reprisals have largely lost their relevance;40 and among 
recent judgments only Kupreškić implicitly admits the existence of lawful belligerent 
reprisals under international law without giving any indication as to their precise 
content and deﬁ nition under international criminal law. 
Furthermore, reprisals are a typical form of state conduct and can hardly be 
conceived of in terms of strict individual conduct. Defences under international 
criminal law are exceptional circumstances justifying or excusing the personal 
conduct of the accused, while reprisals render lawful the entire state conduct. An 
individual claiming that his conduct is part of a lawful reprisal admits that his 
personal behaviour is unlawful under international criminal law but claims that 
the state conduct as a whole is lawful under the law of state responsibility. 
Th e second option is to consider that, once a circumstance precluding wrongful-
ness applies, the relevant conduct is deﬁ nitely lawful under international law, no 
matter whether state or individual responsibility is at stake. It may seem reasonable 
to apply consistently the rules of international humanitarian law on belligerent 
reprisals to both state and individual responsibility for war crimes. Th e diﬀ erence 
with the previous option is that there is no attempt to bring the (state) reprisal 
mechanism into the defences available under international criminal law. In other 
words, there is no need to operate at the level of secondary norms. Th is is due to 
the fact that the rule on (the lawfulness of ) belligerent reprisals can be understood 
as a corollary of the primary norms of international humanitarian law prohibiting 
certain means and methods of warfare. Accordingly, there is one relevant conduct 
to establish the lawfulness of a belligerent reprisal, and this is the global conduct of 
the state, not the personal behaviour of the accused. Th erefore, state and individual 
responsibility for war crimes can be ascertained consistently, because they originate 
39 A. Cassese, supra note 3, p. 221.
40 For a detailed analysis of this case law, see F. Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, supra note 29, pp. 
216–263.
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from the same conduct, which cannot be lawful and at the same time unlawful 
under international humanitarian law. 
If we accept the Kupreškić requirements, as some states apparently do,41 reprisals 
“may be taken only after a decision to this eﬀ ect has been made at the highest 
political or military level”. Reprisals concerning the means of warfare are a typical 
instance of state conduct not only because they are decided at the highest state 
levels, but also because they generally require the involvement of the state military 
organization in order to be carried out. Th is is the typical situation in which an 
international crime is carried out by a group of persons, and its perpetration is 
possible only because of the existence of a state apparatus in which the crime is 
planned, decided, organized, and ﬁ nally executed. Th ese crimes are regarded as 
heinous because they have at their disposal the entire state apparatus. It is the ‘sys-
tem’ that in a sense legalizes the commission of the international crime. A rigorous 
individual-oriented conceptual scheme focusing only on the personal conduct 
of the accused is clearly ill-equipped to deal with such situations. A diﬀ erent ap-
proach, allowing international tribunals to take into account the general context 
in which international crimes are carried out, proves more eﬀ ective in securing the 
punishment of the persons charged with international crimes.42 In particular, the 
lawfulness of a belligerent reprisal can only be established at the state level, that is, 
taking into account the general conduct of the state. 
Th us, this is a particular case in which individual criminal liability can be 
 established only once the relevant conduct (the state reprisal) is found to be law-
ful or not. As the ICTY did in Kupreškić,43 the relevant provisions of international 
humanitarian law are investigated and interpreted ﬁ rst as regards state responsibility 
and the question of individual liability is then solved accordingly. With respect to 
international humanitarian law rules addressing state conduct but having an impact 
on individual liability, international criminal tribunals cannot but try to guarantee 
a consistency between state and individual responsibility. Th ey should be able to 
take into account the fact that, for example, a military operation is lawful under 
international law, and that the accused cannot be held accountable for a legitimate 
conduct, or that a military action is an unlawful belligerent reprisal, and that this 
can be an aggravating factor for the commander who has abused his leadership 
position. Th is necessarily entails a very close connection between state and indi-
vidual responsibility for war crimes, because the rules on belligerent reprisals must 
be consistently applied under both regimes of international responsibility. 
41 See the UK reservation to the Additional Protocol supra note 30. For the drafting history of the 
Additional Protocol I and the willingness of some states to accept that recourse to reprisals should 
be decided by the Government, see R. Bierzanek, supra note 29.
42 See supra Charters 3 and 4.
43 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000.
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4. Concluding Observations
Th is chapter has examined the question of whether defences and circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness can be regarded as a point of contact between state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes. International case law on the 
subject is not abundant. A few cases show how problematic the co-ordination 
between these regimes can be.
In principle, it is possible to say that international case law conﬁ rms a rigorous 
approach in the application of the principle of personal liability. It appears that even 
similar defences and circumstances precluding wrongfulness can be interpreted in 
diﬀ erent ways under state and individual responsibility, when they apply to diﬀ erent 
conduct. In particular, circumstances precluding wrongfulness are hardly applicable 
under aggravated state responsibility, and the corresponding defences can receive an 
autonomous application under international criminal law. For  example, the same 
wrongful act does not necessarily entail both state and individual responsibility 
since in most cases the state organ would be able to invoke a defence that is not 
available to the state. Self-defence is the major exception to this conclusion, which 
undoubtedly applies under both state and individual responsibility. However, a 
distinction has been made also with respect to self-defence, which in principle has 
two diﬀ erent meanings under state and individual responsibility. Th us, to a cer-
tain extent aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability can be 
regarded as separate regimes when taking into account defences and circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness.
In practice, no generalization seems to be possible and there are at least two 
signiﬁ cant exceptions essentially due to the fact that both state and individual 
responsibility for certain international crimes are to be established with respect to 
the same conduct. First, self-defence marks a clear link between state and individual 
responsibility as far as the crime of aggression is concerned. Th e same notion of 
(state) self-defence is applicable under both state and individual responsibility. Th e 
crime of aggression rests on the assumption that the state conduct is the basis for 
holding political and military leaders accountable under international law. Th ere-
fore, if the state conduct is a lawful reaction in self-defence then no individual 
is accountable under international criminal law. Th is close link between the two 
regimes is due to the fact that the same international rule determines both state 
and individual responsibility.
Second, the lawfulness of certain belligerent reprisals under international 
 humanitarian law can arguably have a deep impact on the establishment of indi-
vidual liability for war crimes. While it is diﬃ  cult to include a typical circumstance 
precluding the wrongfulness of state conduct among the defences available under 
international criminal law, it seems nonetheless necessary to keep a certain consis-
tency in the application of the rules on belligerent reprisals under both state and 
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individual responsibility. Indeed, when a (state) conduct is to be regarded as lawful 
under international humanitarian law, it can hardly be used to aﬃ  rm the criminal 
liability of individuals. Where the same conduct is at stake, it seems reasonable to 
maintain that it should receive the same qualiﬁ cation in terms of both aggravated 
state responsibility and individual criminal liability. According to the same rationale, 
when an isolated conduct entail both ordinary state responsibility and individual 
criminal liability, it seems correct to apply defences and the corresponding circum-
stances precluding wrongfulness in a consistent manner.
As a ﬁ nal remark, it can be said that the analysis of defences and circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness shows, in line with previous chapters, the diﬃ  culty of rely-
ing on a pure either state-oriented or individual-oriented conceptual scheme to solve 
the problems raised by the relationship between state and individual  responsibility 
for international crimes. While a certain separation characterizes in principle these 
regimes, there are also close links due to the deﬁ nition of certain crimes under 
international law, and to factual circumstances which are relevant to establish both 
aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability. 
Chapter 6
Ascribing Responsibility for Collective Crimes: 
Modes of Liability
Th e previous chapters have discussed the elements of international crimes. In the 
following pages, the analysis continues to focus on the conduct capable of entailing 
a dual responsibility under international law, but from a diﬀ erent perspective. Th e 
relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes 
is examined from the standpoint of international criminal law. Because interna-
tional criminal tribunals generally focus on large-scale crimes, they have not only 
interpreted the elements of international crimes in a way which takes their collec-
tive dimension into account, they have also developed speciﬁ c modes of liability 
by which to ascribe individual criminal liability to the participants in collective 
criminality. Th is conﬁ rms the fact that the collective dimension of international 
crimes plays a crucial role in ascribing individual criminal liability.
Indeed, the analysis of international case law reveals a gradual shift from purely 
individual to collective responsibility. International criminal tribunals increasingly 
rely on speciﬁ c modes of liability allowing them to deal with vast scale crimes more 
eﬃ  ciently. Th is is because individual liability is attached to individual members of 
a criminal group according to their participation in a wider criminal enterprise. 
Th erefore, the emphasis shifts from the personal behaviour of the suspect to col-
lective criminality, or even state criminality. While it is not technically possible 
to speak of an overlap between state and individual responsibility as far as modes 
of liability are concerned, these particular modes represent an additional element 
pointing to a substantial overlap of the way in which conduct entailing a dual 
responsibility is ascertained at the international level. 
Th e analysis of these typical elements of international criminal law will start by 
considering the various ways in which individual criminal liability can in principle 
be linked to collective responsibility. It will then trace the evolution of international 
criminal law as far as modes of collective liability are concerned. Finally, it will 
discuss the connections that are entailed by this recent development in terms of the 
relationship between individual and state responsibility for international crimes.
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1. Linking Individual Liability to Collective Criminal Conduct
When international crimes are committed at the collective or state level, the main 
challenge is to secure prosecution in an eﬀ ective way. From the viewpoint of in-
ternational law – a body of law traditionally concentrating on state responsibility 
only, it might seem natural to focus ﬁ rst and foremost on collective responsibility 
and then try to derive individual responsibility from the prior establishment of the 
commission of a collective crime.
Abstractly speaking, there are at least three ways in which to link the establish-
ment of criminal liability of individual perpetrators to a previous ﬁ nding of collec-
tive responsibility. One of the easiest ways is to consider that, if a certain group is 
responsible for an international crime, then all the members of the group must be 
held criminally liable. In other words, mere membership in the criminal group is 
enough to automatically entail the criminal liability of each member of the group 
for the crimes committed by the group.1 Th is mechanism is undoubtedly unac-
ceptable from the perspective of individual liability, because it totally disregards the 
basic principles of international criminal law, according to which the material and 
psychological participation of each member of the group must be demonstrated. 
But it is also problematic from the viewpoint of state responsibility. If the group 
is a state, then a ﬁ nding of aggravated state responsibility would necessarily entail 
the criminal responsibility of all the members belonging to the state community. 
No similar consequence can be justiﬁ ed under international law. 
Second, it is possible to limit the eﬀ ect of a previous ﬁ nding on group respon-
sibility, and to say that it should only entail the criminal liability of a restricted 
number of members of the group, namely, only the leaders of the group. Since it 
can be regarded as not materially possible or not fair to punish all the members 
of group, one could focus only on those persons who have planned, decided, and 
organized the commission of the relevant collective crimes. In other words, only 
a few decision-makers can be held criminally liable on behalf of the entire group. 
Th us, it is the group as a whole to be indirectly sanctioned through the punish-
ment of its ‘major responsible’ members. Again, if the group is a state, this second 
option could be consistent with a state-oriented conceptual scheme, but ﬁ nds no 
support in international practice. Except for aggression, international crimes do 
not include in their deﬁ nition any such limitation with respect to the oﬀ enders 
that can be put on trial. And this option is clearly at odds with the basic principle 
1 Th is was arguably the aim of the American proposal which led to the inclusion of the crime of mem-
bership in the IMT Statute annexed to the London Charter. See S. Darcy, Collective Responsibility 
and Accountability under International Law (Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007), pp. 257–262. As 
will be discussed below, however, the IMT had been very careful in triggering such a mechanism 
(see infra in this Chapter).
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of individual guilt and the fundamental purpose of international criminal law, 
which is to ﬁ ght against impunity and bring to justice all those who have com-
mitted international crimes.
Th ird, the collective responsibility of the entire group can be said to entail only 
the criminal liability of those members who have actually participated in the col-
lective criminal conduct. In other words, a more limited connection between the 
collective nature of the crime and those who can bear criminal liability for it can be 
taken into account. According to this third option, if the entire group is declared 
criminal, the prosecution of individual members of the group can only rely on partial 
presumptions. Th us, while the actus reus can be presumed – or better yet, while 
membership in the criminal group should be regarded as the actus reus of the crime 
in question – the criminal court will nonetheless have to establish beyond doubt 
the mens rea of the member who participated in the collective criminal context. 
Th is third option may be acceptable from the standpoint of international criminal 
law, since the previous ﬁ nding on collective responsibility does not automatically 
give rise to individual liability, but it has the legal eﬀ ect of allowing criminal courts 
to establish individual liability more easily. 
International practice shows no such case of a direct link between the establish-
ment of aggravated state responsibility and individual liability for international 
crimes. Th e only precedent can be traced back to the IMT Statute, where individual 
liability is linked to a previous establishment of collective responsibility for inter-
national crimes. Accordingly, two questions arise. First, whether such a link (or a 
similar link) between collective and individual responsibility for international crimes 
can still be relied upon today. Second, how the collective dimension of international 
crimes can be a point of contact between state and individual responsibility. 
2. Th e Crime of Membership in a Criminal Organization
After WWII, the prosecution of those responsible for the widespread crimes com-
mitted during the war was faced with a major problem, namely that of bringing 
to justice an amazingly high number of perpetrators. Th erefore, it was necessary to 
ﬁ nd prompt ways to put the suspects on trial. Th e special mechanism elaborated 
in order to deal with collective international crimes was the crime of membership. 
According to Article 9 (1) of the IMT Statute: 
At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal 
may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) 
that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal 
organization.
Th en, Article 10 added that: 
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In cases were a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the com-
petent national authority of a Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to 
trial for membership therein before national, military, or occupation courts. In any 
such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved and 
shall not be questioned.
Th us, the IMT was competent to assign criminal status to German organizations 
that were responsible for the most serious international crimes committed dur-
ing WWII. Th en every member of such organizations would be subject to trial 
and punishment before the competent national courts. In particular, members 
of criminal organizations would be found guilty for mere participation in those 
organizations, not for having committed speciﬁ c international crimes. In other 
words, mere membership was regarded as criminal. Accordingly, Control Council 
Law No. 10 provided that acts recognized as crimes included “membership in cat-
egories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International 
Military Tribunal”.2
Th e crime of membership was elaborated by the US according to the common 
law notion of corporate liability, and with the aim to concentrate international 
eﬀ orts (that is, the IMT jurisdiction) on the prosecution of crimes committed by 
state leaders and criminal organizations, while leaving subordinates to domestic 
courts.3 Th us, the crime of membership was conceived of to facilitate the attribu-
tion of liability for collective crimes to the various members of the criminal groups. 
Since it was impossible for the IMT to prosecute all those responsible for crimes 
committed during WWII, this mechanism allowed national courts to deal with 
intermediate and minor players, and more generally with all the members of the 
organizations which would have been declared criminal by the IMT.
However, the crime of membership was problematic from the viewpoint of the 
principle of individual criminal liability. If applied literally, the mechanism pro-
vided under Articles 9 and 10 of the IMT Statute would have meant disregarding 
the basic principle according to which “no one may be held answerable for acts 
or omissions of organizations to which he belongs, unless he bears personal re-
sponsibility for a particular act, conduct or omission”.4 Indeed, the main problem 
with the crime of membership was that it indirectly provided for a mechanism of 
collective punishment. Th e risk of guilt by association was acknowledged by the 
IMT, and it explicitly rejected the possibility of mass punishments (as did domestic 
courts in subsequent trials).5
2 See Article II (1)(d) of Control Council Law N. 10.
3 See, in general, H. Meyrowitz, La répression des crimes contre l’humanité par les tribunaux allemands 
en application de la loi n.10 du Conseil de Contrôle Allié (Paris, LGDJ, 1960).
4 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 137.
5 IMT Judgment, supra Chapter 1, note 90, p. 251 (“criminal guilt is personal, and mass punish-
ment must be avoided”). Th e same position was clearly shared by domestic courts pronounc-
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In its judgment, the IMT was very careful in applying Article 9. First, it declared 
criminal only a few German organizations, namely, the Leadership Corps of the 
Nazi Party, the Gestapo, the SD, and the SS. Th ese organizations were established 
and used for purposes which were criminal under international law; membership 
in these organizations was voluntary; and their members were involved in the 
commission of the most serious crimes perpetrated by the Nazi regime during 
WWII. Second, the IMT made a careful evaluation of the legal consequences of 
such declarations as far as the individual criminal liability of their members was 
concerned. In particular, it held that:
A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence of 
both is co-operation for criminal purposes. Th ere must be a group bound together and 
organized for a common purpose. Th e group must be formed or used in connection 
with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter. Since the declaration with 
respect to the organizations and groups will, as has been pointed out, ﬁ x the criminal-
ity of its members, that deﬁ nition should exclude persons who had no knowledge of 
the criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted by the 
State for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the commission of 
acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as members of the organization. 
Membership alone is not enough to come within the scope of these declarations.6
In other words, the IMT tried to bring back this crime to the traditional concepts 
of criminal law. 
A member of an organization which the Tribunal has declared to be criminal may be 
subsequently convicted of the crime of membership and be punished for that crime 
by death. Th is is not to assume that international or military courts which will try 
these individuals will not exercise appropriate standards of justice.7 
To be sure, the main legal consequence of the declaration was to ﬁ x the criminal-
ity of its members, that is, to regard membership as the actus reus of the crime in 
question. However, the IMT required domestic courts to establish, in addition, 
that membership was voluntary and that the accused had knowledge that the group 
or organization was used for the commission of international crimes. In that way, 
the IMT required the mens rea of the member to be established. Of course, where 
members of the organization were found to have personally committed international 
crimes, this would be enough to entail their criminal liability independently of the 
fact that their membership in the criminal organization was voluntary.
ing in subsequent trials. See the Flick case, US Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Flick and Others, 
22 December 1947, 14 ILR (1947), p. 266 et seq., the Krupp case, US Nuremberg Military 
 Tribunal, Krupp and Others, 30 June 1948, 15 ILR (1948), p. 627 et seq., and the Farben case, 
supra Chapter 4, note 79.
6 IMT Judgment, supra Chapter 1, note 90, p. 251 (emphasis added).
7 Ibid., p. 250.
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As a result, the crime of membership was not considered to be a mechanism 
which automatically ascribed liability for the crimes committed by the group or 
organization to all its members, including those who had not participated in their 
execution. Th e IMT considered the crime of membership to be a separate interna-
tional oﬀ ence in which the actus reus is membership in a criminal organization or 
group, and the mens rea is knowledge of the criminal purpose of that organization 
or group. 
On the one hand, it was mere membership that was to be criminalized (inde-
pendently of the commission of international crimes), since it was considered that 
criminal groups or organizations had been the main instruments of the German 
state for the planning and execution of international crimes. On the other hand, 
this separate oﬀ ence did not call into question the principle of individual criminal 
liability, since the IMT deﬁ ned it according to the principle of personal guilt.8 
Th us, the crime of membership could be seen as a useful tool in the prosecution 
of international crimes committed by the state apparatus. In particular, it established 
a direct legal link between those state structures declared criminal by the IMT and 
the individual criminal responsibility of the members of such organizations.
3. Modes of Collective Liability under International Criminal Law
Yet modern international criminal law seems to have abandoned such a mechanism. 
Th e crime of membership was exceptionally included in the London Charter, and 
no similar tool has been inserted since that time in the statutes of international 
criminal tribunals. Moreover, such tribunals have no jurisdiction over collective 
entities, but only over natural persons. While various domestic legal systems pro-
vide for the criminalization of membership in groups or organizations established 
for the purpose of committing crimes, it seems impossible to assert the existence 
of a similar oﬀ ence under modern international criminal law9 in the absence of 
any explicit provision or of any relevant practice in that regard, apart from the 
Nuremberg precedent. However, international criminal tribunals have elaborated 
other tools to deal with crimes committed in a collective context. In particular, they 
increasingly rely on speciﬁ c modes of liability which can facilitate the appraisal of 
collective criminal phenomena and the establishment of the individual liability of 
the members of criminal groups.
8 Subsequent trials which applied the crime of membership respected the deﬁ nition and recom-
mendations made by the IMT. See, in particular, the Ministries case (supra Chapter 3, note 139), 
and the Einsatzgruppen case (US Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Ohlendorf et al., 10 April 1948, 
15 ILR (1948), pp. 656–668).
9 See S. Bouiﬀ ror and C. Derycke, ‘Les organisations criminelles’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit 
international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), pp. 167–179.
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Command responsibility, for example, was elaborated with the precise aim of 
facilitating the attribution of collective crimes committed in hierarchically organized 
contexts to those allegedly most responsible, i.e., commanders. Since the Yamashita 
case, command responsibility has signiﬁ cantly broadened its scope and today not 
only military commanders but also civilian superiors can be held accountable for 
not having prevented or punished the crimes committed by their subordinates. 
However, despite its very broad scope, command responsibility has been applied 
by international tribunals in a very rigorous manner and only in a very few cases 
has the Prosecutor successfully charged persons under this form of liability. Since 
direct responsibility is always to be preferred, in the end command responsibility 
has been conﬁ ned to a few cases of military-like situations, and has been success-
fully applied to low-ranking military commanders.10
Another form of liability has proved more successful in the prosecution of col-
lective crimes, and is increasingly relied upon by ad hoc tribunals: this is ‘aiding 
and abetting’. Indeed, this form of liability presupposes that the crime has been 
carried out by a group of persons, and, since it distinguishes between perpetrators 
and accomplices, it allows international tribunals to ascribe individual liability 
to those persons who have not directly committed international crimes, but who 
(knowingly) have substantially contributed to the commission of these crimes.
Th us, aiding and abetting is a form of liability which can be very useful to deal 
with collective crimes, which are characterized by the fact of being carried out by 
large amounts of organized perpetrators. Under such circumstances the oﬀ ence is 
generally so complex that it can only be perpetrated with the contribution of vari-
ous oﬀ enders, each of them performing a very specialized task which has nonethe-
less a substantial eﬀ ect on the achievement of the criminal purpose. Th us, it can 
be very diﬃ  cult to appraise all the criminal acts which, taken together, result in 
10 For a general overview of the ad hoc tribunals’ case law concerning command responsibility see B.I. 
Bonafè, ‘Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility’, 5 JICJ (2007), p. 599 et seq. For 
two recent cases, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Orić, TC, Judgment, 30 June 2006, and ICTY, Prosecu-
tor v. Strugar, TC, Judgment, 31 January 2005. In the former case, the accused was found guilty 
under the doctrine of command responsibility and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, but 
the AC reversed his conviction under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Orić, 
AC, Judgment, 3 July 2008). In the latter case, the AC upheld the accused’s conviction under 
Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, AC, Judgment, 17 July 2008). For 
a particular conception of superior responsibility, see N.L. Reid, ‘Bridging the Conceptual Chasm: 
Superior Responsibility as the Missing Link between State and Individual Responsibility under 
International Law’, 18 Leiden Journal of International Law (2005), p. 827. Th e author maintains 
that superior responsibility is a mode of liability capable of reconciling state and individual respon-
sibility for international crimes. Since both kinds of responsibility originate from the breach of 
the same duty to prevent or punish the commission of international crimes, the establishment of 
superior responsibility would lead to the parallel establishment of state responsibility. For further 
reﬂ ections on this issue, see infra Chapter 7, notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
174   Chapter 6
the commission of international crimes. Aiding and abetting is a form of liability 
which can help in identifying those oﬀ enders who are structurally remote from the 
commission of international crimes but who have otherwise played a substantial 
role in their perpetration, i.e., accomplices.
Aiding and abetting is now a well-established form of liability. Since its ﬁ rst 
case, the ICTY had the occasion to illustrate the two basic requirements that must 
be fulﬁ lled to hold the accomplice criminally liable.11 Th e actions of the accused 
must have a substantial and direct eﬀ ect on the commission of the international 
crime, and the accused must have the knowledge of the likely eﬀ ect of his or her 
actions.12 Subsequent case law has further clariﬁ ed that notion, and identiﬁ ed speciﬁ c 
situations in which it can be said that the accomplice knowingly gave “practical 
assistance, encouragement, or moral support” having a substantial eﬀ ect on the 
perpetration of collective crimes.13
11 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, paras. 663–692.
12 According to recent case law, “Th e actus reus of aiding and abetting is that the support, encourage-
ment or assistance of the aider and abettor has a substantial eﬀ ect upon the perpetration of the 
crime. Th ere is no requirement of a causal relationship between the conduct of the aider or abettor 
and the commission of the crime, or proof that such conduct was a condition precedent to the 
commission of the crime. An omission may, in the particular circumstances of the case, constitute 
the actus reus of aiding and abetting. Further, the assistance may occur before, during or after the 
principal crime has been perpetrated. While each case turns on its own facts, mere presence at the 
scene of a crime will not usually constitute aiding or abetting. However, where the presence bestows 
legitimacy on, or provides encouragement to, the actual perpetrator, that may be suﬃ  cient. In a 
particular case encouragement may be established by an evident sympathetic or approving attitude 
to the commission of the relevant act. For example, the presence of a superior may operate as an 
encouragement or support, in the relevant sense. Th e mens rea required is knowledge that, by his 
or her conduct, the aider and abettor is assisting or facilitating the commission of the oﬀ ence. Th is 
awareness need not have been explicitly expressed. It may, of course, be inferred from all relevant 
circumstances. Th e aider and abettor need not share the mens rea of the perpetrator, but he or she 
must be aware of the essential elements of the crime ultimately committed by the perpetrator, and 
must be aware of the perpetrators’ state of mind. Th is is not to say that the aider and abettor must 
be aware of the speciﬁ c crime that will be committed by the perpetrator. If the aider and abettor 
is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed by the perpetrator, and one 
of those crimes is in fact committed, than he has intended to assist or facilitate the commission of 
that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor.” (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., TC, Judgment, 
30 November 2005, paras. 517–518).
13 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998, paras. 190–257. For the relevant 
case law, see ICTY, Prosecutor v Delalić et al., TC, Judgment, 16 November 1998, paras. 327–329; 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, TC, Judgment, 25 June 1999, paras. 62–65; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac et al., TC, Judgment, 22 February 2001, paras. 391–393; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., 
TC, Judgment, 2 November 2001, paras. 253–263; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, TC, Judgment, 
15 March 2002, paras. 88–90; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, TC, Judgment, 29 November 2002, 
paras. 70–71; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, TC, Judgment, 31 March 2003, para. 
63; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, AC, Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 33; ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Simić et al., TC, Judgment, 17 October 2003, paras. 161–165; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, 
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Interestingly, due to the nature of collective crimes, aiding and abetting is in-
creasingly relied on to deal with crimes committed by superiors or leaders. Indeed, 
superiors and leaders generally do not physically participate in the commission of 
international crimes. Th ese are normally carried out by ‘executioners’, whose direct 
criminal responsibility can be established quite easily. It is much more diﬃ  cult to 
prove a direct involvement on the part of leaders. One can assume that leaders 
generally play a major role in conceiving and planning the commission of collec-
tive crimes. But this is very diﬃ  cult to demonstrate. Charges for having planned, 
ordered or instigated the commission of international crimes are rarely successful. 
Th us, aiding and abetting can be a form of liability which at least allows the tri-
bunal to convict leaders for the role they played in facilitating the commission of 
collective crimes. For example, the ICTY relied on aiding and abetting to convict 
two commanders of the Bosnian Serb Army. General Krstić, Commander of the 
Drina Corps, and Colonel Blagojević, Commander of the Bratunac Brigade, were 
both convicted for aiding and abetting genocide.14 Similarly, aiding and abetting 
was the form of liability which allowed the ICTR to convict as accomplices in the 
Rwandan genocide leading political ﬁ gures, such as the Minister of Finance of the 
Interim Government.15 Although aiding and abetting can facilitate the prosecution 
of international crimes, paradoxically it has the eﬀ ect of turning state leaders into 
simple accomplices.16 
From the standpoint of the present analysis, the most interesting form of liability 
is undoubtedly joint criminal enterprise. Th e possibility of relying on joint criminal 
AC, Judgment, 25 February 2004, para. 102; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, AC, Judgment, 19 April 
2004, paras. 135–144; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, AC, Judgment, 29 July 2004, paras. 43–52; 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, TC, Judgment, 1 September 2004, paras. 271–274; ICTY, Prosecu-
tor v. Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005, paras. 726–728; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Strugar, TC, Judgment, 31 January 2005, paras. 349–350. Th e ICTR has also relied on this form 
of liability. However, it has generally convicted persons who could be regarded, at the same time, 
as direct perpetrators and as accomplices. See ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, TC, Judgment, 2 Sep-
tember 1998, paras. 484, and 693; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, Judgment, 
21 May 1999, paras. 199–201, and 500; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, TC, Judgment, 27 January 
2000, paras. 125–126, and 944; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, TC, Judgment, 1 Decemebr 2003, 
paras. 757, and 765–769; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, TC, Judgment, 22 January 2004, paras. 
588, and 596–600; Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., TC, Judgment, 25 February 2004, paras. 763, 
and 802.
14 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, AC, Judgment, 19 April 2004, paras. 135–144; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005, paras. 723–728, and 770–787. 
15 See ICTR, Prosecutor v. Semanza, TC, Judgment, 15 May 2003, paras. 433–436. But see also 
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gerard Ntakirutimana, TC, Judgment, 21 February 2003, paras. 
787–790, and ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, TC, Judgment, 15 July 2004, paras. 455–457, 
464, and 485.
16 K. Gustafson, ‘Th e Requirement of an “Express Agreement” for Joint Criminal Enterprise’, 5 JICJ 
(2007), p. 152.
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enterprise was aﬃ  rmed for the ﬁ rst time by the ICTY in the Tadić case,17 and now 
this form of liability is routinely applied in the jurisprudence of both the ICTY 
and the ICTR. Th e ICC Statute also includes joint criminal enterprise among the 
forms of liability provided under Article 25.18
Th e reasons for the success of this form of liability are quite obvious. Interna-
tional crimes are generally carried out by groups of perpetrators, and joint criminal 
enterprise allows international tribunals to take this collective dimension into ac-
count.19 Th is was explicitly recognized by the ICTY in Tadić. Th e Appeals Cham-
ber acknowledged that, according to the Statute, all those who have committed 
international crimes, “whatever the manner in which they may have perpetrated, 
or participated in the perpetration of those violations, must be brought to justice”, 
and put the emphasis on the collective nature of international crimes in order 
to conclude that the Statute also embraces modes of collective liability, as joint 
criminal enterprise.20
17 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 185–229.
18 “In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: . . . (d) In any other way contributes 
to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the 
aim of furthering the criminal activity or purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the 
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime” (Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome 
Statute). Th ere are diverging opinions on the actual scope of this provision. For an interpreta-
tion consistent with the case law of the ad hoc tribunals concerning joint criminal enterprise, see 
A. Cassese, ‘Th e Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise’, 5 JICJ (2007), p. 132. For a narrower interpretation, see K. Ambos, ‘Joint Criminal 
Enterprise and Command Responsibility’, 5 JICJ (2007), p. 159.
19 See N. Piacente, ‘Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial 
Policy’, 2 JICJ (2004), pp. 446–454.
20 “[Th e Statute] does not exclude those modes of participating in the commission of crimes which 
occur where several persons having a common purpose embark on criminal activity that is then 
carried out either jointly or by some members of this plurality of persons. Whoever contributes 
to the commission of crimes by the group of persons or some members of the group, in execution 
of a common criminal purpose, may be held to be criminally liable, subject to certain conditions, 
which are speciﬁ ed below.  Th e above interpretation is not only dictated by the object and pur-
pose of the Statute but is also warranted by the very nature of many international crimes which are 
committed most commonly in wartime situations. Most of the time these crimes do not result from 
the criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the 
crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal 
design. Although only some members of the group may physically perpetrate the criminal act 
(murder, extermination, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, etc.), the participation 
and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in facilitating the commission of 
the oﬀ ence in question. It follows that the moral gravity of such participation is often no less – or 
indeed no diﬀ erent – from that of those actually carrying out the acts in question. Under these 
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Th us, joint criminal enterprise is aimed at making possible the conviction of 
the members of a criminal group. But this is not a way to ascribe criminal liability 
for mere membership in a criminal organization. Th is point has been made quite 
clear. Joint criminal enterprise does not resuscitate the Nuremberg crime of mem-
bership. Joint criminal enterprise is simply a form of liability, not a new oﬀ ence 
criminalizing participation in a criminal group or organization. To be convicted, 
the accused must have personally carried out international crimes, even if he or 
she has done so together with other perpetrators.21
Th e fact that joint criminal enterprise requires the oﬀ ence to have actually been 
carried out is useful to distinguish this notion from that of conspiracy. Th e latter 
was included in the IMT Statute, even though it only applied to crimes against 
peace. Indeed, in the case of conspiracy, mere agreement is suﬃ  cient to convict 
an accused who has not materially carried out the relevant crime, whereas “the li-
ability of a member of a joint criminal enterprise will depend on the commission 
of criminal acts in furtherance of that enterprise”.22
circumstances, to hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person who materially performs the 
criminal act would disregard the role as co-perpetrators of all those who in some way made it possible 
for the perpetrator physically to carry out that criminal act. At the same time, depending upon the 
circumstances, to hold the latter liable only as aiders and abettors might understate the degree of 
their criminal responsibility. Th is interpretation, based on the Statute and the inherent character-
istics of many crimes perpetrated in wartime, warrants the conclusion that international criminal 
responsibility embraces actions perpetrated by a collectivity of persons in furtherance of a common 
criminal design” (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 190–193, empha-
sis added). For a diﬀ erent view, advocating a more literal interpretation of the ICTY Statute, see 
J.D. Ohlin, ‘Th ree Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise’, 5 JICJ 
(2007), p. 69. 
21 Th e ICTY had the occasion to clarify that: “[j]oint criminal enterprise is diﬀ erent from membership 
of a criminal enterprise which was criminalized as a separate criminal oﬀ ence in Nuremberg and in 
subsequent trials held under Control Council Law No 10. As pointed out by the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission, what was to be punished in relation to the latter was ‘no mere conspiracy 
to commit crimes but a knowing and voluntary membership of organizations which did in fact 
commit crimes, and those on a wide scale’. No such oﬀ ence was included in the Tribunal’s Statute. 
Th e Secretary-General made it clear that only natural persons (as opposed to juridical entities) 
were liable under the Tribunal’s Statute, and that mere membership in a given criminal organiza-
tion would not be suﬃ  cient to establish individual criminal responsibility . . . Criminal liability 
pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise is not a liability for mere membership of for conspiring to 
commit crimes, but a form of liability concerned with the participation in the commission of a 
crime as part of a joint criminal enterprise, a diﬀ erent matter. Th e Prosecution in the present case 
made that point clear when it said that Ojdanić was being charged not for his membership in a 
joint criminal enterprise but for his part in carrying it out. Th e indictment talks of his ‘having 
signiﬁ cantly contributed’ to the execution of the joint criminal enterprise by ‘using the de jure and 
de facto powers available to him’.” (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., AC, Decision on Ojdanić’s 
Motion challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, paras. 25–26).
22 Ibid., para. 23.
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According to a now well-established case law, joint criminal enterprise is a form 
of liability requiring the members of the group to actually participate in the com-
mission of the crime. Th e objective elements (actus reus) of joint criminal enterprise 
are: 1) a plurality of persons; 2) the existence of a common plan, design or purpose 
which amounts to or involves the commission of an international crime; and 
3) participation of the accused in the common design involving the perpetration of 
an international crime.23 Th e ICTY identiﬁ ed three diﬀ erent types of joint criminal 
enterprise, and accordingly three diﬀ erent mens rea requirements.24
Th e ‘basic’ form of joint criminal enterprise includes cases where all co-perpetra-
tors, acting pursuant to a common purpose, possess the same criminal intention. 
Th is ﬁ rst category requires the intent to perpetrate a certain crime to be shared by 
all co-perpetrators. Th e ‘systemic’ form of joint criminal enterprise is a variant of 
the basic form characterized by the existence of an organized system of ill-treat-
ment, and concerns the so-called concentration camp cases. It requires the accused 
to have personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment as well as the intent to 
further this common concerted system. Th e ‘expanded’ form of joint criminal 
enterprise concerns cases involving a common purpose to commit an interna-
tional crime where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside 
the common purpose, is nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the 
carrying out of that common purpose. Th is third category requires the accused to 
have the intention to participate in the criminal purpose and to contribute to the 
joint criminal enterprise. In addition, the accused is liable for a crime not agreed 
upon in the common plan if the commission of this crime was foreseeable, and he 
or she willingly took that risk. 
As noted above, international tribunals now routinely rely on this form of liability. 
Despite some clariﬁ cation, they apply the deﬁ nition of joint criminal enterprise 
as set out in early case law. From the viewpoint of the present analysis, two sets of 
consequences deriving from reliance on joint criminal enterprise must be pointed 
out. First, the major legal consequence in terms of criminal responsibility is that 
all of the participants in a joint criminal enterprise “are equally guilty of the crime 
regardless of the part played by each in its commission”.25 Th erefore, it is at the 
sentencing stage that the speciﬁ c contribution of the accused will be evaluated.26 
Second, joint criminal enterprise is a form of liability speciﬁ cally aimed at address-
23 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 227.
24 Ibid., para. 228, and ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, AC, Judgment, 22 February 2004, paras. 
97–99.
25 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, TC, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 67. See also ICTY, Prosecu-
tor v. Brđanin and Talić, TC, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution 
Application to Amend, 26 June 2001, para. 26; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, TC, Judgment, 
15 March 2002, para. 82.
26 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, AC, Judgment, 25 February 2004, para. 110.
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ing international crimes committed at the collective level. Th is has the eﬀ ect of 
changing the perspective of the tribunal which has to establish individual liability 
for collective crimes.
As far as mens rea is concerned, relying on a form of liability like joint criminal 
enterprise necessarily implies a diﬀ erent approach in proving this element. Indeed, 
the tribunal has to investigate the intent shared by the co-perpetrators, and not 
that of an isolated oﬀ ender. Th is may considerably facilitate its task. Of course, 
joint criminal enterprise requires the psychological element to be demonstrated, 
and the fact of relying on this particular form of liability cannot alter the mens 
rea required by international crimes. Th us, for example, a participant in a joint 
criminal enterprise aimed at persecuting the civilian population must posses the 
requisite discriminatory intent.27
With respect to the establishment of the shared mens rea, there are also cases in 
which the organization among the members of the criminal enterprise is per se an 
indicium of the psychological attitude of the accused. For example, the ‘systemic’ 
form of joint criminal enterprise seems to render less diﬃ  cult the establishment of 
a shared mens rea. In Krnojelac, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that:
with regard to Krnojelac’s duties, the time over which he exercised those duties, his 
knowledge of the system in place, the crimes committed as part of that system and 
their discriminatory nature, a trier of fact should reasonably have inferred from the 
above ﬁ ndings that he was part of the system and thereby intended to further it. Th e same 
conclusion must be reached when determining whether the ﬁ ndings should have led 
a trier of fact reasonably to conclude that Krnojelac shared the discriminatory intent of 
the perpetrators of the crimes of imprisonment and inhumane acts.28
While proof of the shared intent is certainly easier than proof of the intent of an 
individual perpetrator, it must be admitted that this element is always diﬃ  cult to 
demonstrate. In particular, the shared intent is not easily demonstrated with re-
spect to speciﬁ c intent crimes. One can think of the Krstić and the Blagojević cases 
examined above.29 In similar cases, the Tribunal turned to another mode of liability 
typical of collective crimes which requires a lower mens rea, and has convicted the 
accused as aiders and abettors.
As far as actus reus is concerned, reliance on joint criminal enterprise means that 
the tribunal will not evaluate the personal conduct of one single oﬀ ender, but that 
27 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, TC, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 826. Th is aspect has raised consider-
able controversy, because the third category of joint criminal enterprise requires a lower standard 
of mens rea and hardly seems applicable to speciﬁ c intent crimes. For an attempt to reconcile this 
apparent inconsistency, see E. Van Sliedregt, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting 
Individuals for Genocide’, 5 JICJ (2007), p. 184. 
28 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, AC, Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 111 (emphasis added).
29 Th ese cases have been examined supra in Chapter 4. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, AC, 
Judgment, 24 February 2004, paras. 115–132.
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of a plurality of perpetrators. In this respect, the ad hoc tribunals have adopted a 
more liberal approach. In particular, they will focus on the ﬁ nal result of the col-
lective conduct of a group of oﬀ enders in achieving their common purpose, for 
example in persecuting the civilian population. Concretely, this means that the 
tribunal focuses on a collective criminal context. Th e personal conduct of the ac-
cused must ‘only’ evidence some form of participation in the commission of the 
relevant international crime. 
Th e fact that international criminal tribunals do not seem to be willing to exces-
sively broaden the scope of joint criminal enterprise with respect to the personal 
contribution of the accused does not exclude reliance on the doctrine of joint 
criminal enterprise in cases in which the accused played only a secondary role in 
the furtherance of the common criminal purpose. Th e ICTY required that par-
ticipation and contribution of individual members be “signiﬁ cant”.30 Th is does 
not mean, however, that the member of the joint criminal enterprise must have 
physically committed any part of the actus reus of the relevant crime, nor that his 
contribution must have had a substantial eﬀ ect on the commission of the crime, 
as in aiding and abetting.31 Th e level of participation in a joint criminal enterprise 
is “less than the level of participation necessary to graduate an aider or abettor 
to a co-perpetrator of that enterprise.”32 Arguably, the reason for this lower in-
volvement is twofold. Joint criminal enterprise is characterized by the common 
criminal purpose, and additionally requires the accused to share the intent with 
other participants, while an aider and abettor only needs to have knowledge of 
the principal’s intent.33 Th us, whether the participation of an individual accused 
person in a joint criminal enterprise can be regarded as signiﬁ cant is established 
on a case-by-case basis, according to the particular characteristics of the collective 
criminal phenomenon at issue.34
30 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, AC, Judgment, 3 April 2007, para. 430.
31 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, AC, Judgment, 24 February 2004, para. 102.
32 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., TC, Judgment, 2 November 2001, para. 287.
33 Ibid., para. 288.
34 Nonetheless, the Tribunal has indicated some factors which can be relevant in establishing the 
necessary level of participation in a joint criminal enterprise. Ibid., para. 311: “Th e level of partici-
pation attributed to the accused and whether that participation is deemed signiﬁ cant will depend 
on a variety of factors, including the size of the criminal enterprise, the functions performed, the 
position of the accused, the amount of time spent participating after acquiring knowledge of 
the criminality of the system, eﬀ orts made to prevent criminal activity or to impede the eﬃ  cient 
functioning of the system, the seriousness and scope of the crimes committed and the eﬃ  ciency, 
zealousness or gratuitous cruelty exhibited in performing the actor’s function”.
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4. Joint Criminal Enterprise and Mass Atrocities
One of the most controversial aspects concerning joint criminal enterprise is whether 
this doctrine can apply to very broad cases in which the Prosecution includes 
among the members of a criminal enterprise a large amount of persons, in particu-
lar, political or military leaders who have not physically committed any relevant 
crime, and who are structurally remote from those having materially perpetrated 
these crimes. 
It need hardly be recalled that joint criminal enterprise requires a common 
purpose among the participants, and that they participated in the commission of 
international crimes in furtherance of the common purpose. Excessively broaden-
ing its scope, it is maintained, creates a risk that joint criminal enterprise will be 
transformed into what is essentially guilt by association.35 In practice, however, 
international crimes are most of the time committed by large groups of perpetra-
tors and the criminal design is often elaborated at the level of political and military 
leaders. Joint criminal enterprise could be a very useful tool to ascribe liability to 
those oﬀ enders that have not materially committed any international crime, and 
more generally to deal with collective criminality.36
In Brđanin, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY considered that joint criminal enter-
prise was not the appropriate mode of liability to describe the individual criminal 
liability of the accused.37 Th e Prosecutor alleged that many individuals participated 
in a joint criminal enterprise with the purpose of forcibly removing the Bosnian 
Muslim and Bosnia Croat population from the territory of the planned Serbian 
state. Th ese included Momir Talić, other members of the ARK Crisis Staﬀ , the 
leadership of the SerBiH and the SDS, including Radovan Karadžić, Momcilo 
Krajišnik and Biljana Plavšić, members of the Assembly of the Autonomous Region 
of Krajina and the Assembly’s Executive Committee, the Serb Crisis Staﬀ s of the 
ARK municipalities, the army of the Republika Srpska, Bosnian Serb paramilitary 
forces and others. Since the accused did not physically commit any of the crimes 
charged in the indictment, the Prosecutor had to establish whether there had been 
an agreement (to commit the relevant crime) between the accused and the other 
persons listed above. However, the Tribunal did not examine the existence of a joint 
35 See S. Darcy, supra note 1, pp. 245–253, who expresses criticism over both joint criminal enterprise 
and command responsibility as modes of liability which “tend to raise the spectre of collective 
responsibility”, (p. 366); J.D. Ohlin, supra note 20, p. 88; H. Van Der Wilt, ‘Joint Criminal 
Enterprise: Possibilities and Limitations’, 5 JICJ (2007), p. 69; E. Van Sliedregt, supra note 27, 
p. 184.
36 A. Cassese, supra note 18, p. 109; K. Gustafson, supra note 16, p. 134; A.M. Danner and J.S. 
Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the 
Development of International Criminal Law’, 93 Calif. L. Rev. (2005), pp. 75–169.
37 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, TC, Judgment, 1 September 2004, paras. 343–355.
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criminal enterprise between the accused and Momir Talić, other members of the 
ARK Crisis Staﬀ , the leadership of the SerBiH and the SDS (including Radovan 
Karadžić, Momcilo Krajišnik and Biljana Plavšić), members of the ARK Assembly 
and the Assembly’s Executive Committee and the Serb Crisis Staﬀ s of the ARK 
municipalities, since the latter did not physically commit any of the relevant crimes. 
As far as the remaining alleged participants in the joint criminal enterprise, that 
is, the accused and “members of the army and Serb paramilitary forces (‘Relevant 
Physical Perpetrators’)”, the Tribunal found that no agreement between them had 
been established. In particular, 
given the physical and structural remoteness between the Accused and the Relevant 
Physical Perpetrators and the fact that the Relevant Physical Perpetrators in most 
cases have not even been personally identiﬁ ed, the Trial Chamber is not satisﬁ ed that 
the only reasonable conclusion that may be drawn from the Accused’s and the Rel-
evant Physical Perpetrators’ respective actions aimed towards the implementation of 
the Common Plan is that the Accused entered into an agreement with the Relevant 
Physical Perpetrators to commit a crime.38
Th us, since reliance on joint criminal enterprise requires proof of an agreement 
between the accused and the “relevant physical perpetrators”,39 the Trial Chamber 
held that this form of liability is not appropriate for cases of an “extraordinarily 
broad nature”;40 it is rather applicable to smaller criminal enterprises in which a 
closer connection between the accused and the perpetrators can be established.41 
Th e Prosecution appealed this part of the judgment, and the Appeals Chamber 
granted the appeal.42 Th e Appeals Chamber clariﬁ ed that an accused can be liable 
for his or her participation in a common criminal purpose where the actus reus is 
perpetrated by persons who do not share the common purpose, that is, persons 
outside the joint criminal enterprise.43 Th ere may be joint criminal enterprises in-
cluding only political or military leaders when they use persons outside the joint 
criminal enterprise to carry out the actus reus of an international crime.44 
38 Ibid., para. 354.
39 Ibid., para. 353.
40 Ibid., para. 355.
41 Ibid., note 890 reads: “ICTY cases have applied JCE to enterprises of a smaller scale, limited to a 
speciﬁ c military operation and only to members of the armed forces (Krstić Trial Judgment, para. 
610); a restricted geographical area (Simić Trial Judgment, paras 984–985); a small group of armed 
men acting jointly to commit a certain crime (Tadić Appeal Judgment, paras. 232 et seq.; Vasiljević 
Trial Judgment, para. 208); or, for the second category of JCE, to one detention camp (Krnojelac 
Trial Judgment, para. 84)”.
42 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, AC, Judgment, 3 April 2007, paras. 357–450.
43 Ibid., paras. 349, 404, and 414.
44 Ibid., paras. 410–413.
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In addition, the Appeals Chamber held that joint criminal enterprise does not 
require proof of an explicit agreement between the accused and the physical perpe-
trators to commit a particular crime.45 Th is form of liability requires the existence 
of a common purpose amounting to or involving the commission of an interna-
tional crime.46 Th us, the Appeals Chamber found that joint criminal enterprise 
can be applied to large-scale cases.47 Once the elements of joint criminal enterprise 
are properly deﬁ ned and are supported by the evidence, there is no risk that this 
doctrine might lapse into guilt by mere association.48 
Th is means that, in principle, joint criminal enterprise is capable of addressing 
large collective criminal phenomena, including international crimes committed 
by the entire state apparatus, in particular crimes elaborated at the highest level 
of the state hierarchy. In practice, the possibility to ascribe liability to state leaders 
under the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise will largely be a matter of evidence. 
As recognized by the Appeals Chamber, it would not be correct to invoke those 
practical diﬃ  culties to preclude the application of this doctrine to large-scale cases.49 
Th erefore, the crucial aspect concerns the exact deﬁ nition of the elements of joint 
criminal enterprise when applied to state leaders. If narrowly construed, the broad 
scope that this doctrine might have in theory can disappear in practice, as happens 
with command responsibility. 
In Brđanin, the Appeals Chamber was very careful in putting forward the ele-
ments of joint criminal enterprise when applied to large-scale cases, in particular 
when the physical perpetrators do not belong to the joint criminal enterprise. Th e 
Tribunal must be satisﬁ ed beyond reasonable doubt that there is a plurality of 
persons belonging to the criminal enterprise; that the common criminal purpose 
is suﬃ  ciently speciﬁ ed and is common to all the members of the joint criminal 
enterprise; that the accused made a signiﬁ cant contribution to the furtherance of 
the common purpose; that the accused has the intent to commit an international 
crime; and that the crime can be imputed to the accused because he or she used 
the physical perpetrators in accordance with the common plan.50 Th e Appeals 
Chamber concluded that, when all these requirements are met, the accused can 
45 Ibid., para. 419.
46 Ibid., para. 418.
47 For some precedent decisions of the ad hoc tribunals reaching the same conclusion, see ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, AC, Decision on interlocutory appeal regarding application of joint 
criminal enterprise to the crime of genocide, 22 October 2004, para. 25; ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Karemera and others, AC, Decision on jurisdictional appeals: Joint criminal enterprise, 12 April 
2006, para. 16; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, AC, Judgment, 22 March 2006, paras. 68–70; ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, TC, Judgment, 27 September 2006, para. 876. 
48 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, AC, Judgment, 3 April 2007, paras. 424–425.
49 Ibid., para. 424.
50 Ibid., paras. 430–431.
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appropriately be held liable under both the ﬁ rst and the third category of joint 
criminal enterprise.51
Th e content of this judgment is likely to raise some criticism, as the trial court’s 
judgment already did. However, from the standpoint of the present analysis, it is in-
teresting to note which elements of large-scale joint criminal enterprise among those 
listed above can bring individual criminal liability closer to state  responsibility. 
First, the common criminal purpose plays a crucial role. When the physical 
perpetrators are outside the joint criminal enterprise, “the key issue remains that 
of ascertaining whether the crime in question forms part of the common crimi-
nal purpose”.52 Th e common purpose is certainly the distinctive feature of this 
doctrine, and with respect to somewhat smaller enterprises the proof of the com-
mon criminal purpose may not be too problematic. For example, the ‘systemic’ 
form of joint criminal enterprise does not require proof of an agreement among 
the co-perpetrators.53 Arguably, this is due to the particular circumstances of this 
form of joint criminal enterprise. Th e so-called ‘concentration camp cases’ refer 
to structured, organized, even hierarchical forms of co-perpetration in which the 
agreement is expressed by the very system which has made the commission of the 
relevant collective crimes possible.54 However, with respect to large-scale cases, 
it can be very diﬃ  cult in practice to show that there is such a common purpose 
among state leaders, and that it is shared by all the members of the joint criminal 
enterprise. In addition, it is uncertain whether the ICTY would accept to rely on 
joint criminal enterprise in cases other than those in which common goals can 
only be achieved by collective action. 
In Simić, the Tribunal dealt in particular with the basic form of joint criminal 
enterprise and it stressed that: 
Th e common goal to commit these acts of persecution [arrest, detention, cruel and 
inhumane treatment, deportation, forcible transfer] could not have been achieved 
without the joint actions of the police, paramilitaries, the Tactical Group of the JNA and 
Crisis Staﬀ . No participant could have achieved the common goals on their own.55
Th is case was not particularly problematic because the accused (Simić) “was at 
the apex of the joint criminal enterprise at the municipal level”.56 However, it is 
unclear whether the Tribunal was simply discussing the speciﬁ c circumstances of 
51 Ibid., para. 431.
52 Ibid., para. 418.
53 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, AC, Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 97; ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Kvočka et al., AC, Judgment, 28 February 2005, para. 118. 
54 A. Cassese, supra note 18, p. 112.
55 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić et al., TC, Judgment, 17 October 2003, para. 991.
56 Ibid., para. 992.
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the case before it, or whether it was setting out a general requirement that could 
also be regarded as applicable to other cases. In other words, it remains to be seen 
whether in future cases joint criminal enterprise would be limited to common 
criminal goals which can only be achieved through collective action. 
What is certain is that the Tribunal focuses on the collective dimension of the 
criminal enterprise, not on each single contribution provided by the members of 
the joint criminal enterprise. When it had to deal with the claim of an accused who 
contended that his role was insigniﬁ cant because the joint criminal enterprise would 
have been successful even without his contribution, the ICTY simply rejected this 
“piecemeal approach”.57 When otherwise dealing with political leaders, the Tribunal 
has accorded a fundamental role to the general criminal context. In Krajišnik, more 
than 50 pages are dedicated to the description of the administration of Bosnian-
Serb Republic, and about 100 pages deal with the connection between the state 
machinery and the accused in order to establish his personal responsibility under 
the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise.58
Th us, as in the establishment of aggravated state responsibility, the focus is on 
collective action. When applied to state leaders, the common criminal purpose or 
plan can correspond to the state policy elaborated at the highest levels of the state 
hierarchy, and the facts which can lead to the establishment of the common criminal 
purpose are the same as those that can be relied upon to ascertain the seriousness of 
the wrongful state act, that is, aggravated state responsibility. Th erefore, the broad 
notion of joint criminal enterprise upheld in Brđanin shows that the greater the 
emphasis put on the common criminal purpose, the closer joint criminal enterprise 
comes to collective responsibility. As long as joint criminal enterprise is detached 
from the material commission of international crimes, a greater co-ordination with 
state responsibility is needed.
Second, large-scale joint criminal enterprises including only political or military 
leaders can be problematic because a link must be established between the accused 
and the physical perpetrators to say that the former participated in the common 
criminal purpose. Th e Appeals Chamber in Brđanin held that the crimes committed 
by the physical perpetrators can be imputed to the accused when he or she has used 
these persons to act in accordance with the common plan.59 Unfortunately, the 
judgment does not further clarify what “to use the principal perpetrators” means, 
nor does it elaborate on the criteria according to which the criminal conduct of the 
physical perpetrators is “imputable” to the accused. Th e Appeals Chamber simply 
stated that the link must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.60 
57 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., AC, Judgment, 28 February 2005, paras. 419–420.
58 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, TJ, Judgment, 27 September 2006, pp. 54–109, and 306–406.
59 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, AC, Judgment, 3 April 2007, paras. 413 and 430.
60 Ibid., para. 414.
186   Chapter 6
Similarly, the judgment in Krajišnik was not entirely satisfactory in setting out 
the legal requirements necessary to prove the link between the members of the joint 
criminal enterprise and the physical perpetrators. However, this case is interesting 
because it shows that crimes committed by mid or low-level perpetrators can be 
‘attributed’ to the leadership having the power and authority over political and 
military organs so that it can be said that they are responsible for, among other 
things, the “creation”, “support”, “direction”, and “control” of the state machinery 
which has conceived of and carried out a criminal policy.61 
Th us, the question is how the link between the joint criminal enterprise of 
political and military leaders and the physical perpetrator can be established. Th e 
mere reference to “imputation” or to criteria such as “direction” and “control” 
immediately recalls the rules of state responsibility on the attribution of wrong-
ful acts. Is it possible that the Tribunal implicitly referred to criteria such as those 
codiﬁ ed by the ILC in 2001? What seems indisputable is that attribution of the 
(large scale) criminal conduct of the physical perpetrators to a joint criminal en-
terprise composed of state leaders only comes very close to attribution of state 
organs’ conduct to the state. In both cases, there is a collective entity which acts 
through physical perpetrators and whose responsibility can only be established by 
‘imputing’ certain conduct to this collective entity. It is possible that the Tribunal 
will develop criteria of ‘attribution’ similar to those existing under the law of state 
responsibility. At any rate, while the criteria of such an imputation can be a matter 
of controversy, the underlying idea is very similar. When both state and state leaders 
responsibility is assessed with respect to the same international crimes, it would 
be very diﬃ  cult to maintain a rigorous separation between these two regimes. A 
certain degree of consistency must inevitably be guaranteed in the parallel estab-
lishment of state and individual responsibility for the same conduct. In the end, 
this particular form of joint criminal enterprise dramatically reduces the distance 
between aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability of state 
leaders for international crimes.  
5. Modes of Collective Liability and State Responsibility
Aggravated state responsibility arises out of serious international crimes. It is es-
tablished with respect to large scale atrocities and general criminal practices carried 
out by the state apparatus. If necessary, collective fault must be demonstrated to 
hold a state responsible for certain international crimes, like genocide. In sum, 
aggravated state responsibility deals with collective responsibility. 
61 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, TJ, Judgment, 27 September 2006, paras. 1120–1121.
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By contrast, international criminal law focuses on individual accountability. It 
attaches responsibility to individual perpetrators, even though international crimes 
are normally carried out by large and organized groups of perpetrators, if not by 
the state itself. Because it is very diﬃ  cult to conceive of international crimes in 
pure individual terms, international criminal law faces two main challenges: hold-
ing political and military leaders accountable, and properly taking the collective 
dimension of international crimes into account.62 Th e foregoing analysis shows 
that the constant concern of international criminal law has been the elaboration 
of particular tools allowing international criminal tribunals to address collective 
criminal phenomena. If international criminal tribunals cannot rely on a direct 
link between collective and individual responsibility, other tools, and in particular 
speciﬁ c modes of liability, can help to ascribe individual liability for international 
crimes. 
It must be recalled that criminal responsibility is in no way ascribed to groups 
as such. Today, international criminal law does not provide for any speciﬁ c of-
fence criminalizing mere participation in a criminal organization. Joint criminal 
enterprise is not the crime of membership. It does not establish a direct legal con-
nection between collective responsibility and individual liability, as the crime of 
membership did.63 International criminal tribunals have been rigorous in convicting 
the perpetrators of collective crimes in a manner which is respectful of the basic 
principle of personal liability.64 
Th erefore, one of the major problems with international crimes is that these are 
prohibited under international rules directed at either states or individuals, when in 
practice international crimes are most often committed by groups of perpetrators. 
International law does not address these crimes in terms of collective responsibility of 
criminal groups,65 but in terms of either state or individual responsibility. According 
to one commentator, international crimes committed by groups “are unlikely to be 
prevented nor will compliance with the relevant provisions of international law be 
signiﬁ cantly improved through punishment of one single individual”.66 Th is can 
62 H. Van Der Wilt, supra note 35, pp. 91–92; K. Gustafson, supra note 16, pp. 135–136; E. Van 
Sliedregt, supra note 27, pp. 185–187.
63 However, there are international law scholars which would welcome the criminalization of mere 
participation in an organization whose purpose is to commit international crimes. See A. Viviani, 
Crimini internazionali e responsabilità dei leader politici e militari (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 2005), pp. 
194 and 202.
64 A. Cassese, supra note 18, p. 109.
65 See L. Zegveld, Th e Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 55–58, and 223. According to this author, there is a major 
obstacle in holding armed opposition groups accountable for international humanitarian law 
violations. Th is is regarded as “incompatible with the fundamental right of the state to preserve 
its existence and to remain the only authority” (ibid., p. 163).
66 Ibid., p. 133.
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help to explain the increasing focus on the collective dimension of international 
crimes, and the need for international criminal law to provide for speciﬁ c mech-
anisms allowing international (and domestic) criminal tribunals to deal with such 
crimes. In other words, international case law tries to ﬁ nd acceptable ways to bridge 
the gap between the individual and the state by taking into account intermediate 
social structures which have no clear status under international law but which 
are most often responsible for the commission of international crimes. From this 
standpoint, this approach can lead to the establishment of a certain relationship 
between state and individual responsibility.
It results from the present analysis that the increasing attention given to group 
criminality has been possible thanks to two main elements. First, the deﬁ nition of 
certain international crimes requires these crimes to be carried out at the collective 
level. As noted above, international tribunals have accepted that a single prohibited 
type of conduct can amount to, for example, a crime against humanity if it is part 
of the general criminal context, or that the genocidal intent can be inferred from 
the general criminal context. Accordingly, the elements of certain international 
crimes have been interpreted in a way that has allowed international tribunals to 
establish the collective criminal context ﬁ rst, and then to evaluate whether the 
individual conduct was part of it. If so, it is possible to hold the accused (or rather 
the member of the criminal group) accountable for participating in the relevant 
collective crimes.
Second, international criminal law has increasingly focused on modes of liabil-
ity making it possible to address collective crimes more eﬃ  ciently. Th is seems to 
be one of the most important developments that international criminal law has 
recently undergone. Reliance on modes of liability such as command responsibil-
ity and joint criminal enterprise is essential to ascribe liability for international 
crimes which otherwise would have been diﬃ  cult to conceive of as the mere sum 
of isolated instances of criminal conduct. In particular, joint criminal enterprise 
radically changes the way in which individual liability for collective crimes is estab-
lished: the actus reus is the global criminal conduct carried out by the participants 
in the furtherance of a common criminal design, and the mens rea is the shared 
intent of the members of the criminal group.67 Th is arguably brings individual 
liability closer to aggravated state responsibility. Indeed, the collective dimension 
of international crimes assumes a primary role in the establishment of individual 
criminal responsibility.
67 E. Van Sliedregt, Th e Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law (Th e Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2003), p. 353, refers to joint criminal enterprise as the 
‘modern version’ of the Nuremberg crime of membership.
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While certain modes of liability, like command responsibility,68 are only capable 
of addressing smaller groups criminality,69 and of ascribing liability to low-ranking 
oﬃ  cials, other modes of liability are capable, at least in principle, of addressing 
larger groups or state criminality. In particular, joint criminal enterprise can be used 
to ascribe criminal liability to political or military state leaders for international 
crimes. It is not possible to say whether this form of liability will be successfully 
applied to future large-scale cases. For example, the elements of this particular 
joint criminal enterprise could be construed very narrowly. In any way, this is a 
very signiﬁ cant development of international criminal law, which would have at 
its disposal not only tools to take the collective dimension of international crimes 
into account, but also a speciﬁ c mode of liability to deal with crimes orchestrated 
by political and military leaders.70 
Th e developments examined above witness a clear shift in focus from strictly 
personal to collective criminal conduct. In particular, the modes of collective li-
ability lead to a certain relationship between state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes. Th ey do not entail a direct legal connection between these 
regimes, but they show the growing need to develop tools capable of taking into 
account the collective dimension of international crimes, and overcome the limits 
of a rigorous individually-focused methodology. In particular, reliance on modes 
of collective liability (such as joint criminal enterprise) has the eﬀ ect of establishing 
individual criminal liability in a way which is increasingly similar to the assessment 
of aggravated state responsibility for the same internationally prohibited conduct. 
68 B.I. Bonafè, supra note 10, p. 599.
69 According to G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law 
in the Darfur Case’, 3 JICJ (2005), p. 547, “International criminal law has oriented itself toward 
these discrete smaller groups precisely because the larger groups – nations and states – cannot be 
the appropriate object of criminal responsibility”.
70 As this book was going to press, the Prosecutor of the ICC requested an arrest warrant against the 
president of Sudan, Omar Hassan Al Bashir, on the ground that he committed genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. Th e interest of this case lies in the fact that the Prosecutor relies 
on a particular mode of liability (perpetration by means) and alleges that Al Bashir committed crimes 
‘through’ members of the state apparatus, the army and the Militia/Janjaweed. Th e criteria according 
to which the crimes can be attributed to Al Bashir are described by the Prosecutor as follows: “Al 
Bashir controls and directs the perpetrators. Th e commission of those crimes on such a scale, and for 
such a long period of time, the targeting of civilians and in particular the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, 
the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators, and the systematic cover-up of the crimes through public 
oﬃ  cial statements, are evidence of a plan based on the mobilization of the state apparatus, including 
the armed forces, the intelligence services, the diplomatic and public information bureaucracies, and 
the justice system.” (ICC Oﬃ  ce of the Prosecutor, ‘Summary of the case: Prosecutor’s Application 
for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58 Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’, 14 July 2008, 
p. 7, emphasis added, <www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-Summary-20081704–ENG
.pdf>). What is worth stressing here is the striking similarity of such criteria with those provided 
for under the law of state responsibility as far as state agency determination is concerned.
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When coupled with the possibility of taking judicial notice that certain international 
crimes have been perpetrated at the collective level and are part of ‘world history’,71 
then individual criminal liability turns into an establishment of mere participation 
in a collective international crime whose commission has been assessed once and 
for all. As a consequence, this particular methodology in the judicial establish-
ment of individual criminal liability inevitably resembles that used to ascertain 
aggravated state responsibility. Th e same context of collective criminality is at 
the basis of both kinds of international accountability because it is crucial in the 
proof of the various elements of international crimes and of the modes of liability. 
Th e assessment of the collective commission of international crimes becomes the 
unavoidable factual ﬁ nding to establish both state and individual responsibility. 
Once this basic assessment of the prohibited material conduct is carried out, what 
these regimes additionally require is the application of speciﬁ c rules on attribution 
to an individual or to a state.  
6. Concluding Observations
Th is chapter has examined the way in which speciﬁ c modes of liability could entail 
a relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. 
International case law shows interesting developments on this subject. While a direct 
legal connection between collective and individual responsibility had exceptionally 
been provided for under the IMT Statute, today no similar tool exists. International 
criminal tribunals have therefore relied on the modes of liability at their disposal 
to appraise the collective nature of international crimes.
As for command responsibility, reliance on joint criminal enterprise has been 
both strongly criticized and enthusiastically welcomed.72 Th e reaction could hardly 
have been diﬀ erent. Th ese modes of collective liability represent a challenge, from 
the standpoint of international criminal law. Th ey try to apply to collective phe-
nomena a set of legal standards conceived and developed for individual conduct. 
However, it is generally recognized that, when applied in a very careful manner, 
these modes of liability represent an indispensable tool for international criminal 
tribunals to address collective criminality. In a sense, they try to bridge the gap 
between individual and state responsibility. 
Th e relationship between state and individual responsibility entailed by these 
modes of liability is partially diﬀ erent from the other points of contact illustrated 
in previous chapters. Modes of collective liability bring the establishment of indi-
71 See supra Chapter 3, note 127, and accompanying text.
72 See in particular the contributions to the symposia on command responsibility and joint criminal 
enterprise published in 5 JICJ (2007).
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vidual criminal liability closer to the establishment of aggravated state responsibility. 
More generally, these modes of liability are another sign of the radical change of 
perspective that characterizes the recent evolution of international criminal law. 
International criminal tribunals no longer focus on individual behaviour, but they 
establish that international crimes have been committed at the collective level and 
that the required psychological attitude was shared by all the participants to the 
joint criminal enterprise. Th is results in an establishment of individual responsibility 
which is much closer to that of state responsibility for international crimes. 
Accordingly, the way in which the commission of collective and state crimes is car-
ried out becomes very similar. In particular, joint criminal enterprise can be applied 
to hold state leaders accountable for international crimes. It is uncertain whether 
this particular form of joint criminal enterprise would share some standards with 
state responsibility, but it shows an additional point of contact between state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes. As these two kinds of international 
responsibility become closer, because they focus on the same conduct, there is an 
increasing need to guarantee a certain consistency in the way each evolves. 

Chapter 7
Establishing State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes
In principle, one of the clearest signs of the separation between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes is that there are diﬀ erent and independent 
bodies charged with enforcing obligations of states and obligations of individuals 
under international law. Individual liability is established by international (and 
domestic) criminal tribunals. State responsibility is dealt with by competent politi-
cal bodies, internationals courts, or is simply left to the more traditional means of 
peaceful settlement of international disputes.
For example, with respect to the genocide that took place in the former Yugoslavia, 
it seems natural to say that international law ascribes responsibility in diﬀ erent ways 
with respect to individuals, on the one hand, and states on the other. Th us, the task 
of the ICTY is to establish whether certain individuals have actually committed 
genocide, whereas the task of the ICJ is to ascertain issues of state responsibility.
In Krstić, the ICTY judgment started making clear that, while dealing with 
notorious crimes committed during the conﬂ ict in the former Yugoslavia, it would 
not address the question of collective responsibility, because its task was to establish 
individual criminal liability only.1 On the other hand, the ICJ has been asked to 
settle the dispute between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and to ascertain 
whether the latter was responsible for the genocide that occurred in the former 
Yugoslavia.2 And Bosnia has from the very beginning made it clear that it was 
looking for neither revenge nor collective guilt.3
1 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 2. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Delalić et al., TC, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 230, in which the Tribunal explicitly says 
that it “is a criminal judicial body, established to prosecute and punish individuals for violations 
of international humanitarian law, and not to determine State responsibility for acts of aggression 
and unlawful intervention.”
2 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1.
3 “Cette aﬀ aire ne blâme pas tous les Serbes pour les actes de génocide. Nous ne visons pas les citoyens de 
Sérbie-Monténégro ou les citoyens de la République des Serbes de Bosnie, qui ont été induits en erreur 
par leurs chefs. Nous cherchons à établir la responsabilité d’un Etat” (S. Maupas, ‘Ouverture du procès 
pour ‘génocide’ de la Bosnie contre la Serbie’, Le Monde, 28 February 2006).
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Yet one may have doubts about such an absolute separation between state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes as far as enforcement mechanisms 
are concerned. Indeed, there are cases in which the establishment of state and 
individual responsibility is somehow connected. In particular, the present chapter 
will investigate two of them. First, in establishing individual liability for certain 
international crimes, international criminal tribunals might have to apply rules 
belonging to the law of state responsibility. Second, there might be instances in 
which state and individual responsibility for international crimes are not established 
in perfect isolation from each other because either the same body deals with situ-
ations entailing both kinds of international responsibility or certain international 
crimes require a parallel determination of state and individual responsibility. Th ese 
are cases that can unveil a closer relationship between state and individual respon-
sibility than one might have expected.
1. Issues of State Responsibility before International Criminal Tribunals
Th e best example of the ﬁ rst class of issues is the criterion respectively used in 
international criminal law and in the law of state responsibility to attribute the 
conduct of de facto state organs to the state.4 Th e starting point of this analysis 
is a consideration of the diverging decisions of the ICJ in Nicaragua and of the 
ICTY in Tadić. Th ese cases have been the object of considerable debate among 
international law scholars.5 Th ey have also been viewed as an element of increasing 
fragmentation of the international legal order, attracting the attention and concern 
of the ILC.6 However, from the standpoint of the present analysis, this kind of case 
merits close examination for a diﬀ erent reason: it shows a clear point of contact in 
the establishment of state and individual responsibility for international crimes. 
In Tadić, the ICTY was confronted with the question of whether certain war 
crimes had been committed in international or internal armed conﬂ icts by organ-
4 Th e precise identiﬁ cation of the customary rules on state agency is a very complicated question, 
which the codiﬁ cation of State responsibility seems to leave at least partially unsettled. See, in general, 
P. Palchetti, L’organo di fatto dello Stato nell’illecito internazionale (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 2007).
5 See, in particular, C. Kress, ‘L’organe de facto en droit international public. Réﬂ exions sur l’im-
putation à l’Etat de l’acte d’un particulier à la lumière des développements récents’, 105 RGDIP 
(2001), pp. 93–144; F. Dopagne, ‘La responsabilité de l’Etat du fait des particuliers: les causes 
d’imputation revisitées par les Articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement 
illicite’, 34 RBDI (2001), pp. 492–525. For a critical view on the 1997 Trial Chamber decision, see 
M.P. Scharf, ‘Trial and Error: An Assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes 
Tribunal’, 30 NYU J. Int’l L. Pol. (1998), pp. 167–200.
6 Th e work of the ILC on the topic is summarized in its last ‘Report of the Study Group on Frag-
mentation of International Law, ﬁ nalized by M. Koskenniemi’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, of 
13 April 2006, <untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/gfra.htm>.
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ized military groups.7 Th e Tribunal had to establish individual criminal liability, 
but to do so it considered that it was necessary to apply the relevant rules of the 
law of state responsibility. 
As is well known, the conﬂ ict took place in the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina between the Bosnian governmental armed forces and the Bosnian Serb 
forces.8 Th e Bosnian Serb forces were supported by the JNA (the armed forces of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Th e alleged crimes were perpetrated by the 
accused as a member of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. Th us, according to the Trial 
Chamber, it had to decide whether the Bosnian Serb forces were de facto agents 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or not,9 so as to determine whether to apply 
the rules concerning international armed conﬂ icts or rather the rules concerning 
internal armed conﬂ icts. In the former case, the accused could be found liable for 
the violation of the more advanced and precise international rules referred to in 
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute; otherwise, the accused could be found guilty under 
Article 3 of the more limited and generic prohibitions relating to internal armed 
conﬂ icts.10
Th e Tribunal found that, prior to 19 May 1992, the JNA had control over a 
substantial portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina,11 and that it had played a signiﬁ -
cant role in training and equipping the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces.12 Before 
that date, Bosnian Serb forces co-operated with and acted under the command of 
and within the framework of the JNA. Th us, crimes perpetrated before May 1992 
could be considered acts of de facto agents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
that is, as crimes committed in an international armed conﬂ ict.
But on 15 May 1992, the SC demanded that all interference from outside Bosnia 
and Herzegovina by units of the JNA cease immediately.13 It further demanded that 
those units either be withdrawn, or be placed under the authority of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed.14 
Consequently, the VRS (Bosnian Serb forces of the Republika Srpska) was created 
 7 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, and AC, Judgment, 15 July 1999.
 8 Th e Bosnian Serb forces controlled territory under the banner of the Republika Srpska and revolted 
against the de jure Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 9 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 584: “acts of the armed forces of the 
Republika Srpska, although nationals of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after 19 May 
1992 in relation to opstina Prijedor may be imputed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) if those forces were acting as de facto organs or agents of that State”.
10 See Articles 2 and 3 of the ICTY Statute (SC Res, 827(1993)), and the explanations given by the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadić, 2 October 1995, paras. 79–95, as regards 
their diﬀ erent application.
11 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 113.
12 Ibid., para. 593.
13 SC Resolution 752(1992), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
14 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 582.
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in May 1992, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia transferred units, materials, 
and soldiers to the VRS force. 
Even though there remained the same weapons, the same equipment, the same 
oﬃ  cers, the same commanders, largely the same troops, the same logistics centres, 
the same suppliers, the same infrastructure, the same source of payments, the same 
goals and mission, the same tactics, and the same operations,15 the Trial Chamber 
found that “after 19 May 1992 the armed forces of the Republika Srpska could 
not be considered as de facto organs or agents of the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia”.16 Th erefore, the Trial Chamber concluded that the armed 
forces of the Republika Srpska were nothing more than mere allies, “albeit highly 
dependent allies, of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) in its plan to achieve a Greater Serbia from out of the remains 
of the former Yugoslavia.”17
Indeed, the Court chose to apply the ‘eﬀ ective control’ test established by the ICJ 
in the Nicaragua case,18 according to which a general relationship of dependence 
and control is not enough to entail state responsibility. Confronted with this very 
high threshold, the Prosecution failed to show that Serbia and Montenegro exer-
cised the required control over the VRS.19 Consequently, the Court decided that, 
after 19 May 1992, the VRS could not be regarded as de facto organs or agents of 
Serbia and Montenegro.20 Since the theory of an ‘international conﬂ ict’ was not 
15 Ibid., Judge McDonald Dissenting Opinion, para. 7.
16 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 607.
17 Ibid., para. 606. See also para. 605: “there is no evidence on which this Trial Chamber can conclude 
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the VJ ever direct or, for 
that matter, ever felt the need to attempt to direct, the actual military operations of the VRS, or to 
inﬂ uence those operations beyond that which would have ﬂ owed naturally from the coordination 
of military objectives and activities by the VRS and VJ at the highest levels.”
18 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
USA), supra Chapter 1, note 44, para. 115: “United States participation, even if preponderant or 
decisive, in the ﬁ nancing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selec-
tion of its military  or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still 
insuﬃ  cient in itself, on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of 
attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or 
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. All the forms of United States participation mentioned above, 
and even the general control by the respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency 
on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed 
or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged 
by the applicant State. Such acts could well be committed by members of the contras without the 
control of the United States. For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it 
would in principle have to be proved that that State had eﬀ ective control of the military or paramilitary 
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed” (emphasis added).
19 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 588.
20 Ibid., para. 587.
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accepted by the majority of the Trial Chamber (with Judge McDonald dissenting), 
the accused was found responsible for war crimes perpetrated in the context of an 
internal armed conﬂ ict under Article 3 of the Statute.
In her dissenting opinion, Judge McDonald essentially maintained that the 
‘eﬀ ective control’ test is not the appropriate standard for agency determination in 
the Tadić case.21 On the one hand, she advanced a particular interpretation of the 
Nicaragua judgment22 which the ICJ seems to have subsequently upheld.23 More 
interestingly from the viewpoint of the present analysis, Judge McDonald focused 
on the diﬀ erences between state responsibility and individual liability.24 First of 
all, while state responsibility fundamentally entails the right of the injured state to 
monetary damages, in cases of individual criminal liability, reparations are not at 
issue.25 Second, the general context of the Tadić case is completely diﬀ erent from 
the situation which gave rise to the Nicaragua-USA dispute.26 Finally, her dissent-
ing opinion emphasizes the diﬀ erences between the general principles underlying 
international humanitarian law and those underlying state responsibility.27 In short, 
her argument seems to imply that reliance on a diﬀ erent criterion of attribution of 
de facto organs’ conduct to the state was justiﬁ ed in Tadić because of the diﬀ erent 
nature of individual criminal liability.28
21 Th e ﬁ rst alternative argument, however, was that “if eﬀ ective control is the degree of proof required 
to establish agency under Nicaragua, I conclude that this standard has been met” (ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Tadić, 7 May 1997, Judge McDonald Dissenting Opinion, para. 15).
22 Indeed, she stated that, according to the Nicaragua judgment, “it appears that there are two 
bases on which the acts of the VRS could be attributed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro): where the VRS acted as an agent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 (Serbia and Montenegro), which could be established by a ﬁ nding of dependency on the one side 
and control on the other; or where the VRS was speciﬁ cally charged by the Federal Republic of 
 Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to carry out a particular act on behalf of the Federal Republic 
of  Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) thereby making the act itself attributable to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In Nicaragua, the Court required a showing of 
eﬀ ective control for this latter determination” (ibid., para. 25).
23 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, paras. 385–412, where the Court applies two 
diﬀ erent standards to establish either 1) whether the VRS can be equated with Serbian state organs 
or 2) whether the VRS could have acted under the direction or control of Serbia.
24 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, 7 May 1997, Judge McDonald Dissenting Opinion, para. 27: “Th is is 
recognized even by the majority, which notes that Nicaragua was concerned ultimately with the 
responsibility of a State for a breach, inter alia, of rules of international humanitarian law, while 
the instant case is concerned ultimately with the responsibility of an individual for the breach of 
such rules”.
25 Ibid., para. 28.
26 Ibid., para. 29.
27 Ibid., para. 33.
28 See T. Meron, ‘Classiﬁ cation of Armed Conﬂ ict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout’, 92 
AJIL (1998), pp. 236–242.
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Th e Trial Chamber’s judgment was appealed, and the Tribunal discussed both 
the question of the relationship between state and individual responsibility, and the 
problem of the right test to apply. As to the ﬁ rst issue, the Appeals Chamber stated 
that the question did not concern the distinction between state and individual 
responsibility. Rather, the point was merely the application of the rules concerning 
attribution provided for under the law of state responsibility.29 More generally, the 
Chamber held that: “international humanitarian law does not include legal criteria 
regarding imputability speciﬁ c to this body of law. Reliance must therefore be had 
upon the criteria established by general rules on State responsibility.”30 As to the 
right test to apply in state agency determination, the Tribunal held that, in the 
Tadić case, the Nicaragua test of the ‘eﬀ ective control’ was not applicable. 
Th e Appeals Chamber started by analysing the rationale of international rules 
on state agency,31 and accordingly distinguished various situations with diﬀ erent 
degrees of control required. First, in cases of private individuals acting on behalf 
of the state, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the state issued speciﬁ c 
instructions concerning the commission of the illegal act.32 Second, in cases where 
individuals make up an “organized and hierarchically structured group,” agency 
determination requires that the group as a whole be under the overall control of 
the state in order to attribute the conduct of the group to the state.33 Th e rationale 
behind such a ﬁ nding is that otherwise “States might easily shelter behind, or use 
29 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 104: “what is at issue is not the 
distinction between the two classes of responsibility. What is at issue is a preliminary question: 
that of the conditions on which under international law an individual may be held to act as a de 
facto organ of a State. Logically these conditions must be the same both in the case: (i) where 
the court’s task is to ascertain whether an act performed by an individual may be attributed to a 
State, thereby generating the international responsibility of that State; and (ii) where the court 
must instead determine whether individuals are acting as de facto State oﬃ  cials, thereby render-
ing the conﬂ ict international and thus setting the necessary precondition for the ‘grave breaches’ 
regime to apply. In both cases, what is at issue is not the distinction between State responsibility 
and individual criminal responsibility. Rather, the question is that of establishing the criteria for 
the legal imputability to a State of acts performed by individuals not having the status of State 
oﬃ  cials.”
30 Ibid., para. 105.
31 “[T]he requirement of international law for the attribution to State of acts performed by private 
individuals is that the State exercises control over the individuals. Th e degree of control may, how-
ever, vary according to the factual circumstances of each case” (ibid., para. 117). Indeed, the Court 
explained that “the rationale behind this rule [article 8 of the Draft on State Responsibility] is to 
prevent States from escaping international responsibility by having private individuals carry out 
tasks that may not or should not be performed by State oﬃ  cials, or by claiming that individuals 
actually participating in governmental authority are not classiﬁ ed as State organs under national 
legislation and therefore do not engage State responsibility.”
32 Ibid., paras. 118–119.
33 Ibid., paras. 120 and 131. 
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as a pretext, their internal legal system or the lack of any speciﬁ c instructions in 
order to disclaim international responsibility.”34 It is important to note that the 
Appeals Chamber justiﬁ ed the distinction between diﬀ erent degrees of control – i.e., 
speciﬁ c instructions, and overall control – according to the nature of the perpe-
trator of international crimes, namely, isolated individuals or organized groups.35 
International law also embraces a third test: “the assimilation of individuals to State 
organs on account of their actual behaviour within the structure of the State”.36 
Finally, the Appeals Chamber reported many cases conﬁ rming that judicial and 
state practice adhere to such rules on agency determination.
Th us, the right test to apply under the circumstances of the Tadić case – that is, 
with respect to organized and hierarchically structured groups – was the ‘overall 
control’ test.37 Accordingly, the accused was to be held responsible for war crimes 
committed in the context of an international armed conﬂ ict under article 2 of the 
Statute. Subsequent case law shows that, today, the ‘overall control’ test is well 
established and normally applied by the ICTY.38
From the viewpoint of the present analysis, it is irrelevant whether the overall 
control test is the right test or not. Abstractly speaking, the ICTY could have 
 relied on other international law rules to determine whether the armed conﬂ ict 
was international or internal. What must be stressed here is that, once the Tribunal 
decided to apply the rules on state attribution, it had to do so in a consistent way 
with the interpretation they receive under the law of state responsibility. From 
this perspective, the Tadić case is remarkable because it shows a clear willingness 
to rely on the rules provided under the law of state responsibility, even when these 
rules must be applied in a diﬀ erent context, that is, when they must be applied to 
a preliminary question in a criminal proceeding. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber 
34 Ibid., para. 123.
35 Ibid., para. 120 (“Plainly, an organized group diﬀ ers from an individual in that the former normally 
has a structure, a chain of command and a set of rules as well as the outward symbols of authority. 
Normally a member of the group does not act on his own but conforms to the standards prevailing 
in the group and is subject to the authority of the head of the group.”).
36 Ibid., para. 141. Later the Court explained that “private individuals acting within the framework 
of, or in connection with, armed forces, or in collusion with State authorities may be regarded 
as de facto State organs. In these cases it follows that the acts of such individuals are attributed 
to the State, as far as State responsibility is concerned, and may also generate individual criminal 
responsibility” (para. 144).
37 Ibid., paras. 146–162.
38 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, paras. 95–123; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, AC, Judgment, 24 March 2000, paras. 137–146; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, 
TC, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 111; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, TC, 
Judgment, 31 March 2003, paras. 181–8 and 197–202; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, TC, Judg-
ment, 1 September 2004, para. 148.
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made it clear that it was applying the same general criterion of control that applies 
in cases of state responsibility.
Th erefore, the Tadić case shows a particular point of contact between state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes. In establishing individual liability 
for war crimes, international tribunals ﬁ rst have to determine the nature of the 
armed conﬂ ict. If recourse is had to the customary rules on state attribution, then 
these rules must be consistently applied in both ﬁ elds of international law. Th is 
case reveals a precise legal connection between state and individual responsibility 
concerning the establishment of a general pre-requisite of war crimes, i.e., the nature 
of the armed conﬂ ict, on the one hand, and one of the basic requirements in the 
establishment of state responsibility on the other. In this sense, Tadić guarantees 
a co-ordination between aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal 
liability.
Th e reply of the ICJ to the Tadić jurisprudence came in 2007, when the Court 
had to pronounce on the same facts, this time from the point of view of state 
responsibility.39 Th e ICJ did not uphold the overall control test set out in Tadić.40 
Th e Court referred back to Nicaragua and applied the eﬀ ective control test, argu-
ably in a slightly narrower way than in the famous precedent.41
It seems that the criticism of the Court over Tadić mainly concerned the deci-
sion of the ICTY to apply the rules on state attribution to a preliminary question, 
that is, the nature of the conﬂ ict. On the one hand, it is possible to agree with 
the Court that the ICTY could have relied upon other international law rules 
to decide this speciﬁ c issue.42 On the other hand, it has been proposed to use 
the unity of substantive law as a remedy for jurisdictional fragmentation and to 
39 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1. Th e judgment has been the object of detailed 
analysis by international law scholars. See the various comments published in 18 EJIL (2007), 5 
JICJ (2007), and 111 RGDIP (2007).
40 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, paras. 399–412. On this speciﬁ c issue, see in 
general A. Cassese, ‘Th e Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on 
Genocide in Bosnia’, 18 EJIL (2007), pp. 649–668.
41 See H. Ascensio, ‘La responsabilité selon la Cour internationale de Justice dans l’aﬀ aire du génocide 
bosniaque’, 111 RGDIP (2007), p. 290.
42 For example, the nature of the conﬂ ict could have been decided having recourse to the rules on 
international legal personality. See the approach adopted by the Trial Chamber in Delalić, ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., TC, Judgment, 11 November 1998, para. 231. From April 1992 the 
conduct of VRS forces could have been seen by the Tribunal as autonomous actions of an ‘inde-
pendent entity’, in order to qualify the conﬂ ict between Bosnia and that entity as international. 
Th is seems to be the only way to characterize that conﬂ ict as international, and at the same time 
to deny attribution of the VRS conduct to Serbia. However, this line of reasoning implies the very 
diﬃ  cult matter of proving that that ‘independent entity’ could have been regarded as a de facto 
government – a possibility that the ICJ seems to exclude in its judgment in the Genocide case, 
supra the Introduction, note 1, para. 420.
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reconcile the decision of the Court with the jurisprudence of the ICTY.43 From 
the present standpoint, the attitude of the Court is mainly problematic because it 
suggests that the same rule can, “without logical inconsistency”, have two diﬀ erent 
meanings according to the context in which it is applied.44 In other words, this 
case raises concern because it epitomizes the danger of inconsistency underlying a 
conception that tries to maintain, at any cost, a strict separation between state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes.45 When dozens of individuals 
can be convicted for grave breaches because their conduct is attributable to a state, 
it is diﬃ  cult to maintain that at the same time that state would not be responsible 
under international humanitarian law because the conduct of such individuals 
is not attributable to the state. Th erefore, it would have seemed more ‘logical’ to 
conclude that either two diﬀ erent international rules apply to two diﬀ erent legal 
questions, or that the same international rule should be consistently interpreted 
and applied to the same legal question.
Another aspect of the Tadić case which must be pointed out here is that it shows 
a certain willingness of the ICTY to mark a distinction between individual crimi-
nal liability and state responsibility. State agency determination in case of crimes 
committed by organized military groups is a situation somewhat similar to the 
establishment of command responsibility. However, the ICTY relies on an ‘overall 
control’ test to attribute the conduct of military groups to the state, whereas it ap-
plies an ‘eﬀ ective control’ test to establish the existence of a superior-subordinate 
relationship under the doctrine of command responsibility.46 Th us, with respect 
to crimes committed in the framework of military or paramilitary groups, this 
results in the application of two diﬀ erent criteria in relation to the establishment 
of state responsibility and of the criminal liability of commanders respectively. Th is 
dual approach has been explained by the diﬀ erent nature of state responsibility 
43 See E. Cannizzaro, ‘Interconnecting International Jurisdictions: A Contribution from the Genocide 
Decision of the ICJ’, 1 European Journal of Legal Studies (2007), <www.ejls.eu>. In particular, it 
is the substantive unity of the issue brought before two diﬀ erent international jurisdictions which 
“would plead for the unity of the legal assessment of the same conduct under the same rule of 
law” (p. 6).
44 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, paras. 404–405. Th e issue of applying two dif-
ferent tests to the qualiﬁ cation of the armed conﬂ ict and to state agency determination is discussed 
in detail by M. Spinedi, ‘On the Non-Attribution of the Bosnian Serbs’ Conduct to Serbia’, 5 JICJ 
(2007), pp. 829–838. Th e author concludes that it is not “very easy” “to prove that the criteria of 
attribution of conduct to states for determining participation in a conﬂ ict are diﬀ erent than those 
applicable for the attribution of wrongful acts” (p. 837).
45 Arguably, the Court could have relied on the fact that the ICTY was dealing with a preliminary 
question, and accordingly it could have treated it diﬀ erently from the other facts that the ICTY 
must establish beyond doubt in order to convict an accused for international crimes. On the 
relevance of the ad hoc tribunals judgments for the ICJ, see infra Chapter 9.
46 See supra Chapter 6.
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and individual criminal liability.47 Indeed, it might be argued that holding com-
manders criminally responsible for the crimes committed by their subordinates 
should require more rigorous conditions than those necessary to attribute the 
same conduct to the state (and give rise to its responsibility under international 
law). However, the interesting aspect of this approach from the viewpoint of the 
relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes 
is that it reveals a tendency to conceive of state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes as two diﬀ erent regimes. Th us, while under certain circum-
stances the ad hoc tribunals may have to apply rules of state responsibility, these 
very rules are kept separate from rules concerning similar notions that are speciﬁ c 
to individual criminal liability.48 
2. Connections in the Establishment of State and of Individual 
 Responsibility
Another aspect which may undermine the strict separation between state and in-
dividual responsibility for international crimes concerns a certain blurring of the 
distinction between international bodies charged with establishing aggravated state 
responsibility and those responsible for establishing individual criminal liability. 
It is generally true that international criminal tribunals only focus on individual 
criminal liability under international law. However, the foregoing analysis has shown 
that there are cases in which aggravated state responsibility needs at least to be 
taken into account. On the other hand, a diﬀ erent point of contact between state 
and individual responsibility derives from the fact that there may be international 
bodies – charged, at least in principle, with state responsibility issues only – that 
in practice also deal with individual criminal liability. Th e most blatant example 
is provided by the practice of the UN SC.
A very controversial issue at the end of the twentieth century was the establish-
ment of the ICTY by the SC. International law scholars were essentially divided 
on the question of whether or not the SC had the power to establish such juris-
47 A. Viviani, Crimini internazionali e responsabilità dei leader politici e militari (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 
2005), p. 65, note 132. Th e diﬀ erent nature and purposes of state and individual responsibility 
for international crimes will be examined below in Chapter 8.
48 It must be noted however that it is not always easy to keep these notions separate. For example, the 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry for Darfur shows a certain blurring between the notions of 
overall control referred to state conduct and that of eﬀ ective control required under the doctrine 
of command responsibility. See, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
to the United Nations Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 
September 2004’, supra Chapter 3, note 25, para. 123.
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dictional bodies under the law of the UN Charter.49 From the viewpoint of the 
present analysis, the precise identiﬁ cation of legal foundations of the SC’s power to 
establish international criminal tribunals is not so important. What matters is the 
fact that the SC’s power to address issues of individual liability challenges the strict 
separation between the establishment of state responsibility, on the one hand, and 
individual criminal liability, on the other. Indeed, if one assumes that the regimes of 
state and individual responsibility are mutually autonomous, it is striking to realize 
that the power to take measures against both states and individuals responsible for 
international crimes could be concentrated in the hands of one organ traditionally 
entrusted to deal only with the maintenance of international peace and security.50 
By contrast, if one adopts the opposite approach, according to which individual 
liability is nothing but a particular way of indirectly sanctioning the author state, 
then the power of the SC to establish ad hoc tribunals is perfectly logical because 
these tribunals are essentially aimed at sanctioning wrongful state acts.51 Th is dif-
ference in approach is arguably one of the reasons why the establishment of the 
ICTY by the SC has been so controversial, as was the establishment of the Iraqi 
Compensation Commission.52
An important question that arises is how this twofold role of the SC is possible. 
What seems worth noting here is that the establishment of the ICTY, and of the 
ICTR a year later, are not isolated acts in the practice of the SC. Indeed, the prac-
tice of the SC shows an ever-increasing number of resolutions dealing with the 
conduct of individuals, resolutions explicitly directed at individuals, and resolu-
tions in which measures are taken against individuals under Chapter VII.53 Both 
the ICTY and the ICTR have upheld the SC’s power to establish international 
criminal tribunals.54 International practice shows that today a broad interpretation 
of the SC’s powers under Chapter VII of the Charter prevails, in particular with 
49 See supra Chapter 2, note 68 and accompanying text.
50 See A.C. Carpenter, ‘Th e International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression’, 64 Nord. 
J. Int’l L. (1995), p. 233; G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of 
Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’, 3 JICJ (2005), p. 542. 
51 See E. Sciso, ‘I rapporti fra Consiglio di sicurezza e Corte penale internazionale’, in S.I.D.I., 
Cooperazione fra Stati e giustizia penale internazionale. III Convegno. Siena 12 e 13 giugno 1998 
(Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 1999), p. 246.
52 For different opinions on the SC power to establish the Compensation Commission, see 
G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘On the Security Council’s ‘Law-Making’’, 83 Riv. Dir. Int. (2000), pp. 717–719; 
D. Caron, ‘Th e Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’, 87 AJIL (1993), 
p. 552; B. Graefrath, ‘Iraqi Reparations and the Security Council’, 55 ZaöRV (1995), pp. 1–68.
53 See I. Cameron, ‘UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, 72 Nord. J. Int’l L. (2003), pp. 159–214.
54 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Juris-
diction, 2 October 1995; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, TC, Decision on the Defence Motion 
on Jurisdiction, 18 June 1997.
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respect to the possibility for this body to take measures not only against states but 
also against individuals, as far as such measures serve the function of maintaining 
international peace and security. Th us, while the drafters of the UN Charter argu-
ably intended to conﬁ ne the SC’s powers to state action, today the power of the 
SC to address issues of individual liability no longer seems to be an open question 
under international law.55 
It is against this background that the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR 
must be evaluated. Acting under Chapter VII was certainly the most expeditious 
way to bring those responsible to justice, and no other ad hoc tribunal has been 
established since.56 But the power of the SC to set up such tribunals is only one 
element of the broader international practice pointing to the recognition of the 
SC’s power to address individual conduct. 
Th e ICC Statute can be cited as a conﬁ rmation of the signiﬁ cant role that the 
SC can have in the enforcement mechanisms of international criminal law. Indeed, 
under the Rome Statute, the SC has the power not only to refer situations to the 
Court (Article 13) but also to defer investigation or prosecution (Article 16).57 On 
55 L. Condorelli, ‘Legalità, legittimità, sfera di competenza dei Tribunali penali ad hoc creati dal 
Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite’, in F. Lattanti and E. Sciso (eds.), Dai Tribunali penali 
internazionali ad hoc a una Corte permanente (Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 1996), pp. 47–63. 
Condorelli maintains that, according to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, subsequent practice 
can have such an eﬀ ect on the interpretation of the UN Charter.
56 Th e lack of political will to set up new ad hoc tribunals seems mainly due to the fact that such 
tribunals are very expensive and rather slow in the prosecution and punishment of the indicted 
persons, and due also to the fact that the permanent ICC has now come into being. See ‘Report 
of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004’, supra Chapter 3, note 25, 
para. 574.
57 On the relationship between the ICC and the SC, see S. Yee, ‘A Proposal to Reformulate Article 
23 of the ILC Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court’, 19 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. (1995–6), pp. 529–538; C.L. Blakesley, ‘Jurisdiction, Deﬁ nition of Crimes, and Triggering 
Mechanisms’, 25 Den. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y (1996–7), pp. 233–280; H.P. Kaul, ‘Towards a Permanent 
International Criminal Court. Some Observations of a Negotiator’, 18 HRLJ (1997), p. 172; 
G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Fine prematura del ruolo preminente di studiosi italiani nel progetto di codi-
ﬁ cazione della responsabilità degli Stati: specie a proposito di crimini internazionali e dei poteri 
del Consiglio di sicurezza’, 81 Riv. Dir. Int. (1998), pp. 110–129; V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Th e 
Relationship between the Security Council and the Projected International Criminal Court’, 3 
JACL (1998), pp. 97–119; A. Zimmermann, ‘Th e Creation of a Permanent International Criminal 
Court’, 2 Max Planck Y. UN L. (1998), pp. 169–237; P. Gargiulo, ‘Th e Controversial Relation-
ship between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council’, in F. Lattanzi and W.A. 
Schabas (eds.), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Ripa di Fagnano 
Alto, Il Sirente, 1999), pp. 67–103; S.R. Ratner, ‘Th e Relationship between the International 
Criminal Court and the Security Council: An Appraisal of the United States Position’, in S.I.D.I., 
Cooperazione fra Stati e giustizia penale internazionale. III Convegno. Siena 12 e 13 giugno 1998 
(Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 1999), pp. 237–243; E. Sciso, supra note 51, p. 245; L. Yee, ‘Th e 
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the one hand, the existence of a permanent ICC guarantees a certain separation 
between state and individual responsibility under international law. On the other 
hand, in Rome a clear majority of states nonetheless supported the SC’s power of 
so-called ‘judicial intervention’.
Th e power of the SC to refer cases to the Court was already present in the 1993 
Working Group proposal, and it was maintained both by the ILC (in its 1994 
Report) and by the PrepCom (in the 1998 Draft). Except for a few isolated posi-
tions,58 during the Rome conference this power was not called into question, and 
it was ﬁ nally embodied in Article 13.59 
Th e SC power to block the Court was more controversial. A number of states 
opposed what was perceived as a serious threat to the independence of the future 
criminal court, and this led to a signiﬁ cant modiﬁ cation of the original proposal 
on this issue. Indeed, according to the ILC proposal the Court could not exer-
cise its jurisdiction as long as the situation was being dealt with by the SC under 
Chapter VII (Article 23).60 Th is provision was inserted in order to co-ordinate 
the activity of the SC with that of the future ICC, and was inspired by Article 12 
of the UN Charter with the purpose of co-ordinating the activity of the GA and 
the SC. However, one may doubt that Article 12 is the most appropriate source 
of inspiration: unlike the GA, the ICC is not an organ of the UN, and arguably 
International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16’, in R.S. Lee (ed.), 
Th e International Criminal Court. Th e Making of the Rome Statute. Issues, Negotiations, Results 
(Th e Hague, Kluwer, 1999), pp. 143–152; M.H. Arsanjani, ‘Reﬂ ections on the Jurisdiction and 
Trigger Mechanism of the International Criminal Court’, in A.M. Von Hebel et al. (eds.), Reﬂ ec-
tions on the International Criminal Court. Essays in Honour of Adrian Bos (Th e Hague, TMS Asser 
Press, 1999), pp. 57–76; L. Arbour and M. Bergsmo, ‘Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional 
Overreach’, in A.M. Von Hebel et al. (eds.), Reﬂ ections on the International Criminal Court. Essays 
in Honour of Adrian Bos (Th e Hague, TMS Asser Press, 1999), pp. 129–140; F. Berman, ‘Th e 
Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council’, in A.M. Von 
Hebel et al. (eds.), Reﬂ ections on the International Criminal Court. Essays in Honour of Adrian 
Bos (Th e Hague, TMS Asser Press, 1999), pp. 173–180; G.H. Oosthuizen, ‘Some Preliminary 
Remarks on the Relationship between the Envisaged International Criminal Court and the UN 
Security Council’, 46 NILR (1999), pp. 313–342; M. Bergsmo, ‘Occasional Remarks on Certain 
State Concerns about the Jurisdictional Reach of the International Criminal Court, and Th eir 
Possible Implications for the Relationship between the Court and the Security Council’, 69 Nord. 
J. Int’l L. (2000), pp. 87–113; J.F. Escudero Espinosa, La Corte penal internacional y el Consejo de 
seguridad (Madrid, Dilex, 2004).  
58 See the press releases by India and Pakistan of 16 June 1998 (L/ROM/8, L/ROM/9) and 17 July 
1998 (L/ROM/22), <www.un.org/icc/index.htm>.
59 Article 13 reads: “Th e Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: . . . (b) A situation in which one or 
more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
60 ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 46th Session’, YILC (1994), vol. II(2), p. 43. For a comment on 
Article 23, see S. Yee, supra note 57, p. 529.
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Article 12 has lost most of its original authority.61 Th us, one can rather turn to the 
relationship between the SC and the ICJ.62 Despite the absence of speciﬁ c provi-
sions on the subject, the Court has maintained that there is nothing “irregular in 
the simultaneous exercise of their respective functions”;63 the SC has its political 
functions whereas the Court has its judicial functions.64 Th us, as a matter of prin-
ciple, it is perfectly conceivable that the SC and the ICC exercise their respective 
and diﬀ erent functions with respect to the same situation.
A compromise was found during the Rome conference thanks to the so-called 
‘Singapore proposal’, according to which a formal decision of the SC under Chapter 
VII was necessary to block an investigation or prosecution before the ICC. In this 
way, it was possible to co-ordinate the action of the SC under Chapter VII and 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, and at the same time to guarantee the independence 
of the ICC. Th us, an explicit decision under Chapter VII is necessary to block the 
activity of the Court, while the sole fact that a situation is put on the SC agenda 
is not suﬃ  cient to do so.65 
From the viewpoint of the present analysis, the most signiﬁ cant aspect is the 
role the SC has gradually assumed with respect to individuals committing serious 
breaches of community obligations. Th e drafting history of the ICC Statute and 
the ﬁ nal outcome of the Rome conference conﬁ rm that the SC has the power to 
address the conduct of individuals who breach of the most fundamental rules of the 
international community. Indeed, the Rome Statute is not capable of conferring 
new powers on the SC. Articles 13 and 16 are necessarily grounded on the powers 
entrusted to the SC by the UN Charter.66
Th us, the existence of a political body which centralizes the adoption of meas-
ures with respect to both states and individuals represents a signiﬁ cant point of 
contact between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. And 
61 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra 
Chapter 1, note 44, para. 28. See S.R. Ratner, supra note 57, p. 241.
62 See R. Higgins, ‘Th e Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the International 
Court of Justice’, in A.M. Von Hebel et al. (eds.), Reﬂ ections on the International Criminal Court. 
Essays in Honour of Adrian Bos (Th e Hague, TMS Asser Press, 1999), pp. 163–172.
63 ICJ, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staﬀ  in Teheran (United States of 
America v. Iran), Judgment, 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports 1980, para. 40.
64 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, Judg-
ment, 26 November 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, para. 95.
65 Article 16 now reads: “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with 
under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that eﬀ ect; 
that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions”, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
66 See A. Zimmermann, supra note 57, p. 216; F. Berman, supra note 57, p. 176; M. Bergsmo, supra 
note 57, p. 94; J.F. Escudero Espinosa, supra note 57, p. 153.
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this is not only an abstract point of contact due to the fact that one body has the 
power to deal with both state and individual conduct with respect to the same 
situation. Th is broad power of the SC may establish a concrete link between the 
establishments of state and individual responsibility. Indeed, this situation can lead 
to such a close link that a separation between state and individual responsibility is 
diﬃ  cult to maintain in practice.
First, the SC has played a role in the enforcement of international criminal law 
(by establishing ad hoc tribunals or by referring a case to the ICC) in situations 
where international crimes had arguably been committed in the framework of a 
state policy or with the involvement of the state apparatus. In other words, interna-
tional prosecution of international crimes has been put in place by the SC once it 
has been found that a certain situation not only was a threat to international peace 
and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter but also entailed some degree 
of state involvement. In practice, it seems possible to maintain that the prosecu-
tion of core crimes at the international level has generally focused on cases which 
implied a dual responsibility of the state and its organs. A certain degree of state 
responsibility seems undeniable, for instance with respect to the crimes commit-
ted in Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur. In a sense, the SC has exercised 
its powers with respect to individuals in cases of international crimes generally 
perpetrated at the state level.
Second, an unlimited power of the SC to address individual conduct can have a 
detrimental eﬀ ect on international criminal law, which creates a risk that it may be 
used to attain diﬀ erent goals from its own. Th e SC power to bar an ICC proceed-
ing “would eﬀ ectively extend the privileged position of certain states to the Court 
and call into question the principle of equality before the law”.67 Th e intrusion of 
a political organ in the judicial function of the ICC can result in selective justice, 
as shown by the SC decision to grant immunity from the Court’s jurisdiction to 
peacekeeping personnel from states not party to the Rome Statute. In 2002, the SC 
adopted Res. 1422 which, according to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, requested 
the ICC not to commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of cases 
involving current or former personnel from those states for a twelve month period. 
Th e same request was renewed in 2003.68 It is true that immunity was granted 
to such persons ‘only’ temporarily. However, the SC has subsequently decided in 
two speciﬁ c situations that current or former peacekeeping personnel from states 
not party to the Rome Statute “shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
that contributing State for all alleged acts and omissions arising out of or related 
to” the forces operating in Liberia and Sudan.69 Th is results in two ad hoc cases of 
67 V. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 57, p. 109.
68 See SC Resolution 1487(2003), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
69 See SC Resolutions 1497(2003), para.7, and 1593(2005), para. 6, <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
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permanent immunity from the ICC jurisdiction, and seriously calls into question 
the principle of equality before the law.70
Furthermore, the increasing focus of the SC on individual conduct may lead, 
to a certain extent, to a substitution of individual accountability for international 
crimes for state responsibility, thus establishing an even closer link between state 
and individual responsibility. Instead of discharging its traditional functions under 
the UN Charter and adopting measures towards states endangering international 
peace and security, the SC may be induced to concentrate on the role of individuals 
in similar situations of international crisis. Th e ultimate function of international 
criminal law, i.e., “to combat impunity and render justice to the victims of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity”,71 is arguably diﬀ erent from the primary 
responsibility of the SC under Chapter VII, i.e., the maintenance of international 
peace and security.72 And measures adopted against individuals can hardly have 
the same eﬀ ect of measures adopted against states in order to fulﬁ l the very func-
tion of maintaining international peace and security.73 Nonetheless, the practice 
of the SC clearly reveals a growing importance of individual accountability, to the 
detriment of state responsibility.74
What has happened with respect to the situation in Darfur is a very good  example 
of this trend. International crimes – war crimes and crimes against humanity – 
have been committed in a widespread and systematic manner. Th ese crimes are 
substantially attributable to Sudan.75 Th e SC determined that “the situation in 
Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security and to stability in 
the region”.76 Th e SC has dealt with the situation in Darfur essentially by adopting 
measures against individuals and non-governmental entities.77 A few months later, 
having acknowledged that Sudan was not complying with its obligations under 
international law, the SC declared that it 
70 See G. Gaja, ‘Immunità squilibrate dalla giurisdizione penale in relazione all’intervento armato in 
Liberia’, 86 Riv. Dir. Int. (2003), p. 763.
71 Th is is the way in which the ICTY interprets its mandate by the SC (see the ICTY Completion 
Strategy, UN Doc. S/2002/678).
72 For a comparative analysis of the nature and functions of state and individual responsibility, see 
infra Chapter 8.
73 Less doubtful is the situation in which measures taken by the SC against individuals are only part 
of a broader set of measures taken against states endangering international peace and security. 
74 See infra note 85.
75 See supra Chapter 3, note 27.
76 SC Resolution 1556(2004), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
77 As the SC has stated: “all states shall take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply, to 
all non-governmental entities and individuals, . . . of arms and related materiel of all types” (ibid., 
para. 7, emphasis added).
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shall consider taking additional measures as contemplated in Article 41 of the Char-
ter of the United Nations, such as actions to aﬀ ect Sudan’s petroleum sector and the 
Government of Sudan or individual members of the Government of Sudan, in order 
to obtain such full compliance or full cooperation.78 
No such measures towards Sudan have ever been taken. Th e SC has extended the 
measures adopted in Res. 1556 to all parties to the internal conﬂ ict, including 
therefore also the Government of Sudan.79 However, the Government of Sudan 
can request the SC for an exemption from the prohibition of the movement of 
military equipment and supplies into the Darfur region.80 In the end, this measure 
will concern only the above-mentioned non-governmental entities. 
By contrast, the SC has adopted new measures against those individuals respon-
sible for the international crimes in Sudan.81 Following the proposal of the Com-
mission of Inquiry previously established to investigate the violations committed 
in Darfur,82 the SC has for the ﬁ rst time referred a situation to the ICC according 
to Article 13 of the Rome Statute.83 Th is decision is certainly to be welcomed. 
However, no parallel action against Sudan was decided. Th us, on the one hand, 
one may wonder whether future proceedings before the ICC in which high-rank-
ing Sudanese organs will be charged with the international crimes committed in 
Darfur84 are an adequate response to a situation endangering international peace. 
On the other hand, the situation in Darfur is now growing worse, the involvement 
of other states in the crisis is not unlikely, and one may doubt whether measures 
addressing only individual conduct are appropriate to fulﬁ l the primary function 
of the SC, that is, maintaining international peace and security.85 
78 SC Resolution 1564(2004), para. 14, <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
79 SC Resolution 1591(2005), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
80 Ibid., para. 3 (a)(v), and para. 7.
81 Additional measures against individuals have been adopted under Res. 1591(2004), and a list of such 
individuals has subsequently been included in Resolution 1672(2006), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
82 Th e Commission of Inquiry focused only on the identiﬁ cation of individual perpetrators (supra 
Chapter 3, note 25). However, nothing in the letter of SC Resolution 1564(2004) prevented the 
Commission from interpreting its mandate in broader terms and including issues of state respon-
sibility. 
83 SC Resolution 1593(2005), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
84 See supra Chapter 6, note 70.
85 According to Rao, “by emphasizing the individual criminal responsibility and merely punish-
ing individuals, we will not be able in the long run to stamp out the situations that provide the 
environment for lawless behavior” (P.S. Rao, ‘International Crimes and State Responsibility’, in 
M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, 
Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), p. 80). See also V.D. Degan, ‘Responsibility of States and Individuals 
for International Crimes’, in S. Yee and W. Tieya (eds.), International Law in the Post-Cold War 
World: Essay in Memory of Li Haopei (London, New York, Routledge, 2001), pp. 209, and 211, 
pointing out the risk that, in practice, state responsibility has no real consequences.
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3. Establishing State and Individual Responsibility for Aggression
Th e crime of aggression was, and still is, one of the most controversial aspects of 
the ICC Statute. According to Article 5, the ICC will have jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, but only once the Assembly of States Parties agrees on a deﬁ ni-
tion of this crime and on the conditions under which the Court is to exercise its 
jurisdiction. In addition, Article 5 speciﬁ es that the future provision on the crime 
of aggression “shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations”. In other words, the judicial action of the ICC with respect to 
aggression must not impinge on, and must be co-ordinated with, the SC’s primary 
role under Chapter VII, and in particular its power under Article 39 to determine 
when a state act of aggression has been carried out.
Abstractly speaking, the relationship between the ICC and the SC as far as ag-
gression is concerned can be considered from two diﬀ erent perspectives: that of 
the relationship between the Rome Statute and the UN Charter, and that of the 
relationship between state and individual responsibility. From the standpoint of 
the law of treaties, the ICC Statute contains a provision requiring respect for the 
primary responsibility of the SC under Chapter VII. However, there is no need 
to establish a procedure that automatically subordinates the exercise of the ICC 
jurisdiction over individuals charged with the crime of aggression to a prior deter-
mination that state aggression has actually occurred. Th e ICC must simply ‘respect’ 
the determinations of the SC concerning state conduct. If there is a determination 
under Chapter VII, the ICC should respect it as far as state aggression is concerned, 
but at least in principle it would be free to deviate from that determination as far 
as individual liability is concerned.86 Absent a determination under Article 39, 
the ICC will be free to exercise its jurisdiction over the alleged perpetrators of the 
crime of aggression.
From the standpoint of the relationship between state and individual respon-
sibility, things are arguably diﬀ erent. If the crime of aggression is strictly deﬁ ned 
in terms of state action, liability cannot be ascribed to individuals lacking an 
 assessment of the relevant state conduct. If a state has not committed aggression, its 
political and military leaders cannot be charged with aggression. However, the ICC 
cannot pronounce on issues of state responsibility, since its jurisdiction is strictly 
limited to natural persons.87 Th us, the action by the Court would necessarily be 
86 See Fourth Session of the Assembly of the States Parties to the ICC Statute, ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex 
II, para. 64, <www.icc-cpi.int>. For example, if the oﬀ ender lacks the requisite mens rea it cannot 
be convicted.
87 For opinions in favour of the ICC power to proceed even if state aggravated responsibility has 
not been previously established, see V. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 57, p. 106; G. Gaja, ‘Th e 
Respective Roles of the ICC and the Security Council in Determining the Existence of an Aggres-
sion’, in M. Politi and G. Nesi (eds.), Th e International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggres-
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subordinated to the previous assessment concerning state aggression by a diﬀ erent 
international body having the power to address state conduct. Naturally, the SC is 
the ﬁ rst on the list, but it is not the only one. Th e GA may pronounce on similar 
issues. So too can the ICJ. Th is raises the problem of the choice of the competent 
body, which is not an easy task. But there is an even more problematic aspect: in 
principle, if the international body charged with determining state aggression is 
unable to pronounce on a particular situation, then action by the ICC would be 
completely precluded.
If it were possible to regard the crime of aggression as a crime which could also 
be committed by private individuals, no prior assessment of the state conduct 
would be necessary.88 Th e ICC would thus be totally free to exercise its jurisdiction 
independently of the position adopted, for instance, by the SC with respect to the 
diﬀ erent question of state aggression. However, at present international law seems 
clearly oriented towards a deﬁ nition of aggression rigorously framed in terms of 
state conduct. Th e analysis carried out in previous chapters has pointed out the 
particular features of the crime of aggression with respect to the material element, 
the perpetrators, the seriousness requirement, and defences. On the other hand, 
the case law of the ICJ has undoubtedly conﬁ ned aggression to state conduct.89
With respect to the amendment process of Article 5 of the ICC Statute, the 
outcome is highly uncertain. Th e crime of aggression raises various questions, and 
some of them are very controversial. However, the works of the PrepCom and 
of the SWGCA have also highlighted the existence of essentially three relatively 
well-established aspects concerning aggression. First, the crime of aggression is a 
‘leadership’ crime. Aggression can only be committed by political and military 
leaders, i.e., in the words of the PrepCom and the SWGCA, by persons “being in 
a position eﬀ ectively to exercise control over or to direct the political and military 
action of a State.”90 Second, aggression is strictly deﬁ ned in terms of state conduct. 
Th erefore, an act of aggression “means an act referred to in GA Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which is determined to have been committed by 
sion (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004), p. 123; S.M. Yengejeh, ‘Reﬂ ections on the Role of the Security 
Council in Determining an Act of Aggression’, in M. Politi and G. Nesi (eds.), Th e International 
Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004), pp. 130–131; M. Lehto, 
‘Th e ICC and the Security Council: About the Argument of Politicization’, in M. Politi and 
G. Nesi (eds.), Th e International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression (Aldershot, Ashgate, 
2004), p. 148.
88 See supra Chapter 4, note 77 and accompanying text.
89 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra 
Chapter 1, note 44; ICJ, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), supra Chapter 1, note 44, para. 165.
90 ICC-ASP/2/10, p. 234, <www.icc-cpi.int>, previously issued as PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, <untreaty.
un.org/cod/icc/index.html>. See supra Chapter 4.
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the State concerned”.91 Th ird, the ICC could not proceed against individuals unless 
there is a prior determination of the state act of aggression. Th is is due to the fact 
that “it is necessary to determine that a state act of aggression has occurred before 
it can be determined that an individual crime of aggression is at hand”.92
Th e fact that there is an agreement on such basic assumptions does not lead to 
an analogous convergence of opinions on the deﬁ nition of aggression,93 and the 
conditions for the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction. As to the latter, the proposal 
of the PrepCom and the SWGCA reads as follows:
Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime 
of aggression, the Court shall ﬁ rst ascertain whether the Security Council has made 
a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. If no 
Security Council determination exists, the Court shall notify the Security Council 
of the situation before the Court.94
Th is provision tries to co-ordinate the jurisdiction of the ICC with the SC’s power 
under Chapter VII, so that the Rome Statute is consistent with the UN Charter. 
If the SC makes a determination with respect to state aggression, then the ICC 
must take it into account. However, this does not solve the problem where the SC 
takes no action.95
Th ere are considerable diﬀ erences of opinion on this point. Two approaches 
have emerged: one in favour of the exclusive competence of the SC, and the 
other supporting such competence for other bodies as well, such as the UN GA 
or the ICJ.96 In the end, two alternatives have been included in the PrepCom and 
 SWGCA proposals: 1) the ICC jurisdiction would be precluded if there is no prior 
determination of aggression made by a competent organ outside the Court; or 2) 
91 Ibid.. See supra Chapter 3.
92 Ibid., p. 385.
93 While aggression is a leadership crime and subordinates cannot be charged with it, the question of 
whether command responsibility would be applicable under such circumstances is controversial. 
More generally, the debate revolves around the forms of liability which are applicable to the crime 
of aggression (see ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex II, para. 18–31, <www.icc-cpi.int>). A similar problem 
concerns the possibility to hold individuals accountable for the attempt to commit aggression (see 
ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex II, para. 33–43, <www.icc-cpi.int>). Th e question is even more diﬃ  cult 
when state aggression has not fully materialised, since 1) the deﬁ nitions of state aggression and 
of the individual crime of aggression may be diﬀ erent in this respect, and 2) this situation puts 
in question the role of an outside body that might be called upon to determine whether state 
aggression has occurred.
94 See PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>, and ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2, 
p. 4, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
95 Th e SC has determined the existence of a state aggression only on very few occasions. See supra 
Chapter 1, note 43. Moreover, the inactivity of the SC is generally due to the veto power of the per-
manent member states. Th ese states would thus be able to leave the ICC in a state of  paralysis.
96 ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex II, paras. 63–74, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
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the ICC would be able to proceed with the case.97 In the end, this proposal leaves 
open the door to diﬀ erent solutions, but it shows the two major problems concern-
ing the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. First, there 
is uncertainty over the legal eﬀ ects of the prior determination of state aggression 
(by the SC or another international body) with respect to the establishment of 
individual liability by the ICC.98 Second, the proposal seeks, at all costs, to keep 
the determination of state aggression and the establishment of individual criminal 
liability for aggression separate, in order to preserve the autonomy of the ICC and 
to respect the basic principles of international criminal law. 
Th ese uncertainties concerning the crime of aggression can only be explained 
by the fact that the dilemma faced by the drafters of these proposals is that of try-
ing to look at the crime of aggression from the perspective of individual criminal 
liability (that is, with the aim of deﬁ ning the elements of an individual crime and 
of keeping a strict separation between the activity of the ICC and issues of state 
responsibility), but having assumed that the crime of aggression has a particular 
nature, that is, it is a state crime. Th us, the paradox of the crime of aggression is 
that, due to its nature, a close link with state responsibility is unavoidable, but at 
the same time the speciﬁ c features of the individual crime of aggression must be 
identiﬁ ed.99 To be sure, it is a very diﬃ  cult task. At a certain point the SWGCA 
recognized that its ultimate task is “to delineate clearly the point of intersection between 
individual responsibility on the one hand and State responsibility on the other.”100 Th us, 
with respect to aggression, there are clear connections between state and individual 
responsibility and they raise particular problems that cannot be solved if there is 
no clarity concerning the theoretical underpinnings concerning this crime.
On the one hand, the establishment of personal criminal liability for the crime 
of aggression necessarily requires the corresponding act of state aggression to be 
established. Th is implies the assessment of both material conduct (amounting to 
aggression) and the fact that this conduct is attributable to a state. Where there 
is such a prior determination of state aggression, the question concerns the legal 
 eﬀ ects of this determination for the ICC.101 Th e prior ﬁ nding of fact relating to the 
material conduct amounting to aggression can be seen as a preliminary question 
necessary to establish individual criminal liability. Although it can be maintained, 
 97 ICC-ASP/2/10, p. 234, <www.icc-cpi.int>, previously issued as PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, para. 5, 
<untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>, and ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2, p. 4, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
 98 ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex II, paras. 60–62, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
 99 Th e SWGCA explicitly states that it has to distinguish between the collective act of and individual 
participation in aggression (ICC-ASP/4/32, pp. 362–364, <www.icc-cpi.int>).
100 Ibid., para. 62 (emphasis added).
101 See G.H. Oosthuizen, supra note 57, who examines both the review power of the ICC and the 
binding eﬀ ect of SC resolutions from an institutional viewpoint. As to the former aspect, see also 
J.F. Escudero Espinosa, supra note 57, p. 162.
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abstractly speaking, that the ICC has the power to review this ﬁ nding according to 
elements not previously taken into account, such as self-defence,102 in practice it is 
diﬃ  cult to accept two diﬀ erent qualiﬁ cations of the same act of aggression. A certain 
consistency must be guaranteed when the same international rule deﬁ nes aggression 
under both state and individual responsibility. On the other hand, this does not 
prevent the ICC from considering elements speciﬁ c to international criminal law 
which can exclude individual criminal responsibility notwithstanding a determina-
tion that a state act of aggression has taken place, such as certain defences typical 
of individual conduct. Turning to the legal ﬁ nding on state attribution, arguably 
the ICC cannot depart from it. While this particular aspect has no direct impact 
on the subsequent trial of state leaders for aggression, it can play an indirect role 
before the ICC. Once it is established that a state has committed an act of aggres-
sion, the actus reus has already been determined, and the mens rea of political and 
military leaders can be easily inferred from the general criminal context.103 How is 
it possible for state leaders to deny “intention or knowledge”104 of the relevant act 
of aggression? In the end, it seems very diﬃ  cult to keep the establishment of state 
and individual responsibility for aggression separate. Prior determination is likely 
to have a very profound impact on the ICC.105
On the other hand, there is a clear need to maintain the separation between the 
determination of state aggression and the establishment of individual accountability 
for aggression. Th e eﬀ orts of the PrepCom and the SWGCA have been aimed at 
elaborating proposals which could guarantee a certain autonomy for the ICC. If 
the jurisdiction of the ICC is made dependent on a prior determination of state 
aggression, the major risk is that of a paralysis of the Court if the competent body 
cannot reach a decision on that issue. From this perspective, the option concerning 
102 A. Zimmermann, supra note 57, considers the binding eﬀ ect of SC resolutions to be limited to 
the extent that it reaches a determination on the merits of the act of aggression. “Th us, the ICC 
itself would eventually have to consider and determine all those elements of the crime which are 
not already contained in the determination made by the Security Council under Article 39 of the 
Charter” (p. 203). See also ICC- ASP/4/32, Annex II, para. 61, <www.icc-cpi.int>. However, this 
possibility can be problematic because the SC generally limit itself to very concise determinations 
under Article 39. If the SC simply states that aggression has occurred, does this mean that the 
ICC can review this decision according to the elements of state responsibility for aggression not 
taken into account?
103 See supra Chapter 4.
104 See ICC-ASP/2/10, p. 234, <www.icc-cpi.int>, previously issued as PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, 
para. 1, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>.
105 According to one commentator, if the prior determination of the SC were binding upon the ICC, 
it would leave the Court “only the remaining task of determining the role of individuals involved 
in the act of aggression, much in the same style of a compensation commission administering 
individual claims after a country such as Iraq has been determined to be liable for all amounts” 
(S. Yee, supra note 57, pp. 532–533).
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the competence, for example, of the ICJ is less problematic, even though it raises 
concerns as to the introduction of a hierarchy between these two institutions.106 
A solution could be to admit that the ICC “can proceed” even in the absence of 
a prior determination of state aggression.107 However, it is not clear what exactly 
this second option means. Assuming that the Court can establish the material 
conduct amounting to aggression but that it cannot attribute such conduct to a 
state, would this imply that the Court is supposed to focus on individual liability 
only? Th is might be inconsistent with the deﬁ nition of the crime of aggression. 
By contrast, does this mean that the Court has given the power to ascertain that 
a state act of aggression has taken place? However, such a possibility might imply 
that the Court would apply the relevant rules of state responsibility. 
In both cases, whether the ICC has a review power or “may proceed”, the main 
problem would be to guarantee a consistent application of international primary 
rules called into question under both state and individual responsibility. As recog-
nized by the SWGCA, the ICC and the SC have “autonomous, but complementary 
roles, which could best be advanced if both institutions [have] broadly compatible 
rules regarding the determination of an act of aggression”.108
To sum up, the debate over the crime of aggression is particularly interesting 
because it highlights the contradictions necessarily connected to the lack of a clear 
theoretical approach over this crime. On the one hand, it is taken for granted that 
there must be a separation between the enforcement mechanisms of state and 
individual responsibility. While the SC is called on to establish the existence of a 
state wrongful act, the ICC jurisdiction is limited to the prosecution of individuals 
for aggression. And this scheme is never called into question in the recent proposal 
concerning the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. On 
the other hand, the nature of this crime is not disputed either. Aggression is a 
crime which can be committed only by states. Th ere is a general overlap between 
the elements of state responsibility for aggression and the elements of the crime of 
aggression entailing individual liability. Th us, the criminal liability of political and 
military leaders would be almost inextricably connected to the prior determina-
tion of a state act of aggression.109 And if the Court “may proceed” without such 
a prior determination, state responsibility would be implicit in the conviction of 
military or political state leaders.
106 ICC-ASP/5/35, p. 14, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
107 See ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, Annex III (“Non-paper submitted by the Chairman on the 
exercise of jurisdiction”), pp. 18–20, <www.icc-cpi.int>. Th is document seems to admit that, in 
any case, the Court can proceed. It is unclear whether the option according to which – absent a 
prior determination – the ICC may not proceed has been set aside.
108 Ibid., p. 11. See also E. Sciso, supra note 51, p. 258.
109 See T.L.H. McCormack and G.J. Simpson, ‘A New International Criminal Law Regime?’, 42 
NILR (1995), p. 196; V. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 57, p. 107. 
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4. Concluding Observations
When taking into account the establishment of international responsibility for the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, there is a 
consistently reaﬃ  rmed division of tasks between international bodies entrusted with 
the establishment of state responsibility, and international bodies having to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over individuals responsible for international crimes.
Th e ICJ has recently aﬃ  rmed its discretion in interpreting issues of general 
international law with respect to previous decisions of international criminal tri-
bunals.110 At the same time, the Court based its judgment on previous ﬁ ndings 
of fact of the ICTY. In other words, this seems to conﬁ rm the view according to 
which there is a certain division of competences between international bodies 
dealing with either state or individual responsibility to be respected. However, 
this strict division of compenteces may prove problematic in the establishment of 
international responsibility for international crimes. 
Th e present chapter has examined various situations in which such a ‘natural’ 
assumption is called into question. First, there are cases in which notions of state 
responsibility must be consistently applied before international criminal tribunals. 
Th e Tadić case has been examined in detail. Th e crime of aggression raises a similar 
question. Once it is accepted that the material element of this crime corresponds 
to a rule governing state responsibility, a certain co-ordination between state and 
individual responsibility for aggression needs to be guaranteed. Absent a determi-
nation on the state conduct, and assuming that the ICC can proceed, it can only 
do so by relying on the relevant rules of general international law governing state 
aggression. Th ese examples show that, if a separation between the establishment 
of state and individual responsibility for international crimes is to be maintained, 
it must be counterbalanced by an eﬀ ective co-ordination of these regimes.
Second, there are cases in which this division of competences disappears, or more 
precisely, where it becomes unidirectional. Th e analysis has focused on the powers 
of the SC and its practice addressing both state and individual conduct. When no 
separation exists between the body charged to deal with state responsibility and 
that exercising criminal jurisdiction over the individuals responsible for interna-
tional crimes, there is the risk that the basic principles of international criminal 
law may be frustrated or that the intervention of a political body in such matters 
may result in selective justice. In addition, individual criminal liability would be 
closely connected to state responsibility, and would essentially be established with 
respect to crimes entailing a dual responsibility under international law. Taking 
into account the crime of aggression, the prior determination of state aggression 
is capable of having a considerable impact on the establishment of state leaders’ 
110 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, para. 403.
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criminal liability. Furthermore, this increases the possibility for individual criminal 
liability to be used as an alternative or substitute for state responsibility. In other 
words, the risk is to use individual criminal liability for diﬀ erent purposes from 
those that naturally characterize this ﬁ eld of international law. Th e separate but con-
nected establishment of state and individual responsibility shows all the diﬃ  culties 
of ﬁ nding a fair balance between the need to combat impunity for  international 
crimes and the need to guarantee state compliance with international rules in an 
eﬀ ective way.

Part III
Th e Relationship Between State and Individual 
Responsibility for International Crimes

Chapter 8
Complementarity Between State and Individual 
Responsibility for International Crimes
Th e analysis of international practice carried out in Part II has concentrated on 
both the diﬀ erences and the points of contact between state and individual respon-
sibility for international crimes. Th e main result is that the relationship between 
these regimes entails an increasing number of problematic issues concerning their 
co-ordination. Th us, it no longer seems possible to simply disregard this relation-
ship or assume that these issues can be eﬃ  ciently addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
Th e purpose of the following two chapters is to discuss the general outcomes of 
the foregoing analysis of international practice and shape a theoretical framework 
capable of explaining the relationship between state and individual responsibility 
accordingly.
1. Th e Relationship Between State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes according to International Practice
International practice prompts two general remarks on the relationship between 
state and individual responsibility. Aggravated state responsibility and international 
criminal law are in principle regarded as separate regimes under international law. 
However, in practice there are various points of contact between these regimes. A 
special plea must ﬁ nally be reserved to the crime of aggression which is generally 
considered to be a crime of an exceptional nature with respect to which no complete 
separation between state and individual responsibility seems possible.
Undoubtedly, international practice shows a certain tendency to keep state 
responsibility separate from individual liability. Th ese regimes may well share a 
common origin, i.e., the breach of obligations owed to the entire international 
community. Nonetheless, they remain two diﬀ erent legal regimes of international 
responsibility aiming at governing the consequences of distinct types of conduct.
In particular, international criminal law only concerns individual conduct, not 
state conduct. Th e principle of individual criminal liability applies to all individuals, 
both state organs and private individuals. International case law has made it plain 
that no state policy need be demonstrated as a condition for holding state organs 
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accountable when they commit international crimes which by deﬁ nition must be 
carried out in a widespread or systematic way. To be convicted, every defendant 
must have had a certain mens rea, and this element can never be presumed, not 
even with respect to high ranking state organs. Defences under international 
criminal law do not necessarily have the same meaning of circumstances preclud-
ing wrongfulness under the law of state responsibility. Th e modes of liability that 
can be relied upon to ascribe liability for crimes committed at the collective level 
do not require a previous establishment of state responsibility.
All in all, international practice points to a separation between state and indi-
vidual responsibility for international crimes. With respect to crimes entailing a 
dual responsibility under international law, this separation arguably derives from the 
dissociation between the conduct of the state and that of its organs. Th is dissocia-
tion also explains why state organs can be prosecuted even if they have committed 
the relevant international crimes in the exercise of governmental authority. At the 
same time, this dissociation does not prevent state organs’ conduct from being 
attributed to the state, and accordingly it does not relieve the state of responsibil-
ity for the same crimes.1
On the other hand, the analysis of international practice also reveals that, not-
withstanding the separation between state and individual responsibility for interna-
tional crimes, and independently of the particular case of the crime of aggression, 
there are various points of contact between these two regimes which can hardly 
be eliminated. Th e way in which the material element of international crimes is 
established by international criminal tribunals is very similar to the way in which 
the wrongful state act amounting to a crime is demonstrated. Th e general criminal 
context plays a fundamental role in proving the material element of international 
crimes. Th e same importance of the general criminal context characterizes the 
1 Th e issue of state organs’ immunity has not been examined in detail here. I had the occasion to 
discuss the relation between international crimes and immunity from jurisdiction elsewhere. See 
B.I. Bonafè, ‘Imputazione all’individuo di crimini internazionali e immunità dell’organo’, 87 
Riv. Dir. Int. (2004), pp. 393–426. Th e dissociation between state conduct and that of its organs 
justiﬁ es both the separation between state and individual responsibility for international crimes, 
and a certain point of contact between them. While state organs cannot invoke immunity ratione 
materiae to escape punishment for international crimes, their conduct is still attributable to the 
state. Accordingly, the state is immune from jurisdiction even though it is accused of having com-
mitted international crimes, and certain state organs can validly invoke immunity ratione personae 
(before domestic courts) because the protection aﬀ orded to states in order to guarantee a peaceful 
development of international relations prevails over the general interest to ﬁ ght against impunity 
and prosecute all those responsible for international crimes. See also P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Crimes et 
immunités, ou dans quelle mesure la nature des premiers empêche l’exercice des secondes’, 103 
RGDIP (1999), pp. 289–295; A. Cassese, ‘When May Senior State Oﬃ  cials Be Tried for Interna-
tional Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’, 13 EJIL (2002), pp. 853–875; and 
M. Frulli, Immunità e crimini internazionali (Torino, Giappichelli, 2007).
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establishment of the mens rea for speciﬁ c intent crimes. For example, there is no 
case of an oﬀ ender possessing the genocidal intent in which the general criminal 
context was not also established. Furthermore, particular modes of liability have 
been elaborated to address the collective dimension of international crimes more 
eﬃ  ciently. Th e more international criminal law focuses on and develops tools to deal 
with collective criminality, the more the assessment of individuals’ crimes reveals 
traits of overlap with the assessment of states’ crimes. At a minimum, it deals with 
the same facts that are capable of entailing aggravated state responsibility.
Other aspects can lead to an even more direct link between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes. A number of international law rules need 
to be applied under both state responsibility and international criminal law. Th is 
is, for instance, the case of the rules of international humanitarian law governing 
belligerent reprisals. Another example could be provided by the rules on state 
attribution, if these are conﬁ rmed to be the right standard to determine the nature 
of an armed conﬂ ict.
Furthermore, the strict separation between state and individual responsibility is 
put into question by the fact that at the international level there are organs having 
the power to deal with both state and individual conduct amounting to international 
crimes. In particular, the SC has increasingly addressed issues of individual liability 
and even has a signiﬁ cant role in the enforcement mechanisms of international 
criminal law. For all the reasons pointed out above, the existence of some form of 
relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes 
at the international level seems to be undeniable.
Against this background, the speciﬁ c features of the crime of aggression seem to 
diﬀ erentiate this crime from other international crimes. Th e crime of aggression 
is deﬁ ned in terms of state conduct. Th e material element of aggression entailing 
individual liability corresponds to the deﬁ nition of the state acts of aggression entail-
ing aggravated state responsibility, that is, to those uses of armed force considered 
to be per se among the most serious breaches of obligations owed to the entire 
international community. Aggression is a leadership crime, and only political or 
military state leaders can be convicted for aggression. Even with respect to the mens 
rea, this crime shows a certain overlap between state and individual responsibility. 
Th e same notion of self-defence seems to be applicable to both state and individual 
responsibility for aggression. Th erefore, this crime is at ﬁ rst sight characterized 
by an almost inextricable link between state and individual responsibility under 
international law.2 However, recent developments and in particular the insertion 
2 Th e particular nature of this crime also explains why jurisdiction over aggression can only be exer-
cised by either an international criminal court or the domestic courts of the state of nationality of 
the defendants (see Article 8 of the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind). Th is marks a considerable diﬀ erence with respect to other crimes that can be prosecuted 
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of aggression in the ICC Statute has involved a certain change in perspective. As 
discussed above, considerable eﬀ orts are being made in order to keep the establish-
ment of state and individual responsibility for aggression separate.
2. A Functional Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility for 
 International Crimes
Leaving aside for the moment the crime of aggression, the analysis of the functions 
of state and individual responsibility respectively conﬁ rms the two main results 
illustrated above, that is, the substantial diﬀ erence of these regimes, and at the same 
time the existence of inevitable points of contact between them.
On the one hand, it is generally acknowledged that one of the major diﬀ erences 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes concerns their 
respective functions.3 An analogous diﬀ erence has been pointed out by international 
courts.4 It is maintained that international crimes committed by individuals give rise 
according to the principle of universal jurisdiction (see supra Chapter 1, notes 16–18). According 
to the ILC, “Th is principle of exclusive jurisdiction is the result of the unique character of the 
crime of aggression in the sense that the responsibility of an individual for participation in this 
crime is established by his participation in a suﬃ  ciently serious violation of the prohibition of cer-
tain conduct by States contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Th e aggression attributed to a State is a sine qua non for the responsibility of an individual for his 
participation in the crime of aggression. An individual cannot incur responsibility for this crime 
in the absence of aggression committed by a State. Th us, a court cannot determine the question of 
individual criminal responsibility for this crime without considering as a preliminary matter the 
question of aggression by a State. Th e determination by a national court of one State of the ques-
tion of whether another State had committed aggression would be contrary to the fundamental 
principle of international law par in parem imperium non habet” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of 
its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 30). For a recent case raising the issue of domestic 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, see C. Kress, ‘Th e Iraqi Special Tribunal and the Crime 
of Aggression’, 2 JICJ (2004), pp. 347–352.
3 According to Cassese, “Th e primary goal of [individual] responsibility is to punish the culprit. . . . 
Th e primary goal of [state] responsibility is to bring about cessation of the breach or reparation of 
the damage, not the punishment of the delinquent State; a reparative rather than punitive outlook 
is taken” (A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 271). See also 
P.-M. Dupuy, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsi-
bility of the State’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A 
Commentary, vol. II (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1097; M. Kamto, ‘Responsabilité 
de l’Etat et responsabilité de l’individu pour crime de génocide. Quels mécanismes de mise en 
œuvre?’, in K. Boustany and D. Dormoy (eds.), Génocide(s) (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1999), pp. 500 
and 509; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (Th e Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2005), 
pp. 35–36.
4 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., TC, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 470; and IACHR, 
Velásquez Rodriguez case, supra the Introduction, note 7, para. 134.
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to a set of secondary rules which aim at completely diﬀ erent purposes from those 
characterizing the law of state responsibility. As to the major goals of individual 
criminal liability, reference is generally made to social functions such as punishment 
and deterrence,5 or more generally to forms of social control.6
On the other hand, some authors have supported the existence of a regime of 
state criminal responsibility consisting of the punishment of state organs, and other 
authors have tried to bring individual criminal liability back to the framework of 
more traditional consequences belonging to the law of state responsibility.7 However, 
there is general agreement that the punishment of state organs does not preclude 
the application of the traditional consequences of state responsibility. Th erefore, 
it is generally aﬃ  rmed that individual criminal liability cannot be regarded as a 
substitute for state responsibility.8 Th e criminal liability of state organs is provided 
under customary international law alongside the traditional consequences of state 
responsibility.
Therefore, the question is whether state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes are in fact completely diﬀ erent sets of secondary rules or 
whether, at least under certain circumstances, there is an overlap between these 
regimes as far as their general objectives are concerned. Th e analysis will begin by 
focusing on the functions of international criminal law in order to see whether 
the consequences of state responsibility include measures serving the functions of 
international criminal law. Subsequently, the opposite perspective will be adopted, 
and international criminal law will be examined in the light of the traditional 
functions of state responsibility, with a view to determining whether the punish-
ment of state organs responsible for international crimes could be framed among 
the consequences of the law of state responsibility. Only then will it be possible 
5 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, TC, Judgment, 29 November 1996, paras. 58–65; ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Furundžija, TC, Judgment,10 December 1998, paras. 288–289, and 291; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, TC, Judgment, 3 March 2000, paras. 763–764; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, AC, Judg-
ment, 24 March 2000, para. 185; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., AC, Judgment, 20 February 
2001, para. 806; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Todorović, TC, Judgment, 31 July 2001, para. 28. 
6 M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (Paris, Gallimard, 1975).
7 See supra Chapter 2.
8 See, in particular, C.T. Eustathiades, ‘Les sujets du droit international et la responsabilité interna-
tionale. Nouvelles tendances’, 84 RCADI (1953), p. 603; S.C. McCaﬀ rey, ‘Article 5: Responsibility 
of States’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), Commentaries on the International Law Commission’s 1991 Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Erès, Paris, 1993), pp. 129–130; A. Pellet, 
‘La responsabilité pénale individuelle, alternative aux sanctions collectives?’, in V. Gowlland-Deb-
bas (ed.), United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
2001), p. 105; A.A. Cançado Trinidade, ‘Complementarity between State Responsibility and 
Individual Responsibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: Th e Crime of State Revisited’, 
in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, 
Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), pp. 261, and 267.
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to illustrate the complementarity between state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes.
A. Th e Functions of International Criminal Law and State Responsibility
First of all, it is diﬃ  cult to maintain that state responsibility and international 
criminal law each share a punitive function. Th e regime of state responsibility has 
undergone a long and diﬃ  cult process of codiﬁ cation, but in the end states have 
certainly been reluctant to support the establishment of their criminal responsibility 
for the breach of community obligations.9
Th e Draft Articles adopted by the ILC in 1976 contained a provision, Article 
19, deﬁ ning ‘crimes of States’. However, even Article 19 did not intend to establish 
a criminal responsibility of states. Th e Commentary on Article 19 is very explicit 
on that point:
in adopting the designation ‘international crime’, the Commission intends only to refer 
to ‘crimes’ of the State, to acts attributable to the State as such. Once again it wishes to 
sound a warning against any confusion between the expression ‘international crime’ 
as used in this article and similar expressions, such as ‘crime under international law’, 
‘war crime’, ‘crime against peace’, ‘crime against humanity’, etc., which are used in a 
number of conventions and international instruments to designate certain heinous 
individual crimes.10
Since then, any possible reference to criminal responsibility of states has been deleted 
from the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Moreover, the ILC has eliminated 
the few other elements which could have been related to a regime of criminal state 
 9 See G. Abi-Saab, ‘Th e Uses of Article 19’, 10 EJIL (1999), p. 351; C. Dominicé, ‘La question 
de la double responsabilité de l’Etat et de son agent’, in E. Yakpo and T. Boumedra (eds.), Liber 
Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (Th e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 157, and 
more generally supra Chapter 1.
10 Commentary to Article 19 (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 28th Session’, YILC (1976), vol. II 
(2), para. 59). As Spinedi points out: “the Commission had no intention to link the wrongful 
acts that it called international crimes with consequences of a type unknown to international law 
currently in force. Th e Commission wished to indicate in Draft Article 19 that there are wrongful 
acts regarded by the international community as more serious than all others because they aﬀ ect 
essential interests of the Community. As a consequence, these wrongful acts entail a regime of 
responsibility diﬀ erent from that attaching to other wrongful acts. According to the Commission 
the diﬀ erences relate to the forms of responsibility and to the subjects that may implement it. 
Th is does not mean, however, that the Commission had the intention to attach to these acts forms 
of responsibility similar to those provided in the penal law of modern domestic legal systems” 
(M. Spinedi, ‘International Crimes of State. Th e Legislative History’, in J.H.H. Weiler et al. (eds.), 
International Crimes of State. A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility 
(Berlin, De Gruyter, 1989), p. 52). With respect to the recent ‘decriminalization’ of state respon-
sibility, see also L.-A. Sicilianos, ‘Th e Classiﬁ cation of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension 
of the Relations of International Responsibility’, 13 EJIL (2002), p. 1128.
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responsibility. Th ese are the recognition of punitive damages, speciﬁ c consequences 
of state crimes, and disciplinary or penal action as a form of satisfaction.
With respect to punitive damages,11 the text adopted on the ﬁ rst reading con-
tained Article 45 (2), providing that satisfaction may take the form of “damages 
reﬂ ecting the gravity of the infringement”.12 When he ﬁ rst took this provision into 
account, Special Rapporteur Crawford acknowledged that the ILC had rejected 
the concept of punitive damages for the purposes of Article 45. Moreover, due to 
states’ concern about punitive damages, he proposed that punitive damages should 
be conﬁ ned to Article 19, that is, in the limited framework of the consequences 
of international crimes.13 Accordingly, the Drafting Committee eliminated all 
references to particular damages in the general provision dealing with satisfac-
tion,14 and discussed the possibility of introducing punitive damages in relation 
to aggravated state responsibility only. Th is is why, in 2000, provisional Article 42 
(“Consequences of serious breaches of obligations to the international community 
as a whole”) left open the question by simply stating that a serious breach “may 
involve, for the responsible State, damages reﬂ ecting the gravity of the breach.”15 
A clear position on the issue was ﬁ nally taken by Special Rapporteur Crawford 
in his Fourth Report. First, “damages reﬂ ecting the gravity of the breach” are not 
punitive damages. Second, punitive damages are not permitted under interna-
tional law. Accordingly, Article 42 should be retained but reviewed in the light of 
Governments’ criticism of punitive damages.16 What happened in the end is well 
11 H.W. Briggs (ed.), Th e Law of Nations: Cases, Documents and Notes (New York, Appleton-Cen-
tury-Crofts, 1952), p. 754; I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 148; G. Carella, ‘I punitive damages e la riparazione del danno morale 
in diritto internazionale’, 67 Riv. Dir. Int. (1984), p. 751; C.D. Gray, Judicial Remedies in Interna-
tional Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 26; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law (6th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 464; A. De Hoogh, Obligations Erga 
Omnes and International Crimes. A Th eoretical Inquiry into the Implementation and Enforcement of 
the International Responsibility of States (Th e Hague, Kluwer, 1996), pp. 166–7; N.H.B. Jørgensen, 
‘A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages in International Law’, 68 BYIL (1997), p. 247; N.H.B. 
Jørgensen, Th e Responsibility of States for International Crimes (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 187.
12 ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 67. Th e provision was 
elaborated by G. Arangio-Ruiz in his ‘Fifth Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1993), vol. 
II(1), p. 32.
13 J. Crawford, ‘Th ird Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.1, paras. 174 
and 190.
14 See Article 38 of the text provisionally adopted in 2000 (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.600).
15 Th e position of the Drafting Committee is illustrated in the Statement of the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee Mr. G. Gaja at the 2662nd meeting of the ILC, 17 August 2000, pp. 22 and 
27, <www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/projects/state_responsibility_document_collection.php>.
16 J. Crawford, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/517, para. 45. See also 
IACHR, Velásquez Rodriguez case, Compensatory damages, Judgment, 21 July 1989, Annual Report 
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known. All references to particular damages disappeared from Article 41 of the 
text ﬁ nally adopted in 2001.
Article 52 of the 1996 Draft Articles established two speciﬁ c consequences to 
be attached to the commission of international crimes by states.17 First, the injured 
state was entitled to obtain restitution in kind even if the burden of providing res-
titution was out of all proportion to the beneﬁ t gained by the injured state instead 
of compensation, and even if restitution could seriously jeopardise the political 
independence or economic stability of the responsible state.18 Second, the injured 
state was entitled to obtain satisfaction even with demands which could impair 
the dignity of the responsible state.19 Th ese speciﬁ c consequences have been taken 
into account by Special Rapporteur Crawford, who nonetheless considered them 
to be problematic.20 In particular, with respect to satisfaction, he held that its main 
element “is now proportionality, and there is no need to ‘humiliate’ even a State 
which has committed a gross breach of a community obligation”.21 Accordingly, 
the Special Rapporteur proposed to delete those speciﬁ c consequences. Due to 
the importance of the values underlying international crimes, he proposed other 
speciﬁ c consequences such as punitive damages, additional obligations for third 
states, and a general clause leaving the door open to future developments under 
customary international law.
As noted above, the Drafting Committee rejected Crawford’s proposal on ‘penal’ 
consequences, and Article 52 was replaced with a ‘without prejudice’ clause on 
further consequences arising under international law.22 Th us, Article 41 of the text 
adopted in 2001 makes no reference to consequences with a punitive or humiliat-
ing character, but simply lists a few additional obligations for third states23 and the 
without prejudice clause just mentioned.
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Ser. C, No. 7 (1990), paras. 37–38, and IACtHR, 
Godinez case, Compensatory damages, Judgment, 21 July 1989, Annual Report of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Ser. C, No. 8 (1990), paras. 35–36.
17 ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), p. 76.
18 To be precise, Article 52 established that the restitution was not subject to the limitations set out 
in subparagraphs c) and d) of Article 43 (ibid.).
19 Similarly, Article 52 established that the satisfaction was not subject to the restriction set out in 
paragraph 3 of Article 45 (ibid.).
20 J. Crawford, ‘Th ird Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.4, para. 408. See 
also P.-M. Dupuy, ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique international’, 297 RCADI (2002), p. 367.
21 Ibid., Th is is an important aspect because it shows that even satisfaction is conceived of in com-
pensatory terms rather than punitive.
22 Th e position of the Drafting Committee is illustrated in the Report of its Chairman, G. Gaja (see 
supra note 15). See Article 42, para. 3 of the Draft Articles provisionally adopted in 2000, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.600.
23 Th ese are the duty of co-operation (see supra Chapter 1), the obligation not to recognize as law-
ful a situation created by a serious breach, and the obligation not to render aid or assistance in 
maintaining that situation.
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A third consequence to be taken into account is disciplinary or penal action 
against the responsible individuals. Th is was an undisputed form of satisfaction 
supported by international practice (mostly cases of state responsibility concerning 
the treatment of aliens). Accordingly, the Draft Articles adopted in 1996 estab-
lished that: “in cases where the internationally wrongful act arose from the serious 
misconduct of oﬃ  cials or from the criminal conduct of oﬃ  cials or private parties, 
[satisfaction may take the form of ] disciplinary action against, or punishment of, 
those responsible”.24
Th is general provision on satisfaction was not intended to codify a special conse-
quence of crimes of states. However, it soon raised the question of the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. In particular, 
this provision could have been interpreted as including in general terms individual 
criminal liability among the consequences of wrongful state acts.
Th e approach of Special Rapporteur Crawford was sceptical with respect to this 
particular consequence. He took into account that states’ opinions were rather 
divided on that issue.25 He also aﬃ  rmed that it was not clear “whether prosecution 
of criminal conduct was sought by way of satisfaction or as an aspect of performance 
of some primary obligation”.26 In other words, prosecution of nationals for inter-
national crimes may simply derive from an international obligation to prosecute 
or extradite the perpetrators of such oﬀ ences, which has nothing to do with the 
legal relation between the injured state and the responsible state deriving from the 
commission of a wrongful act and governed by secondary rules. Th e problem was 
then addressed and, in some way solved, by the Drafting Committee: disciplinary 
or penal action, one of the typical consequences of state responsibility, was simply 
omitted from the ﬁ nal text of the Draft Articles.27
Th e same question was brought up again with respect to the consequences of 
crimes of state. Indeed, during the plenary debate it was suggested that the ILC 
took into account the ‘transparency’ of states in case of serious breaches of obliga-
tions towards the international community as a whole.28 In other words, it was 
proposed to consider the criminal liability of state organs for international crimes 
24 Article 45, para. 2 (d), ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 48th Session’, YILC (1996), vol. II(2), 
p. 67.
25 J. Crawford, ‘Th ird Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.1, para. 175.
26 Ibid., para. 192.
27 “Th ere was some discussion in the Plenary and then in the Drafting Committee on the question of 
whether Article 38 [45] should refer, among the modalities of satisfaction, to disciplinary or penal 
action relating to the individuals whose conduct caused the internationally wrongful act. Given 
the divergent views on this issue and also the fact that paragraph 2 does not intend to provide an 
exhaustive list, the Committee decided not to mention disciplinary or penal action in the text”, 
Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee Mr. G. Gaja at the 2662nd meeting of 
the International Law Commission, 17 August 2000, p. 22 (see supra note 15).
28 Ibid., p. 53.
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as a special consequence of state ‘serious breaches’ since aggravated state responsi-
bility was viewed as a pre-condition to bring state organs to trial.29 However, the 
Drafting Committee was “unable to accept this proposal”,30 because
the articles do not address the question of the individual responsibility under inter-
national law of any person acting in the capacity of an organ or an agent of a State. 
While this could already be inferred from the fact that the articles only address the 
issues related to the responsibility of States, the Committee felt that a speciﬁ c provi-
sion added clarity. As a result you have article 58 entitled ‘Individual responsibility’. 
Again this article amounts to a ‘without prejudice clause’.31
Th us, neither the provisional draft of 2000 nor the ﬁ nal text addresses the problem 
of the relationship between the punishment of state organs for international crimes 
and punishment for aggravated state responsibility.32 Th e ‘without prejudice’ clause 
embodied in Article 58 does not exclude the existence of a separate body of inter-
national law governing the responsibility of individuals for international crimes, 
29 Th e theory in question has been strongly supported by A. Pellet, ‘La responsabilité des dirigeants 
pour crime international de l’Etat. Quelques remarques sommaires au point de vue du droit 
international’, in G. Doucet (ed.), Terrorisme, victimes et responsabilité pénale internationale 
(Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 2003): “lorsque l’individu en question est un gouvernant, . . . l’Etat qu’il 
dirige devien[t] ‘transparent’ et . . . les immunités traditionnelles, source d’impunité, disparaissent” 
(p. 198); “l’engagement de la responsabilité personnelle des gouvernants est une manière de sanc-
tionner, concrètement, les comportements étatiques contraires au droit des gens” (p. 200). See also 
A. Pellet, supra note 8, pp. 105–116. Pellet rejects the possibility of considering individual 
criminal liability as an alternative to collective sanctions against states responsible for serious 
breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a whole. However, he puts the 
emphasis on the close link between state and individual responsibility. In particular, he points 
out the fact that, when the exercise of jurisdiction over state organs allegedly responsible for 
international crimes – who are entitled to immunity – is possible, “c’est parce que [l’Etat] a, par 
eux, commis un crime que le voile étatique peut être percé. L’une des conséquences du concept de crime, 
totalement oubliée par le projet d’articles de la CDI, est, en eﬀ et, la ‘transparence’ de l’Etat grâce à 
laquelle la responsabilité des individus par l’intermédiaire desquels il a agi (ou qui ont agi par son 
intermédiaire?) peut être recherchée sans qu’ils puissent se retrancher derrière leurs fonctions oﬃ  cielles” 
(p. 108). See also A. Pellet, ‘Vive le crime! Remarques sur les degrés de l’illicite en droit interna-
tional’, in Le droit international à l’aube du XXI ème siècle – Réﬂ exions de codiﬁ cateurs (New York, 
United Nations, 1997), pp. 287–315, and A. Pellet, ‘Can a State Commit a Crime? Deﬁ nitely, 
Yes!’, 10 EJIL (1999), pp. 425–434.
30 Similarly, the ILC rejected the ‘transparency’ theory and decided not to deal with individual 
criminal liability in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (see ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 
52nd Session’, YILC (2000), vol. II(2), paras. 383 and 388).
31 G. Gaja, Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee at the 2662nd meeting of the 
International Law Commission, 17 August 2000, p. 53, supra note 15.
32 Th e commentary on Article 58 “makes clear that the Articles as a whole do not address any ques-
tion of the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a 
State. It clariﬁ es a matter which could be inferred in any case from the fact that the Articles only 
address issues relating to the responsibility of States” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Ses-
sion’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 142).
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nor does it exclude that there may be a relationship between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes. Th e Commission is silent on this relationship, 
but it seems to start at least from the assumption that these regimes are separate 
and that individual liability cannot exhaust aggravated state responsibility.
Where crimes against international law are committed by State oﬃ  cials, it will often 
be the case that the State itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure 
to prevent or punish them. In certain cases, in particular aggression, the State will 
by deﬁ nition be involved. Even so, the question of individual responsibility is in 
principle distinct from the question of State responsibility. Th e State is not exempted 
from its own responsibility for internationally wrongful conduct by the prosecution 
and punishment of the State oﬃ  cials who carried it out. Nor may those oﬃ  cials hide 
behind the State in respect of their own responsibility for conduct of theirs which is 
contrary to rules of international law which are applicable to them.33
To sum up, there is no doubt that the long work of codiﬁ cation of state responsi-
bility has highlighted a general agreement on the absence of any punitive purpose 
of aggravated state responsibility.34 Th is conﬁ rms the substantive diﬀ erence with 
33 Ibid., para. 3. An analogous position was explicitly held by the ILC in 1976. Th e commentary 
on Article 19 reads: “it must be added at once that it would be wrong to identify the right-duty 
of certain States to punish individuals who have committed such crimes with the ‘special form’ 
of international responsibility applicable to the State in cases of this kind. Th e obligation to pun-
ish personally individuals who are organs of the State and are guilty of crimes against the peace, 
against humanity, and so on does not, in the Commission’s view, constitute a form of international 
responsibility of the State, and such punishment certainly does not exhaust the prosecution of the 
international responsibility incumbent upon the State for internationally wrongful acts which are 
attributed to it in such cases by reason of the conduct of its organs. Punishment of those in charge 
of the State machinery who have started a war of aggression or organized an act of genocide does 
not per se release the State itself from its own international responsibility for such acts. Conversely, 
as far as the State is concerned, it is not necessarily true that any ‘crime under international law’ 
committed by one of its organs for which the perpetrator is held personally liable to punishment, 
despite his capacity as a State organ, must automatically be considered not only as an internation-
ally wrongful act of the State concerned, but also as an act entailing a ‘special form’ of responsi-
bility for that State” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 28th Session’, YILC (1976) vol. II(2), pp. 
103–104). Th e point is further made clear that: “the attribution to the State of an internationally 
wrongful act characterized as an ‘international crime’ is quite diﬀ erent from the incrimination 
of certain individuals-organs for actions connected with the omission of an ‘international crime’ 
of the State, and that the obligation to punish such individual actions does not constitute the 
form of international responsibility specially applicable to a State committing an ‘international 
crime’ or, in any case, the sole form of this responsibility” (ibid., p. 119). See also M. Spinedi, ‘La 
responsabilité de l’État pour ‘crime’: une responsabilité pénale?’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit 
international pénal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), pp. 93–114. 
34 Interestingly, the existence of a criminal regime of state responsibility was excluded by the ICTY 
in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, AC, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of 
the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 29 October 1997, para. 25. See C. Tomuschat, 
‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’, 281 RCADI 
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respect to individual liability for international crimes, which has as its essential 
purpose the punishment of the wrongdoer.
Deterrence is generally regarded as the other fundamental purpose of individual 
criminal liability. Th us, the punishment of individuals responsible for international 
crimes is also conceived of as a future-oriented measure which is able to prevent the 
commission of similar oﬀ ences. From this perspective, can individual convictions 
be regarded as a special consequence of aggravated state responsibility? In other 
words, is there a purpose of deterrence in aggravated state responsibility?
Taking into account the codiﬁ cation of aggravated state responsibility, Article 41 
does not mention such a purpose. Th e only notion which can be considered close 
to deterrence is that of ‘assurances and guarantees of non-repetition’35 embodied in 
Article 30. Th is is a general provision of the regime of ordinary state responsibility, 
and as such it is also applicable in case of serious breaches.36
However, individual criminal liability has never been considered to be a guar-
antee of non-repetition by the ILC. Assurances and guarantees of non-repetition 
are not a special consequence of the regime of aggravated state responsibility. One 
can even doubt that assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are an autono-
mous secondary rule under customary international law. According to the Special 
Rapporteur’s view, they appear rather as a particular form of cessation. Indeed, 
they are essentially associated with the continuation of the breach and, therefore, 
are irrelevant when the breach has ceased.37 In its commentaries, the ILC refers to 
(1999), p. 290; A. Bos, ‘Crimes of State: In Need of Legal Rules?’, in G. Kreijen (ed.), State, Sov-
ereignty, and International Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 235. Th e ICJ 
has recently come to the same conclusion (Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, paras. 
170, and 178).
35 Th e Commentary on Article 30, para. 9, holds that: “they share the characteristics of being 
future-looking and concerned with other potential breaches. Th ey focus on prevention rather 
than reparation” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 90). 
See also P.-M. Dupuy, supra note 20, p. 371.
36 Article 30 is certainly applicable to serious breaches according to the without prejudice clause 
of Article 41, para. 3. Moreover, the special consequences of Article 41 focus on cessation of the 
serious breach. In particular, para. 1 codiﬁ es the duty of co-operation with respect to cessation 
of serious breaches (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), 
p. 113).
37 J. Crawford, ‘Th ird Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507, paras. 53 and 59. 
To be more precise, he concludes that “they are cognate to cessation” (ibid., para. 57). See also 
J. Crawford et al., ‘Th e ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts: Completion of the Second Reading’, 12 EJIL (2001), p. 988 (“assurances and guarantees of 
non-repetition are not necessary part of the legal consequences of an international wrongful act. 
Much will depend on the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the obligation and of 
the breach”, emphasis added).
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the ICJ’s LaGrand case.38 However, in the conception of the ILC assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition “are better treated as an aspect of the continuation 
and repair of the legal relationship aﬀ ected by the breach”.39
Th erefore, it is diﬃ  cult to identify a speciﬁ c purpose of deterrence in aggravated 
state responsibility or particular secondary rules aiming towards that end. Th is 
marks a major diﬀ erence with respect to individual criminal liability. From this 
point of view, aggravated state responsibility can hardly be regarded as a measure 
serving a typical function of individual criminal liability.
B. Th e Functions of State Responsibility and International Criminal Law
Th e relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes 
can be examined from a diﬀ erent point of view. Taking into account the contents 
of aggravated state responsibility, it is possible to see whether the punishment of 
state organs can be assimilated to some of the consequences attached to state seri-
ous breaches under international law. In other words, one may wonder whether 
individual criminal liability can serve the typical functions of state responsibility.
With respect to countermeasures, the question of their function and purpose has 
traditionally been very controversial.40 As noted above, there have been attempts to 
regard the punishment of state organs for international crimes as a speciﬁ c reprisal 
under the law of state responsibility.41 However, when looking more generally at 
the codiﬁ cation work of state responsibility, it seems that the ILC has constantly 
taken a diﬀ erent approach on the matter.42 Indeed, countermeasures are considered 
as exceptional measures which have the aim of inducing the responsible state to 
comply with its obligations. In other words, the general purpose of countermeasures 
is never punitive.43 According to this prevailing approach, it is diﬃ  cult to identify a 
38 ICJ, LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 2001, ICJ 
Reports 2001, p. 466. See also ICJ, Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico 
v. USA), Judgment, 31 March 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 12, in particular, paras. 148–149.
39 Commentary on Article 37, ILC, ‘Report on the work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. 
II(2), para. 11. For a diﬀ erent opinion, see G. Palmisano, ‘Les garanties de non-répétition entre 
codiﬁ cation et réalisation juridictionnelle du droit: à propos de l’aﬀ aire LaGrand’, 106 RGDIP 
(2002), p. 753.
40 See in general C. Focarelli, Le contromisure nel diritto internazionale (Milano Giuﬀ ré, 1994).
41 See supra Chapter 2.
42 Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz in his overview of the literature on the subjects concludes that 
“a broad consensus also exists on the function of the countermeasures taken by the injured State. 
Indeed, while no one questions that they might be adopted to bring about cessation of ‘criminal’ 
conduct or, by way of an extrema ratio, to guarantee reparation lato sensu, nearly all rule out the 
possibility of their being used for purely punitive purposes” (G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Fifth Report on 
State Responsibility’, YILC (1993), vol. II(1), para. 152).
43 J. Crawford, ‘Th ird Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.3, paras. 294 and 
296; Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, G. Gaja, supra note 15, p. 40; A. De 
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connection between state and individual responsibility. With respect to the general 
purpose of countermeasures, it hardly seems possible to consider individual criminal 
liability to be a measure with no punitive purpose which is aimed at guaranteeing 
compliance with states’ primary obligations.
Similarly, individual criminal liability can hardly be regarded as a form of cessa-
tion of the wrongful state act. Th e punishment of state organs that have committed 
international crimes normally takes place after the relevant state serious breaches 
have ceased. Th e same conclusion must be reached, albeit for diﬀ erent reasons, with 
respect to restitution and compensation. It is diﬃ  cult to regard the punishment of 
state organs as a way “to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful 
act was committed”44 or a way to compensate any ﬁ nancially assessable damage 
caused by the internationally wrongful act.45 Th us, these typical consequences of 
the regime of state responsibility do not establish a connection between state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes.
However, a certain link may exist between individual criminal liability and 
state responsibility as far as satisfaction is concerned. Satisfaction can take various 
forms, as recognized by the ILC.46 But there is one particular form of satisfaction, 
which is capable of playing a signiﬁ cant role with respect to state responsibility for 
international crimes, namely, the punishment of the responsible state organs, in 
particular, if it can amount to a ‘declaratory judgment’.47 Th e question may arise 
as to whether the judgment of criminal courts prosecuting state organs for inter-
national crimes can also be conceived of as a form of satisfaction for the injured 
state. In particular, the question concerns judgments pronounced by international 
Hoogh, supra note 11, p. 269. Th e Commentaries on the ﬁ nal text make clear that countermeasures 
are exceptional in character, that they can only be taken “in order to induce the responsible state 
to comply with its obligation”, that they are “intended as instrumental, in other words, since they 
are taken with a view to procuring cessation of and reparation for the internationally wrongful 
act and not by way of punishment, they are temporary in character and must be as far as possible 
reversible in their eﬀ ects in terms of future legal relations between the two States” (Commentary 
on Chapter 2, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 128, paras. 
2, 3, and 6), and, ﬁ nally, that they “are not intended as a form of punishment for the wrongful 
conduct” of states (Commentary on Article 49, ibid., p. 129, para. 1).
44 Article 35 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ibid., p. 96).
45 Article 36 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ibid., p. 98).
46 Under Article 37, para. 2, satisfaction “may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an 
expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate remedy” (ibid., p. 105). Moreover, 
according to the ILC, satisfaction “is the remedy for those injuries, not ﬁ nancially assessable, which 
amount to an aﬀ ront to the State. Th ese injuries are frequently of a symbolic character, arising 
from the very fact of the breach of the obligation, irrespective of its material consequences for the 
State concerned” (commentary on Article 37, ibid., p. 106, para. 3).
47 “One of the most common modalities of satisfaction provided in the case of moral or non-material 
injury to the State is a declaration of the wrongfulness of the act by a competent court or tribunal”, 
Commentary on Article 37, ibid., p. 106, para. 6).
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criminal tribunals. Indeed, when established with the support of the entire inter-
national community, these have been regarded by some authors as ‘measures’ taken 
against the responsible state. Th e crucial issue is thus whether these judgments – 
theoretically limited to individual criminal liability – can also be seen as a general 
recognition of aggravated state responsibility. A positive answer to this question 
has been advanced in the literature. According to Rosenne, “adequate punishment 
of an accused whose acts are attributable to a State may be adequate satisfaction if 
the responsibility of that State is established”.48
Two main remarks can be made with respect to the possibility of regarding 
individual criminal liability as a form of satisfaction under aggravated state respon-
sibility. Th e ﬁ rst one concerns the fact that international criminal tribunals cannot 
ascertain state responsibility. Th ey do not apply the secondary norms governing 
state responsibility. Th eir jurisdiction is limited to natural persons. Th ey focus on 
individual – not state – conduct prohibited under international law. Th e principle 
of individual criminal liability is applied in a rigorous manner. However, there may 
be cases in which there is not such a strict separation between the establishment 
of state responsibility and the establishment of individual liability. In particular, 
there are cases in which the material breach amounting to an international crime 
is established in a very similar way and irrespective of the fact that it entails state 
or individual responsibility. Th e foregoing analysis has revealed that there are 
certain international crimes which are deﬁ ned in terms of state action, and which 
require international tribunals – if not to establish aggravated state responsibility – 
at least to take into account that the relevant individual conduct has taken place 
in the context of a state serious breach before ascribing personal criminal liability. 
International criminal tribunals have increasingly focused their attention on crimes 
committed at the collective level, and have reﬁ ned the tools at their disposal to 
address the collective dimension of international crimes. Th us, it is not possible to 
exclude that the punishment of certain state organs for certain international crimes 
can require, at least indirectly, a previous assessment of the same facts giving rise 
to aggravated state responsibility.
Th e second remark concerns the diﬀ erent nature of ordinary and aggravated 
state responsibility. From a purely bilateral point of view, it is arguably possible to 
regard the punishment of state organs responsible for isolated crimes as a form of 
satisfaction for the injured state in the framework of ordinary state responsibility. 
In this case, both kinds of responsibility originate from the very same conduct. Th is 
hypothesis is more common than one may at ﬁ rst sight imagine. A comprehensive 
study on reparation has pointed out that injured states seldom ask for reparation. 
48 S. Rosenne, ‘State Responsibility and International Crimes: Further Reﬂ ections on Article 19 of 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 30 NYU J. Int’l L. Pol. (1997–1998), p. 164 (emphasis 
added).
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Th ey normally try to obtain the cessation of the wrongful act or the punishment 
of the wrongdoer, and only as a last resort do they adopt countermeasures.49 It 
has been pointed out that satisfaction is characterized by the fact of being a ‘self-
inﬂ icted’ measure,50 which “settles the matter completely and deﬁ nitively”.51 In a 
sense, the state acknowledges that a wrongful act has been committed by one of its 
organs, but at the same time the punishment of the culprit can be seen as a proof 
of the lack of any involvement of the state apparatus considered in its entirety. In 
other words, rather than a secondary obligation properly speaking, satisfaction may 
be better understood as a possibility oﬀ ered to the author state to dissociate itself 
from the responsible organ and avoid other consequences provided for under the 
law of ordinary state responsibility. In this sense, the punishment of state organs 
for isolated crimes by the author state can have a twofold eﬀ ect under international 
criminal law and under ordinary state responsibility, and be regarded as a signiﬁ cant 
point of contact between these two regimes because individual liability can exhaust 
ordinary state responsibility.
By contrast, aggravated state responsibility originates from serious, that is, wide-
spread or systematic, breaches. When there is a general involvement of the state 
apparatus, it is diﬃ  cult to conclude that the punishment of a few state organs is 
capable of settling the matter completely as far as state responsibility is concerned. 
Th e conviction of a state organ by an international criminal tribunal cannot be 
understood as the settlement of a bilateral dispute between the author state and 
the injured state; it is adopted in a multilateral framework. As discussed in previ-
ous chapters, it does not correspond to a judicial assessment of aggravated state 
responsibility, even though it may take into account the same facts that entail state 
responsibility. Th erefore, when there is a general involvement of the state in the 
commission of international crimes, the punishment of isolated state organs can 
hardly be conceived of as a measure that exhausts aggravated state responsibility. 
In a very broad sense, the conviction of state organs for international crimes com-
mitted by the state can be seen as a reaﬃ  rmation of the fundamental principles 
breached, but in no way can it operate as a circumstance precluding aggravated 
state responsibility. Although the punishment of state organs could be included 
in a special notion of satisfaction, it seems appropriate to conclude that this sui 
generis form of satisfaction for the immaterial injury suﬀ ered by the international 
community as a whole does not eliminate the need for the author state to comply 
49 M. Iovane, La riparazione nella teoria e nella prassi dell’illecito internazionale (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 
1990).
50 G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Second Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1989), vol. II(1), p. 42; 
G. Morelli, Nozioni di diritto internazionale, (edn, Padova, Cedam, 1967), p. 358.
51 See B. Conforti, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal Systems (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoﬀ , 
1993), p. 200, and M. Iovane, supra note 49, pp. 200–205.
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with its secondary obligations under the law of state responsibility.52 Th e convic-
tion of isolated state organs would not exhaust aggravated state responsibility and 
would not preclude that the commission of the relevant international crimes by 
the state entails the typical consequences of this regime, in particular, the duty to 
repair the injury caused to another state or to the beneﬁ ciaries of the obligation 
breached. Th e same position has been expressed by the ILC in its commentary on 
former Article 19 on State Responsibility,53 and it has been conﬁ rmed by the ICJ 
in its recent judgment in the Genocide case.54
3. Th e Complementarity Between State and Individual Responsibility 
for International Crimes
Th e functional analysis of state and individual responsibility conﬁ rms the results 
emerging from the study of international practice. In principle, these can be regarded 
as separate and independent regimes. State and individual responsibility are diﬀ er-
ent because they deal with diﬀ erent subjects, apply diﬀ erent legal standards, and 
serve diﬀ erent functions under international law.
However, individual criminal liability and aggravated state responsibility can be 
seen as complementary and, to a certain extent, overlapping regimes.55 As noted 
52 Indeed, with respect to breaches entailing aggravated state responsibility the re-aﬃ  rmation of 
the primary obligation breached can ‘satisfy’ the general interest of the international community, 
but it is arguably not enough to ‘satisfy’ the injured state or the beneﬁ ciaries of the obligation 
breached. In the bilateral framework of ordinary state responsibility, the punishment of state 
organs can be seen as a declaratory judgment suﬃ  cient to settle an interstate dispute. Th e ICJ 
in the Genocide case seems to apply this same reasoning (supra the Introduction, note 1, paras. 
462–465). However, Serbia’s ordinary responsibility arose out of the breach of a due diligence duty 
(for not having prevented or punished the commission of genocide). Th erefore, it is disputable 
whether a duty of reparation was still owed in that case (see C. Tomuschat, ‘Reparation in Cases 
of Genocide’, 5 JICJ (2007), pp. 907–911). What can be inferred, a contrario, from the reading 
of the ICJ’s judgment (para. 462) is that, had Serbia been found responsible for having directly 
committed genocide – that is, in the framework of aggravated state responsibility – a declaratory 
judgment would not have been enough, and it would not have exhausted other secondary rules, 
such as compensation.
53 “Punishment of those in charge of the State machinery who have started a war of aggression or 
organized an act of genocide does not per se release the State itself from its own international 
responsibility for such acts” (ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 28th Session’, YILC (1976), vol. 
II(2), p. 104).
54 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, paras. 173–174.
55 For a similar view, see H. Gros Espiell, ‘International Responsibility of the State and Individual 
Criminal Responsibility in the International Protection of Human Rights’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), 
International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 
2005), p. 160, and A.A. Cançado Trinidade, ‘Complementarity between State Responsibility and 
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above, state and individual responsibility for international crimes share the same 
origin, that is, the breach of the most important obligations owed to the interna-
tional community as a whole. Th e types of conduct to which those obligations 
correspond entail a dual responsibility because the international legal order considers 
it to be necessary to attach two complementary – diﬀ erent but overlapping – sets 
of consequences, neither of which can exhaust the other.
Nonetheless, a generic statement on the complementarity between state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes does not say much about the 
precise relationship between these regimes. As summarized above, the study of 
international practice has indicated the existence of a considerable number of points 
of contact between individual criminal liability and aggravated state responsibil-
ity. Th e functional analysis of state and individual responsibility for international 
crimes conﬁ rms that these regimes are separate and at the same time that there are 
links between them. Indeed, at least with respect to isolated international crimes, 
individual criminal liability of state organs can be seen as a particular form of 
satisfaction under the law of ordinary state responsibility. With respect to crimes 
entailing a dual responsibility under international law, there is always a certain 
kind of relationship between these regimes, or more precisely between individual 
criminal liability and ordinary state responsibility. What remains to be established 
is the general framework capable of explaining the complementarity between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes.
Individual Responsibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: Th e Crime of State Revisited’, in 
M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, 
Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), pp. 258, 260, and 268. According to the latter author, state and indi-
vidual responsibility must be regarded as complementary to each other and ineluctably intertwined, 
“despite the insuﬃ  cient development of the matter, reﬂ ected in the persistent compartmentalized 
approach to the international responsibility of the State and the international criminal responsibil-
ity of individuals”. 
Chapter 9
Towards a Dual Responsibility Paradigm?
Coming now to the determination of a general framework capable of explaining the 
relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes, we 
can take, as a starting point, an observation which has already been put forward. 
When international crimes entail a dual responsibility, international practice shows 
that the elements of individual criminal liability can only be established by duly 
taking into account the general criminal context; that there are defences that must 
be applied in a consistent manner under both regimes; and that there are modes 
of liability speciﬁ cally aimed at addressing the collective nature of international 
crimes. In particular, when political and military leaders are charged with large-
scale crimes, individual criminal liability tends to be established in a way which 
is very similar to that used to prove aggravated state responsibility. All in all, with 
respect to certain crimes there are direct links between the establishment of state 
responsibility and the establishment of individual responsibility.
Th us, having found that a certain relationship between these regimes of inter-
national responsibility for international crimes emerges from empirical analysis, 
the ﬁ nal question to be examined here concerns the identiﬁ cation of a general 
framework that can explain the diﬀ erent elements of this relationship which result 
from international practice. To answer this question it is necessary to go back to 
the conceptual schemes described in Part I, and to evaluate whether and to what 
extent these general approaches are a useful guide in describing the complementar-
ity between state and individual responsibility.
1. Th eoretical Approaches and the Complementarity Between State and 
Individual Responsibility for International Crimes
International practice shows that neither the individual-oriented conceptual scheme 
nor the state-oriented conceptual scheme is, in its entirety, capable of explaining 
the variety of the relationship between state and individual responsibility for all 
international crimes.
According to a pure individual-oriented conceptual scheme as described in Part I, 
aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability are not only governed 
by diﬀ erent sets of secondary norms but they also originate from diﬀ erent primary 
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norms. However, the analysis of international practice carried out in Part II reveals 
that such a complete separation, in particular with respect to primary norms, is 
not justiﬁ ed. Among other crimes, war crimes are a clear example of international 
crimes prohibited under primary norms aiming at both state and individual conduct. 
For example, the violation of the same ‘intransgressible’ principles of international 
humanitarian law entails both state and individual responsibility.1 But it is also 
possible to recall other articulations of primary norms intended to narrow, under 
speciﬁ c circumstances, the scope of certain prohibited conduct, and directed at 
both states and individuals, such as self-defence with respect to the prohibition 
of aggression or belligerent reprisals with respect to certain war crimes. In such 
cases, the relevant conduct cannot be regarded as a breach of a primary norm and 
therefore it is perfectly lawful under international law independently of the fact 
that it has been carried out by states or individuals. Accordingly, if a certain use 
of force amounts to a legitimate action taken in self-defence or if a certain type of 
conduct represents a lawful belligerent reprisal, it cannot entail either aggravated 
state responsibility or individual criminal liability. In addition, international crimes 
are commonly collective criminal acts whose material element is established in 
very similar, if not identical, ways from the standpoint of both state and individual 
responsibility.
According to a pure state-oriented conceptual scheme as described in Part I, 
state and individual responsibility are not only governed by the same primary 
norms, they also belong to the same set of secondary norms governing the special 
consequences to be attached to the commission of international crimes by states. 
However, the analysis of international practice reveals that such a complete overlap, 
in particular, of secondary norms, is not justiﬁ ed. One may recall the fact that the 
consequences especially provided for under international criminal law also apply 
to international crimes committed by private individuals and the punishment of 
such individuals has nothing to do with state responsibility. More generally, the 
functional analysis of the regimes of state and individual responsibility has shown 
how diﬃ  cult it is to include a traditional criminal sanction, such as the punish-
ment of those state organs who are responsible for international crimes, among the 
secondary rules governing aggravated state responsibility. In particular, these two 
regimes diﬀ er as to some of their basic requirements, such as the mens rea which is 
a characterizing feature of international criminal law. As discussed above, even if 
the punishment of state organs for the commission of isolated international crimes 
could be regarded as a measure that, under certain circumstances, can preclude 
ordinary state responsibility from arising, this would not be true with respect to 
aggravated state responsibility, that is, the consequences to be attached to the serious 
breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a whole.
1 See supra Chapter 5, note 36.
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More generally, the individual-oriented scheme is problematic because it tends 
to reduce international crimes to private facts, when they are normally carried out 
as large scale or systematic oﬀ ences which require the involvement of a plurality of 
organized perpetrators, if not the state itself. In so doing, it removes the connection 
with state responsibility. Th e state-oriented scheme has the advantage of taking into 
account the relationship between state and individual responsibility for international 
crimes. However, in order to be regarded as a special consequence under the law 
of state responsibility, individual criminal liability is so closely connected to state 
responsibility that, in the end, the relationship between these regimes fades out 
and, ultimately, disappears.
Th e second option is to consider that the state-oriented and the individual-
oriented conceptual schemes have no general application, but they can both be 
useful in explaining the relationship between state and individual responsibility 
with respect to diﬀ erent categories of international crimes. In fact, one may be 
tempted to say that these two theoretical schemes should not be set aside; that 
a separation can be re-introduced in the evaluation of the results emerging from 
the analysis of international practice; and that the state-oriented scheme and the 
individual-oriented scheme have two diﬀ erent, albeit limited, scopes of validity.
Th is is an interesting option because it can help to solve, for example, the problem 
of the particular nature of the crime of aggression.2 Th ere would be two diﬀ erent 
kinds of relationship between state and individual responsibility governed by the 
state-oriented scheme and the individual-oriented scheme respectively. One would 
be used for crimes rigorously deﬁ ned in terms of state action and whose punish-
ment can be regarded as a special sanction towards the author state, and the other 
for crimes deﬁ ned in terms of individual conduct and whose punishment has 
nothing to do with state responsibility. Th erefore, the relationship between state 
and individual responsibility would not necessarily be explained according to the 
same abstract scheme for all international crimes, and for example the crime of 
aggression could be treated diﬀ erently from crimes against humanity.
However, this option necessarily posits the possibility to classify international 
crimes in two separate groups according to their nature, and requires the relation-
ship between state and individual responsibility for each category of international 
crimes to vary in correspondence to one of the general schemes described above. 
Th is assumption can hardly be veriﬁ ed both from a practical and a theoretical 
point of view.
2 See B.V.A. Röling, Th e Tokyo Trial and Beyond. Reﬂ ections of a Peacemonger (Cambridge MA, Polity 
Press, 1993), pp. 65–70 and 98–100. Th is author seems to implicitly adopt a similar view. Putting 
the emphasis on the peculiarity of the crime of aggression, he suggests that while this crime is 
characterized by a very close relationship between state and individual responsibility, a diﬀ erent 
solution could be adopted with respect to other international crimes.
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On the one hand, this option presupposes the existence of a category of indi-
vidual crimes based on a complete dissociation between the conduct of the state and 
that of natural persons, and entailing no relationship between state and individual 
responsibility. In particular, the punishment of those responsible for such crimes 
depends on the application of primary and secondary norms that are totally separate 
from those governing aggravated state responsibility. It is true that international 
practice shows a tendency to keep state and individual responsibility separate, and 
to apply the principle of individual criminal liability in a very rigorous manner. It is 
also true that certain international crimes can be carried out by isolated individu-
als on their own initiative, and not as a consequence of a state or group criminal 
policy.3 However, the foregoing analysis has revealed that even though these are 
isolated crimes, the same prohibition applies to states and that, if committed by 
state organs, they entail at least ordinary state responsibility. Th is is, for example, 
what happens with war crimes that can be perpetrated in perfect isolation by single 
soldiers or the autonomous crime of torture. Th e breach of these primary norms 
always entails a dual responsibility under international law, because individual 
criminal liability for such crimes overlaps with state responsibility.
On the other hand, this option presupposes the existence of a separate category 
of international crimes based on the identity between the conduct of the state and 
that of its organs, and in respect of which the punishment of the responsible state 
organs can be seen as a sanction against the author state. In the works of inter-
national law scholars it is possible to ﬁ nd various references to “system crimes”,4 
“state-sponsored crimes”,5 and crimes committed by the “state as a whole”.6 How-
ever, these scholars do not appear to agree on a precise deﬁ nition of this category of 
3 See the deﬁ nition of individual crimes advanced by B.V.A. Röling, ‘Aspects of the Criminal 
Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Th e New Humanitarian 
Law of Armed Conﬂ ict (Napoli, Editoriale Scientiﬁ ca, 1980), p. 203, and P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Interna-
tional Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsibility of the State’, in 
A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, vol. II 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1088. 
4 B.V.A. Röling, ‘Th e Signiﬁ cance of the Laws of War’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Current Problems of 
International Law (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1975), pp. 137–139; A. Bos, ‘Crimes of State: In Need of 
Legal Rules?’, in G. Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002), passim.
5 B.M. Yarnold, ‘Th e Doctrinal Basis for the International Criminalization Process’, in M.C. Bassiouni 
(ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 1999), p. 148.
6 A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in Inter-
national Law’, 52 ICLQ (2003), p. 623. Similarly, some Italian authors refer to crimes “riconducibili 
alla complessiva organizzazione dello Stato”. See M. Iovane, La tutela dei valori fondamentali nel diritto 
internazionale (Napoli, Editoriale scientiﬁ ca, 2000), pp. 516, and 560–561; P. De Sena, Diritto 
internazionale e immunità funzionale degli organi statali (Milano, Giuﬀ ré, 1996), pp. 167, 176, 
182, and 185–187; F. Lattanzi, ‘Riﬂ essioni sulla competenza di una Corte penale internazionale’, 
76 Riv. Dir. Int. (1993), p. 674.
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international crimes, which must necessarily be committed by states. Th e analysis 
of international practice has revealed that only the crime of aggression requires 
an explicit link between the establishment of the state act of aggression and the 
crime of aggression entailing individual criminal liability, and that the same could 
probably be said of certain war crimes which require a larger involvement of the 
state military apparatus to be carried out.
However, this overlap of primary norms whose breach entails both state and indi-
vidual responsibility does not automatically imply a corresponding unity at the level 
of secondary norms. If we take aggression, for instance, the study of international 
practice shows that the regime of individual criminal liability remains separated 
from the regime of aggravated state responsibility. Not only there is a tendency to 
maintain a separation in the establishment of state and individual responsibility for 
aggression, but a ﬁ nding of (aggravated) state responsibility for aggression does not 
automatically entail the individual criminal liability of state leaders for the same 
serious breach. Individuals can always be found not guilty because they lacked the 
required mens rea, or they could rely on speciﬁ c defences.7
Th us, one is led to assume that the fact that state and individual responsibility 
originate from the same material act of aggression does not necessarily imply that 
they are governed by the same secondary rules. As discussed above, the seriousness 
of the breach and the nature of the primary norm breached are the reasons why 
the conviction of a state leader for aggression cannot substitute the traditional 
consequences entailed under the law of state responsibility with respect to the 
author state.
Accordingly, this second option must also be set aside, since it can hardly be 
reconciled with the results emerging from the analysis of international practice. If 
it is particularly diﬃ  cult to identify two separate categories of pure individual and 
state crimes, it is even more diﬃ  cult to accept this option from a theoretical view-
point. In fact, it would result in the parallel application of two conceptual schemes 
which in the end deny any relationship between state and individual responsibility 
for international crimes. Th is second option has the merit of reﬂ ecting the diﬀ erent 
features of certain international crimes, but from a theoretical viewpoint it seems 
no more than an escamotage to set aside again the legal relationship between these 
regimes. Although many clues point to the existence of such a relationship, this 
approach seems incapable of capturing its precise content.
7 See A. Gattini, Le riparazioni di guerra nel diritto internazionale (Padova, Cedam, 2003), p. 689.
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2. Th e Th eoretical Framework Explaining the Complementarity Between 
State and Individual Responsibility for International Crimes
Th e elaboration of a general framework capable of explaining the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes can only be 
based on the outcomes of the analysis of international practice.
International practice undoubtedly shows a certain complementarity between 
these regimes. Complementarity, however, remains a vague concept. To explain in 
its entirety the relationship between state and individual responsibility for interna-
tional crimes, two apparently diverging aspects must be taken into account. First, 
the theoretical framework should be capable of explaining the separation of these 
regimes. Second, it must at the same time explain the various points of contact 
between these regimes which emerged from the foregoing analysis. In other words, 
one is inevitably brought to the conclusion that the sole general framework capable 
of explaining international practice in its entirety is a conceptual scheme according 
to which state and individual responsibility originate from the same primary rules 
but are governed by diﬀ erent sets of secondary rules.8
From a very general standpoint, this particular conception of the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes can help to illus-
trate the fact that diverging views have been expressed by international law scholars 
in this regard. Indeed, it can explain why some authors have focused on the close 
links between these regimes, while others have rather pointed out the diﬀ erences.9 
Similarly, the position adopted by the ILC and in particular the ‘without prejudice’ 
clauses inserted in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility and the Draft Code 
of Crimes respectively become clearer if one takes into account the need to keep 
the codiﬁ cation of these two sets of secondary norms separate, without excluding 
a certain overlap, and therefore a certain relationship between them.10 Indeed, the 
challenging aspect of dealing with this relationship is to insert these regimes in a 
unitary legal framework without losing sight of their diﬀ erences. Th e proposed 
conceptual scheme – according to which state and individual responsibility for 
 8 For a historical explanation of the overlap of primary norms prohibiting core international crimes 
with respect to both states and individuals, see P. Fois, ‘Sul rapporto tra i crimini internazionali 
dello Stato e i crimini internazionali dell’individuo’, 87 Riv. Dir. Int. (2004), pp. 929–954. See 
also N.L. Reid, ‘Bridging the Conceptual Chasm: Superior Responsibility as the Missing Link 
between State and Individual Responsibility under International Law’, 18 Leiden Journal of Inter-
national Law (2005), p. 797, who starts from the premise that state and individual responsibility 
“share origins depending on the primary obligations concerned, but they diverge when it comes 
to their practical content”. However, Reid does not venture to demonstrate the validity of that 
basic assumption.
 9 See supra Chapter 2.
10 See supra Chapter 1.
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international crimes share a common origin but are governed by diﬀ erent sets of 
secondary norms – is an attempt to explain both sides of the complementarity 
between state and individual responsibility.
More speciﬁ cally, this conceptual scheme seems capable of providing a general 
framework for the solution of the various problems entailed by the relationship 
and examined in Part II. Th e foregoing analysis of international practice shows that 
these problems substantially concern the need for a certain co-ordination between 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes. Th e mere need for co-
ordination points to the existence of a legal relationship between these regimes, 
a co-ordination which otherwise would make no sense between two completely 
separate ﬁ elds of international law. Th erefore, the proposed conceptual scheme 
is shaped in a way which makes it possible to justify the co-ordination and the 
consistent application of two diﬀ erent sets of secondary rules both aiming at the 
protection of the most important obligations owed to the international community 
as a whole.
First, positing the unity of state and individual responsibility for international 
crimes at the level of primary norms is essential to determine the actual content 
of the relationship between these two regimes, as revealed by the analysis of inter-
national practice.
A crucial element of this relationship is the correspondence of the conduct 
amounting to an international crime and giving rise to both state and individual 
responsibility. Th erefore, conduct triggering a dual responsibility under international 
law cannot be qualiﬁ ed diﬀ erently (i.e., as lawful or unlawful) according to whether 
that conduct is assessed from the perspective of state versus individual responsibility. 
Th ere is little doubt that the same prohibition of aggression is provided for under 
a primary norm directed at both states and individuals. Th us, the same conduct (a 
state act of aggression) simultaneously leads to aggravated state responsibility and 
individual criminal liability under international law. Th e foregoing analysis shows 
that the same is true with respect to war crimes and torture, whose deﬁ nition is: 
provided for under speciﬁ c international conventions; corresponds to customary 
international law; and applies to both individual crimes and state wrongful acts.11 
Similarly, the prohibition of genocide provided for under customary international 
law and codiﬁ ed in the 1948 Convention is aimed at both state and individual 
conduct.12 Finally, as discussed above, crimes against humanity do share a common 
11 Th e ILC, in its Commentary on Article 40 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ILC, 
‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 84), recognizes aggravated 
state responsibility for breaches of international humanitarian law, and for torture as deﬁ ned in 
Article 1 of the 1984 Convention (para. 5).
12 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1.
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deﬁ nition under both state and individual responsibility because they essentially 
include widespread and systematic violations of fundamental human rights.
Understood from this perspective, the unity of primary norms can satisfactorily 
explain the relationship between state and individual responsibility with respect 
to the elements of international responsibility examined above. As discussed in 
previous chapters, this relationship is not always clear because a certain conceptual 
confusion may concern the precise qualiﬁ cation of these elements as primary or 
secondary norms.
A good example comes from the consideration of the seriousness requirement. 
Although the issue may be controversial, the foregoing analysis leads to the conclu-
sion that it is a requirement under the secondary rules of aggravated state respon-
sibility. Th e seriousness element has no corresponding general requirement under 
international criminal law. As such, seriousness is a speciﬁ c feature of aggravated 
state responsibility that needs not be co-ordinated with, and is independent from, 
the requirements of international criminal law. In practice, the existence of such a 
threshold in aggravated state responsibility does not exclude that the same conduct 
amounting to international crimes but not reaching the required degree of serious-
ness entail both individual criminal liability and ordinary state responsibility, as 
may happen for instance with respect to isolated war crimes. However, with respect 
to certain international crimes, the seriousness requirement is directly provided 
for under the relevant primary norms whose breach triggers a dual responsibility 
under international law. Th is is, for instance, the case of aggression or crimes against 
humanity. In such cases, the seriousness of the prohibited conduct represents an 
element common to both state and individual responsibility. To see whether both 
regimes are implicated by the same ‘serious’ conduct one needs only look at the 
way in which the relevant breaches are established. Th e analysis of international 
practice has shown that the same methodology is used to ascertain the carrying out 
of those collective crimes that are capable of triggering a dual responsibility under 
international law.13 Th e material element of collective crimes is normally established 
having regard ﬁ rst to the general criminal context and then to the participation 
of the accused in this general context. Th is is conﬁ rmed by the increasing reliance 
on modes of collective liability (such as joint criminal enterprise) and the way 
in which these speciﬁ c features of international criminal law have actually been 
interpreted and applied in international case law.14 Th erefore, when seriousness 
is a common element of state and individual responsibility (because it is directly 
provided for under the relevant primary norms), it is possible to conclude that it is 
essentially assessed in an analogous way under both aggravated state responsibility 
and individual criminal liability.
13 See supra Chapter 3.
14 See supra Chapter 6.
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Similar reasoning can be applied to the mens rea/fault element. Th e mens rea is 
a speciﬁ c requirement under international criminal law. While it has no formal 
correspondence under state responsibility, the latter body of international law 
does not exclude that the fault of the state may be taken into account if required 
by the relevant primary norms. Th e classical example is the crime of genocide. At 
ﬁ rst sight, this element might also be seen as potentially problematic, because it 
is unclear whether and to what extent it can entail a relationship between these 
regimes. However, from the standpoint of the proposed conceptual scheme, the 
relationship between state and individual responsibility is limited to those primary 
norms requiring a mens rea/fault element to trigger both kinds of responsibility. Th e 
foregoing analysis has revealed that what might have appeared to be a diverging 
element has proved to be a much closer link between state and individual respon-
sibility.15 While an overlap of the notions of mens rea and fault can be justiﬁ ed with 
respect to isolated crimes, as far as collective crimes are concerned these elements are 
established in a very similar way under both state and individual responsibility.
Th e unity of primary norms is also useful to explain another element of the rela-
tionship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. Th e 
need to proceed with a consistent application of certain international norms (such 
as self-defence or belligerent reprisals) under both state and individual responsibil-
ity has just been recalled above. Th ese rules can be conceived of as articulations of 
primary norms intended to narrow the scope of certain unlawful conduct. Th us, 
self-defence limits the scope of the crime of aggression and belligerent reprisals 
limit the scope of certain war crimes. Accordingly, the material conduct (of states or 
individuals) which can be justiﬁ ed as self-defence or belligerent reprisals cannot be 
unlawful under international law. A consistent application of these primary norms 
implies a clear link between state and individual responsibility for international 
crimes, or rather that neither state nor individual responsibility can be triggered 
with respect to conduct that is regarded as lawful under international law.16
Th e main consequence of the described unity at the level of primary norms is 
that the material conduct amounting to an international crime is the same under 
both regimes of international responsibility.17 Once established for the purpose 
of, for example, state responsibility, the same conduct is relevant for (consistently) 
ascertaining individual criminal liability. In other words, there is a correspondence 
in the assessment of the structural elements of international crimes under both 
regimes of international responsibility. Th is link between the establishment of state 
15 See supra Chapter 4.
16 See supra Chapter 5.
17 For an analogous view as regards the crime of genocide, see E. Cannizzaro, ‘Interconnecting 
International Jurisdictions: A Contribution from the Genocide Decision of the ICJ’, 1 European 
Journal of Legal Studies (2007), <www.ejls.eu>.
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responsibility and the establishment of individual responsibility for international 
crimes has recently been conﬁ rmed by the ICJ in the Genocide case. Th e Court 
noted that the fact-ﬁ nding process of the ICTY falls within the evidence that merits 
special attention in the determination of state responsibility,18 and it concluded that 
the relevant ﬁ ndings of fact made by the Tribunal at trial “should in principle be 
accepted as highly persuasive”.19 Another example concerns the situation in Darfur. 
Th e UN Commission of Inquiry had the task of establishing whether international 
crimes had occurred in that region, and the ICC actually relies on this previous 
establishment of the relevant facts when it has to pronounce on questions relat-
ing to the individual criminal liability of single defendants.20 Th is does not mean 
that both state and individual responsibility are simultaneously and automatically 
ascertained. Th is requires a further step consisting of the application of the diﬀ er-
ent rules governing aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability 
respectively. In other words, the (common) primary international norm concerns 
a certain prohibited material conduct. But it does not deﬁ ne its scope ratione 
personae. Th us, the determination of the applicable responsibility regime and, 
accordingly, the consequences of the commission of the crime depend on speciﬁ c 
international rules on attribution and the relevant secondary rules governing either 
state or individual responsibility.
Second, the proposed conceptual scheme posits the separation of the sets of 
secondary norms governing aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal 
liability respectively. Th e foregoing analysis of international practice presents a col-
lection of cases in which the separation and diﬀ erences between the regime of state 
responsibility and that of individual criminal liability have been consistently reaf-
ﬁ rmed. In particular, the establishment of state responsibility is independent from 
the establishment of state organs’ criminal responsibility, and state responsibility for 
international crimes can be ascertained even though no state organ has previously 
been convicted for the same breaches allegedly committed at the state level.
18 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, para. 214. On the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
ICJ and the ICC, see M. Boot, Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine 
Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Antwerpen, Oxford, 
New York, Intersentia, 2002), pp. 62–65. Th e jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals is 
only marginally taken into account by Y. Shany, Th e Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts 
and Tribunals (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 39–40.
19 Ibid., para. 223. In fact, the Court saw no reason to depart from the similar ﬁ ndings of the ICTY, 
and concluded that the acts committed at Srebrenica were to be qualiﬁ ed as acts of genocide under 
international law (paras. 296–297). See also S. Rosenne, ‘War Crimes and State Responsibility’, 
in Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory (eds.), War Crimes in International Law (Th e Hague, M. Nijhoﬀ , 
1996), p. 104. 
20 See, for example, ICC, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007, paras. 59 and 
75, <www.icc-cpi.int>.
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More generally, the foregoing analysis has revealed the separation between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes lies at the level of the secondary 
rules. In particular, this separation concerns the diﬀ erent requirements and func-
tions characterizing the two regimes of responsibility for international crimes.
For example, the seriousness requirement diﬀ erentiates aggravated state responsi-
bility from individual criminal liability when this element is not present as a general 
requirement of the relevant crime under international criminal law. As in the case 
of the autonomous crime of torture, the same conduct amounting to oﬃ  cial tor-
ture and entailing individual criminal liability cannot also lead to aggravated state 
responsibility if it is not carried out in a widespread or systematic way.21
To give another example, the mens rea requirement remains a general feature of 
international criminal law, even though fault can play a role under state responsi-
bility with respect to certain international crimes. Accordingly, the same conduct 
amounting to an international crime and entailing aggravated state responsibility 
cannot also lead to individual criminal liability where the mens rea is not proved 
beyond any reasonable doubt.
Th e functional analysis of state and individual responsibility conﬁ rms that 
these regimes pursue diﬀ erent objectives and are substantively diﬀ erent. Indeed, 
this separation easily explains the fact that state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes are generally ascertained by diﬀ erent bodies at the international 
level. While the unity at the level of primary norms can justify the existence of 
international bodies competent to adopt measures against both states and individu-
als responsible for the commission of international crimes, this situation can be 
problematic because one single organ would be called to adopt measures serving 
diﬀ erent functions at the international level.22
As already noted, even with respect to the crime of aggression a separation in the 
establishment of state and of individual responsibility is maintained. Th e reason 
for this separation lies in the completely diﬀ erent nature of state and individual 
responsibility. A distinction in the application of the rules pertaining to interna-
tional criminal law and aggravated state responsibility respectively is maintained 
even though the relevant crime is deﬁ ned in terms of state action and a previous 
determination of state responsibility is necessary to proceed against the defendants. 
Th is is not to deny that there are particularly close ties between state and individual 
responsibility for aggression, but these links do not justify a diﬀ erent solution as 
far as the independence of secondary norms of state and individual responsibility 
are concerned.
Th is general framework proves useful to explain two ﬁ nal aspects concerning the 
relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes. 
21 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para. 142.
22 See supra Chapter 7.
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As illustrated above, one of the major consequences of the described separation at 
the level of secondary norms is that state organs’ criminal liability cannot substitute 
aggravated state responsibility for the same serious breach. However, the foregoing 
analysis has pointed out that under particular circumstances the punishment of 
state organs responsible for isolated international crimes can exhaust ordinary state 
responsibility for the same conduct. Th e reason for this apparently problematic 
solution is that individual responsibility in this case is better understood as a measure 
capable of preventing the relevant conduct from being regarded as unlawful. By 
contrast, with respect to serious crimes committed with a general involvement of 
the state apparatus it is not possible to regard the punishment of a few state organs 
as a measure exhausting aggravated state responsibility.23
On the other hand, the proposed conceptual scheme in no way intends to dis-
regard another aspect emerging from the study of international practice, namely, 
the need to apply consistently certain international rules provided for under either 
state or individual responsibility where these rules are called into question in con-
nection with the other body of international law. For example, there are cases in 
which the establishment of state and individual responsibility requires the applica-
tion of the same legal standard. From the standpoint of state responsibility, the ICJ 
has recently made clear that the conviction of state organs is not a pre-requisite 
for holding a state responsible for international crimes.24 Th erefore, it is less likely 
that an international court dealing with state responsibility may need to apply the 
standards of international criminal law. Th is does not imply that, if an international 
court relies on international criminal law notions, it should not try to apply such 
23 See supra Chapter 8.
24 See ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, paras. 180–182 (“State responsibility can 
arise under the Convention for genocide and complicity, without an individual being convicted of 
the crime or an associated one”, para. 182). However, the judgment of the ICJ has been criticized 
for applying categories of international criminal law to the diﬀ erent issue of state responsibility for 
genocide. See A. Cassese, ‘On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility 
for Genocide’, 5 JICJ (2007), pp. 875–887. In particular, P. Gaeta, ‘Génocide d’Etat et responsabilité 
pénale individuelle’, 111 RGDIP (2007), p. 276, holds that: “La responsabilité pénale individuelle 
pour génocide, dans les diﬀ érentes modalités prévues par la Convention, devient ainsi simplement la 
condition préalable de la responsabilité internationale de l’Etat. La Cour internationale de Justice se 
charge elle-même de constater cette responsabilité personnelle en déclarant vouloir appliquer les critères 
élevés d’établissement de la preuve normalement requis lorsqu’on a aﬀ aire à des accusations d’une telle 
gravité”. However, these two issues should be examined separately. With respect to the second 
issue concerning the standard of proof, it is true that the judgment of the ICJ is not entirely clear. 
Th e Court ﬁ rst adopted as general standard of proof a “fully conclusive” standard (para. 209), 
but then it applied to a typical question of state responsibility (i.e., de facto agency determination) 
the much more demanding “beyond reasonable doubt” standard (para. 422), which is typical of 
criminal law proceedings. On this speciﬁ c issue, see A. Gattini, ‘Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ’s 
Genocide Judgment’, 5 JICJ (2007), pp. 889–904.
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notions consistently.25 However, it is from the standpoint of international criminal 
law that international practice shows the most interesting cases in which the rules 
pertaining to the law of state responsibility have been called into question. Similar 
cases generally concern the application of rules of state responsibility to prelimi-
nary questions that are essential to establish the existence of a breach amounting 
to an international crime. Accordingly, it seems logical that the same rules should 
be applied in a consistent manner, independently of the speciﬁ c ﬁ eld of interna-
tional law in which they may be at stake.26 For example, the rules on state agency 
determination must be consistently applied under the law of state responsibility 
and, if necessary, by international criminal tribunals having to decide the nature 
of an armed conﬂ ict.
Finally, the described theoretical framework for the relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes covers the diﬀ erent degrees of 
this relationship. Indeed, the relationship between state and individual responsibility 
can vary according to the diﬀ erent features of international crimes.
It is certainly true that there are crimes deﬁ ned in terms of pure individual 
conduct. With respect to such individual crimes, there may nonetheless be a link 
between individual criminal liability and ordinary state responsibility, because for 
example defences must be co-ordinated or because the punishment of state organs 
can be seen as a form of satisfaction for the injured state. Or there may be a rela-
tionship between individual criminal liability and aggravated state responsibility 
if the same legal standards are applicable, as in the case of oﬃ  cial torture and the 
need to apply the rules on state agency determination.
At the other end of the spectrum, it is possible to identify a few crimes rigor-
ously deﬁ ned in terms of state conduct, such as the crime of aggression. With 
respect to these crimes, there is certainly a much closer relationship between 
individual criminal liability and aggravated state responsibility. For example, with 
respect to aggression, a preliminary determination of the state act of aggression is 
necessary to proceed with the prosecution of state leaders. Th e determination of 
state aggression can be seen as one of the elements of the establishment of state 
leaders’ criminal liability. Moreover, the relationship between state and individual 
responsibility for this category of crimes can concern other elements of crime, as 
for example defences.
In the middle lies the most critical category of international crimes, those address-
ing prohibited conduct that can only be carried out at the collective level. Th ese 
25 On this speciﬁ c issue, see A. Cassese, supra note 24, pp. 875–887. More generally, on the need to 
avoid the fragmentation of international law in the identiﬁ cation of the rules applicable to cases in 
which there is a limited jurisdiction of the ICJ, see E. Cannizzaro and B.I. Bonafè, ‘Fragmenting 
International Law through Compromissory Clauses? Some Remarks on the Decision of the ICJ 
in the Oil Platforms Case’, 16 EJIL (2005), pp. 481–497.
26 See supra Chapter 7.
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crimes proved to be a real challenge from the standpoint of international criminal 
law. With respect to collective crimes, no direct link exists between the regime of 
aggravated state responsibility and international criminal law. However, there is 
a clear trend in international practice pointing to a substantial similarity in the 
establishment of the facts entailing state and individual responsibility for collective 
crimes.27 Th is is mainly due to the growing reliance on the elements of the general 
criminal context in the establishment of individual criminal liability and the devel-
opment of speciﬁ c modes of liability to address collective forms of participation in 
the commission of international crimes. Th us, international criminal tribunals have 
increasingly focused on collective criminality. Th e methodology used to establish 
the commission of international crimes has been widely discussed above. Generally, 
it is ﬁ rst established that international crimes have been perpetrated at the collec-
tive level, and then individual criminal liability is ascribed to the oﬀ enders that 
have contributed to a much broader criminal conduct. Increasingly, international 
criminal tribunals rely on modes of collective liability. Accordingly, they no longer 
evaluate the elements of international crimes with respect to the personal conduct 
of single perpetrators, but they establish that the material element has been carried 
out by a plurality of perpetrators and that they share the required psychological 
element. As illustrated above, the possibility to apply joint criminal enterprise to 
large-scale cases can lead to a substantial equivalence between the establishment 
of aggravated state responsibility and the establishment of state leaders’ criminal 
liability. Th is is not to say that today international criminal tribunals engage in a 
previous establishment of aggravated state responsibility for the relevant crimes. 
What is certain is that they increasingly focus on the same conduct that can also 
trigger aggravated state responsibility.
At any rate, it is worth stressing that this classiﬁ cation of international crimes 
into individual, collective, and state crimes, is purely descriptive and in no way 
intends to be normative. Th e deﬁ nition of international crimes may vary over 
time, and the relationship between state and individual responsibility may change 
accordingly.
3. Towards a Dual Responsibility Paradigm?
It remains to be seen, on the basis of how customary international law develops, 
whether the general conceptual scheme proposed here to appraise the relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes can be under-
stood as an emerging dual responsibility paradigm. Th is study has tried to address 
27 See in particular Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
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the various connections between these regimes that are so often disregarded. It 
seems undeniable that most international crimes give rise to two diﬀ erent forms 
of international responsibility, neither of which can exhaust the other. Th ese two 
diﬀ erent forms of international responsibility need to be established in a consistent 
manner because they originate from the breach of the same primary norms and they 
accordingly focus on the same material conduct. Th ese are two diﬀ erent regimes 
between which a relationship is nonetheless established by the fact that they both 
belong to the same international legal order.
Th is study has led to the conclusion that there is indeed a relationship between 
these regimes, and has proposed a theoretical framework which has been applied 
above to explain the various degrees of relationship between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes. It must be added that this is at the same 
time a ﬂ exible framework that can take into account further developments of 
international law. For example, the degrees of relationship can change over time. 
Indeed, the relationship between state and individual responsibility essentially 
depends on the deﬁ nitions of international crimes, that is, primary norms. If, in 
the future, international law undergoes a radical change and broadens the scope of 
self-defence to include the use of armed force against private individuals, the crime 
of aggression would be deﬁ ned in totally diﬀ erent terms and private individuals 
could be charged with aggression. Inevitably, the degree of relationship between 
state and individual responsibility would change accordingly. To give another 
example, if the international community one day reaches an agreement on the 
deﬁ nition of terrorism, this deﬁ nition will necessarily entail a particular degree of 
relationship between state and individual responsibility,28 and this relationship will 
vary according to the elements describe above.
Th e main result of this analysis is that aggravated state responsibility and indi-
vidual criminal liability are to be seen under a unitary legal framework. State and 
individual responsibility for international crimes could have been conceived of in 
(almost) perfect isolation at a time when international criminal law was applied 
episodically under exceptional circumstances. But the rapid development of inter-
national criminal law and its increasing focus on mass atrocities and state leaders’ 
liability have signiﬁ cantly brought to the surface the problems connected to the 
overlap between state and individual responsibility for the same crimes. Currently, 
it seems impossible to see them as perfectly isolated ﬁ elds of international law.
28 P.-M. Dupuy, ‘States Sponsor of Terrorism: Issues of International Responsibility’, in A. Bianchi 
(ed.), Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), 
p. 3. For the view according to which a customary rule on the crime of international terrorism 
has already evolved in the world community, see A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 162–178.
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Finally, the conceptual scheme proposed here to describe the complementarity 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes can be useful 
to explain a general trend emerging from international practice that raises concern 
among international law scholars, namely, the increasing individualization of inter-
national responsibility for international crimes.29 Compliance with the prohibition 
of international crimes has taken two completely diﬀ erent paths as regards, on the 
one hand, the repression of individual crimes and, on the other, the reaction against 
states’ most serious wrongful acts. Prosecutions for international crimes have been 
promoted both at the international and the domestic level, while international rules 
on the international community’s means of reacting against international crimes 
committed by states are still at an embryonic level or, more precisely, at the level 
of progressive development. International law scholars have highlighted the risk 
that aggravated state responsibility could be reduced to an exceptional or secondary 
mechanism of reaction against the most serious breaches of community obliga-
tions.30 From this perspective, attention is rather to be given to the unity of state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes and their complementary 
application that can be a useful tool in fostering respect with the most important 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole.
In light of these general trends, the limited relationship due to the identity of 
primary norms prohibiting core crimes shows all its importance. It can facilitate the 
assessment of aggravated state responsibility, even though it cannot eliminate the 
risk that individual criminal liability will become, in practice, a sort of substitute 
for state responsibility. International law scholars point out that individual crimi-
nal liability cannot be regarded as the panacea to international crimes, nor can it 
constitute an eﬀ ective substitute for aggravated state responsibility.31 In a recent 
case the ICTR has stressed the fact that international law today certainly has the 
potential to apply to individuals, but that international law remains a body of law 
29 See M.D. Evans, ‘International Wrongs and National Jurisdiction’, in M.D. Evans (ed.), Remedies 
in International Law: Th e Institutional Dilemma (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), p. 175; A. Noll-
kaemper, supra note 6, p. 615; M. Wladimiroﬀ , ‘Th e Individual within International Law’, in 
R. Th akur and P. Malcontent (eds.), From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: Th e 
Search for Justice in a World of States (Tokyo, New York, Paris, United Nations University Press, 
2004), p. 111.
30 According to Rao, “the very concept of State crimes was opposed as non-existent, undesirable, 
impractical and certainly not in conformity with the well-advanced and accepted trend in favour 
of individual criminal responsibility” (P.S. Rao, ‘International Crimes and State Responsibility’, in 
M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, 
Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ , 2005), p. 67).
31 See supra Chapter 7, note 85 and accompanying text.
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primarily made for states.32 In an imperfect world, complicated by the co-existence 
of (among other actors) both states and individuals, the relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for international crimes cannot be avoided, and – as 
the ICJ has recently pointed out – the “duality of responsibility continues to be a 
constant feature of international law”.33
32 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, 12 September 2006, TJ, para. 459 (“Th e principle of individual 
responsibility for serious violations of international law is one of the key indicators of a paradigm 
shift from a view of international law as law exclusively made for and by States, to a body of 
rules with potential application to individuals”). See also the more general views expressed by 
E. McWhinney, ‘Shifting Paradigms of International Law and World Order in an Era of Historical 
Transition’, in S. Yee and W. Tieya (eds.), International Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essay in 
Memory of Li Haopei (London, New York, Routledge, 2001), p. 17.
33 ICJ, Genocide case, supra the Introduction, note 1, para. 173.
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